War report: 4 key challenges for Sudan's army (7-14 July)

Executive summary

1. Analysis: four key challenges facing the army in its attempts to resist the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia’s advances and regain lost territory.

2. Battle of Sennar: the RSF's abuses in Sennar are causing widespread displacement, with signs of attempted forced demographic changes through the use of starvation as a weapon of war.

3. Battle of Khartoum: limited skirmishes continue in the contested state of Khartoum, as the army took measures to prevent the RSF’s use of foreign mercenaries.

4. RSF drone campaign: the militia continued its campaign of drone strikes targeting areas outside of its control, with attacks on northern, eastern and southern Sudan.  

5. Al-Jazirah state: In the RSF’s ongoing campaign of abuse targeting civilians of Al-Jazirah state, the militia has started an extortion racket whereby the RSF – known for looting – asks citizens to pay fees for protection from looting.

6. North Kordofan massacre: 23 civilians were killed in a massacre on a convoy attempting to reach a market.

7. Darfur: Battles are ongoing in Al-Fashir, while civilian casualties have occurred in army strikes targeting RSF positions in RSF-held parts of Darfur.

1. Analysis: Challenges facing the army

• The RSF’s growing control of Sennar state has major implications for war due to Sennar’s strategic location bordering multiple states and South Sudan, and its significant agricultural production.

• In tandem with the RSF’s advances in West Kordofan, the militia is solidifying its position on the Sudan-South Sudan border, thus increasing its access to supply routes.

• This is compounded by the army’s inability to control the militia’s western supply outlets from Chad and the Central African Republic.

• The army's planned counteroffensive faces challenges due to equipment shortages and disruptions to its supply lines, thus hindering its efforts to resist RSF advances.

RSF control of Sennar

As noted last week, the RSF militia’s advances in Sennar state have vital ramifications in the context of the war in Sudan.  According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED, 12 July), “the fall of Sennar cannot be overstated” given that the state borders four other states, in addition to sharing a border with South Sudan and Ethiopia, and contributes significantly to Sudan’s agricultural production.

In their monthly report on the war in Sudan, ACLED re-capped the militia’s advances in Sennar, starting in Jabal Moya, a mountain range situated at the border between al-Jazirah and Sennar states. “The RSF’s control of Jabal Moya was the tipping point of the army’s collapse in Sennar state,” ACLED said.

On 29 June, the RSF — led by Abu Aqlah Keikel, the commander who led the offensive taking Al-Jazirah state within a week — advanced from Jabal Moya and attacked Sinjah city, south of Sennar city. With the army withdrawing from its bases in Sinjah by 1 July, the RSF was able to gain control over the army bases in other localities in Sennar, such as al-Mazmoum, al-Suki, Wad al-Nile, and Dinder. The loss of the latter forced the army and its allies to withdraw to Al-Gadarif state, east of Sennar.

ACLED predict that the militia may siege Sennar city from all directions should its next advances come north of Dinder city and south from al-Jazirah state into the east of Sennar city. Should the city of Sennar fall - and by extension, the state of Sennar - the White Nile and Blue Nile states will be isolated from other army-controlled areas, potentially culminating in the RSF opening multiple frontlines in White Nile and Al-Gadarif or advancing south towards the Blue Nile state.

Furthermore, military expert told Mada Masr (12 July) on condition of anonymity that the RSF’s advance in Sennar could open new avenues for supplies and the involvement of more foreign mercenaries due to the regions’ delicate security, the presence of armed gangs and weapon trafficking.

RSF access to South Sudan border

As noted last week, the militia’s advances in Sennar and West Kordofan strengthened its position across the Sudan-South Sudan border, thereby increasing access to new supply routes to South Sudan.  

In Sennar, the militia now has a secure route through al-Mazmoum city to South Sudan from which it allegedly gets fuel, ammunition, and weapons supplies. In addition, the militia’s control of al-Meiram city in West Kordofan state gives it another vital supply route with South Sudan that further solidifies its strategic position in the state, given that the city is located approximately 60km north of South Sudan (ACLED, 12 July).

Nonetheless, the army maintains control over key military bases in West Kordodan. Alongside retaining the 22nd Division camp in Babanusa, the army also has bases in crucial areas such as al-Nuhud city, where it has amassed substantial forces, including army troops, popular resistance forces, and allied tribal militias (Mada Masr, 12 July)

RSF western supply routes

The RSF’s securing of supply routes south of Sudan are compounded by the army’s inability to control the militia’s supply outlets from Chad and the Central African Republic to the west and south-west of Sudan respectively. However, according to sources within Sudan’s ruling sovereign council, the army’s commander-in-chief Abdulfattah al-Burhan met with top military commanders in Omdurman to discuss alternative military strategies to counter the RSF and cut off its western supply routes. The army is also reportedly preparing for a counteroffensive targeting the RSF’s rear lines, which secure their supply routes (Mada Masr, 12 July).

Army counteroffensive hindered by lack of equipment

However, the army’s planned counteroffensive faces significant obstacles to with regards to obtaining necessary equipment.

RSF gains in Khartoum in August 2023 have disrupted Sudan’s arms industry, following the loss of Al-Yarmouk Military Industrial Complex in al-Shagara military area. Thus, Mada Masr’s (12 July) sovereign council sources say it has been difficult for the army to obtain ammunition and maintenance equipment for its vital assets. The obstacle posed to a counteroffensive by the lack of necessary equipment is subsequently exacerbated by challenges getting pre-existing equipment to the frontlines. Mada Masr’s source said that while the army is working to secure alternative supply lines to support its ongoing operations, the RSF and their backers are obstructing the arrival of military shipments.

The obstacles confronting army counteroffensives also culminate in public questioning of the army’s ability to resist RSF advances. Particularly following the army’s withdrawal from Al-Jazirah state at the end of 2023, the army’s withdrawals in West Kordofan and Sennar strengthened the RSF militia’s positions across the Sudan-South Sudan border (ACLED, 12 July).

2. The Battle of Sennar

·      The RSF’s advances in Sennar state are leading to massive displacement, with over 100,000 citizens fleeing to army-controlled areas.

·      The militia’s campaign of abuses in Al-Dinder shows hints of attempted forced demographic change. Alongside mass killing, the militia is seizing equipment necessary for food production and giving it to its tribal base in Sennar.

·      Nonetheless, the army has targeted RSF positions in Sennar.

Displacement due to RSF abuses

With the RSF’s advances in Sennar triggered a waves of displacement in the hundreds of the thousands, the majority of civilians fled to army-controlled areas in Al-Gadarif and the Blue Nile states, with the militia looting civilians’ properties (ACLED, 12 July). Over 100,000 displaced individuals from Al-Dinder and Sinjah in Sennar state arrived in Al-Gadarif over the past week as they were forced to flee the RSF’s takeover of those areas (Sudan Tribune, 11 July). Reports have emerged of the militia’s campaign of abuses in Al-Dinder specifically.

RSF abuses in Al-Dinder

Al-Dinder Emergency Room said the militia destroyed a university college, assassinated five civilians, and injured dozens in an attack on surrounding villages.

The local volunteer group stressed that that the RSF’s ongoing campaign of violence, marked by the invasion of peaceful villages, terrorising and killing of residents, and forced displacement of those remaining, “clearly demonstrates that this is a war waged against civilians, not the army” (Sudan Tribune, 9 July).

The militia also attempted an incursion into Al-Dinder’s National Park, one of Africa’s most significant wildlife reserves which hosts rare species. While the wildlife police thwarted the attack, police forces in the park lack sufficient equipment to protect it from future attacks (Mada Masr, 12 July).

Forced demographic change

The RSF militia is simultaneously attempting to starve the civilians of Al-Dinder, while empowering its Rizeigat tribal base (Sudan Tribune, 14 July). As reportedly by Al-Dinder’s Emergency Room, the militia is seizing agricultural equipment, seeds, and fertilisers from villages in the region through intimidation, beatings, and killings,” raising concerns about the potential failure of the upcoming agricultural season

The Emergency Room added that an estimated 200 tractors seized by the militia are being stored in the villages of Al-Farish and Kamrab west of Al-Dinder which are primarily inhabited by members of the Rizeigat tribe, the same tribe from which many RSF leaders and soldiers hail. They also claim that Kamrab and Al-Farish have become operational bases for the RSF, used for launching raids and storing stolen goods from Al-Dinder and its surrounding villages.

The army’s resistance in Sennar

Mada Masr (12 July) reported on the army’s attempts to deplete the RSF’s resources as the militia attempts to expand in Sennar following its capture of state capital Singa last week. This included:

·      Ongoing battles in southeast Sennar’s Dinder region, which is located near Sudan’s border with Ethiopia. 

·      The army’s Air Force conducted intense barrel bomb strikes on RSF gatherings in west Sennar’s strategic Jabal Moya, causing substantial casualties and equipment losses.

·      Limited skirmishes at the Doba bridge, northeast of Sennar, where the army maintains control over the area which secures Sennar city’s eastern villages and the route to al-Gadarif state.

3. The Battle of Khartoum

·      Limited skirmishes continue in the contested state of Khartoum.

·      In attempt to restrict the RSF’s use of foreign mercenaries, Khartoum state authorities ordered the exit of all foreigners.

Skirmishes in Khartoum

Limited skirmishes continue across Sudan’s tri-city capital, Khartoum, with Mada Masr (12 July) reporting that:

·      In Omdurman, there were clashes in Ombada and neighborhoods west of Omdurman, where the military secured significant gains last week. The RSF also launched heavy artillery strikes at al-Thawra neighborhoods north of Omdurman. In addition, one civilian was killed and six were injured as the RSF shelled residential areas in the city

·      In Bahri, northern Khartoum, the army said its forces at the Hatab operational base destroyed an RSF fuel tanker and several military vehicles, and captured three fully-equipped vehicles.

The army controls the Karari locality and some neighbourhoods of old Omdurman, while Khartoum and Khartoum Bahri are mostly under the control of the RSF with the exception of army bases and its general command headquarters (Sudan Tribune, 11 July).

Measures to restrict mercenary activity

Amid the RSF’s use of mercenaries from Ethiopia, South Sudan, Chad, Mali, and Niger for sniping and artillery shelling, authorities in Khartoum state issued a two-week deadline for foreign nationals to leave Khartoum. The RSF’s use of mercenaries triggered increased suspicion of foreigners. Colonel Nazar Khalil, director of the foreigners and immigration control department in Khartoum state said the decision aims to safeguard the lives of foreign nationals in Khartoum (Sudan Tribune, 11 July)

4. RSF drone campaign

·      The RSF continues its campaign of drone strikes targeting areas outside of its control, with attacks on Shendi in the River Nile state northern Sudan, Al-Gadarif state in eastern Sudan and the White Nile state in southern Sudan.

·      Back in April 2024 – during the month of Ramadan - the militia launched drone attacks on Al-Gadarif, alongside killing more than ten in Atbarah in the River Nile state. Similar drone attacks occurred in Merowe in the Northern state and Sennar city (Sudan Tribune, 12 July).

Shendi

The army’s ground defenses in the Third Infantry Division intercepted drone attacks targeting Shendi in the early hours of 10 July. Eyewitnesses said there were no casualties (Mada Masr, 12 July).

Al-Gadarif

Two civilians were injured in an RSF drone attack targeting Al-Gadarif state government headquarters during a public gathering held in support of the army. The drones missed their target and crashed near a women’s and maternity hospital and Al-Sadaqa neighbourhood. The drones were flown from within Al-Gadarif and a suspect was arrested. Al-Gadarif remains vulnerable to RSF incursions given its proximity to Al-Jazirah and Sennar states, where the militia has a presence. A drone previously struck the General Intelligence Service headquarters and other government buildings on 9 April (Sudan Tribune, 11 July)

White Nile

The RSF launched its second drone attack on the White Nile state, utilising four unmanned aerial vehicles to target military sites. The army’s air forces shot down an RSF drone targeting the headquarters of the army’s 18th Division in Kosti. Then, the army’s ground defences intercepted and shot down drones targeting the city of Rabak and the Kenana air base. Sources indicated that the latest drones used appeared different from those previously used, both in the sound of their flight and their increased speed (Sudan Tribune, 12 July).

5. Al-Jazirah state

·      Since the RSF militia seized control of Al-Jazirah state in December 2023, the militia instantly began to commit horrific abuses against its residents, including fighting, kidnapping, sexual violence, forced displacement, looting, humiliation, and intimidation (Sudan Tribune, 11 July).

·      This week, there are reports of attacks in Abu Quota city, a major centre for thousands of farmers who grow wheat, cotton, peanuts, and vegetables on lands belonging to the Jazirah scheme.

·      The militia has started an extortion campaign targeting Abu Quota residents.

Village attacks

The RSF has been continuously attacking villages and the city of Abu Qouta, a major centre for thousands of farmers who grow wheat, cotton, peanuts, and vegetables on lands belonging to the Al Jazirah schema. On 9 July, the militia attacked the village of Al-Ghadir, affiliated with Abu Qouta. Residents who resisted the militia’s looting were shot at, resulting in several injuries.

Extortion

The RSF is imposing daily fees ranging from $30-$40 USD on residents of Abu Qouta, claiming that it is for protection against looting, say the city’s local Resistance Committees. The committees indicated that the RSF threatened to “withdraw protection” from the city if the amount could not be paid. Abu Qouta Resistance committees stressed that all aspects of life in the area have ceased, with the market closed, cash unavailable, and a severe shortage of food and medicine.

6. North Kordofan massacre

At least 23 civilians were killed in an RSF massacre in North Kordofan state after the militia opened fire on a convoy from the village of Fanquqa travelling to Umm Sumaima market (Sudan Tribune, 14 July).

The RSF has held control over most of North Kordofan since the early stages of the war and faces accusations of numerous violations and crimes against civilians, including killings, looting, detention, and forced displacement.

The militia maintained a tight siege on Al-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, for months. This has severely restricted the movement of commercial convoys, leading to shortages of essential goods such as food, medicine, and fuel. North Kordofan is also experiencing a complete blackout of communications and internet services.

7. Darfur

·      In the region of Darfur in western Sudan, battles are ongoing in the city of Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur, which remains the only state in the region not to fall to the RSF militia.

·      Meanwhile, there have been civilian casualties in army strikes targeting RSF supplies in parts of Darfur held by the militia.  

Al-Fashir

The army and the RSF exchanged artillery and air strikes in al-Fashir as residents continued to flee the city amid the militia’s ongoing siege. Escalating military operations have triggered a mass exodus from the city, with humanitarian activists reporting that an estimated 3,000 residents fled on 12 July (Sudan Tribune, 12 July).

Army airstrikes

Sudanese military warplanes launched a series of airstrikes targeting multiple locations in Nyala, South Darfur, and Al-Geneina, West Darfur – both of which fell to the RSF in late 2023. The attacks resulted in civilian casualties. The Sudanese military claims the airstrikes are aimed at destroying military supplies allegedly being delivered to the RSF by Emirati aircraft, including: ammunition, rocket launchers, drones, and communications equipment (Sudan Tribune, 14 July).

Sudan humanitarian briefing (1-7 July)

Executive summary

·      A famine has not yet been declared in Sudan, despite projections that an improvement of food security conditions may still ensure that 109,000 will be under famine-like conditions.

·      This week’s briefing looks at how different territory-holding armed entities hinder humanitarian delivery in Sudan, namely the warring parties (the army and the Rapid Support Forces militia) and the “neutral” Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdelwahid Nur.

·      With rape escalating in areas under RSF control, this briefing looks at some of the challenges facing victims and survivors, alongside solutions proposed by the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa.

1. Famine

As reported last week, The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) warn that there is a realistic chance of famine in at least 14 areas across in Sudan, leaving over half of Sudan’s 48 million people facing chronic hunger, with over 750,000 at risk of death by starvation between June and September 2024 (Sudan In The News, 3 July).

Nonetheless, the IPC project that there could be some improvement in food security conditions during the harvest season from October 2024 to February 2025. The total of those facing crisis-level or worse food insecurity could fall to about 21 million people, but this will still leave 109,000 people under famine-like conditions (Conversation, 7 July).

As noted by the Conversation, a key driver for the rapidly deteriorating food security situation in Sudan is the war, which has:

·      Restricted movements of goods and services

·      Disrupted markets,

·      Hindered agricultural production and humanitarian access.

Famine still not declared

Yet while humanitarians are clamouring for the IPC to declare a ‘famine’, but it is hampered by a lack of robust data, argues famine scholar Alex de Waal (London Review of Books, 3 July). “Too much of the country is no longer safe for Sudanese or foreign NGOs, and cautious nutritionist-statisticians don’t like speculating about what’s happening where aid workers aren’t reporting on child malnutrition rates,” De Waal wrote. However, the Clingendael Institute predict 2.5 million dead by the end of the year.

 In addition, different armed entities in Sudan in hinder attempts to mitigate the famine.

How Sudan’s armed entities hinder humanitarian relief

·      The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, known for looting and imposing bureaucratic hurdles, is impeding aid access in areas under its control.

·      The Sudanese army, allegedly aiming to starve the RSF into submission, is restricting aid to RSF-controlled areas.

·      While the Sudan Liberation Movement group under the leadership of Abdelwahid Nur (SLM-Nur) has offered to facilitate aid delivery, it also imposes its own bureaucratic requirements, further complicating the humanitarian situation.

·      Solutions to avert a famine were proposed by staff at the International Food Policy Research Institute 

RSF

The RSF serve as an obstacle to the delivery of humanitarian aid due to both the militia’s systematic looting and the bureaucratic burdens it is imposing in areas under its control.

The World Food Programme (WFP) revealed that unknown armed men looted three aid trucks on their way to Central Darfur. While the WFP did not disclose who the militants were affiliated to nor the exact location of the incident, Sudan Tribune (1 July) noted that the region is divided, with six localities under RSF control and the remaining three under SLM-Nur control.

It is worth noting, however, the RSF have history for looting aid, with USAID administrator Samantha Power saying the militia has been “systematically looting humanitarian warehouses”. In addition, De Waal describes the RSF as “a looting machine, its forces plundering every town and village they occupy, while wantonly destroying public infrastructure, including universities and hospitals” (London Review of Books, 3 July).

Furthermore, the RSF-established Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO) has also implemented its own set of bureaucratic requirements, particularly in Darfur, further complicating aid delivery in a region already grappling with a dire humanitarian crisis (Sudan Tribune, 1 July).

The army

With the UN requiring the consent of Sudanese army leader Abdelfattah al-Burhan to deliver humanitarian aid, De Waal outlined the army’s motivations for restricting aid access (London Review of Books, 3 July).

Estimating that 90 per cent of the hungriest people in Sudan are in the swathes of land controlled by the RSF, De Waal suggests that starvation is a cheap and effective weapon “for an army struggling to make progress on the battlefield”.

Arguing that the army intends to use starvation as a weapon of war “to the full,” De Waal adds that the army calculates – “perhaps correctly” -that if it can cut off food to those areas, the RSF will splinter or face rebellions from local militia.

SLM-Nur

Presenting itself as a neutral force aligned to neither the army of the RSF, the SLM-Nur armed group, which commands territory in Central Darfur, suggested that it could facilitate the entry of international humanitarian organisations provided that it is handed over Al-Fashir. North Darfur’s capital would subsequently become a centre for managing humanitarian affairs and relief for all areas of Darfur, Kordofan, White Nile, and Al-Jazira (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).

However, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) said its efforts to deliver aid are impeded by the SLM-Nur areas under its control (Jabal Marra, Central Darfur); including mandatory registrations, travel permits, and fees, are significantly disrupting the flow of vital assistance to vulnerable populations (Sudan Tribune, 1 July). 

Famine solutions

Solutions to avert a famine were proposed by Khalid Siddig and Rob Vos of the International Food Policy Research Institute, aimed that the IPC working group on Sudan. They included: (Conversation, 7 July)

·      Restore humanitarian access so that humanitarian agencies can get safe and sustained access to areas with populations most in need.

·      Substantially increase the amount of food assistance and other essential supplies to prevent loss of life and support livelihoods.

·      Scale up nutrition interventions, particularly for vulnerable groups such as children and pregnant women.

·      Support livelihoods, including distribution of agricultural inputs and creating safe zones for farming.

2. Rape as a weapon of war

·      Rape and other forms of sexual violence are escalating in areas of Sudan controlled by the RSF militia.

·      The RSF is using rape as a weapon of war, with testimonies from survivors from the Massalit ethnic group.

·      Survivors face stigma, limited support, and fear of reprisals, hindering efforts to provide medical and psychological care.

·      Women’s rights organisation the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) call for a gender-responsive civilian protection framework in Sudan, including access to reproductive health services, safe zones, and accountability for perpetrators.

Increased sexual violence in RSF areas

Abdirahman Ali, the country director for Sudan at CARE International, confirmed the fast increasing rate of gender-based violence reported across Sudan, particularly in the areas where the RSF are present (DW, 2 July). Indeed, there have been reports of increased Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), including gang rape among other violations, following the RSF’s advances into Sennar state (Sudan Tribune, 5 July).

Rape as a weapon of war

In a feature piece, DW (2 July) spoke to various survivors of the RSF’s rape. The testimonies show how the militia is using rape as a weapon of their genocidal war in Darfur. Halima (name changed) said she believes the RSF raped her because she belongs to the Massalit ethnic group – formerly the majority of West Darfur’s city of al-Gineina – until the RSF genocide last year. Another young woman recalls how her RSF attacker asked her what tribe she was from, before telling her she would be killed if she was Massalit as “the Massalit would never own land in Sudan in the future”.

These survivors' stories are backed up by Human Rights Watch, which has documented numerous atrocities of a similar nature, warning of a potential genocide unfolding against the Massalit people in West Darfur. Nonetheless, rape survivors are struggling to get support (DW, 2 July)

Lack of support for rape victims and survivors

Alongside facing severe and life-threatening consequences, including loss of family support, homes and shelters and increased risk of suicide, survivors are afraid to seek medical treatment because of the stigma and fear of reprisals from rape. Even so, support is not readily available in many cases, with rape victims and survivors struggling to obtain contraception, abortion medication and post-exposure anti-viral medications. (Sudan Tribune, 3 July).

Psychological support for people affected by gender-based violence is also hard to come by, Ali said: "There are multiple displacements. Communities and internationally displaced persons are moving from one location to the other, complicating [efforts] to provide continuous support to this population” (DW, 2 July).  

Ali added that, especially in refugee camps, violence against women and girls continues, with situation exacerbated by difficulties in the delivery of emergency food assistance, clean water, health care and nutrition. The biggest challenge, he said, is moving health and nutrition supplies across the border from Chad into Sudan for people who are internally displaced.

To worsen matters, the RSF attack facilities providing lifesaving sexual and reproductive healthcare. With rape victims and survivors already struggling to obtain contraception, abortion medication and post-exposure anti-viral medications, an RSF attack destroyed a clinic belonging to the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), which further restricted access to lifesaving sexual and reproductive healthcare in Darfur for women and girls. The RSF has also been kidnapping the clinic’s patients, and their whereabouts are unknown. (Sudan Tribune, 3 July).

Solution for gender-responsive protection

The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) call for the establishment of a gender-responsive civilian protection framework in Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 5 July).

“Dignity kits with feminine hygiene supplies are essential not only for maintaining dignity but also for preventing health issues,” SIHA said.

“Access to sexual and reproductive health care, including emergency services, is also a primary necessity.” SIHA added, alongside calls for prioritising civilian protection in Sudan through gender-responsive aid, establishing safe zones, holding perpetrators accountable and supporting for investigations into human rights violations and disruptions of illicit financial flows that fuel conflict.

Sudan war report (1-7 July)

Executive summary

·      1. Sennar: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advances in the strategically vital state of Sennar has vital ramifications, given the importance of the state to Sudan’s agriculture and food security. In addition, the militia’s positions closer to the South Sudan border potentially opens up new supply routes and raises concerns of its expansion towards the eastern state of al-Gadarif.

·      2. West Kordofan: The militia further strengthened its position across the Sudan-South Sudan border by controlling Al-Meiram, a city near its border.

·      3. Khartoum: The partial destruction of al-Halfaya bridge may potentially benefit the RSF, although the army’s recapture of al-Doha neighhbourhood paves the way for further army advances in Omdurman.

·      4. Al-Fashir: The RSF’s ongoing siege of Al-Fashir continues to be marked by the targeting hospitals and civilian infrastructure, with drones and artillery used against civilians, including a mosque-cum-kitchen and a market.

·      5. Politics: Egyptian attempts to reconcile rival political factions ended with renewed accusations that the Taqadum coalition is the political wing of the RSF after its statement failed to explicitly condemn the militia.  

1. Sennar

·      The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advances in Sennar state, a strategically vital area in Sudan, has significant repercussions.

·      Firstly, Sennar crucial for agriculture, food security and electricity production.

·      Secondly, the capture of Sinjah and Al-Dinder positions the RSF closer to the border with South Sudan, potentially opening up new supply routes for the militia alongside raising concerns of its expansion towards Al-Gadarif state in eastern Sudan. 

·      Moreover, the RSF’s entry into Sennar has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, displacing hundreds of thousands as well as increasing the risk of famine.

The importance of Sennar state

The RSF militia began a campaign on 24 June to seize the city of Sennar, but quickly turned to the smaller towns of Sinjah and Al-Dinder (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).

The RSF’s entry into Sennar state could mark a turning point in Sudan’s war given the strategic importance of Sennar in terms of natural resources, food security, borders and humanitarian operations (Mada Masr, 5 July).

·      The RSF’s attack on Sennar jeopardises the summer agricultural season, which heightens the risk of famine in central and western Sudan, especially as the rainy season has cut off roads.

·      After neighbouring Al-Jazira state, Sennar is the second most important agricultural state in Sudan as it is a key producer of millet, cotton and gum arabic. The production of around 10,000 tons of raw gum arabic in Sennar last year offset the loss of South Darfur - one of the country’s largest producers of gum arabic — to the RSF in November 2023.

·      The state also hosts the Sennar Dam for hydroelectric power generation which irrigates the Jazeera Scheme — the largest irrigation project globally and one of Africa’s largest agricultural projects. Cotton has also been an economic cornerstone in the scheme and similar projects in Sennar.

·      In addition to food security, grain mills and electricity production, Sennar is strategically crucial for linking the eastern and western states after the capture of Al-Jazeera’s capital Wad Madani fell to the RSF last year.

·      Sennar connects the Gadarif, White Nile, and North Kordofan states and borders South Sudan.

·      Sennar has also become a refuge for around 80,000 displaced people fleeing Al-Jazeera State.

Sinjah

Following their entry into Sennar’s state capital last week, the RSF solidified their control over Sinjah. Sudan Tribune’s (1 July) sources said the RSF’s control now extends over the entire city of Sinjah, including the headquarters of the Sudanese army’s 65th Brigade, which was abandoned by the armed forces who retreated to the city of Sennar city. Eyewitnesses reported that the RSF also secured the entrance to the Blue Nile Bridge - a crucial link between Sinjah and areas east of Sennar – in a move that suggested a potential eastward expansion towards Al-Dinder, a locality bordering the eastern Al-Gadarif state.

Importance of Sinjah

In the grand scheme of the war, the RSF’s advances in Sinjah are significant in how they may force the army to change tactics given the strategic benefits gained for the RSF.

A former Sudanese military source told Mada Masr (5 July) that the army’s plans may need revision if the RSF continues to shift battles from Al-Jazira to Sennar. Moreover, according to a source in the General Intelligence Service, shifting military operations to Sennar means that the RSF is nearing the border with South Sudan, which could facilitate the delivery of military supplies to the RSF through smuggling routes, thereby boosting the militia’s capabilities in Al-Jazirah and Sennar.

Additionally, there is a heightened risk of military operations extending to the strategically important Al-Gadarif State. To counter this, the military must regain the initiative and strike deep into the RSF’s positions in Al-Jazirah and Khartoum, the source added.

Dinder

The risk of the RSF striking Al-Gadarif state increased after the militia took control of Al-Dinder – a town located about 25 kilometres east of Sinjah and a strategic location linking Sennar and the Blue Nile with the region of eastern Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 5 July).

The army had initially recaptured Al-Dinder after the RSF seized the town and engaged in widespread violations and looting, with video clips showing the destruction inflicted by the RSF on civilian property (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).

However, the RSF announced that it regained control of Al-Dinder for the second time in less than a week. The militia showed footage of its forces on Al-Dinder Bridge leading to Sennar and Al-Gadarif, where the army and allies are stationed (Sudan Tribune, 5 July).

Displacement

The RSF’s entry to Sennar state has led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands, further hindering an already challenging humanitarian situation.  It was initially reported that over 55,400 fled Sinjah (Sudan Tribune, 1 July) upon the RSF’s entry, with reports of escalating costs for those attempting to flee. The UN subsequently reported that more than 136,000 people fled Sennar state after the RSF launched their attack (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).

However, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are facing several challenges.

·      State governments had begun to reopen schools and relocate the IDPs from existing shelters (Sudan Tribune, 1 July).

·      Sennar residents who fled to neighbouring Al-Gadarif state ended up stranded in the main market without tents and blankets amid downpours of heavy rain after schools that had served as displacement centres were emptied by the government (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).

·      Disruption to communication networks is impeding the collection of accurate information (Sudan Tribune, 1 July).

·      Amid a mass exodus of civilians, mainly towards neighbouring Al-Gadarif and the Blue Nile states, food aid or shelter is also difficult to find (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).

·      Villages in Al-Gadarif, one of several possible targets for the RSF campaign, had already witnessed people fleeing (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).

·      The rough terrain, worsened by the onset of the rainy season causing streams and valleys to overflow, has made it a significant challenge to leave Sennar (Mada Masr, 5 July).

·      Around 25, most of them women and children, died in a sinking boat as they sought to cross the Blue Nile river in attempts to flee the RSF’s advance in Sennar (AFP, 4 July).  

2. West Kordofan

·      The RSF has strengthened its position across the Sudan-South Sudan border by taking control of a city close to it.

Under two weeks after the RSF took control of state capital al-Fula, the militia captured Al-Meiram – a city around 60km from South Sudan border, near the disputed Abyei area, reportedly without a fight.

According to Radio Dabanga’s local sources (5 July), the army was allowed a safe exit towards South Sudan following an agreement mediated by community leaders. Army supporters argue that a significant shortage of supplies and ammunition made defending the city challenging, with aviation support arriving too late.

Nonetheless, the fall of Al-Meiram both isolates the 22nd Division in Babanousa falling the fall of four brigades and three garrisons in West Kordofan. In addition, the RSF now controls a large part of the Sudan-South Sudan border, stretching from the disputed Abyei region to the borders of East, South, Central, and West Darfur, which they entirely control.

3. Khartoum

·      In the Battle for Khartoum, the partial destruction of Halfaya Bridge over the Nile River is argued to benefit the RSF by hindering army surprise attacks.

·      However, the army’s recapture of al-Doha neighbourhood in Omdurman weakens the RSF's buffer zone and potentially paves the way for further army gains in the city.

Halfaya Bridge

The Sudanese army accused the RSF of partially destroying the Halfaya Bridge over the Nile River (Sudan Tribune, 1 July), with the RSF returning the accusations (Mada Masr, 5 July).

The bridge, situated north of the Sudanese capital, connects Khartoum Bahri to the east with Omdurman to the west. It was controlled by the RSF from the east and the army from the west (Sudan Tribune, 1 July).

The bridge remains the last one connecting Bahri to Omdurman following the destruction of Shambat Bridge in November 2023 (Mada Masr, 5 July). Bridges in Khartoum state are strategically important for both sides in the conflict, as they are used to deliver logistical supplies and support during battle (Sudan Tribune, 1 July).

A military source told Mada Masr (5 July) that the RSF benefitted from the bridge’s destruction as it partially neutralises the military’s ability to launch surprise attacks from positions in Wadi Sidna and Omdurman’s outskirts, especially since significant military forces withdrew to participate in Sinjah.

Omdurman

In Omdurman, the army continued to gain ground on the militia after regaining control of al-Doha neighbourhood, west of the city. Al-Doha represented a buffer zone for the RSF, protecting west Omdurman areas under the militia’s control such as Dar al-Salam, Ombada, and the Libya and Kandahar markets (Sudan Tribune, 2 July).

Mada Masr’s (5 July) military sources say the capture of al-Doha pave the way for the army to reclaim Ombada, with the neighbourhood holding significant importance in Omdurman’s urban warfare, primarily due to its proximity to the strategic al-Arda street, which stretches from the east to the west of the city, and the Engineers Corps camp. Moreover, al-Doha served as a headquarters and residence for many influential RSF leaders in Omdurman.  

After the army regained the radio and TV headquarters in old Omdurman in March, it made further progress by regaining parts Ombada. Nonetheless, Salha suburb south of Omdurman remains under RSF control (Sudan Tribune, 2 July).

4. Al-Fashir

·      In the RSF’s ongoing siege of Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur state, the militia continued its pattern of attacks on hospitals and medical facilities, in attempts to cripple the city’s health sector.

·      The militia’s campaign targeting civilians and vital infrastructure also saw drone strikes and artillery shelling on a mosque hosting a volunteer kitchen and a crowded market.

RSF mosque attack (Sudan Tribune, 1 July)

Eight people including women and children were killed and 18 others were injured after an RSF drone attacked a mosque housing a volunteer kitchen providing aid to IDPs, in the latest of the RSF’s daily artillery shelling and drone strikes on al-Fashir.  

Another RSF hospital attack (Sudan Tribune, 2 July)

In the militia’s continued targeting of al-Fashir’s health facilities, the militia shelled two hospitals in the ninth such attack since the siege began on 10 May.

Darfur governor Minni Minawi said the RSF destroyed a private hospital in Al-Fashir’s Grand Market, meaning they targeted all hospitals in the area with high-precision cannons reportedly brought from the UAE. Minnawi added that the RSF bombed Jabal Marra hospital less than forty minutes later.

The RSF’s targeting of medical facilities in Al-Fashir is considered an attempt to cripple the health sector, with dialysis centre, South Hospital, the Saudi Hospital, and several private medical centres already destroyed.

Women’s clinic destroyed (Sudan Tribune, 3 July)

An RSF attack then destroyed a clinic belonging to the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), a global healthcare provider and a leading advocate of sexual and reproductive health and rights. Several IPPF staff and volunteers were killed or injured.

The destruction of the clinic further restricts access to lifesaving sexual and reproductive healthcare in Darfur for women and girls, with reports showing how rape victims and survivors are struggling to obtain contraception, abortion medication and post-exposure anti-viral medications. The RSF has also been kidnapping the clinic’s patients, and their whereabouts are unknown.

Crowded market attacked (Sudan Tribune, 3 July)

Fifteen were killed and 29 others injured in a heavy artillery attack by the RSF on a crowded market in Al-Fashir, the latest in a wave of the militia’s relentless attacks that have wreaked havoc on Al-Fashir’s infrastructure, destroying homes, medical facilities, and essential civilian services.

5. Politics

·      Egypt hosted a conference aiming to reconcile the Democratic Bloc and the Taqadum coalition.

·      The pro-army Democratic Bloc renewed accusations that Taqadum sides with the RSF.

·      A joint statement concluding the conference was agreed upon, but three Democratic Bloc leaders refused to sign it as it failed to explicitly condemn the RSF.

Cairo talks

Rival Sudanese political factions – the Democratic Bloc and the Taqqadum faction - formally attended reconciliation talks in Cairo, Egypt (Reuters, 6 June). The Egyptian government organised the conference aiming at uniting Sudanese political forces and garnering support for resolving the conflict, but disagreements between them overshadowed the proceedings (Sudan Tribune, 6 June).

During the conference, the Democratic Bloc refused to hold joint sessions with Taqaddum, which it accuses of siding with the RSF (Reuters, 6 June). Taqaddum is led by UAE-based former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok who has been accused of cosying up to the RSF “which in turn is accused of atrocities including crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing”. The Democratic Bloc demands Taqqadum “condemn the RSF's atrocities and dissolve their partnership with the militia” (AFP, 6 June).

Taqadum statement fails to condemn the RSF

While the two groups agreed to write a shared statement calling for an end to the war, it was not signed by three Democratic Bloc leaders with forces fighting alongside the army (Reuters, 6 June). Darfur governor Minni Minnawi, finance minister Jibril Ibrahim and deputy sovereign council chairman Malik Agar refused to sign the statement due to its lack of explicit condemnation of the RSF (Sudan Tribune, 6 June).

The statement was confined to condemning “all violations committed in the war” without explicitly mentioning the RSF which are accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes, killings of civilians, rape, and looting. Minnawi said that the statement fails to address the suffering of RSF victims. Ga’afar Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, a leader of the Democratic Unionist Party and chairman of Democratic Bloc signed the statement, but said the text failed to explicitly address his condemnation of RSF attacks on Sinjah, cities sheltering IDPs, and the atrocities committed in Darfur (Sudan Tribune, 6 June).

Taqadum spokesperson Bakri al-Jak denied accusations that the coalition is the RSF’s political wing by saying that it condemns atrocities committed by both sides (AFP, 6 June).  

Humanitarian report (21-28 June)

How the UN can help resolve Sudan’s humanitarian crisis

·      1. Famine: Despite credible assertions that famine has already arrived in Sudan, a famine has not yet been officially declared. This has been attributed to issues including the UN’s deferral to a Sudanese military government argued to have a vested interest in objecting to a formal famine declaration. Nonetheless, solutions have been proposed to ensure that much-needed aid reaches starving Sudanese.

·      2. The humanitarian response: The International Rescue Committee identified five key challenges facing Sudan’s humanitarian response, and proposed solutions to mitigate them.

·      3. Refugees: Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia and Chad face escalating health emergencies due to aid shortages and restrictions on their movement to the UAE, Uganda and Egypt.

1. Famine

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) warn that there is a realistic chance of famine in at least 14 areas across in Sudan, including: parts of the capital Khartoum, neighbouring Al-Jazira state, and the Kordofan and Darfur regions (Reuters, 27 June). With over half of Sudan’s 48 million people facing chronic hunger, this leaves over 750,000 at risk of death by starvation (New York Times, 27 June).

Why has a famine not been declared?

A famine can be declared by the IPC – a collaboration that includes UN agencies, governments and aid groups which produces internationally recognised assessments of food crises – if at least 20% of the population in an area are suffering extreme food shortages (Reuters, 27 June).

Indeed, famine scholar Alex de Waal said Sudan’s starvation crisis is unprecedented for at least 40 years (New York Times, 27 June). Similarly, Confluence advisory think-tank founder Kholood Khair, researcher and editor Raga Makawi and writer Joshua Craze suggest that Sudan faces “the largest famine the world has seen for at least forty years” (New York Review of Books, 23 June). Yet, the IPC is yet to officially declare a famine (New York Times, 27 June). This can be attributed to factors including difficulties collecting data and the Sudanese government’s aim to prevent a formal famine declaration.  

Data collection

The New York Times’ (27 June) Declan Walsh attributes the IPC’s inability to formally declare a famine in Sudan to “in part – because reliable data is hard to obtain” amid Sudan’s health system collapsing and aid workers being unable to reach the worst-affected areas because of intense fighting and restrictions imposed by the warring parties.

The UN’s deference to the Sudanese army

With the UN “waiting for the IPC” before formally declaring a famine, Khair, Makawi and Craze note that the IPC is undertaking an assessment in collaboration with a Sudanese army “which has obvious incentives to delay such an announcement”.

 (New York Review of Books, 23 June).

Why the army does not want a famine declaration

Providing context on the Sudanese military government’s reluctance to allow the UN to formally declare a famine, Alex de Waal wrote that “[the army] has a vested interest in avoiding a formal declaration of famine in Darfur because that would increase pressure to permit the flow of aid to [areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces militia]”. The motivation for this, de Waal argues, is that “the Sudanese army believes that forcing starvation in RSF areas can destroy the group’s base”. De Waal added that the army used the strategy of restricting aid flow into enemy territory in previous wars, under the assumption that “aid kept the rebellion alive [and] aid workers became sympathisers with the rebel cause” (Foreign Affairs, 17 June).

Famine solutions for the UN

Given the army’s interest in a formal famine declaration that may allow aid to flow into RSF-held territory, Khair, Makkawi and Craze note that the UN’s deference to the army for authorisation hampers efforts to mitigate “the largest famine the world has seen for at least forty years”. The authors attributed this to the UN’s fear of expulsion by Sudanese authorities. Nonetheless, they proposed solutions to overcome such challenges (New York Review of Books, 23 June).   

·      Despite the army’s objections, Khair, Makawi and Craze calls for the UN World Food Programme (WFP) to unilaterally declare a famine, thereby unlock more funding and pressure for humanitarian access to RSF-held areas.

·      While the UN fears expulsion, the authors note its leverage as “the [WFP] is too big to expel” given the army’s reliance on it to feed its territory and maintain support.  

·      Furthermore, the authors propose that the army’s restrictions on cross-border aid delivery into RSF-held territory can be overcome by the UN relocating operations to a regional capital outside the army’s control, establishing cross-border hubs in Chad and South Sudan, and directly engaging with local forces, including the RSF.

2. The humanitarian response

The International Rescue Committee (25 June) identified the five challenges facing the response to Sudan’s humanitarian crisis, and proposed solutions to mitigate them.

Five challenges

The IRC identified the following five challenges facing the response to Sudan’s humanitarian crisis:

·      The targeting of humanitarian workers and looting of supplies

·      Restrictions on aid delivery

·      Restrictions on humanitarian actors

·      Targeting and destruction of infrastructure

·      Weak response leadership (with the UN in particular being blamed)

1. TARGETING OF HUMANITARIAN WORKERS AND LOOTING OF SUPPLIES

Insecurity in Sudan makes it a difficult and dangerous place for aid delivery as:

·      Increased violence along ethnic lines makes the situation even more challenging, as agencies must carefully consider the background of staff before deploying them to different regions of the country.

·      UN OCHA said that over 150 vehicles have been stolen from aid organizations, while 61 offices and 57 warehouses have been looted.

·      The World Food Programme (WFP) has estimated that over $13 million of food aid has been looted since the war began.

2. RESTRICTIONS ON AID DELIVERY

Sudan has the highest level for severity of access restraints according to the Assessment Capacities Project, with contributing factors including: 

·      Since the start of the conflict, hundreds of international NGO staff have faced lengthy delays in obtaining visas.

·      Approximately 30,000 metric tons of aid were sitting in Port Sudan, Al-Obeid and Kosti as of mid-May 2024, awaiting permissions for onward movement.

·      Security services in White Nile and Khartoum regularly seek to “accompany” humanitarian workers delivering aid and reportedly prevent access to certain locations.

·      Fighters at checkpoints sometimes demand payments from humanitarian personnel to be allowed to pass.

3.  HUMANITARIAN ACTORS BLOCKED FROM CROSSING FRONTLINES AND BORDERS TO REACH PEOPLE IN NEED

With Sudan divided into regions of army and RSF control, aid must move across frontlines and borders to reach those who need it, but “both sides are consistently undermining these efforts”. Following accusations that the RSF was transporting weapons from Chad, the army revoked its previous non-objection to cross-border aid delivery.

The only way for humanitarian aid to reach millions living in RSF-held parts of Sudan is by bringing it across frontlines within the country. Yet, to date, no sustained agreements on crossline aid access have been reached.

OCHA reported that denial of permission to move within Sudan or to cross an international border, combined with ongoing conflict, blocked the transport of humanitarian aid to over 600,000 in Darfur, 300,000 in Kordofan and 100,000 in Khartoum. Since August 2023, there have been almost no crossline deliveries in Khartoum state due to this.

4. TARGETING AND DESTRUCTION OF ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

·      Sudan’s health care system has virtually collapsed, with at least 307 incidents of violence against health care workers or facilities recorded since the war began.

·      Both sides reportedly use facilities for military purposes.

·      Banking operations are almost completely suspended as many bank headquarters, most of which were based in Khartoum, have been closed due to insecurity, power outages and looting.

·      Both sides were blamed for regular and widespread telecommunications outages

5. WEAK RESPONSE LEADERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT OF LOCAL RESPONDERS

Although humanitarian organisations depend on coordination and information provided by UN agencies, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) say that “a lack of UN leadership and the limited presence of UN agencies and staff across the country, including senior decision-makers and essential monitoring teams, are undermining efforts to ensure assistance reaches those most in need”. 

The IRC add that decisions made by the UN-led Humanitarian Country team lack explanations, instructions or monitoring, with field-level coordination structures “ineffective” and “meetings sporadic”.

The IRC further claim that UN-led coordination efforts take place in English which “excludes many local organizations and responders without whom an appropriate, at-scale response cannot happen”.

Yet, three out of every five dollars provided by donors for the Sudan response has been directed to UN agencies, despite their comparatively limited presence, while locally led organisations and responders have been “woefully underfunded”. 

Solutions for “resetting” Sudan’s humanitarian response

Nonetheless, the International Rescue Committee (25 June) proposed solutions for resetting Sudan’s humanitarian response, including:

·      Food insecurity: donors and the UN urgently scaling up funding for and delivery of cash operations, and support Sudanese farmers to plant crops and improve food production by expanding access to agricultural inputs.

·      Increased funding for local responders, alongside reforming structures to increase opportunities for local responders to directly access grants, prioritising reforming the Sudan Humanitarian Fund which failed to fund any local responders in 2023.

·      Senior access coordinator appointed by the UN Secretary General. 

·      Strengthen and decentralise UN response leadership in Sudan with UN operational hubs across the country led by senior staff, and an Emergency Telecommunications Cluster increasing capacity to all humanitarian actors can access services.

·      Increase the UN Security Council’s scrutiny of the crisis by holding regular, open briefing sessions led by the secretary general and the emergency relief coordinator, and creating safe opportunities for NGOs and local responders to share their experiences of humanitarian access barriers.

3.Refugees

Urgent appeals for humanitarian aid have been issued for Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia and Chad, where health emergencies are escalating due to lack of proper care and sanitation. In addition, restrictions are being imposed on Sudanese seeking refuge in the UAE, Uganda and Egypt.

Urgent humanitarian appeals

Humanitarian appeals have been made for Sudanese refugees in neighbouring Ethiopia to the east and Chad to the west, whereby there are severe health crises amid the lack of care and sanitation.

Ethiopia

As reported in previous week’s reports, Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia are also being targeted by Ethiopian militias (Reuters, 7 June), who killed and injured women searching for water (Sudan Tribune, 18 June).  

Last week, however, the No to Women’s Oppression initiative launched an urgent humanitarian appeal to the international community to resolve the crisis of Sudanese refugees stranded in the Kumer and Olala camps in the forests of Ethiopia, estimated at 6,248 people, including 2,133 children, 76 people with disabilities, and 1,196 sick people

The initiative called on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Ethiopian authorities to evacuate all refugees to safe camps and provide them with essential resources, in a statement that documented how refugees were dying due to lack of medical care.

According to the statement, “forty-three births were performed using a razor and nylon bags, with wounds stitched using regular thread after boiling it,” with four cases of paralysis occurring among refugees due to incorrect drug injections, and the lack of oxygen to assist with breathing causing instant deaths (Radio Dabanga, 24 June).

Chad

The UN’s refugee agency is calling for urgent international support as the humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad reaches a critical point. Since April 2023, the conflict in Sudan has reportedly forced over 600,000 refugees and 180,000 Chadian returnees to flee into Chad, with more than 115,000 arriving since the start of 2024.

A third of new arrivals remain in dire conditions along the border, with Adre town, originally home to 40,000 people, struggling to accommodate a six fold population increase.  

Overcrowded and unsanitary conditions in Adre led to a severe health crisis, with over 1,200 cases of Hepatitis E reported, including three fatalities. The impending rainy season threatens to exacerbate this crisis, potentially leading to outbreaks of waterborne diseases and impeding humanitarian access. The potential for further displacement remains high amid fighting in Al-Fashir, widespread looting and burning of villages, and a looming famine in Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 25 June)

Refugees facing restrictions

As Sudan’s humanitarian crisis worsens, countries that Sudanese refugees aim to go to are starting to impose restrictions, including the UAE and Uganda. While we reported on Egypt’s mass deportations of Sudanese refugees, new figures show how Sudanese form the highest proportion of refugees in Egypt.

United Arab Emirates

Radio Dabanga (26 June) report that the UAE announced the suspension of the ‘emergency’ residence permits, which grants residence to those fleeing the ongoing war for Sudanese refugees who possess any type of visit permit. 

The UAE had previously included Sudan on the list of countries eligible for emergency accommodation following the outbreak of war on 15 April 2024. Sudanese refugees could obtain this permit by paying 1,200 Dirhams annually.

Initially, five of the seven emirates offered the residence permits to Sudanese nationals, but three had ceased issuing them recently. Two that still accept applications have a rejection rate of about 90%.

Uganda

Open Democracy (25 June) reported that, in Uganda, Sudanese refugees “feel stuck” after the country announced a change to its ‘open door’ policy amid funding crisis. In January 2024, the Ugandan government announced that Sudanese refugees would no longer be able to register as refugees while living in the capital and other urban towns around the country. All arrivals must instead now live in refugee camps to obtain such documents – and stay in the camps thereafter.

The move is a drastic change of policy for Uganda. Refugees previously had the right to work and move freely throughout the country, with access to health and education. They were also given a small plot of land to cultivate, and food and financial support. An anonymous Ugandan official told the Ayin network that restrictions were introduced for security reasons and to reduce pressure on local services.

Egypt

Previous week’s reports covered how Sudanese refugees were dying on their way to Egypt (Radio Dabanga, 11 June), yet those who arrived are being “unlawfully” deported in large numbers (Amnesty, 19 June).

Indeed, Sudan Tribune (25 June) reported that Egypt is hosting at least 672,000 registered refugees and asylum-seekers from 62 countries, with Sudanese forming the largest group. According to figures from the UN refugee agency, this represents over double the number from a year ago, with more than 617,000 forced to flee Sudan approaching its office in Egypt since April 2023.

Sudan war report (22-29 June)

Summary 

·      1. Battle for Khartoum: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia now resembles “rogue gangs” in capital state Khartoum as it directs its energy towards Al-Fashir, while the Sudanese army has reportedly put all strategic fuel depots out of service.

·      2. Sennar: The RSF’s entry into Sennar saw widespread looting and civilian deaths, with the militia occupying state capital Sinja and the strategic Jabal Moya area.

·      3. Al-Fashaqa: Ethiopian militias have invaded Al-Fashaqa on the Sudan-Ethiopia border region with the aim of seizing control of agricultural lands.

·      4. Libya: In an attempt to cut off critical RSF supply routes, Sudan’s war is now also being fought on Libyan soil between armed groups allied to the warring parties.

·      5. Al-Fashir: The RSF’s ongoing siege on Al-Fashir is being characterised by the systematic targeting of health care facilities and displacement camps. Analysts also identified obstacles to calls for a UN-AU civilian protection mission.

·      6. International: Sudan recalled its ambassador to Chad alleging it is facilitating the UAE’s support for the RSF; Taqadum leader and ex-prime minister Abdalla Hamdok’s defence of the UAE role fuelled allegations of Taqadum’s alliance with the RSF; and the Jeddah peace process was criticised.  

1. The Battle of Khartoum

·      The RSF in Khartoum are now reported to resemble “rogue gangs”.

·      In Khartoum North (Bahri), the army reportedly put Al-Jaili fuel refinery out of service, thus taking all strategic fuel depots that can benefit the RSF out of service.

Khartoum City

With the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia continuing to target the Armoured Corps, a senior military source told Mada Masr (28 June) that the army aims to connect its main camps in Khartoum and secure the state, although a specific timeline for completing these stages has not been set.

The source added that the RSF in Khartoum has now turned into mere rogue gangs, no longer conducting military offensives, instead using tactics that resemble street warfare. The main formation of RSF troops has been fragmented, the source added, attributing this transformation to the impact of the battles in al-Fashir, which led to a significant withdrawal of RSF fighters from Khartoum. Those remaining in Khartoum and Al-Jazira are reportedly either forces recruited from criminals who escaped from prisons or rogue groups that previously lived off looting and banditry, or from civilian groups that have aligned with RSF leaders.

Khartoum North (Bahri)

The army’s Weapons Corps in northern Bahri continued to deploy across various front to cut off the RSF’s military supplies to the Jaili area where they are stationed (Mada Masr, 28 June) and maintained control of the Khartoum Oil Refinery, also known as Al-Jaili Refinery (Sudan Tribune, 21 June).  With the Sudanese Air Force targeting remaining fuel depots used by the RSF, an engineering source at the refinery told Mada Masr (28 June) that the military has taken all the strategic fuel depots out of service. Thus, the refinery will no longer be able to process fuel, ensuring that oil coming from South Sudan will pass through without any refining, and will soon be transported to the Bashayer port for export.

2. Sennar

·      The RSF’s arrival in Sennar state came with widespread looting and 20 civilians reportedly killed.

·      The militia took control of the strategic Jebel Moya area with army forces promising to fight fiercely to regain it.

·      Sennar state capital, Sinja, fell to the RSF militia in a major blow to the army.  

RSF arrives in Sennar

Clashes erupted between the army and the RSF on the northern outskirts of Sennar over control of the Sennar Sugar Factory, surrounding villages, and the strategic Jabal Moya area, amid the militia’s southward expansion from Al-Jazirah state into Sennar (Sudan Tribune, 24 June). The RSF’s arrival triggered panic among residents, leading to a mass exodus towards Sennar city, as artillery shells rained on civilian neighbourhoods (Sudan Tribune, 25 June). The militia reportedly reportedly killed over 20 in villages around Jabal Moya during widespread looting (Mada Masr, 28 June).

RSF takes the strategic Jabal Moya

The RSF seized the strategic Jebel Moya area, with Mada Masr’s (28 June) sources saying that controlling this area directly threaten the cities of Sennar and Rabak, and the Kenana military base in the White Nile State. 

A senior Sudanese military officer told Mada Masr that the military will fight fiercely to retake it. Mada Masr’s observations indicate that both sides are amassing more troops and tanks, preparing for a decisive battle before the rain season in autumn, which is expected to affect supply routes.

RSF enters in Sinjah, mass displacement

After gathering in Jabal Moya, the RSF announced that it had seized the 17th Infantry Division headquarters in Sennar state following a surprise attack on the city. The army denied reports of the RSF’s control of Sinjah, stating that its forces are actively engaged in combat against the militia (Sudan Tribune, 29 June).

Nonetheless, the RSF’s entry saw a mass exodus from the city after the militia reportedly ransacked shops, homes, and the market in Sinjah. Eyewitnesses recounted RSF fighters storming homes and demanding valuables such as cars, mobile phones, money, and jewelry. Sennar state, already home to displaced people from other conflict-stricken regions, is now grappling with a fresh wave of internally displaced people from the Jabal Moya area, which fell under RSF control (Sudan Tribune, 29 June).  

3. Al-Fashaqa

The Sudanese army, which had re-taken control of approximately 90% of Al-Fashaqa border region since 2020, is now facing a resurgence of Ethiopian aggression after militias launched a renewed incursion into Sudanese territory, penetrating 15 kilometres deep into the region. Reports of escalating violence, looting, and attacks on farmers and herders in the border area have raised alarm as the militias attempt to seize control of agricultural lands. Local livestock owner Abdallah Ahmed reported being robbed of 140 sheep by the militias at gunpoint, warning of the dire consequences of unchecked violence and highlighting the militias’ attempts to prevent Sudanese farmers from cultivating their lands during the crucial rainy season (Sudan Tribune, 24 June).

4. Sudan’s war being exported to Libya

·      In an attempt to cut off critical RSF supply routes which could weaken the militia across several fronts in Sudan, Sudan’s war is now also being fought on Libyan soil.

Clashes occurred in Libyan territory between the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army led by Minni Minawi (SLM/A-MM) and defectors from the Revolutionary Awakening Council (RAC) loyal to the RSF led by General Mohamed Bakhit Ajab Al-Dor (Sudan Tribune, 22 June). 

A source for the Joint Forces – a coalition comprising of the army and allied armed movements including the SLM/A-MM fighting the RSF in North Darfur – told Mada Masr (28 June) that the battles aim to halt military supplies and reinforcements to the RSF, leading to battles spilling over into Libyan territory.

UN reports indicate that thousands of Sudanese fighters are present in various Libyan cities although they returned to Sudan after the war started in April last year.  Al-Dor’s group began withdrawing from Libya last week, heading to Sudan to support the RSF in Al-Fashir (Sudan Tribune, 22 June).

As noted last week, the Sudan-Libyan-Chad border triangle is critical for the RSF’s operations, as it means dominance over fuel smuggling routes from Libya, making such battles crucial for the army and allies as they aim to cut off the RSF’s supplies and deplete their resources, thereby affecting their capability of multiple fronts across Sudan (Mada Masr, 21 June). Nonetheless,  RSF field commander Ali Rizqallah, known as “Al-Savanna,” claimed that the militia controls the tri-border area linking Sudan, Libya, and Chad (Sudan Tribune, 22 June).

5. Al-Fashir

·      Sudan Tribune (23 June) reported that the death toll in Al-Fashir rose to over 260, with more than 1,630 injured since the RSF siege began on 10 May 2024, according to Doctors Without Borders (MSF).

·      Nonetheless, the death toll has continued to rise in an RSF campaign marked by the systematic targeting of hospitals, displacement camps and civilians attempting to flee the violence.

·      While previous reports noted that human rights activists are calling for UN-AU civilian protection mission in Al-Fashir, analysts have identified the obstacles to prospect of one including the pre-existing lack of security in Al-Fashir and divides within the UN Security Council.

RSF systematic targeting of hospitals

As part of its ongoing siege of Al-Fashir, the state capital of North Darfur, the RSF is targeting healthcare facilities, with a medical source telling Mada Masr (28 June) that the militia’s operations are concentrated around medical areas and regions providing food and water to displaced persons within the city.

Last week saw the eighth and ninth of the militia’s campaign of attacks on Al-Fashir’s health facilities since the siege began on 10 May. Al-Fashir Southern Hospital has endured five attacks, forcing it to close. The Babiker Nahar Children’s Hospital was also closed after being bombed. Following the transfer of treatment services to the Saudi Hospital, it was bombed three times (Radio Dabanga, 25 June).

Indeed, the Saudi maternity hospital, which was the last functioning hospital in Al-Fashir capable of responding to mass casualty events, was put out of service following RSF shelling that killed a female pharmacist and destroying a pharmacy in the process (Sudan Tribune, 23 June).

Days later, the militia subsequently hit the only remaining dialysis centre in Al-Fashir, forcing to cease operations, thus depriving 94 patients from different parts of Darfur of dialysis treatment. The center had been upgraded to a regional facility to handle medical cases from other states of Darfur, after most had ceased operations as the RSF seized territory (Radio Dabanga, 25 June). The militia then targeted Iqra Hospital, further crippling Al-Fashir’s healthcare system (Sudan Tribune, 25 June), which killed at least one (Radio Dabanga, 26 June).

Targeting displacement camps

Alongside targeting hospitals, the militia is also targeting displacement camps, with at least five civilians killed in artillery shelling on the Abu Shouk camp. Adam Rijal, spokesperson for the General Coordination for Displaced People and Refugees, warned that the toll could rise due to communication blackouts in the area. While the camp, which houses nearly 400,000 displaced, was a haven for those escaping RSF brutality in other parts of Darfur, it is now witnessing an exodus of residents to seek refuge in nearby Tawila and Jebel Marra (Sudan Tribune, 25 June).  

Indeed, the number of displaced has exceeded 70,000, dispersed across different localities in the state, including Kutum and Tawila, according to Mada Masr (28 June).  A source from Northern State’s Dabba also said there is a significant increase in the number of displaced persons arriving to the locality.  One of the displaced persons who fled Al-Fashir told Mada Masr that the journey to Dabba took four days due to the RSF’s roadblocks, setting up checkpoints, and threatening citizens on the basis of their ethnicity.

Debate on protection mission

Sudan In The News’ last three weekly reports showed how proposed solutions to avert the RSF genocide in Al-Fashir have centred around calls for a UN-AU protection mission, including from:

·      Human Rights Watch (HRW, 19 June) Sudan researcher Mohamed Osman.

·      HRW Deputy Africa Director Laetitia Bader (Euronews, 20 June).

·      Yonah Diamond and Mutasim Ali of Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (CNN, 14 June) and (Foreign Policy, 5 June).

·      David Simon, the director of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program, (Washington Post, 3 June).

However, the International Crisis Group (24 June) note that political obstacles and logistical and security risks hinder the deployment of external security forces in Al-Fashir. In addition, an article published by the Ayin Network (22 June) quoted from analysts who identified the challenges facing such a mission.

Gerrit Kurtz, a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, sees little chance of passing such a resolution – to authorise a protection mission for Al-Fashir - via the UN Security Council. Kurtz cited the bad relations between Russia on one side and the US, UK and France on the other, among the permanent members. “Therefore, only the AU Peace and Security Council or the AU Assembly could authorise an African deployment,” he said.  

Canada’s first resident diplomat in Sudan, Nicholas Coghlan, believes a ceasefire agreement is necessary before any country commits to deploying troops in Sudan. “It would require at least a tentative, possibly partial, ceasefire and the acquiescence of both parties. I cannot see that any foreign country would be disposed to risk the lives of its soldiers in the current context,” he said.

Solution for Al-Fashir

Amid the aforementioned obstacles to a UN-AU protection mission in Al-Fashir, the International Crisis Group (24 June) proposed that an alternative way to protect civilians in the besieged city would be to open a safe passage into neutral areas of nearby Central Darfur controlled by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, an ethnic Fur who leads Darfur’s largest rebel group.

6. International

·      Sudan recalled its ambassador from Chad amid allegations that Chad is facilitating the UAE’s support for the RSF militia.

·      However, ex-prime minister and the leader of the Taqadum coalition of civilians, Abdalla Hamdok, defended the role of the UAE in Sudan.

·      Allegations that Taqadum is the political wing of the RSF, and the enmity it is causing between Sudanese political forces, are argued to pose an obstacle to an Egypt-sponsored conflict mediation process.

·      The US-Saudi brokered Jeddah peace process was criticised on the basis it is argued to contribute to prolonging the conflict.

Chad ambassador recalled

Sudan recalled its ambassador from Chad over escalating tensions concerning border security and Chad’s alleged support for the RSF. A government insider revealed to Sudan Tribune (28 June) that Chad is actively aiding the RSF by opening its borders for UAE supplies, facilitating the movement of RSF commanders and recruiting foreign fighters. “All Emirati aid to the militia is channeled through Chad, and Sudan has presented evidence to support this claim,” the source said.

 The UAE’s role

Indeed, the UAE’s involvement in Sudan through its alleged support for the RSF continues to be a theme of articles. Arguing the UAE supports the RSF with the aim of controlling Sudan’s agricultural and economic resources, Mohamed Suliman, a senior researcher at Northeastern University, suggests the “cost of the UAE’s expansionist dreams is high,” citing the abuse of natural resources, committing of massacres, support for dictators and warlords, killing of democratic aspirations and destabilising of “too many political orders”. Suliman called for the UAE to “stop acting as a rogue state, rethink its foreign policies, and consider fairer alternatives for all concerned” (Middle East Monitor, 24 June). 

Taqadum leader Hamdok defends the UAE

However, in an interview with Emirati media outlet the National (26 June), Sudan’s former prime minister and current leader of the Taqadum coalition, Abdalla Hamdok, dismissed allegations of the UAE’s support for the RSF. Hamdok, currently residing in the UAE, said: “the UAE has always been supportive of Sudan, and there is a lot of links and ties in the history”.

Taqadum, the political wing of the RSF militia

Hamdok’s comments further fuelled allegations that Taqadum is the political wing of the RSF, which is argued to an impediment to an Egypt-sponsored conflict mediation process.

 As noted by Dame Rosalind Marsden, the former UK ambassador to Sudan, the accusations that Taqadum is the political wing of the RSF have gained traction among many Sudanese, who called for the coalition to maintain consistent messaging in condemning violence by both sides of Sudan’s conflict (Chatham House, 21 June).  

In an analysis of Egypt’s “pragmatic” approach to mediating the conflict, Taqadum’s alleged partnership with the RSF, and the enmity it has caused between Sudan’s political forces, are argued to be a central challenge for political dialogue and consensus-building by analyst Elfadil Ibrahim. While Taqadum do not recognise the army’s legitimacy, the Sudan Charter Forces (SCF) do, notes Ibrahim. Furthermore, SCF members such as Darfur governor Minni Minnawi cite the formations of local governments led by Taqadum officials in RSF-controlled territory - as stipulated in the Taqadum-RSF Addis Ababa agreement in January 2024 - to back up allegations of Taqadum’s partnership with the militia (New Arab, 25 June).

Criticism of the Jeddah peace talks

Amid the indefinite suspension of the US-Saudi brokered Jeddah peace talks between the army and RSF, governance specialist Tahany Maalla argued that they are “out of step with the nuanced dynamics on the ground”. Maalla suggested that their design and structure contributed to prolonging the conflict in three significant ways.

·      Firstly, the focus on achieving ceasefire and coordinating humanitarian efforts at the expense of hosting political discussions is argued to have pushed Darfur’s armed movements to abandon neutrality with the aim of securing a stake in any future political agreement.

·      Secondly, the lack of a bridge connecting ceasefire and political negotiations is blamed for the “militarisation of civilian discourse,” which is “reinforcing militarised authority and legitimacy.

·      Finally, Maalla attributes the peace talks to the conflicting parties both obstructing aid access and exploiting to enhance international legitimacy, citing the RSF redirecting their strategy to targeting aid distribution routes with intentions to assert itself as a de-facto authority by controlling aid flows. 

Diplomatic solutions

The International Rescue Committee (25 June) provided diplomatic solutions for ending the conflict in Sudan including:

·      Elevating engagement with the warring parties and their sponsors to the highest diplomatic level as a reflection of the severity of the crisis and a demonstration of international commitment to addressing it.

·      Deploying levers of influence including encouraging the UAE and Saudi Arabia to halt the import of Sudanese gold and livestock until a ceasefire is implemented, alongside extending the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts and using their findings to increase public scrutiny of the roles of regional actors.

·      Expanding investigative mechanisms, potentially including a Commission of Inquiry on Sudan, to hold those responsible for violations of international law to account.

Diplomacy report (15-21 June): Sudan confronts UAE at the UN; Why is the world ignoring Sudan?

DIPLOMACY REPORT

·      In this week’s diplomacy developments, Sudan’s ambassador to the UN provided evidence in accusing the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia at a UN Security Council session.

·      There were also reports of the UAE using its influence over UN Security Council members to prevent Sudan’s grievances being discussed.

·      The UN Security Council’s resolution to end the RSF’s siege on Al-Fashir was criticised for coming too late and not calling out the UAE.

·      Analysts downplayed the impact of Sudan’s weapons agreement with Russia.

·      Racism, the both sides narrative and physical numbing have been argued to be factors for the world “overlooking” Sudan’s crisis.

Sudan confronts the UAE at the UN security council

Multiple sources (18 June) reported that, in a UN Security Council (UNSC) session, Sudan’s ambassador to the UN, Al-Harith Idriss, accused the UAE of providing weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. "The military aggression launched by the RSF, supported with weapons by the Emirates, is deliberately and systematically targeting the villages and cities," Idriss said.

"The UAE must stay away from Sudan! That is the first requirement that will allow for stability in Sudan. It must stop its support,” Idriss added.  

Idriss accused the UAE of assisting RSF forces through militias in Chad, southern Libya and central Africa, adding that Sudan has submitted copies of a half dozen UAE passports found on the battlefield in Khartoum to the council to back up their claims of Emirati interference. He also said that wounded RSF fighters are being airlifted to Dubai for medical treatment.

Idriss further accused on the UAE of using its influence on the UNSC to avoid accountability for supporting the militia. As reported by PassBlue (15 June), a woman-led media company covering the UN, when the UAE was an elected member of the UNSC from January 2022 to December 2023 it “kept Sudan off the agenda”. Sudan’s requests for open emergency meetings in April and May 2024 were rebuffed by monthly rotating presidents Malta and Mozambique respectively, who held private consultations meaning Idriss could not participate.

Malta said it was because the Sudanese ambassador sent his request in Arabic. PassBlue note that the UNSC has no written rule on language requirements. Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Africa Programme,  said: “we have underestimated the destructive and irresponsible power of the UAE [who] used the fact that it controls five major ports in Mozambique to make sure that Mozambique did not host a meeting investigating allegations against the UAE.” 

Criticism of the UN Security Council resolution

PassBlue’s (15 June) article carried criticisms of the UN Security Council resolution to end the RSF siege on al-Fashir. Cameron Hudson said it “comes much too late to save many [who have and] will die because of the existing conditions.” PassBlue noted that the resolution did not call out the UAE, who Sudan’s government say has provided weapons used to displace and kill predominantly non-Arab groups and rape hundreds of women.

Russia

DW’s (16 June) feature piece on Sudan’s agreement to allow Russia to build a naval base on the Red Sea in exchange for weapons carried insights from analysts who expressed uncertainty that the Sudanese army will get the support it seeks.

Political scientist Andreas Heinemann-Grüder from the Center for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies said it is unknown what weapons Russia has offered, noting Russian skepticism when the Sudanese army previously wanted fighter aircraft and air defence missiles.

Hager Ali of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies said “Russia holds good card in the negotiations,” as “the longer the conflict lasts, the more weapons [the army] needs. That is particularly true of the Sudanese air force, which has to operate in remote regions”. Ali adds that the same applies to diesel fuel, which has long been in short supply, noting that Russia may now deliver it through its base in Sudan rather than through Chad via the Wagner militia.

The global neglect of Sudan

In this week’s analysis, various factors were provided for why Sudan’s war is being “overlooked”, ranging from numbing to racism to the “both sides narrative”.

Physic numbing

Melissa Fleming, the under-secretary-general for global communications at the UN, attributed the lack of attention to psychic numbing," which refers to “the sad reality that people feel more apathetic towards a tragedy as the number of victims increases”. DW (14 June) add  that “research has previously shown that civil wars — especially those seen as internal matters in a faraway country — get less attention than conflicts where one country attacks another”.

Racism

Mohanad Elbalal, the co-founder of Khartoum Aid Kitchen, a crowdfunded campaign to support community kitchens in Sudan,” told Slate (19 June) “there’s a feeling that prejudices – [that this is just Africans killing Africans] might lead people to care less” about Sudan. Similarly, Sudan expert Roman Deckert noted “a deeply ingrained, potentially even subconscious, racism or Eurocentrism…where outsiders incorrectly perceive the fighting as somehow ‘uncivilized’ or ‘typical’".

“Both sides narrative”

In addition, Deckert attributed the lack of attention on Sudan to the “complexity of the situation, where neither side is obviously ‘good or evil’" (DW, 14 June).

Humanitarian report (15-21 June): Famine; starvation as a weapon of war; the plight of Sudanese refugees in Egypt and Ethiopia

HUMANITARIAN REPORT

• This week’s humanitarian report covers the Sudan’s famine and refugee crises.

• While no formal famine declaration has been made, reports suggest famine has reached parts of Sudan, particularly in RSF-controlled Darfur. We identified five factors contributing to this crisis: including the conduct of warring parties and the international community’s unfulfilled funding pledges. We also identified four proposed solutions, including those urging the international community to adopt innovative aid strategies.

• Sudanese refugees fleeing conflict are facing further humanitarian crises in neighboring countries, including attacks in Ethiopia and unlawful deportations from Egypt, despite their perilous journeys and challenges seeking legal entry.

1. Famine

·      In the absence of a formal famine declaration, there are reports that famine has already reached parts of Sudan, particularly territory held by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in Darfur, with projections that the situation will get worse.

·      This report identified five key challenges and contributing factors to the famine: 1) the lack of income, 2) the RSF’s looting of aid and use of starvation as a weapon of war, 3) the army hindering aid access, 4) the water crisis across Sudan and 5) funding pledges that have not materialised.

·      Nonetheless, four solutions have been aimed at the international community to mitigate the famine, ranging from applying pressure to take action to adopting innovative strategies to get aid to those who need it.

Bleak famine projections

About 70% of Sudan’s population could be “extremely hungry” by September, potentially leading to 2.5 to 4 million deaths, according to food security expert Timmo Gaasbeek (BBC, 15 June). “About 15% of the population – in Darfur and Kordofan, the hardest-hit regions, could die by the end of September,” said Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US ambassador to the UN (AFP, 15 June). Thus, USAID administrator Samantha Power said Sudan could be in worse shape than Somalia in 2011 when 250,000 people died after three consecutive seasons without enough rain, potentially ensuring that “Sudan would become the deadliest famine since Ethiopia in the early 1980s,” Power added (AFP, 15 June). 

In the absence of a formal famine declaration, the New York Times (19 June) revealed that famine has already arrived in Darfur. Reuters’ (20 June) investigation identified 14 graveyards expanding fast in Darfur showing how people are dying through starvation and disease. Only satellite images from communities that have not seen fighting in the past six months were reviewed, in order to rule out the possibility that the dead were killed in fighting. Reuters further warn that the situation is about to get worse, as Sudan entered the lean season between harvests where food is less available, and rainy season prevents journeys through roads connecting to urban centres.

Challenge 1: lack of income

Alongside the lack of food in Sudan, the remaining food is “punishingly expensive,” with Amgad Farid of Fikra Studies think-tank highlighting the decline of food imports due to inflation (BBC, 15 June).As per Mohanad Elbalal, the the co-founder of Khartoum Aid Kitchen, a crowdfunded campaign to support community kitchens in Sudan, the lack of income is contributing factor to the unfolding famine (Slate, 19 June). Indeed, a key contributing factor to the lack of income is the inability to work due to a lack of protection from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.

Challenge 2: the RSF

The RSF is considered a major contributing factor to food insecurity across Sudan, using starvation as a weapon of war in the territory it controls.

Darfur

Famine has already reached the Darfur region, where the RSF militia holds 4 out of 5 state capitals. In South Darfur, residents of Kalma camp for displaced persons are too scared to leave to find work amid the lack of protection from the RSF, with men fearing being killed and women fearing being raped (Reuters, 20 June).  

Around Al-Fashir in North Darfur, the RSF’s seizing of the main highway “has largely cut off food” to a Darfur region “already grappling with famine,” with a child dying of malnutrition every two hours at a nearby displacement camp. The road out is “filled with danger,” as temperatures rise to over temperatures rising to over 49 celsius and women report being sexually assaulted (New York Times, 19 June).  Meanwhile, in Niertiti camp in Central Darfur, no supplies are getting as the RSF plundered the harvest (Reuters, 20 June).

RSF looting

Various analysts, officials and humanitarian aid workers have attributed the famine to the RSF’s looting, including Elbalal in comments in Slate (19 June). Alex de Waal of the World Peace Foundation described the RSF as “essentially a looting machine” (BBC, 15 June), noting the militia’s tendency to “[strip] cities and countryside bare of all moveable resources” (Foreign Affairs, 17 June). Furthermore, USAID administrator Samantha Power said the RSF has been “systematically looting humanitarian warehouses, stealing food and livestock, destroying grain storage facilities and wells in the most vulnerable Sudanese communities” (AFP, 15 June).

RSF control of Sudan’s breadbasket – Al-Jazira state

In addition, the RSF’s military victories have also been identified as a contributing factor to the famine, with Amgad Faried citing the RSF’s seizing al-Jazira state “which has the biggest agricultural scheme in Sudan, and produced a lot of our daily needs” (BBC, 15 June). Nonetheless, the army have also been accused of blocking aid access.

Challenge 3: SAF accused of blocking aid access

The army has been accused of preventing aid access into RSF territory for political purposes. Power alleged the army is blocking aid from crossing the border with Chad into Darfur (AFP, 15 June). De Waal claimed that the army is “trying to starve areas under RSF control” (BBC, 15 June), with the aim of turning its fighters against its leader (Foreign Affairs, 17 June).

Jeffrey Feltman, the former US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, blamed the army for the absence of formal famine declaration despite pre-existing “famine-like conditions”. Feltman argued that the downside with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification that officially declares famine is that it requires the cooperation of the Sudanese army, who Feltman said do not want aid to flow into areas controlled by the RSF (Brookings, 20 June). However, De Waal suggests that starvation actually benefits the RSF, as the starving in Darfur are African ethnic groups that the RSF targets for ethnic cleansing (Foreign Affairs, 17 June).

Nonetheless, Khartoum Aid Kitchen co-founder Mohanad Elbalal said the army “doesn’t have an issue” with their kitchens, but the issue in RSF territory is that many community activists who would lead volunteer work are being detained or killed by the militia (Slate, 19 June).

Challenge 4: Water crisis

To worsen matters, a war crisis is enveloping Sudan from east to west, as reported by AFP (16 June). An anonymous diplomat warned that hundreds of thousands will go without water in Al-Fashir as water stations will stop working if the RSF prevent fuel going in. Meanwhile, in Khartoum, entire neighbourhoods have been without water since the war began after the Soba water station – which supplies water to much of the capital – going out of service. People are buying “untreated water off of animal-drawn carts, which they can hardly afford and exposes them to diseases”.

Similarly, in Port Sudan - which depends on one inadequate reservoir - measures to prevent contamination are hindered by displacement with hundreds of thousands fleeing to the city. Thus, cholera has become a “year-round” disease, the diplomat said, noting that the collapse of healthcare in Sudan means that “people are drinking dirty water, they are hungry and will get hungrier, which will kill many, many more”.

Challenge 5: Lack of funding

The lack of funding continues to serve as an obstacle for mitigating Sudan’s food and water crisis. The US announced another $315 million for hungry Sudanese (AFP, 15 June) but this is not considered enough. Justin Brady, head of the UN's humanitarian body (Ocha) in Sudan, said the international community has not provided the funds help those in need (BBC, 15 June).

As noted by Elbalal, the Paris donor conference in April pledged two billion euros for Sudan, but “there’s a difference between a pledge and actual donations arriving,” adding that only 15.8% of the $2.4 billion needed for Sudan’s humanitarian plan has been funded (Slate, 19 June).

Famine Solutions

Proposed solutions to mitigate the famine in Sudan have been directed towards the international community, including apply pressure on donors and states with influence over the warring parties, alongside innovative strategies to meet humanitarian demand.

Pressure international community to meet pledges

Mohanad Elbalal, the co-founder of Khartoum Aid Kitchen, suggested that pressure on the international community to meet the pledges to alleviate Sudan’s humanitarian crisis “would go a long way to actually helping Sudanese people” (Slate, 19 June).

UAE and Saudi leverage

Suggesting the UAE and Saudi Arabia have leverage over the warring parties in Sudan, Alex De Waal calls for the US and western allies to pressure the UAE and Saudi Arabia to lead on getting food aid to starving Sudanese. Yet. despite the Gulf states’ leverage, De Waal attributes their failure to “seriously engage” with the Sudan crisis to the Saudis not wanting the UAE to participate in their peace talks, and the UAE not wanting Saudis to get credit for a peace deal (Foreign Affairs, 17 June).

Recognising Sudan’s division

To overcome access limitations facing aid organisations, and with territory in Sudan divided between the army and RSF, ex-US Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman proposed recognising that Sudan is divided under at least two separate authorities, with agencies dividing which part of the country they work in (Brookings, 20 June).

Flexibility in aid grants

Feltman also called for flexibility in how assistance is delivered, noting that local emergency response rooms “are not people who can apply for aid grants” as “bureaucracies often are not fit to the purpose,” before suggesting “we need to take more risks in how we get assistance into the hands of those who are who are actually delivering” (Brookings, 20 June).

2. Refugees

·      Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries Libya, Ethiopia and Egypt are unable to escape humanitarian crises.

·      In Ethiopia, refugees that left war-torn Sudan are under attack from a militia in north-western Ethiopia’s Awlala forest, with a woman being shot dead last week.

·      Despite the perilous journeys they undertake to seek refuge, and the challenges they face seeking legal entry, Sudanese refugees are being unlawfully deported from Egypt as per Amnesty International, who also proposed a solution to avert further humanitarian suffering.

Sudanese refugees in Libya

Over 40,000 Sudanese refugees and asylum-seekers have arrived in Libya following outbreak of conflict in Sudan, the United Nations said. A statement from the UN World Food Programme (WFP) also warned of an impending humanitarian disaster if aid is not urgently provided to those in need. The estimated total number of Sudanese refugees in Libya’s Kufra city is 45,000. Authorities, however, say it is difficult to know the exact number of these displaced people due to the continuing waves of people coming from war-torn Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 17 June).

Sudanese refugees in Ethiopa

Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia continue to face the risk of death and armed attacks by Fano militants targeting them inside the Awlala forest in the Amhara region of north-western Ethiopia, which houses around 6,000 Sudanese refugees.

A Sudanese woman was killed by the Fano militia in the Awlala camp, in an attack that while a group of Sudanese women were fetching water from a well near the camp. Eight other women were injured in the attack, which involved heavy gunfire. Around 1,700 cases of assault, looting, and theft against Sudanese refugees have been reported in the area. Multiple sources have confirmed to Sudan Tribune that Ethiopian authorities have lost control over the area, leaving it vulnerable to lawlessness and violence perpetrated by Fano militias (Sudan Tribune, 18 June).

Sudanese refugees in Egypt

Despite Sudanese taking life-risking journey to seek refuge in Egypt, they are being returned to danger in Sudan in deportations that Amnesty International says are unlawful. We explored the context behind the Egypt’s restrictions of Sudanese refugees, and the challenges that prevent Sudanese refugees from entering Egypt legally, concluding with a solution proposed by Amnesty International.

Sudanese refugees being returned to war-torn Sudan

According to Amnesty International, Egyptian authorities have used EU-funded security forces in a campaign of mass arrests and forcible deportations against refugees from the Sudan war (Guardian, 19 June). Around 500,000 Sudanese refugees are estimated to have fled to Egypt after the armed conflict erupted in Sudan in April 2023 (Amnesty, 19 June), about 24% of the total who left Sudan, according to the UN’s International Organisation for Migration (Reuters, 19 June).

Amnesty (19 June), published a report entitled, “Handcuffed like dangerous criminals”: Arbitrary detention and forced returns of Sudanese refugees in Egypt, which reveals how Sudanese refugees are rounded up and unlawfully deported to Sudan without due process or opportunity to claim asylum in flagrant violation of international law. The report’s findings were summarised in a Guardian (19 June) article, which included:

·      Amnesty found that Egypt “forcibly returned an estimated 800 Sudanese detainees between January and March 2024, who were all denied the possibility to claim asylum”

·      Amnesty said a campaign of mass arrests in Cairo and neighbouring Giza, where police have “conducted mass stops and identity checks targeting black individuals, spreading fear within the refugee community”.

·      Amnesty documented 14 arrests of refugees from public hospitals in Aswan.

·      People were held in makeshift detention facilities run by Egyptian border guards, a force that has received extensive EU funding.

·      Refugees, including at least 11 children and their mothers, were taken to filthy warehouses or stables at military sites before being “forced into buses and vans and driven to the Sudanese border”.

The context of Egypt’s restrictions

A month after the war erupted in Sudan, the Egyptian government introduced a visa entry requirement for all Sudanese nationals (Amnesty, 19 June). According to Reuters (19 June), the mass arrival of Sudanese led to occasional tensions, with some Egyptians blaming Sudanese and other foreigners for pushing up rental prices, and Egyptian TV commentators citing the "burden" of millions of migrants at a time of high inflation and economic pressures. After Egypt's foreign currency shortage worsened last year many Africans arrested for not having valid papers were held in squalid conditions and asked to pay fees in dollars to avoid deportation, according to lawyers and witnesses.

With EU-funded security forces being used in a campaign of mass arrests and forcible deportations against Sudanese refugees (Guardian, 19 June), Reuters also note that “European states see Egypt as playing an important role in preventing mass migration across the Mediterranean” (Reuters, 19 June).

Challenges for Sudanese asylum seekers in Egypt

As noted by Amnesty (19 June), the Egyptian visa entry requirements leaves Sudanese fleeing with little choice but to escape through irregular border crossings. Radio Dabanga (18 June) noted the bureaucratic challenges to entering Egypt legally, seen as a “deliberate attempt to limit the influx of Sudanese refugees”:

·      Obtaining security approval for entry into Egypt is financially burdensome for many Sudanese given the obligation to use EgyptAir to reach Egypt via Cairo Airport, which is unsuitable for those arriving by land.

·      While registration with the UNHCR theoretically prevents deportation, long waiting periods, sometimes exceeding five months, complicate this.

·      Another issue is the 960km distance between Aswan and Cairo, where the UNHCR headquarters are located, as Sudanese arriving through Aswan may be stopped and asked for entry visas before reaching Cairo.

Radio Dabanga have also continued reporting on the risks that Sudanese are enduring in their attempts to find refuge in Egypt, having last week covered 25 to 50 Sudanese dying on the road to Egypt from scorching heat (Radio Dabanga, 11 June). Indeed, Egyptian authorities deported hundreds back to Sudan who had reached Aswan facing harsh humanitarian conditions during the journey, with high temperatures and insufficient food and drink exacerbating their suffering, with many having chronic diseases (Radio Dabanga, 18 June).

Solution

Amnesty International (19 June) call for Egyptian authorities to immediately cease the mass arbitrary arrests and unlawful deportations of Sudanese refugees who had crossed the border into Egypt seeking refuge from the conflict in Sudan, suggesting that rounding up and deportation of Sudanese refugees was without due process or opportunity to claim asylum is a “flagrant violation of international law”.

War report (15-21 June)

WAR REPORT

·      The Sudanese army repelled the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia’s attempt to take the strategic Armoured Corps base in Khartoum, while the RSF continued shelling civilian areas in Omdurman, including a hospital, killing three and injuring 27.

·      While the army made an advance in Al-Jazira, the RSF took the capital of West Kordofan state – Al-Fula.

·      As the army rejects peace talks, military sources and experts predict army advances Khartoum and Al-Jazira states, with a victory on the Sudanese-Libyan-Chad border in North Darfur having the potential to severely weaken the militia across Sudan.

·      Reports continue emerge of the RSF’s use of mercenaries from neighbouring countries.

·      The RSF continues to be accused of genocide in Al-Fashir, resulting in a worsening humanitarian crisis, with calls for a UN-African Union civilian protection mission and pressure on the UAE for its support of the RSF. 

1. Battle for Khartoum

·      In the Battle for Khartoum, the army fended off the RSF in a key army base south of Khartoum city and its assistant commander-in-chief expressed confidence in advance to its General Command headquarters.

·      In the city of Omdurman, however, the RSF continues to shell civilian sites, including Al-Naw Hospital where three were killed and 27 were injured.

Army victory in Khartoum

The army announced a decisive victory over RSF militants aiming to seize the Armoured Corps (silaah al-mudara’at) base south of Khartoum in Al-Shajara military district (Sudan Tribune, 17 June). A senior army source told Mada Masr (21 June) that that the RSF’s media footage of its attack highlighted issues including ammunition shortages, poor combat tactics and an insufficient number of RPG-armed soldiers needed for an assault on a military camp.

Since August 2023, the RSF has repeatedly failed in its efforts to capture the Armoured Corps, a critical asset for the Sudanese military. Their most recent attempt resulted in a strike by the SAF, routing the RSF and inflicting heavy casualties. The army has also gone on the offensive in the southern belt of Khartoum, where hostilities resumed after a two-month lull. Eyewitnesses reported drones and heavy artillery pounding RSF camps in the Sports City and surrounding areas (Sudan Tribune, 17 June). In a sign of confidence in the Battle for Khartoum, the army’s Assistant Commander-in-Chief Yassir al-Atta promised that the army will reach its General Command headquarters in due course (Mada Masr, 21 June).

Omdurman

Nonetheless, the RSF are continuing to target areas of northern Omdurman totally under army control, particularly the Karari locality. Doctors Without Borders (MSF) announced the death of three people, including a volunteer, and the injury of 27 others following intense artillery shelling by the RSF that struck al-Naw Hospital in Omdurman. The hospital has been continually targeted by the militia, which is continuing to shell civilian cites in nearby Al-Thawra neighbours which received those displaced from Khartoum and Bahri.

Among those killed in the RSF’s attack on another hospital was Sharaf Abu Al-Majd of the pro-democracy Ghadboun group, known for his active participation in anti-military coup protests, who was working as a volunteer at the hospital for months by the time of his killing (Sudan Tribune, 19 June).

2. Army gains in Al-Jazira

In Al-Jazira State in central Sudan, the military recaptured the town of Huda in the Managil locality. Since December 18, the RSF has maintained control over Al-Jazira’s capital, Wad Madani, and later extended its presence to various villages. Since April, however, the military has been amassing troops to retake the state along three axes, and it has received substantial reinforcements (Mada Masr, 21 June).

3. Growing army confidence

·      With the army rejecting peace talks, military sources and experts express confidence that the army will outmanoeuvre the RSF and make advances in Khartoum and Al-Jazira states.

·      An army and allied victory on the Sudanese-Libyan-Chad border has the potential to cut off key RSF supply routes and weaken the militia across multiple fronts.

Army rejects peace talks

In a rejection of peace talks, Yassir al-Atta, the Sudanese army’s Assistant Commander-in-Chief, said: “we will not postpone the war by concluding a truce and conducting negotiations, only for the war to return (again) after a year or two”. Al-Atta, who leads military operations in Khartoum, told his troops to ignore rumours about the resumption of negations, stressing: “true peace will be achieved through the defeat and surrender of the Janjaweed, the return of foreign Arabs to their countries of origin,” while emphasising the need to distinguish between the Darfur Arab tribes and the RSF (Sudan Tribune, 17 June).

After RSF militants failed to seize the Armoured Corps, there is reason to believe that the army is confident that it can defeat the militia militarily, with Al-Atta also promising that the army will reach its General Command HQ in Khartoum in due course.

Army confidence: Khartoum

 A senior military officer told Mada Masr (21 June) that the army’s capabilities have improved since the start of the war and that it is poised to retake the military’s General Command HQ given the favourable outcomes of the military’s siege strategy around Khartoum in recent months. The strategy has reportedly significantly disrupted RSF supply operations and lowered its troops’ morale, especially after the defeats they suffered in al-Fasher and Darfur at large.

Army confidence: al-Jazira

In Al-Jazira state, military experts anticipate a simultaneous offensive across Al-Jazira’s fronts. A field source told Mada Masr (21 June) that the military believes that the advances will be easier than expected, explaining that the onset of the rain season is likely to aid operations, as the RSF is expected to regroup in more accessible areas near supply points, facilitating confrontation.

The importance of the North Darfur desert war

Furthermore, a victory for the Joint Forces – the army and allied armed movements - in the North Darfur desert war along the Sudanese-Libyan-Chadian border has the potential to cut off the RSF’s military supplies, deplete their resources and affect their capabilities on multiple fronts across Sudan (Mada Masr, 21 June).

4. RSF take Al-Fula, West Kordofan

The RSF announced the capture of al-Fula, the capital of West Kordofan state, after the Sudanese army withdrew from its defensive positions and headquarters

a significant number of residents fled to neighbouring areas. The RSF reportedly engaged in looting in several neighbourhoods, including Al-Salam, Al-Wahda, and Al-Daraja, prompting residents to flee towards the city centre or to neighbouring localities like Al-Odaiya and Al-Nuhud. A volunteer from the El Fula Emergency Room estimated that over 60% of the city’s population had fled shortly after the RSF’s arrival. Al-Fula had previously taken in displaced individuals from the city of Babanusa and was sheltering approximately 1,618 displaced people, including 324 children and 714 women (Sudan Tribune, 20 June). 

A video released by RSF fighters after the capture of Al-Fula also showed an Ethiopian raising his country’s flag (Sudan Tribune, 21 June), which brings us onto the RSF’s use of foreign mercenaries.

5. RSF foreign mercenaries

Reports continue to emerge of the RSF’s use of foreign mercenaries from Sudan’s neighbours including the Ethiopia, South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR).

Ethiopian mercenaries

Sudanese authorities captured six Ethiopian women in the eastern state of Al-Gadarif bordering Ethiopia who are accused of serving as RSF snipers. Sources revealed to Sudan Tribune (21 June) that the women had been operating within the RSF for over a year, leveraging their specialized sniping expertise gained in Ethiopia

Their alleged involvement in operations against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and security agencies is supported by images of military engagements and weaponry found on their phones. A video released by RSF fighters after the capture of Al-Fula also showed an Ethiopian raising his country’s flag.

South Sudanese mercenaries

Sudan Tribune (21 June) also noted that South Sudanese nationals were caught fighting alongside the RSF in Khartoum, which was reported on in March 2024. We also covered the RSF’s use of South Sudanese mercenaries in last week’s report, citing Mada Masr (7 June).

Central African Republic mercenaries

A report published by UN experts revealed how the militia are using the Am Dafok area on the Sudan-CAR border "as a key logistical hub,” with the RSF recruiting from armed rebel groups in the CAR – particularly the Popular Front since as early as August 2023 – because the militia can "move between the two countries easily through a long-standing network” (AFP, 14 June).

6. North Darfur desert war

The war in Sudan has entered a new phase as it expands into the desert regions along the Sudanese-Libyan-Chadian border, in a “desert war” over supply routes crossing through the Zurug and Wadi Ambar areas (Mada Masr, 21 June). Zurug in particularly has seen fierce clashes erupt between the RSF and the Joint Forces (the army and allied armed movements) in an extension of the fighting in Al-Fashir. With a Joint Forces official accusing the militia of burning villages near the town, it is

strategic RSF base given that it is a vital supply hub for the militia from Libya (Sudan Tribune, 17 June).

The Sudan-Libya-Chad border region in North Darfur is critical for the RSF’s operations, as it means dominance over fuel smuggling routes from Libya. The militia has also transformed its dominance over these routes into revenue sources and used it to establish networks across central and western Africa. Thus, these battles are crucial as they aim to cut off the RSF’s military supplies, depleting their resources and affecting their capabilities on multiple fronts across Sudan. However, a military source warned that this may lead the militia to launch suicidal offensives to gain control of strategic areas for loot or political leverage, especially since it does not employ defensive tactics (Mada Masr, 21 June).

7. Al-Fashir

·      The RSF is accused of genocide in Al-Fashir targeting Darfur’s non-Arab population, with the current atrocities described as worse than the Janjaweed’s ethnic slaughter of the early 2000s.

·      The death toll in Al-Fashir continues to rise amid ongoing fighting between the RSF and the Joint Forces (the army and allied armed movements).

·      The humanitarian situation continues to worsen, with an inability to access food, water or healthcare.

·      Solutions for Al-Fashir centred around calls for a UN-African Union civilian protection mission and for international pressure on the UAE which is accused of supporting the RSF.

RSF genocide in Al-Fashir

The RSF militia continue to be accused of genocide in Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur state which remains last remaining of the regions five capitals not to have fallen to the RSF. The New York Times (19 June) warn that if the city falls to the militia, “what had largely been a military clash could descend into ethnic slaughter like the violence Darfur endured in the early 2000s, when the Janjaweed, who are Arab, set upon ethnic Africans,” with the UN estimating that 300,000 were killed in the genocide. Highlight the RSF’s “systematic dehumanization” against non-Arabs in Darfur, Sudanese lawyer and legal advisor Mutasim Ali said the RSF is a “rebranded” Janjaweed with the same commanders, ethnic tribes and victim groups, albeit with sophisticated technology and weaponry due to “significant [UAE] support” (CNN, 14 June).

Nonetheless, the current RSF atrocities in Darfur are unprecedented in Sudan’s history, according to Omer Ismail, an acting foreign minister during the transitional period (2019-21) and now a researcher for the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab. The militia has been “systematically destroying civilian dwellings” in areas that have a significant population of the (non-Arab) Zaghawa tribe according to the lab. Centre for Information Resilience open-source investigator Mark Snoeck said over 50 settlements have burned repeatedly, suggesting “intent” and possible forced displacement (NBC, 16 June).

The militia’s genocidal ethnic cleansing campaign in Al-Fashir has been identified as a “scorched earth strategy”. Hager Ali, a researcher at the German think-tank GIGA Institute for Global and Area Studies, defined this as the destruction of important agricultural goods, razing villages, the systematic killing of non-Arab minorities, widespread sexual violence against women, with the aim of ensuring that "even when [the RSF] retreat, [their] enemy has absolutely nothing to gain” (DW, 19 June).

Rising death toll

The death toll continues to rise in Al-Fashir amid ongoing fighting between the RSF militia besieging the city, and the Sudanese army and allied groups defending North Darfur’s state capital.  The Director General of the Ministry of Health in North Darfur, Ibrahim Abdallah Khater, said least 246 were killed, with 2,182 injured since the conflict erupted on 10 May 2024 (Sudan Tribune, 18 June).

The following day, another 18 were killed in a relentless wave of aerial and artillery bombardments targeting al-Fasher and Kutum in North Darfur state.

The Abu Shouk camp for displaced people in Al-Fashir bore the brunt of the RSF artillery fire, claiming the lives of 14 and leaving 25 injured, including women, children, and the elderly. In Kutum, northwest of al-Fasher, army airstrikes, resulted in the deaths of four civilians. Given that the militia launches attacks on Al-Fashir from Kutum, and that it hosts a medical facility for their wounded, the town is an important strategic location for the RSF (Sudan Tribune, 19 June).

Humanitarian situation in Al-Fashir

The humanitarian situation in Al-Fashir also continues to worsen. The RSF’s seizing of the main highway highway “has largely cut off food” to a Darfur region “already grappling with famine,” with a child dying of malnutrition every two hours at a nearby displacement camp. Medical care is also in short supply in Al-Fashir with hospitals forced to close. The road out is “filled with danger,” with temperatures rising to over 49 celsius, women reporting being sexually assaulted and people finding that food and medicine are in short supply when reaching their destinations (New York Times, 19 June).

Dr. Gillian Burkhardt, who worked with Medicins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Al-Fashir said there is no food or access to healthcare in the city, with her husband, MSF logistics team leader Paul Clarke, saying moving humanitarian supplies into the city is immensely difficult amid the lack of functioning airports meaning that trucks filled with ready-made meals from neighbouring Chad take a month to reach Al-Fashir (NBC, 16 June). Yet the humanitarian situation in Al-Fashir may still get worse, with an anonymous diplomat warned that hundreds of thousands will go without water in Al-Fashir as water stations will stop working if the RSF prevent fuel going in (AFP, 16 June).

8. Solutions for Al-Fashir

To prevent the RSF from completing its genocidal project in Al-Fashir, proposed solutions directed at the international community have revolved around the deployment of a civilian protection mission, and applying pressure on the UAE which is accused of supporting the RSF.

African Union-led civilian protection mechanism

Arguing that “major powers have largely invested in a sham peace process for 14 months that is going nowhere,” international human rights lawyer Yonah Diamond called for the international community, led by the African Union, to deploy a civilian protection mechanism in al-Fashir and to explicitly threaten the UAE with consequences should it fail to restrain the RSF and continue to supply it with heavy weaponry. Diamond added that the US and the UK “have leverage to exert pressure on their ally, the UAE, to end the RSF’s genocidal campaign today” (CNN, 14 June).

Similarly, Mohamed Osman, a researcher for Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) Africa division, called on the UN and AU leadership to examine all possible options and deploy a civilian protection mission to Al-Fashir (HRW, 19 June).  

Osman’s colleague Laetitia Bader, HRW’s Deputy Africa Director, also called for the EU to actively voice support for calls for a civilian protection plan and work with the AU, the UN and others — notably the UK and the US - to achieve this. Bader also urged the EU to “act more decisively at the UN, encouraging the three African states on the UN Security Council to work toward deploying such a force” (Euronews, 20 June).

UN Security Council holding the UAE accountable

Osman urged the UN Security Council to act on findings of the UN Panel of Experts on Darfur, including on violations of the UN arms embargo by other countries, notably the UAE (HRW, 19 June).

Bader added that the EU should “press for the full enforcement of the existing UN arms embargo on Darfur, calling out countries such as the UAE violating it, and press for expanding it to all of Sudan” (Euronews, 20 June).

Support ICC investigation

Osman also called on governments to support the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor’s investigation into apparent war crimes and other atrocities in Darfur (HRW, 19 June).

Support humanitarian aid

Bader called on the EU to provide financial support and call for the protection of Sudanese local responders who are faced with providing civilians with support, food, and medical care (Euronews, 20 June).

15-21 June 2024: Sudan In The News' Weekly report: War, Humanitarian, Diplomacy

SUMMARY

Part 1 - War: The Sudanese army repelled the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militias attacks in Khartoum, with confidence that the army may turn the tide in its favour in Khartoum, Al-Jazira and the rest of Sudan should it emerge victorious over the militia in North Darfur. The RSF however seized the capital of West Kordofan state. Amid ongoing accusations of genocide in Al-Fashir, preventative solutions have been directed towards the international community.

Part 2 - Humanitarian: In the absence of a formal famine declaration, famine has already been reported in RSF-controlled Darfur. We identified five contributing factors to the famine in Sudan and four proposed solutions to mitigate it. Meanwhile, refugees fleeing the violence encounter further hardship in neighbouring countries.

Part 3 - Diplomacy: Sudan accused the UAE of supporting the RSF militia and using its influence to hinder UN Security Council discussions while the world’s response to the Sudanese crisis has been hampered by racism, the 'both sides' narrative, and “numbing”.  

PART 1: WAR REPORT

·      The Sudanese army repelled the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia’s attempt to take the strategic Armoured Corps base in Khartoum, while the RSF continued shelling civilian areas in Omdurman, including a hospital, killing three and injuring 27.

·      While the army made an advance in Al-Jazira, the RSF took the capital of West Kordofan state – Al-Fula.

·      As the army rejects peace talks, military sources and experts predict army advances Khartoum and Al-Jazira states, with a victory on the Sudanese-Libyan-Chad border in North Darfur having the potential to severely weaken the militia across Sudan.

·      Reports continue emerge of the RSF’s use of mercenaries from neighbouring countries.

·      The RSF continues to be accused of genocide in Al-Fashir, resulting in a worsening humanitarian crisis, with calls for a UN-African Union civilian protection mission and pressure on the UAE for its support of the RSF. 

1. Battle for Khartoum

·      In the Battle for Khartoum, the army fended off the RSF in a key army base south of Khartoum city and its assistant commander-in-chief expressed confidence in advance to its General Command headquarters.

·      In the city of Omdurman, however, the RSF continues to shell civilian sites, including Al-Naw Hospital where three were killed and 27 were injured.

Army victory in Khartoum

The army announced a decisive victory over RSF militants aiming to seize the Armoured Corps (silaah al-mudara’at) base south of Khartoum in Al-Shajara military district (Sudan Tribune, 17 June). A senior army source told Mada Masr (21 June) that that the RSF’s media footage of its attack highlighted issues including ammunition shortages, poor combat tactics and an insufficient number of RPG-armed soldiers needed for an assault on a military camp.

Since August 2023, the RSF has repeatedly failed in its efforts to capture the Armoured Corps, a critical asset for the Sudanese military. Their most recent attempt resulted in a strike by the SAF, routing the RSF and inflicting heavy casualties. The army has also gone on the offensive in the southern belt of Khartoum, where hostilities resumed after a two-month lull. Eyewitnesses reported drones and heavy artillery pounding RSF camps in the Sports City and surrounding areas (Sudan Tribune, 17 June). In a sign of confidence in the Battle for Khartoum, the army’s Assistant Commander-in-Chief Yassir al-Atta promised that the army will reach its General Command headquarters in due course (Mada Masr, 21 June).

Omdurman

Nonetheless, the RSF are continuing to target areas of northern Omdurman totally under army control, particularly the Karari locality. Doctors Without Borders (MSF) announced the death of three people, including a volunteer, and the injury of 27 others following intense artillery shelling by the RSF that struck al-Naw Hospital in Omdurman. The hospital has been continually targeted by the militia, which is continuing to shell civilian cites in nearby Al-Thawra neighbours which received those displaced from Khartoum and Bahri.

Among those killed in the RSF’s attack on another hospital was Sharaf Abu Al-Majd of the pro-democracy Ghadboun group, known for his active participation in anti-military coup protests, who was working as a volunteer at the hospital for months by the time of his killing (Sudan Tribune, 19 June).

2. Army gains in Al-Jazira

In Al-Jazira State in central Sudan, the military recaptured the town of Huda in the Managil locality. Since December 18, the RSF has maintained control over Al-Jazira’s capital, Wad Madani, and later extended its presence to various villages. Since April, however, the military has been amassing troops to retake the state along three axes, and it has received substantial reinforcements (Mada Masr, 21 June).

3. Growing army confidence

·      With the army rejecting peace talks, military sources and experts express confidence that the army will outmanoeuvre the RSF and make advances in Khartoum and Al-Jazira states.

·      An army and allied victory on the Sudanese-Libyan-Chad border has the potential to cut off key RSF supply routes and weaken the militia across multiple fronts.

Army rejects peace talks

In a rejection of peace talks, Yassir al-Atta, the Sudanese army’s Assistant Commander-in-Chief, said: “we will not postpone the war by concluding a truce and conducting negotiations, only for the war to return (again) after a year or two”. Al-Atta, who leads military operations in Khartoum, told his troops to ignore rumours about the resumption of negations, stressing: “true peace will be achieved through the defeat and surrender of the Janjaweed, the return of foreign Arabs to their countries of origin,” while emphasising the need to distinguish between the Darfur Arab tribes and the RSF (Sudan Tribune, 17 June).

After RSF militants failed to seize the Armoured Corps, there is reason to believe that the army is confident that it can defeat the militia militarily, with Al-Atta also promising that the army will reach its General Command HQ in Khartoum in due course.

Army confidence: Khartoum

 A senior military officer told Mada Masr (21 June) that the army’s capabilities have improved since the start of the war and that it is poised to retake the military’s General Command HQ given the favourable outcomes of the military’s siege strategy around Khartoum in recent months. The strategy has reportedly significantly disrupted RSF supply operations and lowered its troops’ morale, especially after the defeats they suffered in al-Fasher and Darfur at large.

Army confidence: al-Jazira

In Al-Jazira state, military experts anticipate a simultaneous offensive across Al-Jazira’s fronts. A field source told Mada Masr (21 June) that the military believes that the advances will be easier than expected, explaining that the onset of the rain season is likely to aid operations, as the RSF is expected to regroup in more accessible areas near supply points, facilitating confrontation.

The importance of the North Darfur desert war

Furthermore, a victory for the Joint Forces – the army and allied armed movements - in the North Darfur desert war along the Sudanese-Libyan-Chadian border has the potential to cut off the RSF’s military supplies, deplete their resources and affect their capabilities on multiple fronts across Sudan (Mada Masr, 21 June).

4. RSF take Al-Fula, West Kordofan

The RSF announced the capture of al-Fula, the capital of West Kordofan state, after the Sudanese army withdrew from its defensive positions and headquarters

a significant number of residents fled to neighbouring areas. The RSF reportedly engaged in looting in several neighbourhoods, including Al-Salam, Al-Wahda, and Al-Daraja, prompting residents to flee towards the city centre or to neighbouring localities like Al-Odaiya and Al-Nuhud. A volunteer from the El Fula Emergency Room estimated that over 60% of the city’s population had fled shortly after the RSF’s arrival. Al-Fula had previously taken in displaced individuals from the city of Babanusa and was sheltering approximately 1,618 displaced people, including 324 children and 714 women (Sudan Tribune, 20 June). 

A video released by RSF fighters after the capture of Al-Fula also showed an Ethiopian raising his country’s flag (Sudan Tribune, 21 June), which brings us onto the RSF’s use of foreign mercenaries.

5. RSF foreign mercenaries

Reports continue to emerge of the RSF’s use of foreign mercenaries from Sudan’s neighbours including the Ethiopia, South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR).

Ethiopian mercenaries

Sudanese authorities captured six Ethiopian women in the eastern state of Al-Gadarif bordering Ethiopia who are accused of serving as RSF snipers. Sources revealed to Sudan Tribune (21 June) that the women had been operating within the RSF for over a year, leveraging their specialized sniping expertise gained in Ethiopia

Their alleged involvement in operations against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and security agencies is supported by images of military engagements and weaponry found on their phones. A video released by RSF fighters after the capture of Al-Fula also showed an Ethiopian raising his country’s flag.

South Sudanese mercenaries

Sudan Tribune (21 June) also noted that South Sudanese nationals were caught fighting alongside the RSF in Khartoum, which was reported on in March 2024. We also covered the RSF’s use of South Sudanese mercenaries in last week’s report, citing Mada Masr (7 June).

Central African Republic mercenaries

A report published by UN experts revealed how the militia are using the Am Dafok area on the Sudan-CAR border "as a key logistical hub,” with the RSF recruiting from armed rebel groups in the CAR – particularly the Popular Front since as early as August 2023 – because the militia can "move between the two countries easily through a long-standing network” (AFP, 14 June).

6. North Darfur desert war

The war in Sudan has entered a new phase as it expands into the desert regions along the Sudanese-Libyan-Chadian border, in a “desert war” over supply routes crossing through the Zurug and Wadi Ambar areas (Mada Masr, 21 June). Zurug in particularly has seen fierce clashes erupt between the RSF and the Joint Forces (the army and allied armed movements) in an extension of the fighting in Al-Fashir. With a Joint Forces official accusing the militia of burning villages near the town, it is

strategic RSF base given that it is a vital supply hub for the militia from Libya (Sudan Tribune, 17 June).

The Sudan-Libya-Chad border region in North Darfur is critical for the RSF’s operations, as it means dominance over fuel smuggling routes from Libya. The militia has also transformed its dominance over these routes into revenue sources and used it to establish networks across central and western Africa. Thus, these battles are crucial as they aim to cut off the RSF’s military supplies, depleting their resources and affecting their capabilities on multiple fronts across Sudan. However, a military source warned that this may lead the militia to launch suicidal offensives to gain control of strategic areas for loot or political leverage, especially since it does not employ defensive tactics (Mada Masr, 21 June).

7. Al-Fashir

·      The RSF is accused of genocide in Al-Fashir targeting Darfur’s non-Arab population, with the current atrocities described as worse than the Janjaweed’s ethnic slaughter of the early 2000s.

·      The death toll in Al-Fashir continues to rise amid ongoing fighting between the RSF and the Joint Forces (the army and allied armed movements).

·      The humanitarian situation continues to worsen, with an inability to access food, water or healthcare.

·      Solutions for Al-Fashir centred around calls for a UN-African Union civilian protection mission and for international pressure on the UAE which is accused of supporting the RSF.

RSF genocide in Al-Fashir

The RSF militia continue to be accused of genocide in Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur state which remains last remaining of the regions five capitals not to have fallen to the RSF. The New York Times (19 June) warn that if the city falls to the militia, “what had largely been a military clash could descend into ethnic slaughter like the violence Darfur endured in the early 2000s, when the Janjaweed, who are Arab, set upon ethnic Africans,” with the UN estimating that 300,000 were killed in the genocide. Highlight the RSF’s “systematic dehumanization” against non-Arabs in Darfur, Sudanese lawyer and legal advisor Mutasim Ali said the RSF is a “rebranded” Janjaweed with the same commanders, ethnic tribes and victim groups, albeit with sophisticated technology and weaponry due to “significant [UAE] support” (CNN, 14 June).

Nonetheless, the current RSF atrocities in Darfur are unprecedented in Sudan’s history, according to Omer Ismail, an acting foreign minister during the transitional period (2019-21) and now a researcher for the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab. The militia has been “systematically destroying civilian dwellings” in areas that have a significant population of the (non-Arab) Zaghawa tribe according to the lab. Centre for Information Resilience open-source investigator Mark Snoeck said over 50 settlements have burned repeatedly, suggesting “intent” and possible forced displacement (NBC, 16 June).

The militia’s genocidal ethnic cleansing campaign in Al-Fashir has been identified as a “scorched earth strategy”. Hager Ali, a researcher at the German think-tank GIGA Institute for Global and Area Studies, defined this as the destruction of important agricultural goods, razing villages, the systematic killing of non-Arab minorities, widespread sexual violence against women, with the aim of ensuring that "even when [the RSF] retreat, [their] enemy has absolutely nothing to gain” (DW, 19 June).

Rising death toll

The death toll continues to rise in Al-Fashir amid ongoing fighting between the RSF militia besieging the city, and the Sudanese army and allied groups defending North Darfur’s state capital.  The Director General of the Ministry of Health in North Darfur, Ibrahim Abdallah Khater, said least 246 were killed, with 2,182 injured since the conflict erupted on 10 May 2024 (Sudan Tribune, 18 June).

The following day, another 18 were killed in a relentless wave of aerial and artillery bombardments targeting al-Fasher and Kutum in North Darfur state.

The Abu Shouk camp for displaced people in Al-Fashir bore the brunt of the RSF artillery fire, claiming the lives of 14 and leaving 25 injured, including women, children, and the elderly. In Kutum, northwest of al-Fasher, army airstrikes, resulted in the deaths of four civilians. Given that the militia launches attacks on Al-Fashir from Kutum, and that it hosts a medical facility for their wounded, the town is an important strategic location for the RSF (Sudan Tribune, 19 June).

Humanitarian situation in Al-Fashir

The humanitarian situation in Al-Fashir also continues to worsen. The RSF’s seizing of the main highway highway “has largely cut off food” to a Darfur region “already grappling with famine,” with a child dying of malnutrition every two hours at a nearby displacement camp. Medical care is also in short supply in Al-Fashir with hospitals forced to close. The road out is “filled with danger,” with temperatures rising to over 49 celsius, women reporting being sexually assaulted and people finding that food and medicine are in short supply when reaching their destinations (New York Times, 19 June).

Dr. Gillian Burkhardt, who worked with Medicins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Al-Fashir said there is no food or access to healthcare in the city, with her husband, MSF logistics team leader Paul Clarke, saying moving humanitarian supplies into the city is immensely difficult amid the lack of functioning airports meaning that trucks filled with ready-made meals from neighbouring Chad take a month to reach Al-Fashir (NBC, 16 June). Yet the humanitarian situation in Al-Fashir may still get worse, with an anonymous diplomat warned that hundreds of thousands will go without water in Al-Fashir as water stations will stop working if the RSF prevent fuel going in (AFP, 16 June).

8. Solutions for Al-Fashir

To prevent the RSF from completing its genocidal project in Al-Fashir, proposed solutions directed at the international community have revolved around the deployment of a civilian protection mission, and applying pressure on the UAE which is accused of supporting the RSF.

African Union-led civilian protection mechanism

Arguing that “major powers have largely invested in a sham peace process for 14 months that is going nowhere,” international human rights lawyer Yonah Diamond called for the international community, led by the African Union, to deploy a civilian protection mechanism in al-Fashir and to explicitly threaten the UAE with consequences should it fail to restrain the RSF and continue to supply it with heavy weaponry. Diamond added that the US and the UK “have leverage to exert pressure on their ally, the UAE, to end the RSF’s genocidal campaign today” (CNN, 14 June).

Similarly, Mohamed Osman, a researcher for Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) Africa division, called on the UN and AU leadership to examine all possible options and deploy a civilian protection mission to Al-Fashir (HRW, 19 June).  

Osman’s colleague Laetitia Bader, HRW’s Deputy Africa Director, also called for the EU to actively voice support for calls for a civilian protection plan and work with the AU, the UN and others — notably the UK and the US - to achieve this. Bader also urged the EU to “act more decisively at the UN, encouraging the three African states on the UN Security Council to work toward deploying such a force” (Euronews, 20 June).

UN Security Council holding the UAE accountable

Osman urged the UN Security Council to act on findings of the UN Panel of Experts on Darfur, including on violations of the UN arms embargo by other countries, notably the UAE (HRW, 19 June).

Bader added that the EU should “press for the full enforcement of the existing UN arms embargo on Darfur, calling out countries such as the UAE violating it, and press for expanding it to all of Sudan” (Euronews, 20 June).

Support ICC investigation

Osman also called on governments to support the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor’s investigation into apparent war crimes and other atrocities in Darfur (HRW, 19 June).

Support humanitarian aid

Bader called on the EU to provide financial support and call for the protection of Sudanese local responders who are faced with providing civilians with support, food, and medical care (Euronews, 20 June).

PART 2: HUMANITARIAN

• This week’s humanitarian report covers the Sudan’s famine and refugee crises.

• While no formal famine declaration has been made, reports suggest famine has reached parts of Sudan, particularly in RSF-controlled Darfur. We identified five factors contributing to this crisis: including the conduct of warring parties and the international community’s unfulfilled funding pledges. We also identified four proposed solutions, including those urging the international community to adopt innovative aid strategies.

• Sudanese refugees fleeing conflict are facing further humanitarian crises in neighboring countries, including attacks in Ethiopia and unlawful deportations from Egypt, despite their perilous journeys and challenges seeking legal entry.

1. Famine

·      In the absence of a formal famine declaration, there are reports that famine has already reached parts of Sudan, particularly territory held by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in Darfur, with projections that the situation will get worse.

·      This report identified five key challenges and contributing factors to the famine: 1) the lack of income, 2) the RSF’s looting of aid and use of starvation as a weapon of war, 3) the army hindering aid access, 4) the water crisis across Sudan and 5) funding pledges that have not materialised.

·      Nonetheless, four solutions have been aimed at the international community to mitigate the famine, ranging from applying pressure to take action to adopting innovative strategies to get aid to those who need it.

Bleak famine projections

About 70% of Sudan’s population could be “extremely hungry” by September, potentially leading to 2.5 to 4 million deaths, according to food security expert Timmo Gaasbeek (BBC, 15 June). “About 15% of the population – in Darfur and Kordofan, the hardest-hit regions, could die by the end of September,” said Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US ambassador to the UN (AFP, 15 June). Thus, USAID administrator Samantha Power said Sudan could be in worse shape than Somalia in 2011 when 250,000 people died after three consecutive seasons without enough rain, potentially ensuring that “Sudan would become the deadliest famine since Ethiopia in the early 1980s,” Power added (AFP, 15 June). 

In the absence of a formal famine declaration, the New York Times (19 June) revealed that famine has already arrived in Darfur. Reuters’ (20 June) investigation identified 14 graveyards expanding fast in Darfur showing how people are dying through starvation and disease. Only satellite images from communities that have not seen fighting in the past six months were reviewed, in order to rule out the possibility that the dead were killed in fighting. Reuters further warn that the situation is about to get worse, as Sudan entered the lean season between harvests where food is less available, and rainy season prevents journeys through roads connecting to urban centres.

Challenge 1: lack of income

Alongside the lack of food in Sudan, the remaining food is “punishingly expensive,” with Amgad Farid of Fikra Studies think-tank highlighting the decline of food imports due to inflation (BBC, 15 June).As per Mohanad Elbalal, the the co-founder of Khartoum Aid Kitchen, a crowdfunded campaign to support community kitchens in Sudan, the lack of income is contributing factor to the unfolding famine (Slate, 19 June). Indeed, a key contributing factor to the lack of income is the inability to work due to a lack of protection from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.

Challenge 2: the RSF

The RSF is considered a major contributing factor to food insecurity across Sudan, using starvation as a weapon of war in the territory it controls.

Darfur

Famine has already reached the Darfur region, where the RSF militia holds 4 out of 5 state capitals. In South Darfur, residents of Kalma camp for displaced persons are too scared to leave to find work amid the lack of protection from the RSF, with men fearing being killed and women fearing being raped (Reuters, 20 June).  

Around Al-Fashir in North Darfur, the RSF’s seizing of the main highway “has largely cut off food” to a Darfur region “already grappling with famine,” with a child dying of malnutrition every two hours at a nearby displacement camp. The road out is “filled with danger,” as temperatures rise to over temperatures rising to over 49 celsius and women report being sexually assaulted (New York Times, 19 June).  Meanwhile, in Niertiti camp in Central Darfur, no supplies are getting as the RSF plundered the harvest (Reuters, 20 June).

RSF looting

Various analysts, officials and humanitarian aid workers have attributed the famine to the RSF’s looting, including Elbalal in comments in Slate (19 June). Alex de Waal of the World Peace Foundation described the RSF as “essentially a looting machine” (BBC, 15 June), noting the militia’s tendency to “[strip] cities and countryside bare of all moveable resources” (Foreign Affairs, 17 June). Furthermore, USAID administrator Samantha Power said the RSF has been “systematically looting humanitarian warehouses, stealing food and livestock, destroying grain storage facilities and wells in the most vulnerable Sudanese communities” (AFP, 15 June).

RSF control of Sudan’s breadbasket – Al-Jazira state

In addition, the RSF’s military victories have also been identified as a contributing factor to the famine, with Amgad Faried citing the RSF’s seizing al-Jazira state “which has the biggest agricultural scheme in Sudan, and produced a lot of our daily needs” (BBC, 15 June). Nonetheless, the army have also been accused of blocking aid access.

Challenge 3: SAF accused of blocking aid access

The army has been accused of preventing aid access into RSF territory for political purposes. Power alleged the army is blocking aid from crossing the border with Chad into Darfur (AFP, 15 June). De Waal claimed that the army is “trying to starve areas under RSF control” (BBC, 15 June), with the aim of turning its fighters against its leader (Foreign Affairs, 17 June).

Jeffrey Feltman, the former US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, blamed the army for the absence of formal famine declaration despite pre-existing “famine-like conditions”. Feltman argued that the downside with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification that officially declares famine is that it requires the cooperation of the Sudanese army, who Feltman said do not want aid to flow into areas controlled by the RSF (Brookings, 20 June). However, De Waal suggests that starvation actually benefits the RSF, as the starving in Darfur are African ethnic groups that the RSF targets for ethnic cleansing (Foreign Affairs, 17 June).

Nonetheless, Khartoum Aid Kitchen co-founder Mohanad Elbalal said the army “doesn’t have an issue” with their kitchens, but the issue in RSF territory is that many community activists who would lead volunteer work are being detained or killed by the militia (Slate, 19 June).

Challenge 4: Water crisis

To worsen matters, a war crisis is enveloping Sudan from east to west, as reported by AFP (16 June). An anonymous diplomat warned that hundreds of thousands will go without water in Al-Fashir as water stations will stop working if the RSF prevent fuel going in. Meanwhile, in Khartoum, entire neighbourhoods have been without water since the war began after the Soba water station – which supplies water to much of the capital – going out of service. People are buying “untreated water off of animal-drawn carts, which they can hardly afford and exposes them to diseases”.

Similarly, in Port Sudan - which depends on one inadequate reservoir - measures to prevent contamination are hindered by displacement with hundreds of thousands fleeing to the city. Thus, cholera has become a “year-round” disease, the diplomat said, noting that the collapse of healthcare in Sudan means that “people are drinking dirty water, they are hungry and will get hungrier, which will kill many, many more”.

Challenge 5: Lack of funding

The lack of funding continues to serve as an obstacle for mitigating Sudan’s food and water crisis. The US announced another $315 million for hungry Sudanese (AFP, 15 June) but this is not considered enough. Justin Brady, head of the UN's humanitarian body (Ocha) in Sudan, said the international community has not provided the funds help those in need (BBC, 15 June).

As noted by Elbalal, the Paris donor conference in April pledged two billion euros for Sudan, but “there’s a difference between a pledge and actual donations arriving,” adding that only 15.8% of the $2.4 billion needed for Sudan’s humanitarian plan has been funded (Slate, 19 June).

Famine Solutions

Proposed solutions to mitigate the famine in Sudan have been directed towards the international community, including apply pressure on donors and states with influence over the warring parties, alongside innovative strategies to meet humanitarian demand.

Pressure international community to meet pledges

Mohanad Elbalal, the co-founder of Khartoum Aid Kitchen, suggested that pressure on the international community to meet the pledges to alleviate Sudan’s humanitarian crisis “would go a long way to actually helping Sudanese people” (Slate, 19 June).

UAE and Saudi leverage

Suggesting the UAE and Saudi Arabia have leverage over the warring parties in Sudan, Alex De Waal calls for the US and western allies to pressure the UAE and Saudi Arabia to lead on getting food aid to starving Sudanese. Yet. despite the Gulf states’ leverage, De Waal attributes their failure to “seriously engage” with the Sudan crisis to the Saudis not wanting the UAE to participate in their peace talks, and the UAE not wanting Saudis to get credit for a peace deal (Foreign Affairs, 17 June).

Recognising Sudan’s division

To overcome access limitations facing aid organisations, and with territory in Sudan divided between the army and RSF, ex-US Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman proposed recognising that Sudan is divided under at least two separate authorities, with agencies dividing which part of the country they work in (Brookings, 20 June).

Flexibility in aid grants

Feltman also called for flexibility in how assistance is delivered, noting that local emergency response rooms “are not people who can apply for aid grants” as “bureaucracies often are not fit to the purpose,” before suggesting “we need to take more risks in how we get assistance into the hands of those who are who are actually delivering” (Brookings, 20 June).

2. Refugees

·      Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries Libya, Ethiopia and Egypt are unable to escape humanitarian crises.

·      In Ethiopia, refugees that left war-torn Sudan are under attack from a militia in north-western Ethiopia’s Awlala forest, with a woman being shot dead last week.

·      Despite the perilous journeys they undertake to seek refuge, and the challenges they face seeking legal entry, Sudanese refugees are being unlawfully deported from Egypt as per Amnesty International, who also proposed a solution to avert further humanitarian suffering.

Sudanese refugees in Libya

Over 40,000 Sudanese refugees and asylum-seekers have arrived in Libya following outbreak of conflict in Sudan, the United Nations said. A statement from the UN World Food Programme (WFP) also warned of an impending humanitarian disaster if aid is not urgently provided to those in need. The estimated total number of Sudanese refugees in Libya’s Kufra city is 45,000. Authorities, however, say it is difficult to know the exact number of these displaced people due to the continuing waves of people coming from war-torn Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 17 June).

Sudanese refugees in Ethiopa

Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia continue to face the risk of death and armed attacks by Fano militants targeting them inside the Awlala forest in the Amhara region of north-western Ethiopia, which houses around 6,000 Sudanese refugees.

A Sudanese woman was killed by the Fano militia in the Awlala camp, in an attack that while a group of Sudanese women were fetching water from a well near the camp. Eight other women were injured in the attack, which involved heavy gunfire. Around 1,700 cases of assault, looting, and theft against Sudanese refugees have been reported in the area. Multiple sources have confirmed to Sudan Tribune that Ethiopian authorities have lost control over the area, leaving it vulnerable to lawlessness and violence perpetrated by Fano militias (Sudan Tribune, 18 June).

Sudanese refugees in Egypt

Despite Sudanese taking life-risking journey to seek refuge in Egypt, they are being returned to danger in Sudan in deportations that Amnesty International says are unlawful. We explored the context behind the Egypt’s restrictions of Sudanese refugees, and the challenges that prevent Sudanese refugees from entering Egypt legally, concluding with a solution proposed by Amnesty International.

Sudanese refugees being returned to war-torn Sudan

According to Amnesty International, Egyptian authorities have used EU-funded security forces in a campaign of mass arrests and forcible deportations against refugees from the Sudan war (Guardian, 19 June). Around 500,000 Sudanese refugees are estimated to have fled to Egypt after the armed conflict erupted in Sudan in April 2023 (Amnesty, 19 June), about 24% of the total who left Sudan, according to the UN’s International Organisation for Migration (Reuters, 19 June).

Amnesty (19 June), published a report entitled, “Handcuffed like dangerous criminals”: Arbitrary detention and forced returns of Sudanese refugees in Egypt, which reveals how Sudanese refugees are rounded up and unlawfully deported to Sudan without due process or opportunity to claim asylum in flagrant violation of international law. The report’s findings were summarised in a Guardian (19 June) article, which included:

·      Amnesty found that Egypt “forcibly returned an estimated 800 Sudanese detainees between January and March 2024, who were all denied the possibility to claim asylum”

·      Amnesty said a campaign of mass arrests in Cairo and neighbouring Giza, where police have “conducted mass stops and identity checks targeting black individuals, spreading fear within the refugee community”.

·      Amnesty documented 14 arrests of refugees from public hospitals in Aswan.

·      People were held in makeshift detention facilities run by Egyptian border guards, a force that has received extensive EU funding.

·      Refugees, including at least 11 children and their mothers, were taken to filthy warehouses or stables at military sites before being “forced into buses and vans and driven to the Sudanese border”.

The context of Egypt’s restrictions

A month after the war erupted in Sudan, the Egyptian government introduced a visa entry requirement for all Sudanese nationals (Amnesty, 19 June). According to Reuters (19 June), the mass arrival of Sudanese led to occasional tensions, with some Egyptians blaming Sudanese and other foreigners for pushing up rental prices, and Egyptian TV commentators citing the "burden" of millions of migrants at a time of high inflation and economic pressures. After Egypt's foreign currency shortage worsened last year many Africans arrested for not having valid papers were held in squalid conditions and asked to pay fees in dollars to avoid deportation, according to lawyers and witnesses.

With EU-funded security forces being used in a campaign of mass arrests and forcible deportations against Sudanese refugees (Guardian, 19 June), Reuters also note that “European states see Egypt as playing an important role in preventing mass migration across the Mediterranean” (Reuters, 19 June).

Challenges for Sudanese asylum seekers in Egypt

As noted by Amnesty (19 June), the Egyptian visa entry requirements leaves Sudanese fleeing with little choice but to escape through irregular border crossings. Radio Dabanga (18 June) noted the bureaucratic challenges to entering Egypt legally, seen as a “deliberate attempt to limit the influx of Sudanese refugees”:

·      Obtaining security approval for entry into Egypt is financially burdensome for many Sudanese given the obligation to use EgyptAir to reach Egypt via Cairo Airport, which is unsuitable for those arriving by land.

·      While registration with the UNHCR theoretically prevents deportation, long waiting periods, sometimes exceeding five months, complicate this.

·      Another issue is the 960km distance between Aswan and Cairo, where the UNHCR headquarters are located, as Sudanese arriving through Aswan may be stopped and asked for entry visas before reaching Cairo.

Radio Dabanga have also continued reporting on the risks that Sudanese are enduring in their attempts to find refuge in Egypt, having last week covered 25 to 50 Sudanese dying on the road to Egypt from scorching heat (Radio Dabanga, 11 June). Indeed, Egyptian authorities deported hundreds back to Sudan who had reached Aswan facing harsh humanitarian conditions during the journey, with high temperatures and insufficient food and drink exacerbating their suffering, with many having chronic diseases (Radio Dabanga, 18 June).

Solution

Amnesty International (19 June) call for Egyptian authorities to immediately cease the mass arbitrary arrests and unlawful deportations of Sudanese refugees who had crossed the border into Egypt seeking refuge from the conflict in Sudan, suggesting that rounding up and deportation of Sudanese refugees was without due process or opportunity to claim asylum is a “flagrant violation of international law”.

PART 3: DIPLOMACY

·      In this week’s diplomacy developments, Sudan’s ambassador to the UN provided evidence in accusing the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia at a UN Security Council session.

·      There were also reports of the UAE using its influence over UN Security Council members to prevent Sudan’s grievances being discussed.

·      The UN Security Council’s resolution to end the RSF’s siege on Al-Fashir was criticised for coming too late and not calling out the UAE.

·      Analysts downplayed the impact of Sudan’s weapons agreement with Russia.

·      Racism, the both sides narrative and physical numbing have been argued to be factors for the world “overlooking” Sudan’s crisis.

Sudan confronts the UAE at the UN security council

Multiple sources (18 June) reported that, in a UN Security Council (UNSC) session, Sudan’s ambassador to the UN, Al-Harith Idriss, accused the UAE of providing weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. "The military aggression launched by the RSF, supported with weapons by the Emirates, is deliberately and systematically targeting the villages and cities," Idriss said.

"The UAE must stay away from Sudan! That is the first requirement that will allow for stability in Sudan. It must stop its support,” Idriss added.  

Idriss accused the UAE of assisting RSF forces through militias in Chad, southern Libya and central Africa, adding that Sudan has submitted copies of a half dozen UAE passports found on the battlefield in Khartoum to the council to back up their claims of Emirati interference. He also said that wounded RSF fighters are being airlifted to Dubai for medical treatment.

Idriss further accused on the UAE of using its influence on the UNSC to avoid accountability for supporting the militia. As reported by PassBlue (15 June), a woman-led media company covering the UN, when the UAE was an elected member of the UNSC from January 2022 to December 2023 it “kept Sudan off the agenda”. Sudan’s requests for open emergency meetings in April and May 2024 were rebuffed by monthly rotating presidents Malta and Mozambique respectively, who held private consultations meaning Idriss could not participate.

Malta said it was because the Sudanese ambassador sent his request in Arabic. PassBlue note that the UNSC has no written rule on language requirements. Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Africa Programme,  said: “we have underestimated the destructive and irresponsible power of the UAE [who] used the fact that it controls five major ports in Mozambique to make sure that Mozambique did not host a meeting investigating allegations against the UAE.” 

Criticism of the UN Security Council resolution

PassBlue’s (15 June) article carried criticisms of the UN Security Council resolution to end the RSF siege on al-Fashir. Cameron Hudson said it “comes much too late to save many [who have and] will die because of the existing conditions.” PassBlue noted that the resolution did not call out the UAE, who Sudan’s government say has provided weapons used to displace and kill predominantly non-Arab groups and rape hundreds of women.

Russia

DW’s (16 June) feature piece on Sudan’s agreement to allow Russia to build a naval base on the Red Sea in exchange for weapons carried insights from analysts who expressed uncertainty that the Sudanese army will get the support it seeks.

Political scientist Andreas Heinemann-Grüder from the Center for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies said it is unknown what weapons Russia has offered, noting Russian skepticism when the Sudanese army previously wanted fighter aircraft and air defence missiles.

Hager Ali of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies said “Russia holds good card in the negotiations,” as “the longer the conflict lasts, the more weapons [the army] needs. That is particularly true of the Sudanese air force, which has to operate in remote regions”. Ali adds that the same applies to diesel fuel, which has long been in short supply, noting that Russia may now deliver it through its base in Sudan rather than through Chad via the Wagner militia.

The global neglect of Sudan

In this week’s analysis, various factors were provided for why Sudan’s war is being “overlooked”, ranging from numbing to racism to the “both sides narrative”.

Physic numbing

Melissa Fleming, the under-secretary-general for global communications at the UN, attributed the lack of attention to psychic numbing," which refers to “the sad reality that people feel more apathetic towards a tragedy as the number of victims increases”. DW (14 June) add  that “research has previously shown that civil wars — especially those seen as internal matters in a faraway country — get less attention than conflicts where one country attacks another”.

Racism

Mohanad Elbalal, the co-founder of Khartoum Aid Kitchen, a crowdfunded campaign to support community kitchens in Sudan,” told Slate (19 June) “there’s a feeling that prejudices – [that this is just Africans killing Africans] might lead people to care less” about Sudan. Similarly, Sudan expert Roman Deckert noted “a deeply ingrained, potentially even subconscious, racism or Eurocentrism…where outsiders incorrectly perceive the fighting as somehow ‘uncivilized’ or ‘typical’".

“Both sides narrative”

In addition, Deckert attributed the lack of attention on Sudan to the “complexity of the situation, where neither side is obviously ‘good or evil’" (DW, 14 June).

7-14 June 2024: Sudan In The News weekly report

This is the Sudan In The News weekly report, rounding up news, analysis and proposed solutions for Sudan published from 7 to 14 June 2024.

Summary

The report covers the following:

·      1. War: Amid the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) ongoing siege on Al-Fashir, the militia has also perpetrated massacres and crimes across Sudan this week. The army’s military’s successes were also covered. 

·      2. Humanitarian: Famine is estimated to reach 756,000 by September 2024, with the number of internally displaced in Sudan now exceeding ten million. The report also covers the plight of Sudanese refugees in an Ethiopiam forest and Sudanese dying on the road to refuge in Egypt.

·      3. Politics: The Taqadum coalition of civilians continues to attract the ire of the army, while causing a divide within one of its most influential political parties. 

·      4. Diplomacy: As the international community responded to the RSF massacre in Al-Jazira and siege in Al-Fashir, more information has come to light on the military government’s weapons agreement with Russia.

·      5. Analysis: The analysis section covered obstacles to resolving the humanitarian crisis, accusations over Taqadum’s perceived alliance with the RSF, Sudan turning to Russia and Iran amid the US’ lack of influence, and contributing factors as to why Sudan fails to command the international community and media’s attention. 

·      6. Solutions: Alongside proposed solutions for alleviating the looming famine, recommendations were also were directed towards Taqadum, the US and the UN Security Council.

1. War

·      1.1 – RSF siege in Al-Fashir: as the RSF siege in al-Fashir continues, the militia put the last functioning hospital in the city out of service.

·      1.2 – RSF crimes across Sudan: Further information came to light of the RSF’s massacre in Wad al-Noura village the previous week, with the militia also perpetrating massacres in Sennar and Khartoum states.

·      1.3 – Army successes: The army and allied forces in Al-Fashir killed the RSF’s commander in the city. The army also broke the militia’s siege in Babanusa, West Kordofan.

1.1 Al-Fashir: the RSF siege continues

Amid growing fears of an RSF genocide in Al-Fashir, the militia put the city’s most capable hospital out of service in its ongoing siege. 

1.1.1 Genocide

The situation in Sudan bears “all the marks of genocide,” according to Alice Nderitu, the UN special adviser on the prevention of genocide, with “civilians being attacked and killed because of the color of their skin, because of their ethnicity, because of who they are” (DW, 7 June). This is particularly evident in Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur which remains the only state capital in Darfur not taken by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia (Multiple sources, 13 June). Indeed, in Darfur, rights groups say that the RSF is using rape as a weapon of war, and is targeting darker-skinned Masalit people and other non-Arab groups in a campaign of ethnic cleansing (BBC, 10 June). As noted by Philip van Niekerk, smaller militias representing African tribes have joined forces with the army – known as the ‘Joint Forces’ - to defend Al-Fashir “while Arab groups from as far afield as northern Nigeria…have joined up with the RSF – and have no intention of going home” (Daily Maverick, 13 June).

1.1.2 RSF attacks on Abu Shouk IDP camp

In the latest developments of the RSF’s siege of Al-Fashir, four civilians – three of them children - were killed in artillery shelling by the militia on Abu Shouk camp for internally displaced persons. With the camp hosting many displaced from other parts of Darfur by the RSF, it has been under fire for several weeks as part of the RSF’s campaign of indiscriminate shelling and attacks on residential neighbourhoods (Radio Dabanga, 9 June). Leaving the city has proven dangerous, as residents say those fleeing have been attacked and even killed on the main RSF-controlled road out of the city (Multiple sources, 9 June).

1.1.3 RSF attacks last hospital in Al-Fashir

An incident that was covered by global media was the South Hospital - the main hospital in Al-Fashir – being put of service following an RSF attack. It was the only hospital in the city capable of handling daily mass casualty events according to Doctors Without Borders (MSF). Michele Lacharite, the head of MSF emergencies, said: “it is outrageous that the RSF opened fire inside the hospital. This is not an isolated incident - staff and patients have endured attacks on the facility for weeks from all sides, but opening fire inside a hospital crosses a line” (Multiple sources, 9 June). Eyewitnesses say the RSF opened fire and looted drugs, medical equipment, stole an ambulance and assaulted staff (BBC, 10 June).

It subsequently transpired that the RSF exploited a security lapse before attacking the hospital, with Sudan Tribune’s (10 June) military source saying that elements of the Joint Force received deceptive orders from individuals disguised in Joint Force uniforms, instructing them to retreat due to inclement weather and rain, before an RSF unit using civilian vehicles entered the city centre through this opening and attacked the South Hospital, the only functioning medical facility in the area.

With the South Hospital in Al-Fashir being put out of service by RSF attacks, the WHO said that more than 70% of hospitals in conflict-affected states of Sudan and 45% of health facilities in another five states are not working (Reuters, 12 June).

1.2. RSF crimes in other parts of Sudan

·      More information came to light about the RSF’s massacre on Wad al-Noura village in Al-Jazeera state that killed hundreds, with residents having no option but to defend themselves from a militia that is reportedly out of control and attacking neighbourhoods for financial gain.

·      In neighbouring Sennar state, the RSF has reportedly killed at least 20 in

·      In Khartoum state, RSF shelling in Omdorman has reportedly killed at least 40, with the militia reportedly killing disabled individuals on site. Reports have also emerged of South Sudanese mercenaries fighting alongside the militia.

1.2.1 Al-Jazira: Wad al-Noura

More information has come to light following the RSF’s massacre on Wad al-Noura village in Al-Jazira state which killed hundreds. According to Mada Masr (7 June), eyewitnesses said the RSF’s first attempt to raid another village was thwarted by resistance from locals and the Sudanese air force, before the RSF redirected their attack towards Wad al-Noura with around 15 combat vehicles and heavy weaponry, including Katyusha rockets and anti-aircraft guns. A local medical source said most of the casualties were deliberate targets. 

The Middle East Eye (7 June) reported that the massacre was prompted by the militia’s fear of growing resistance, with an anonymous source who fled Al-Jazira for al-Gadarif state in eastern Sudan saying: “the people of al-Jazira have the right to defend themselves as long as the RSF want to kill them and the army is derelict in its duty to defend civilians and the entire country”. Groups that are forming defence groups in areas the RSF is attacking deny accusations that they are backed by hardline Islamists.

As per Mada Masr (7 June), the RSF’s presence in Al-Jazira is divided under four leaderships, with a field military source indicating the undisciplined nature of these RSF combat units, “as they do not follow military orders, and are primarily motivated by looting and theft [and] consequently, attack villages and neighborhoods for financial gain.”

1.2.2 Sennar: another RSF massacre

The RSF committed a new massacre targeting civilians, this time in the village of Sheikh Al-Samani (Sennar State), which killed at least 20 civilians and wounded 25 others as a result of artillery shelling. Residents of the village reported that some victims of RSF attack were “torn to pieces” with others transferred to Sennar Hospital for treatment. There was subsequently a mass exodus of the village’s residents for fear of further attacks from RSF stationed in east Sennar (Meda Meek, 14 June).

1.2.3 Khartoum

In Sudan’s capital state, reports emerged of RSF mass killings in Omdurman and Bahri, alongside the militia’s use of South Sudanese mercenaries.  

1.2.3.1 RSF shelling in Omdurman kills 40

According to the Karari Resistance Committee, about 40 were killed in “violent artillery fire” by the RSF in Omdurman. The committee, which is one of hundreds of grassroots pro-democracy groups that coordinate aid across Sudan, also said that over 50 were injured, “some seriously” (AFP, 7 June).

1.2.3.2 RSF killing disabled

Several mentally disabled individuals have been killed in various areas of Khartoum by the RSF, either by shooting or torture. Two members of Emergency Committees in Bahri confirmed that more than three mentally disabled people were shot on sight by RSF militants, with a Bahri resident who fled to South Sudan saying he witnessed the killing of three mentally disabled people at different times. The RSF reportedly justifying the killings of some residents by claiming the individuals posed a danger to them (Sudan Tribune, 10 June).

1.2.3.3 South Sudanese mercenaries

Mada Masr (7 June) reported that a South Sudanese delegation engaged in discussions with Sudanese officials in Port Sudan. Among the topics on the agenda was Sudan’s concern over South Sudanese militias fighting alongside the RSF

The Sudanese military had previously released footage of South Sudanese mercenaries fighting in the RSF’s ranks, stating that they were apprehended following the military’s recapture of Old Omdurman in March 2024. Two military sources in the Signal Corps in the capital’s Bahri city and the Armored Corps in southern Khartoum told Mada Masr that the majority of RSF fighters involved in the attacks on the two camps are affiliated with South Sudanese militias.

1.3. Army successes 

·      There were celebrations on the streets of Al-Fashir despite the ongoing RSF siege after the Joint Forces killed the RSF militia’s commander of operations.

·      In West Kordofan, the army broke the five-month RSF siege on the 22nd Infantry Division HQ of Babanusa.

·      The army also announced that it shot down drones in the White Nile state and Omdurman.

1.3.1 Joint Forces resistance in al-Fashir

As the RSF siege on Al-Fashir continued, the Joint Forces destroyed seven RSF vehicles and killed several of their militants, alongside shooting down an RSF drone

near the Abu Shouk camp (Sudan Tribune, 11 June). At least 35 civilians were reportedly killed between 10 and 12 June due to the RSF’s heavy artillery shelling. With Al-Fashir’s healthcare system under strain amid the South Hospital being put out of service and the Sayyid al-Shuhada Centre severely lacking in medical supplies, victims of the RSF’s shelling are being transferred to the army’s medical corps, while others receive treatment at home (Sudan Tribune, 12 June).

Celebrations then erupted in Al-Fashir after the Joint Forces killed Ali Yaqoub, commander of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) operations in al-Fasher. Yaqoub, a former tribal militia leader in Central Darfur state, was accused of widespread violations and crimes against the Fur ethnicity before joining the RSF and assuming command of the Central Darfur sector. He played a crucial role in the RSF’s operations in Darfur (Sudan Tribune, 14 June).

1.3.2 West Kordofan: Army breaks the Babanusa siege

In a military success, the Sudanese army broke the RSF siege on its 22nd Infantry Division HQ in Babanusa, West Kordofan after regaining several neighbourhoods in the city. Since January 2024, the RSF had attempted to seize seize control of the 22nd Infantry Division but faced stiff resistance from the army. The intense fighting in West Kordofan has displaced over 50,000 people, who are now living in dire conditions in displacement centres. The assault on Babanusa coincided with a growing rift within the Misseriya tribe, the second-largest ethnic group from which many RSF soldiers and officers hail. In early June, a high-ranking Misseriya delegation from West Kordofan arrived in Port Sudan to declare their support for the armed forces and reject the RSF’s control of their territories (Sudan Tribune, 9 June).  

1.3.3 RSF drones shot down

The army announced that it shot down four RSF drones above Kosti and Kenana in White Nile state, and two in the neighbourhood of the Wadi Sayedna army base in Omdurman (Multiple sources, 7 June). Sudan Tribune’s sources suggest that the RSF launched the drones from the Jebel Aulia area, located in the far south of Khartoum and adjacent to the White Nile state. RSF drones have been targeting towns and cities in the so-called ‘safe states’ in northern and eastern Sudan this year.

2. Humanitarian

·      2.1 - Famine: Although a formal famine declaration in Sudan is yet to be made, preliminary projections are that an estimated 756,000 will face catastrophe or famine by September 2024.

·      2.2 - Displacement: The number of internally displaced in Sudan has reached over ten million as per the UN. Meanwhile, there has been media coverage of the plight of Sudanese refugees in an Ethiopia forest and Sudanese dying by the dozens on their way to seek refuge in Egypt.

2.1 Famine

The World Health Organisation (WHO) said that mass starvation is a "very real risk" in some regions of war-torn Sudan (Reuters, 12 June). In addition, the US’ envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello, said parts of Sudan are in famine, although the extent of extreme hunger remained unclear (Reuters, 11 June).

A formal famine declaration has not yet been made in Sudan. Famines are determined through a complex set of technical criteria set called the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), an initiative of UN agencies, regional bodies and aid groups (Reuters, 11 June). The IPC’s famine determination scale has five classifications: ranging from Phase 1 (no serious food issues), to Phase 5 (catastrophe or famine) (Reuters, 13 June).

A preliminary IPC projection warns that an estimated 756,000 people in Sudan will face a Phase 5 catastrophe between June and September 2024 across 32 localities and clusters. 15% of the population faced IPC 5 catastrophic conditions in Al-Fashir and nearby Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons. Three other areas were cited where 10% of the population had reached the threshold. Many of the areas in the projection where seized by the RSF (Reuters, 13 June). 

2.2 Displacement and refugees

The UN’s migration agency – the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) – said the number of internally displaced in Sudan has reached over 10 million. The internally displaced include 2.8 million who fled their homes before the war began, with another two million driven abroad, mostly to neighbouring Chad, South Sudan Egypt and Ethiopia (AP, 10 June). Media coverage over the past week has brought attention to the plight of Sudanese refugees in the latter two countries in particular.

2.2.1 Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia

Reuters (7 June) reported on around around 8,000 Sudanese refugees stranded in a forest in the Amhara region of northern Ethiopia following repeated attacks by gunmen on Kumer and Awlala refugee camps. With the refugees staying in makeshift dwellings made out of branches, cholera has spread in Kumer amid a shortage of doctors and the refugees face violence when venturing to the valley to wash.  Many of them began a 10-day hunger strike over conditions as supplies ran low, which they stopped after donations came in from Sudanese abroad, the only assistance received so far. 6,000 walked to the UN refugee agency’s HQ in Amhara to protest their conditions but were stopped by police, whereas 2,000 had to flee Kumer camp after gunmen fired at them.

2.2.2 Sudanese refugees dying on the way to Egypt

Meanwhile, dozens of Sudanese attempting to cross the border into Egypt to escape the war died from scorching heat, as hospitals in Aswan, Egypt reportedly received dozens of Sudanese bodies. Reports on the number of deaths vary. Medameek reported 24 dead, while Mada Masr cited up to 50. According to the Refugee Platform in Egypt (RPE), between June 7 and June 9, 40 people were killed, including children, women, and entire families. The number is expected to rise as more bodies are uncovered. The Sudanese General Consul in Aswan, Abdelgadir Abdallah noted the dangers of smuggling between Egypt and Sudan, stating that those who resort to this method often do so because they are unable to obtain a visa or their residency in Egypt expired (Radio Dabanga, 11 June).

2.2.3 Elfashir’s displaced

Amid the RSF siege on Al-Fashir, there is a continous influx of those entering areas controlled by Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdelwahid Nur. Mohamed Abdel Rahman Alnayer, spokesperson for the movement, said that many of Elfashir’s displaced are suffering from hunger and disease, with children, with dozens dying daily due to malnutrition and lack of medicine. While the SLM-Nur is providing security and shelter for the displaced, it lacks the resources to provide adequate food and medical care due to the overwhelming numbers, Alnayer added before calling for assistance from the international community and humanitarian organisations (Sudan Tribune, 11 June).  

3. Politics

As divisions arise within the National Umma Party (NUP) over its position within the Taqadum coalition, army leader Abdelfattah Al-Burhan strongly criticised the coalition amid its perceived ties to the RSF.

3.1 NUP rifts over Taqadum

An internal rift in the National Umma Party (NUP) is reportedly widening over its stance on the Taqadum coalition. While NUP Deputy Chairman Mohamed Abdallah Al-Douma stated that the party leadership considers those participating in the Tagadum founding conference to be violating party decisions, the party’s leader - Fadlallah Burma Nasir insists on participating in the coalition, threatening to refer his deputies to the disciplinary committee. NUP Secretary-General Al-Watheq Al-Berair, Political Bureau member Zainab al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, and her brother Siddiq participated in the Tagadum conference in Addis Ababa the previous week (Sudan Tribune, 7 June).

3.2 Burhan threatens Taqadum

Army leader Abdelfattah Al-Burhan vowed to hold Taqadum’s leaders accountable, accusing them of colluding with the RSF and conspiring to kill Sudanese citizens. Al-Burhan said: “we are astonished and dismayed by those who rejoice at the death of Sudanese citizens, their looting, and the rape of girls while speaking about the government’s illegitimacy” (Sudan Tribune, 7 June).

4. Diplomacy

·      4.1 – International reactions to Wad al-Noura massacre: Despite international condemnations of the RSF massacre in Wad al-Noura, the African Union was criticised for not naming the perpetrators. The Sudanese government also took offence to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ statement.

·      4.2 - Al-Fashir: The US said it will not recognise Darfur as a breakaway state should it fall to the RSF, as the UN Security Council passed a resolution to demand the RSF halt its siege on the city. 

·      4.3 – Sudan-Russia ties: More details emerged of Sudan’s agreement with Russia

·      4.4 - Iran and the UAE: both states have been accused of breaching a UN arms embargo by supplying the army and RSF respectively.

4.1 Wad al-Noura reactions

The RSF massacre in Wad al-Noura was condemned by the US (AFP, 7 June), the UN (Sudan Tribune, 7 June) and the EU (7 June). The African Union also condemned the massacre, although its statement did not mention the perpetrators (7 June) which triggered negative reactions by Sudanese Twitter users.

The Sudanese government’s National Mechanism for Human Rights also reacted negative to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk’s response to the massacre. The mechanism criticised phrases in Türk’s statement that it interpreted as justifying the attack, emphasising that targeting civilians is a consistent tactic of the RSF, alongside denouncing Türk’s call for the RSF to investigate the incident, arguing that it lacks the necessary command structure and has devolved into “gangs of looting and killing” (Sudan Tribune, 11 June).

4.2 Al-Fashir

The US envoy to Sudan said that the US will not recognise Darfur as a breakaway state should it fall to the RSF. The International Criminal Court is calling for evidence to investigate ethnically-motivated attacks in Al-Fashir, while the UN Security Council passed a resolution to demand the RSF halt its siege on the city. 

4.2.1 US will not recognise RSF breakaway state

Warning that Al-Fashir could fall to the RSF imminently, US envoy to Sudan Tom Perriello told the BBC (11 June) that if some in the RSF think capturing al-Fashir will help them establish Darfur as a breakaway state, the US would not recognise an independent Darfur "under any circumstances". Al-Fashir remains the last of Darfur’s five state capitals not yet taken by the RSF.

4.2.2 ICC Al-Fashir investigations

The International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor Karim Khan is urgently investigating allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Darfur city of al-Fashir. His investigators had seen credible allegations of what looked like ethnically-motivated attacks against the civilian population, widespread use of rape and attacks against hospitals, he added. Khan called for anyone with possible evidence, video or audio material to submit it to his office (Multiple sources, 11 June).

4.2.3 UN Security Council on Al-Fashir

The UN Security Council adopted a British-drafted resolution that demands the RSF halt the siege of Al-Fashir. The resolution, which was approved by a vote of 14-0 with Russia abstaining, expresses “grave concern” at the spreading violence and credible reports that the RSF are carrying out “ethnically motivated violence” in al-Fashir. The resolution demands that the RSF and government forces ensure the protection of civilians, including allowing those wishing to move in Al-Fashir or leave the North Darfur capital to safer areas (Multiple sources, 13 June).

4.3 Sudan-Russia relations

Mada Masr (7 June) shed more light on Sudan’s agreement to provide Russia a logistics supply center on the Red Sea in exchange for weapons and ammunition.

Russia reportedly demands that Sudan cease dealings with Ukraine, allocate mining areas, and commence naval base construction while the Sudanese government requested that the Wagner group not engage with the RSF and that the Sudanese Armed Forces are supplied with ammunition and weapons.

4.4 Iran and UAE

The BBC (13 June) reported on allegations that Iran and the UAE are violating a UN arms embargo by supplying drones to the warring parties in Sudan. The army’s recapturing of the state broadcaster’s HQ in March was attributed to Iranian made drones, particularly the Mohajer-6, with Wim Zwijnenburg of the Humanitarian Disarmament Project at PAX saying they “are very effective because they can identify targets accurately with minimal training”. The BBC add that evidence emerged of the RSF using quadcopter drones capable of dropping 120mm mortar shells, with Brian Castner, a weapons expert at Amnesty International, points the finger at the UAE 

5. Analysis

·      5.1 - Humanitarian crisis: obstacles to resolving the humanitarian crisis identified include funding shortfalls, hindrances to agricultural harvesting and political disagreements preventing humanitarian aid.

·      5.2 - Politics: While the Taqadum coalition of civilians continues to be considered the only viable option for the international community, it continues to face accusations of allying with the RSF.

·      5.3 - Diplomacy: Analysts offered a range of views on Sudan’s army turning to Russia and Iran for help, with disagreement over the extent of the US’ leverage and influence on the warring parties.

·      5.4 – Lack of attention on Sudan: the inability to differentiate between the RSF and an army believed to be linked to Islamists is considered by analysts a contributing factor to global inaction on the Sudan crisis.

5.1 Obstacles to resolving the humanitarian crisis in Sudan

·      5.1.1 - Various UN agencies are complaining the alleviating the humanitarian crisis is being hindered funding shortfalls.

·      5.1.2 - As Sudanese people are resulting to eating tree leaves, mitigating the famine is hampered by factors preventing agricultural harvesting including the RSF’s looting of agricultural maintenance equipment and cash liquidity shortages.

·      5.1.3 - In the Nuba Mountains, aid delivery is being impeded by political disagreements, with the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement faction of Abdelaziz Al-Hilu calling for a political agreement to precede humanitarian relief. 

5.1.1 Humanitarian crisis: Funding shortfalls

Amid the looming famine and displacement crisis, aid agencies are reportedly struggling to keep up with rising needs. Mohamed Refaat, Sudan Chief of Mission for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said: "funding shortfalls are impeding efforts to provide adequate shelter, food and medical assistance” (Reuters, 7 June).

William Spindler, spokesperson for the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), said that the UN’s efforts in Sudan have been severely hampered by the lack of funding. Funding for humanitarian aid in Sudan is severely lacking, with only 165 ($432 million) raised out of the $2.7 billion needed to reach 14 million people (Sudan Tribune, 8 June).  Indeed, a report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), close to 1.1 million people were denied crucial humanitarian assistance in Sudan during May 2024, in a situation that has been deteriorating since April 2024. The affected areas include Kordofan, Darfur, Khartoum, and Al-Jazira states, with the main reasons cited as denial of travel permits, border crossing restrictions, insecurity, and obstructions by parties involved in the conflict (Sudan Tribune, 8 June).

5.1.2 Famine: obstacles to harvesting

Radio Dabanga (11 June) reported that locals in the Nuba Mountains are resorting to eating tree leaves as the war reduces chances of a successful agricultural harvest. Contributing factors include the maintenance of agricultural machinery being hindered by the RSF’s looting and sabotage of maintenance stores and agricultural machinery, with the RSF’s advances in the Kordofan region causing skilled workers to flee. In addition, there are challenges financing agricultural operations, with distribution stations supplying fuel to agricultural projects ceasing operations leading petrol prices to soar amid pre-existing cash liquidity shortages.

5.1.3 Famine: The politics of aid delivery

Aid delivery is being hindered by the politicisation of the humanitarian crisis. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, which controls territory in the Nuba Mountains, urged UN agencies to refrain from cooperating with the Sudanese government’s plans to deliver aid without a comprehensive agreement with all warring factions. Negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SPLM-N regarding aid delivery to the Nuba Mountains reached an impasse. The SPLM-N insists on a nationwide aid distribution plan, while the army claims that the talks have stalled due to the SPLM-N’s insistence on involving the RSF in humanitarian arrangements (Sudan Tribune, 8 June).

5.2 Politics: the Taqadum-RSF alliance

Writer Ahmed Mahmoud Kanem, who is opposed to both the army and the RSF, argues that an obstacle to the international community’s efforts to prevent the war is that the view that there is “no other option but Taqadum”. However, Kanem argues that the civilian coalition  “threw themselves into the arms” of the RSF, upon the assumption of their shared enemy in the Islamists. Nonetheless, Kanem warns that Taqadum’s alliance with the RSF is dangerous on the basis that the latter’s rebellion is not revolutionary, seeks to maintain and expand the RSF’s financial and political power, and has ethnic goals that contradict Taqadum’s slogans on Sudan’s unity (Al-Rakoba, 8 June).

5.3 Diplomacy: Russia and Iran’s influence in Sudan grows as the US’ expense

With the US argued to lack leverage in Sudan, the army turning to Russia and Iran to aid its effort against the RSF triggered a diverse range of views from analysts.

Political analyst Magdy Abdelqayyum was quoted in Mada Masr (7 June) to say the Sudanese-Russian agreement is needed as it “thwarts the US-sponsored project of dismantling and fragmenting Sudan, which is facilitated by the UAE through the RSF militarily and [Taqadum] as a civilian political cover”. By contrast, Cameron Hudson, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, challenged notions of US influence or leverage in Sudan. Noting that the army “has turned to Russia and Iran as suppliers of last resort and over whom the US has no direct leverage,” Hudson said “the US should have been using its leverage over countries like the UAE to suspend their support for this war…and it should have been encouraging other closer allies of the US who are inclined to support Sudan’s army, like Turkey or Egypt, to do so (Fox News, 10 June).

Writer Nidal Abdulwahab attributed Russia and Iran’s growing influence in Sudan to the US “falling in line” with Arab countries that “do not support democracy in Sudan” (Al-Rakoba, 8 June). Nonetheless, African affairs analyst Adel Ahmed Ibrahim argued that the Sudanese-Russian agreement may exert pressure on the RSF to go to the Jeddah platform to seek an agreement to stop the war (Mada Masr, 7 June).

5.4 Diplomacy: lack of attention on Sudan

Sudan analysis over the past week has also explored the international community’s perceived inaction, with Hudson said to “complain” the international community’s “responsibility-to-protect” doctrine has been shelved as “we are forced to watch in real-time as the noose tightens around millions of civilians begging to be saved,” with Sudan being “deprioritised” rather than “ignored” (Daily Maverick, 13 June).

 World Politics Review (11 June) argue that the international community’s failure to address the Sudan crisis “ultimately amounts to a choice”. WPR suggested that the civil war in Sudan has received little to no international attention or diplomatic engagement,” as the US and Europe remain focused on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, “and Sudan’s crisis is not yet driving the kind of mass migration into the EU that would get European countries to pay closer attention”.

5.4.1 The “both sides: narrative

With the regards to the international media, the lack of attention on Sudan was attributed to it being unclear “who the good guys are,” argues Philip van Niekerk, who wrote that “while the RSF have been rightly condemned for looting and pillage…it was [Al-Burhan] who led the coup that ended [Sudan’s] democratic experiment,” with the army “still allied with the Islamists” (Daily Maverick, 13 June). Writer Ahmed Mahmoud Kanem identified similar reasons behind the international community’s “failure” to stop the war in Sudan, arguing that while the the danger of the RSF is understood, supporting the army risks reviving the Sudanese Islamic movement (Al-Rakoba, 8 June).

6. Solutions

Proposed solutions for resolving the crisis in Sudan have been directed towards the Taqadum coalition, the international community, UN Security Council and the US.

6.1 Breaking up the Taqadum-RSF alliance

For Taqadum to gain respect from Sudanese people and the international community, writer Ahmed Mahmoud Kanem argues that the coalition “must be freed from [its] dangerous dependency” on the RSF. Kanem argues that the main reason behind the international community’s failure of to stop the war in Sudan is that while the danger of the RSF is understood, supporting the army risks reviving the Sudanese Islamic movement, leaving no other option but Taqadum. However, since the war began, Kanem argues that Taqadum “threw themselves into the arms” of the RSF, upon the assumption of their shared enemy in the Islamists (Al-Rakoba, 8 June).

6.2 Famine prevention

Oliver Kiptoo Kirui, who co-authored the Sudan National Household Survey, recommended various solutions to alleviate the risks of famine in Sudan (Conversation, 12 June).

·      Immediate humanitarian aid: rapid deployment of food aid and nutritional support; opening and maintaining secure humanitarian corridors for uninterrupted aid delivery.

·      Support for agricultural production: providing farmers with seeds, tools and training; initiatives to improve water management and irrigation infrastructure; long-term investments in sustainable farming practices and infrastructure.

·      Economic support: financial aid, reducing inflation and ensuring the availability of affordable basic goods.

·      Conflict resolution and security: efforts to mediate the conflict and establish peace to allow safe access for humanitarian efforts.

·      International coordination: a coordinated international response to ensure efficient use of resources and address displaced populations’ needs; Collaboration and resource-sharing among humanitarian actors can enhance the effectiveness of aid delivery.

6.3 Human rights

A group of 118 feminist, women’s human rights, and human rights groups call on the members of the UN Security Council to (International Service for Human Rights):

• Protect civilians and protect women and girls under the UNSC Resolution 1325 specifically addressing women’s human rights in conflict and create a monitoring and reporting mechanisms on the widespread conflict-related sexual violence the Sudan war.

• Create a mechanism to guarantee immediate and unconditional access for humanitarian aid.

• Immediately restore telecommunications across the country 

• Ensure that accountability is guaranteed against warring parties for the war crimes committed and genocide perpetrated against certain tribes in Darfur.

• Extend the arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan and create effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the embargo.

• Refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) so that the ICC’s jurisdiction is extended to include all conflict areas in Sudan.

6.4 RSF and Islamist terrorist classification

Writer Nidal Abdulwahab called for the US to consider both the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the RSF to be considered terrorist movements, especially in the event of their failure to fully comply with the cessation of the war. He argued that it would be in the US’ regional interest to restrain the UAE and prevent it from supporting the Rapid Support militia (RSF), and prevent Russian and Iranian influence in Sudan from expanding.

Sudan In The News' weekly report (31 May - 6 June 2024)

Summary

A round-up of key Sudan news, analysis and proposed solution published from 31 May to 6 June 2024.

·      1. War: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia has been accused of genocide in Wad Al-Noura village in Al-Jazira State and Al-Fashir in Darfur, as the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) offensives continue to surge.

·      2. Humanitarian: The UN warned that Sudan is at imminent risk of famine, while the number of displaced threatens to exceed 10 million amid ongoing displacement risks.

·      3. Politics: Former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok was selected to be the leader of the Taqaddum coalition.

·      4. Diplomacy: The SAF-led government agrees to give Russia a naval base on the Red Sea in exchange for weapons, to the concern of the west and Saudi Arabia.

·      6. Analysis: Analysts questioned the impact of Sudan’s deal with Russia, Taqaddum’s neutrality and the US’ Sudan policy.

·      7. Solutions: To prevent an RSF genocide in Al-Fashir, proposed solutions revolved around calls for a UN-authorised peacekeeping mission and US pressure on the UAE to stop supporting the RSF.

1. War

·      At least 150 are feared dead following what has been described as an RSF genocide in Wad-Noura village in Al-Jazira state.

·      The RSF cut off the water supply in Al-Fashir, and killed its fleeing residents on an ethnic basis, amid concerns that the militia will complete their genocidal project in Darfur should Al-Fashir fall to it.

·      The army has gained ground in Bahri, Khartoum North and repelled RSF attacks in Babanusa, West Kordofan as increased foreign supplies aid offensive operations.

Wad al-Noura, Al-Jazira: RSF genocide

Wad Madani Resistance Committee announced that Wad Al-Noura village in Al-Jazira state “witnessed a genocide after the RSF attacked it twice”, using heavy artillery against civilians, looting, and driving women and children to seek refuge in the nearby town of Managil (Reuters, 6 June). The coordination of Khartoum Resistance Committees also labelled the massacre as a genocide and forced displacement of residents of Al-Jazira’s villages (Radio Dabanga, 6 June).

With militia opening fire on residents after they tried to stop the RSF from entering (Bloomberg, 6 June), at least 150 are feared dead following the massacre, although Hafiz Mohamad of Justice Africa Sudan said many more people are still missing but that it was "difficult to count all the dead" because "RSF elements are still around the area looting" (BBC, 6 June).

The RSF claimed it was targeting Islamist forces preparing to attack the militia Radio Dabanga, 6 June), but did not acknowledge any civilian casualties. The attack is the latest in a strong of dozens by the RSF on small villages across al-Jazira after it took control of the capital Wad Madani in December 2023 (Reuters, 6 June).

RSF abuses in Al-Jazira in 2024

Since taking control of the state, the RSF has been raiding villages, committing heinous crimes against unarmed residents, including killing, kidnapping, forced displacement, and looting of properties, including crops and household furniture. In addition, the RSF offers to recruit individuals from the villages in exchange for protection, with Al-Hasahisa Resistance committees saying the militia aims to “expand militarization until Al-Jazira’s communities are fully militarized” (Sudan Tribune, 5 June).

Al-Fashir, Darfur: RSF genocide

Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur, is under siege by the RSF, with David Simon, the director of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program, warning that the fall of the city to the militia would enable it to “complete their genocidal project” (Washington Post, 3 June). The RSF have reportedly cut off food supply lines, seized water resources, and control crop distribution, “all of which have placed those living inside the city in a dire humanitarian situation” (Mada Masr, 31 May).

RSF cuts off the water supply

As per Mada Masr (31 May), the most intense clashes took place in the Golo reservoir area, which supplies 20% of the city’s water needs. The leading RSF militant deployed to the area – Savanna – declared the capture of the reservoir and disruption of water supply.

The RSF captured the reservoir, a critical resource for an estimated 270,000 people (including over 130,000 children) on 26 May, but the army and allied groups managed to retake it the next day (Sudan Tribune, 2 June). 

Adele Khodr, UNICEF Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, warned that damage or destruction of the reservoir would cut off families and children from safe water, increasing the risk of waterborne diseases in a region already ravaged by conflict. Children suffering from acute malnutrition and weakened immune systems would be particularly vulnerable, Khodr added (Sudan Tribune, 2 June). 

RSF’s ethnic killings

The militia has also targeted southern Al-Fashir, including the only operational medical facility in the city. Mohamed Suleiman Hamed, a volunteer at the southern hospital, condemned the RSF’s targeting of civilian facilities, including hospitals and said “the army leadership and the joint forces do not target hospitals” (Sudan Tribune, 31 May).  

The RSF’s genocides in Al-Gineina (West Darfur) and Nyala (South Darfur) makes Al-Fashir the last refuge the last refuge for Darfur’s non-Arab citizens (Washington Post, 3 June). However, further displacement is inevitable with ongoing attacks targeting civilians and the Abu Shouk camp for internally displaced persons “part of [RSF] tactics”. Nonetheless, “extreme” challenges accessing water and food supplies, mean that families face severe hurdles leaving Al-Fashir due to the RSF-imposed siege (Mada Masr, 31 May). 

For example, the RSF allegedly executed nine people based on their ethnicity as they fled Al-Fashir, with a relative of the victims saying RSF militants accused them of supporting the joint force of armed movements battling the RSF. Indeed, the RSF are reportedly committing widespread abuses against fleeing civilians, including torture, murder, and detention under the pretense of supporting the armed movements, alongside extorting exorbitant fees from drivers transporting people (Sudan Tribune, 4 June).  

Army goes on the offensive

Mada Masr’s (31 May) military sources said the Sudanese Air Force spearheaded an unprecedented surge in offensives in May 2024, with a field commander saying the military’s strategies shifted toward offensive operations and territorial expansion at the start of the year.

As per Mada Masr’s sources, the intensified airstrikes are a result of increased foreign military supplies, with the army’s logistical support centers bolstered through agreements with China, Russia and Iran. There is also a renewed focus on reviving Sudan’s domestic military industry. 

Alongside intensified airstrikes in North Darfur, Al-Jazirah and the White Nile states, RSF positions were reportedly destroyed across Khartoum state including Baraha hospital in Bahri - “used by the RSF as a stronghold and field hospital”, with RSF supply locations in North Kordofan intercepted.

Bahri, Khartoum North: army gains ground on the RSF

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) crossed the Halfaya bridge connecting Omdurman and Bahri, after destroying RSF positions on the bridge’s eastern side and enabling the army’s entry into Bahri. Military sources indicated that the operation aimed to deliver critical supplies to forces stationed at the Signal Corps in Bahri, where the RSF controls most parts. The army simultaneously advanced into the Dardoog area of Bahri while warplanes bombarded RSF forces coming from Sharg al-Nile and Khartoum (Sudan Tribune, 31 May).

Babanusa, West Kordofan: army repels RSF attacks

SAF repelled waves of RSF attacks on the military’s 22nd infrastry division in Babanusa, West Kordofan, subsequently inflicting losses on the militia and forcing its retreat. Since January 2024, the RSF has been attempting to capture the division in Babanusa. However, the soldiers and mobilized civilians have managed to repel the repeated assaults and push back the attacking forces to more distant and less high-risk areas (Mada Masr, 31 May).

2. Humanitarian

·      The UN warned that Sudan is at risk of famine.

·      The number of displaced by Sudan’s war is close to exceeding 10 million, as displacement risks continue to intensify. 

Famine warnings

In a joint statement, UN agencies said the people of Sudan are at imminent risk of famine, with around 18 million already acutely hungry, including 3.6 million children who are acutely malnourished (Reuters, 31 May).

The UN World Food Programme (WFP, 6 June) subsequently announced that it is scaling up its emergency food and nutrition assistance amid the looming threat of famine, with life-saving food and nutrition assistance to be provided to an additional 5 million people, thus doubling the number of people WFP had planned to support at the start of 2024. Communities in areas where fighting is ongoing   are said to be “at a high-risk of slipping into famine-like conditions if they do not receive urgent and sustained support,” the WFP added.

Displacement

The number of internally displaced by conflict in Sudan is on the verge of exceeding 10 million, warn the International Organization for Migration (IOM). 9.9 million are displaced across Sudan, with 7.1 displaced since the war began.

Approximately 12 million have been forced to flee their homes, with 70% of the displaced population struggling to survive in famine-risk areas, while humanitarian access remains limited or non-existent. The approaching rainy season threatens to worsen the situation, potentially leading to climate-related disasters and disease outbreaks (Sudan Tribune, 6 June).

Ongoing displacement risks for those already displaced

Sudan Tribune (4 June) also reported on the plight of Sudanese who have been displaced several times during the war. Mohamed Kandasha, spokesperson for the South Belt Emergency Room, said the area – which has been controlled by the RSF since the onset of war - experienced a wave of displacement, but some residents returned after the RSF seized control of Al-Jazirah State.

However, soaring food prices alongside the deteriorating security and health situation over the past three months forced them to flee again, with the ongoing communication blackout in vast areas of Khartoum further exacerbating the residents’ plight amid severe difficulties in obtaining drinking water due to power outages and hospitals’ inability to treat chronic disease patients.

3. Politics

Taqadum’s founding conference

The founding conference of the Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadom) concluded with ex-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok confirmed as the coalition’s president. During the conference, some groups reportedly advocated forming a ‘shadow’ government in exile, while others reject this proposal. Participants agreed not to recognise the current de-facto government in Port Sudan, viewing it as “a war government promoting continued conflict” (Radio Dabanga, 31 May).

4. Diplomacy

·      The SAF-led government’s turn to Russia and Iran for weapons raises Saudi and western concerns.  

Sudan turns to Russia

Sudan’s deputy leader Malik Agar travelled to Russia for meetings with its president Vladimir Putin, after the army said it may get weapons in exchange for letting Russia establish a military fuelling station on the Red Sea coast (Bloomberg, 3 June). Sudan previously delayed implementing the agreement, but the external support for the RSF prompted the military-led government to reconsider its position (Sudan Tribune, 1 June).

Saudi and western concerns about Sudan turning to Russia

Saudi Arabia had pressed Sudan to not allow the establishment of a Russian base on the other side of the Red Sea, but it is believed that the inability or unwillingness of Washington and Riyadh to persuade their regional allies to cease support for the RSF drove the government to seek assistance from Iran and Russia to acquire necessary weapons (Sudan Tribune, 1 June).

According to Bloomberg (3 June), the move is likely to stoke Western concern about Russia’s growing African profile, alongside the Sudanese army’s revitalised ties with Iran, which has supplied armed drones that have helped the military regain control of much of Khartoum. “The army’s decision to look to Russia and Iran has happened after “a lack of support from other partners, including the West,” said the Institute for the Study of War.

Kabbashi visits Niger

The deputy commander-in-chief of the army, General Shamsaldin Kabbashi, embarked on official visits to Niger and Mali, accompanied by Defence Minister General Yassin Ibrahim. Sudan accuses the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of recruiting fighters from Arab tribes in Chad and Niger and Mali, and smuggling looted vehicles and weapons into these countries (Sudan Tribune, 4 June).

5. Analysis

·      Analysts suggest that Russia’s supply of weapons to SAF are unlikely to have an impact.

·      Taqadum’s discourses have led their neutrality to be questioned.

·      Analysts criticised US policy on Sudan, with a focus on the impact of sanctions and the Jeddah peace talks.

·      Analysts also highlighted the global risks of the international community’s neglect of Sudan.

Will the Russia deal have an impact?

Analysts are divided over the impact that Sudan’s weapons-for-base agreement with Russia will have. The ISW said such a deal may end Russia’s support for the RSF, who have protected Russian interests in Sudanese gold to help fund its war in Ukraine and mitigate the impact of Western sanctions (Bloomberg, 3 June).

However, Sudanese political analyst Mujahid Bushra said Russia’s support for the army is “unlikely” to have a major impact given that Rapid Support (RSF) finances can sustain a five-year war. In addition, Samuel Ramani, an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, said Russia does not want to align itself to closely with either the army of the RSF militia as “neither side will be able to completely destroy the other” and it wants to “maintain close ties with whoever is in power” (New Arab, 3 June).

Analyst Elfadil Ibrahim also noted that Sudan is simultaneously deepening ties with Ukraine, finding common ground over "illegal armed groups financed by Russia", with Ukrainian Special Forces carrying out night raids on RSF-controlled areas in Omdurman (New Arab, 3 June).

Taqqadum’s neutrality questioned

Taqadum’s claims of neutrality have been questioned by veteran journalist Osman Mirghani, who argues that the civilian coalition’s discourses are biased against the army.

Mirghani argues that Taqadum (previously the FFC) discredit the army’s air force operations while “they overlook the Rapid Support militia’s (RSF) deliberate shelling of safe civilian neighbourhoods, which has claimed many lives”. Mirghani also accused Taqadum leaders of remaining silent about the RSF’s tribal mobilisation and recruitment of foreign mercenaries while attacking the popular resistance to the RSF by accusing the army of seeking a civil and tribal conflict.

Noting trends in Taqaddum discourses whereby condemnations of the RSF are immediately followed by condemnations of the army, Mirghani argued that “army violations are individual, while RSF violations are systematic,” which explains why “when RSF forces enter a town or village, people flee, while the army’s arrival is met with celebration”.

US’ Sudan policy criticised

American policymakers and analysts have criticised the US president Joe Biden administration’s Sudan policy, with particular attention drawn towards the impact of sanctions and the prioritisation of the Jeddah peace talks.

Criticism of sanctions

US special envoy to Sudan Tom Perriello claims that the threat of US sanctions pressured RSF commander Himedti to hold off on a full-scale assault of Al-Fashir (Foreign Policy, 5 June). However, Rep. Michael McCaul (Republican), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who said the Biden administration’s sanctions policy is “uncoordinated and not part of a larger strategy to achieve a lasting cease-fire” (Politico, 31 May). Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies said the US should be negotiating the removal of sanctions to incentivise peace talks or impose high costs forcing the warring parties to attend (Foreign Policy, 5 June).

Criticism of Jeddah peace process

Similarly, Michelle Gavin, an ex-ambassador to Botswana, said “the US appears to be far more invested in the Jeddah process than the belligerents or other influential regional actors [and] the US does not have much leverage with the warring parties, and seems unwilling to use real leverage on their foreign supporters” (Politico, 31 May). Indeed, Mutasim Ali and Yonah Diamond of the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights warned that the international community is mistaken in “prioritising a sham political process in [Jeddah]” (Foreign Policy, 5 June).

The neglect of Sudan

Various insights were published this week arguing that Sudan’s crisis is neglected by the international community. Cameron Hudson argued that Sudan is deprioritised, noting that the wars in Ukraine and Gaza “where Western governments have far greater strategic interests at stake” are absorbing so much of the media’s attention, donor dollars, and policymaker time, that little is left to devote to Sudan (Persuasion, 5 June).

A reflection of the inefficiency of international mechanisms

Nonetheless, Council on Foreign Relations (31 May) fellow Michelle Gavin argued that Sudan’s suffering proves that international mechanisms designed to address threats to peace and security are dysfunctional, basic norms around humanitarian access and civilian protection have eroded, and that “the shame that should accompany support for senseless destruction elude far too many decision-makers.”

International risks of neglecting Sudan

Both analysts highlighted international consequences of the neglect of Sudan’s crisis. Hudson suggested that Sudan’s collapse would result in control being lost over the illegal flow of drugs, weapons, migrants, fighters across unstable regions in Africa, with Perriello warning that Sudan’s conflict may pull in neighbouring countries  (Foreign Policy, 5 June).

Similarly, Gavin cited the re-empowerment of extremists to warn that the conflict in Sudan “will only make bad situations in South Sudan and Chad all the more precarious, Moreover, Gavin added that the “anemic” global response to Sudan signaled to “transactional actors like the UAE, who are willing to pay for influence and bankroll the destruction, that they simply need to stay the course to achieve their aims,” which “will be a lesson those same actors are sure to apply elsewhere, regardless of the costs to others” (Council on Foreign Relations, 31 May).

6. Solutions

·      Calls for a UN-authorised peacekeeping operation to prevent an RSF genocide in Al-Fashir.

·      Calls for the US to pressure the UAE to stop arming the RSF.

·      Calls for humanitarian aid to prevent famine.

UN-authorised peacekeeping operation

Two articles were published this week calling for a UN-authorised peacekeeping mission to protect civilians in Al-Fashir from an imminent RSF genocide.

David Simon, the director of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program, said the mission should secure Al-Fashir’s airport for humanitarian assistance delivery, with the African Union sourcing and organising troops and western states supplying materiel (Washington Post, 3 June). Similarly, Mutasim Ali and Yonah Diamond of the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights call for the US to build regional support for an African Union-led civilian protection mechanism in Al-Fashir (Foreign Policy, 5 June).  

Simon argues that this “most extreme measure in the atrocity-prevention tool kit” is necessary as “the world’s dithering…has left Sudan facing resumed genocide, with no other options to prevent it” (Washington Post, 3 June).

Pressuring the UAE

Politicians and human rights activists are calling for the US to apply pressure on the UAE to stop arming the RSF.

With Rep. Michael McCaul, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, calling on the White House to target countries who supply weapons and materiel to the warring parties (Politico, 31 May), Democrat Sara Jacobs said “one of the fastest ways to end this war and suffering is to get the UAE to stop supporting the RSF (Foreign Policy, 5 June). Jacobs recently introduced a bill prohibiting US arms sales to the UAE until the US certifies that the UAE is no longer supporting the RSF.

Ali and Diamond of the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights urged President Biden to openly call on RSF commander Himedti to call off his attack on Al-Fashir, on the UAE to cease its support for the RSF, and to call an emergency open debate on Al-Fasher at the UN Security Council with a resolution passed for immediate consequences on all actors “openly fueling this genocide, including the UAE” (Foreign Policy, 5 June).

Famine prevention

Finally, Ali and Diamond call for humanitarian aid pledges made at the Paris conference for Sudan to be immediately implemented to prevent wide-scale famine (Foreign Policy, 5 June).