Week 2: April 18-25 — Sudan In The News

Omeer Oreeba depicts the arrival to Khartoum of protesters from Atbara, where the protests began.

Despite the changes in post-Bashir Sudan, there is unfinished business for Sudan’s democracy activists. The week has posed the following questions:

· Should the Sudan Professionals Association remain a leaderless, anonymous organisation?

· Should Omar Al Bashir be sent to the International Criminal Court?

· What foreign policy would a transitional civilian government have?

· How can activists address the role of women, and their under-representation?

Changes

In the week following Omar Al Bashir’s ousting, “the seeds of change have truly been sowed” in Sudan, argues journalist Yousra Elbagir (Financial Times, April 20), citing the sit-in area outside the Sudanese military headquarters as a “symbolic battleground in the fight for personal and political liberty.”

Freelance journalist and communications consultant Reem Abbas (Washington Post, April 23) highlighted Sudan’s “remarkable flowering of freedom of expression,” noting that official Sudanese outlets have gone from being regime mouthpieces, to providing democracy activists a platform.

Yet, Al Bashir’s regime “embedded itself so deeply that dismantling it overnight is impossible,” argues Guardian columnist Nesrine Malik (New Statesman, April 18).

As a result, the sit-in – which Yousra Elbagir (Financial Times, April 20) described as the “most powerful negotiation tool” - continues. Reuters reported that the April 19 sit-in was “the biggest turn-out since…Omar Al Bashir was ousted.”

What is the issue?

The protests continue to be led by the Declaration of Freedom and Change (DFC) forces, an initiative by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), to unite groups calling for a civilian government.

Multiple sources (21 April) reported that the DFC has suspended talks with the transitional military council (TMC), with an SPA spokesman doubting the seriousness of TMC’s pledge to cede power to civilians, and accusing the TMC political committee of being too close to Al Bashir.

TMC concessions

Yousra Elbagir (Financial Times, April 20) noted that Islamist public order laws have evaporated and attempts to disperse the sit-in have been “gentle.”

In seeking to distance itself from Al Bashir’s regime, the TMC has also:

· Sacked an information official (Sudan Tribune, April 19).

· Arrested several top members of the former ruling National Congress Party (Reuters, April 20).

· Promised to restructure the NISS (National Intelligence and Security Service) (Reuters, April 20).

· The newly appointed TMC attorney general Al Walid Sayed Ahmed has ordered the formation of a corruption investigation committee (Reuters, April 20), and lifted the immunity of NISS officials (Sudan Tribune, April 20).

The TMC remains distrusted

Asharq Alawsat (Saudi newspaper) cartoon.

The DFC has strong reservations about TMC members judged to be too close to the regime, consistently calling for the firing of TMC political committee chief Omar Zain Al Abidine, deputy NISS director Jalal Al Deen Al Sheikh, and police chief Eltayib Babikir. The three have reportedly handed in their resignations (BBC News, April 25).

Zain Al Abidine in particular has been accused of “trying his best to bring back to old regime,” as protesters chanted: “We don’t want Zain Al Abidine.”

TMC deputy chief Mohammed Hamdan Dagallo, better known as Himedti, is accused of having his sights set on power by western officials and Sudanese opposition figures (Reuters, April 23).

Air force chief Abdelkhalig Salah told the New York Times (April 23) that demands for immediate civilian government may lead Sudan to civil war, and labelled the protest leaders “communists,” in a move that is unlikely to generate trust among the Sudanese opposition.

Opposition obstacles

Nesrine Malik (New Statesman, April 18), attributes the absence of civil society leaders in Sudan to Al Bashir’s regime stifling opportunity for non-government figures to incubate a political movement or build an electoral profile. Chatham House researcher Ahmed Soliman (Sudan Tribune, April 22) argued that the DFC is yet to establish a leadership structure and policy position.

The SPA leader has been reported as Mohammed Yusuf Al Mustafa (Washington Post, April 24), despite the SPA denial of his leadership, and its insistence that it is a leaderless organization.

Should the SPA maintain its anonymity and leaderless structure?

On one hand, a visible leader could be prone to being co-opted or repressed by the regime. On the other hand, the leaderless structure may leave the SPA prone to the fate of the Occupy Movement, which also insisted on this model.

Indeed, the Occupy Movement’s inability to make decisions, has been mirrored by the SPA still failing to fulfil its promise to put forward its transitional civilian government candidates (Associated Press, 21 April).

Dr. Luka Kuol, of the African Center for Strategic Studies, (Sudan Tribune, April 20) warned that the TMC may appoint a government under its direct supervision, or the former ruling party may recapture state power, if the DFC fails to agree on a list of transitional civilian government candidates.

Another problem is that Darfur and South Kordofan rebel groups still refuse to join the DFC coalition. Alex de Waal (Foreign Affairs, April 23) writes that the decision "echoes" that of John Garang's refusal to join a newly-established civilian government in 1985, a mistake that "condemned Sudan to 20 years of bloody civil war."

Since Darfur and South Kordofan bore the brunt of genocide, their view that “it is too early to talk” is justified. Could the difference between the rebels and the DFC be on how to punish Al Bashir and his allies for war crimes?

Should Al Bashir face the ICC?

Associated Press (22 April) reported that Sudanese activists are keen for Al Bashir to be tried in Sudan. In a pragmatic measure to support Sudanese democracy, it is believed that the ICC-case delayed Sudanese democracy because Al Bashir could not “safely step-down.”

The matter is complicated by TMC members complicit in the war crimes possibly concluding that “like Al Bashir…their only way of avoid [ICC] detention…is to cling to power.”

“Declaration of Freedom and Change: Sit-In Until the Complete Fall”

Details of the coup emerged this week

TMC member Abdelkhalig Salah (New York Times, April 23) said that the move was planned and implemented within 5 hours. Al Bashir felt betrayed, and furiously blamed former NISS chief Salah Gosh.

Radio Dabanga (April 21) reported that, according to senior Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, the final straw for Al Bashir’s security chiefs was when he authorized them to kill 30-50% of the protesters. TMC deputy chief Himedti confirmed this.

Foreign relations

The most visible international supporters of the TMC thus far, have been the Arab anti-Islamist quartet. Multiple sources (April 21) reported that Saudi Arabia and the UAE pledged $3 billion of support to Sudan. Bahrain’s foreign minister was the first to visit Al Burhan in Khartoum, as Egyptian president Abdelfattah Al Sisi convinced African leaders to extend the 15-day deadline for Sudan to hand-over power to civilians, or face suspension from the African Union (Multiple sources, April 23).

Sudanese protesters view this support with suspicion, reflected in anti-Saudi chants. There are fears that Saudi Arabia and UAE are using their immense wealth to suppress democracy, with an SPA representative saying that the Saudi-led bloc has shown little interest in learning about the protesters demands. (Washington Post, April 24).

Yet, there are shared interests between the protesters and the Saudi-led bloc. Kuol (Sudan Tribune, April 20) notes that they share anti-Islamist positions, with David Pilling (Financial Times, April 24) highlighting the “secular” nature of the revolution.

But there is a danger of Sudan becoming part of a “regional tug-of-war” between the Saudi-led bloc and Qatar-Turkey Islamist axis, warns Soliman (Sudan Tribune, April 22). De Waal (Foreign Affairs, April 23) warned that the Arab world’s regional rivalries being played out in Sudan could have "the same calamitous results" as in Libya and Yemen.

Meanwhile, the African Union has condemned the military coup, despite its chair (Egypt) supporting it, a “problematic” position according to Alex de Waal. Emmanuel Balogun and Anna Mwaba (Washington Post, April 24) cited the AU’s inconsistent application of its self-declared commitment to rejecting military coups, to argue that it is unclear whether it will offer strong support for “the will of Sudanese citizens” for a civilian government.

Hence, Soliman (Sudan Tribune, April 22) called for the international community to “think beyond short-term power gains,” and co-ordinate their support for Sudan in addressing the economic crisis and political reformation.

Sudanese democracy activists may feel let down by the international community. Therefore:

What would a transitional civilian government foreign policy look like?

The role of women

The week ended with controversy, as Guardian columnist Nesrine Malik (April 24) criticised the iconic image of Alaa Salah for “[simplifying] a complicated story,” arguing that prominence of the image reflects ongoing class and race issues in Sudan. Malik also noted that Sudanese women protesters continue to face sexual harassment, despite Salah’s hailing as the personification of the revolution.

Malik was criticised in Twitter threads. Omnia Shawkat (April 25) tweeted: “this is unacceptable…let’s not trample women, we rarely get a heroic position.” Journalist Nour Eltigani (April 25) tweeted that the article was “unethical,” given the online bullying that Salah has received.

Malik also argued that the image falsely presents women's participation in the revolution as an exception, when "women jostle with men in most walks of life in Sudan." However, the formal representation of women among the civilian opposition continues to be an issue. Mayada Abdelaziz (April 25) tweeted: “The SPA/DFC are not serious at all on this matter.”

Alaa Salah’s image gave the Sudanese revolution media coverage, and increased its support, even if it masked gender issues in Sudan.

Undoubtedly, the role of women in Sudan’s future, is a lot more than a public relations stunt.

But the SPA/DFC failure to represent the historical role of women in Sudanese revolutions, may affect its long-term reputation.

Does this provided an added incentive to representing the historically important role of Sudanese women in revolutions and society?

To ensure that the matter is addressed with the urgency it deserves, could the potential public relations gains from increased women’s representation be emphasised?

Or could this lead Sudan down a slippery slope of shallow gender equality?