Sudan diplomatic briefing: The cost of the Sudanese military’s deepened ties with Russia

Summary

The relationship between Sudan’s military regime and the Russia are highly convenient for both, provided that they can both meet interests that are critical to the survival of both. Moreover, the importance of their mutual interests have increased given recent developments that have triggered the international isolation of both Sudan and Russia: the 25 October 2021 military coup in Sudan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Thus, both the Sudanese military and Russia need each-other more than ever before, which is reflected in the deepening of their ties. This briefing explores Russia’s interests in Sudan, the drawbacks for the Sudanese coup regime in strengthening its ties with Russia, alongside proposed solutions.

• Russia’s interest in Sudan’s gold: As international sanctions related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean the Kremlin is cut off from global financial systems, Russia aims to stockpile gold in order to stave off economic collapse, fund its war efforts and prevent its currency plummeting. With Sudan being the ninth-largest global gold producer, Russia is accelerating its extraction and smuggling of Sudanese gold through the strengthening of relations between a private military company that does the Russian state’s “dirty work” and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia that dominates Sudan’s gold resources.

• Russia’s interest in a Port Sudan naval base: Russia also seeks immense geostrategic gains via a naval base on Sudanese territory that would enable its presence on of the world’s most important shipping routes, which it could leverage for its international relations.

• Drawbacks: However, the Port Sudan naval base that Sudan’s military appears open to displeases the UAE and Saudi Arabia, who the international isolated coup regime seek as a key ally. In addition, anti-Russian sentiments are growing in Sudan, and potentially within the security apparatus’ business networks that fear secondary sanctions for business with Russia.

• Solutions: Analysts proposed that supporting Sudanese civil society in its democratic quest is the answer to spoiling the marriage of convenience between Russia and the Sudanese military.

Russia’s interests in Sudan: Gold

The first Russian interest in Sudan that this briefing will explore is Russia’s aims to increase its supply of Sudanese gold. After its invasion of Ukraine triggered international sanctions that means that Russia is increasingly cut off from foreign currency and financial systems, gold laundering helps Russia generate profits and move finances across borders because gold can be physically moved across the world outside of digital financial networks, including SWIFT financial messaging, making it harder to regulate and track (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 7 April).

Thus, not only can gold fund Russian military operations, but it can also be pegged to, and increase the value of, Russian currency that steeply plummeted due to Ukraine-related sanctions. To meet its interests in Sudanese gold, ties are deepening between the Wagner Group, “a shadowy private military company close to the [Russian regime]”, and Rapid Support Forces (militia) – with both parties involved in extracting and smuggling Sudanese gold. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia has accelerated its extraction of Sudanese gold.

Why does Russia want Sudanese gold?

As part of efforts to ward off the possibility of increased sanctions related to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia smuggled hundreds of tonnes of illicit gold from Sudan over the last few years. While official statistics suggest that Sudan exports hardly any gold to Russia, an executive of one of the largest Sudanese gold companies told The Telegraph (3 March) that Russia is the largest foreign player in the country’s huge mining sector. A key player in Russia’s plundering of Sudanese gold are the Wagner Group – “a shadowy private military company close to the Kremlin” and Sudan’s military regime (Al-Monitor, 13 April).

Closer ties between the Wagner Group and the Sudanese military

Following the 25 October 2021 military coup in Sudan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered international isolation for both states, ties have been expanded between the coup regime and the Wagner Group, with researcher Raphael Parens arguing that Wagner does the “dirty work” for the Russian state in Africa. Wagner’s involvement in Sudan reportedly started back in 2017, when M-Invest, a Russia-based entity considered to be a cover for Wagner, was given gold-mining exploration contracts in Sudan by ex-dictator Omar al-Bashir (Al-Monitor, 13 April).

Dozens of miners, executives, engineers, consultants and analysts in Sudan interviewed by Bloomberg (April 30) said that Wagner’s relationship with al-Bashir’s regime helped Meroe Gold, a company that the US Treasury Department says is connected to Wagner, secure an operating permit and access to cheap, semi-processed gold ore extracted by small-scale operators. Before al-Bashir was ousted in a palace coup, the Sudanese military regime’s relationship with Russia subsequently evolved into Wagner providing political and military assistance for suppressing revolution that toppled al-Bashir and launching social media disinformation campaigns (Al-Monitor, 13 April).

Wagner has also forged close ties with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander-in-chief Himedti, who is also the vice-chairman of the ruling military-led Sovereign Council in Sudan, with both parties involved in extracting and smuggling Sudanese gold, which is increasingly important to Russia as it seeks to stock gold reserves in its Central Bank to mitigate Ukraine-related sanctions.

Russia steps up its extraction of Sudanese gold after Ukraine invasion

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian companies in Sudan have intensified their exploration of Sudan’s lucrative mineral assets including gold. Commercial Registry documents seen by Bloomberg (April 30) provided the first evidence that the gold mining compound in Atbara in the River Nile state is owned by Meroe Gold, with anonymous US and UK officials saying that Meroe had intensified work at the project site since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In addition to access to lucrative mineral deposits, Meroe has licenses to operate in Sudanese industries ranging from transport and agriculture to plastics, Bloomberg revealed.

Alongside its interests in Sudanese gold, Russia is also keen to build a naval base in Port Sudan, and their ties with Himedti form a key part of achieving that goal.

Russia’s interests in Sudan: a naval base in Port Sudan

The second Russian in interest in Sudan that this briefing explores is Russia’s aims to build a naval base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The Port Sudan naval base holds immense geostrategic importance, as it would facilitate a Russian presence on of the world’s most important and active shipping lanes. Key to achieving this goal is Russia’s deepening ties with RSF commander-in-chief Himedti, a partner for Russia in its first interest – stockpiling Sudanese gold.

Why is a naval base in Port Sudan important to Russia?

Robert Rotberg, the founding director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s program on intrastate conflict, emphasised the geostrategic importance of a naval base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea to Russia, stating that it is “one of the globe’s most active shipping corridors [which] would give Russia agency for the first time below the southern entrance to the Suez Canal and halfway to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean” (Globe and Mail, 19 April).

Thus, Rotberg argues, attempts from western diplomats to prevent Russia’s “encroachment” upon important global shipping lanes – “especially in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine” - are contingent upon the personal ambitions and enrichment plans of Russian president Vladimir Putin and Himedti.

The importance of Himedti

Following Himedti’s visit to Moscow on the day of Russia’s attack of Ukraine, Theodore Murphy, Africa director at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) said that the RSF commander-in-chief and vice-chairman of Sudan’s military-led ruling Sovereign Council "has been courting the Russians most aggressively and they have been responding very positively” (DW, 21 April). Given Russia and Himedti’s mutual interests in plundering Sudanese gold, Himedti is alleged to have raised the possibility of allowing Russia to establish a naval base in Port Sudan (Al-Monitor, 13 April).

Drawbacks for the military in strengthening its Russian ties

Nonetheless, the deepening of ties between Russia and Sudan’s military apparatus has its drawbacks. Firstly, the prospect of a naval base in Port Sudan is likely to alienate the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with the former reportedly already not supportive of the rehabilitation of Islamists within Sudan’s domestic polity. Secondly, anti-Russian sentiments in Sudan may rise amid food insecurity and public exposure of Russian plundering of Sudanese gold. The growing relationship between Russia and the coup regime may also cause internal friction within the latter’s security apparatus.

Alienating the UAE and Saudi Arabia

There are diplomatic drawbacks for Sudan’s coup regime should it allow Russia to build the Port Sudan naval base. The strengthening of its alliance with Russia would come at the expense of its relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia - who the coup regime views as an economic lifeline. The UAE is already not supportive of the rehabilitation of Islamists by Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan, the chairman of the military-led Sovereign Council, in his attempts to build a civilian base to administer and legitimise his coup regime. The Emiratis, who are known to be hostile to Islamists in the region, are said to be unconvinced that Islamists would limit themselves to civic duties. Furthermore, the coup regime can intensify the ire of the Gulf powers if it allows a Russian naval base at Port Sudan, just across the narrow Red Sea from Jeddah in Saudi Arabia – which is argued to be red-line for the Gulf powers, even as they resist pressure from the US president Joe Biden administration to cut ties with Russia (Africa Confidential, 12 May).

Alienating the Sudanese public and security sector business interests

In addition, Samuel Ramani, a Politics tutor at the University of Oxford, argues that economic factors could restrict the scope of Russia-Sudan cooperation.

Firstly, anti-Russian sentiments in Sudan may rise due to food insecurity exacerbated by poor harvests and one-third of Sudanese wheat imports coming from Russia and Ukraine. Secondly, the public exposure of sanctioned Russia’s reliance on illicit economic practices, such as the smuggling of gold from Sudan, “has further eroded Moscow’s reputation in Sudan”. Ramani also notes that up to 250 Sudanese military-controlled companies that have dealings with Russia could face secondary sanctions (Middle East Institute, 25 April), which means that the deepening of relations between the Kremlin and the coup regime may trigger internal friction within Sudan’s security apparatus.

Solution: Support Sudan’s democracy movement

Proposed solutions for restricting growing relations between Sudan and Russia revolve around supporting and empowering the pro-democracy movement.

Ramani notes that Russia is unlikely to abandon or downsize its ambitions in Sudan as the Ukraine war drags on leaving its long-term influence contingent upon “opportunistic aspiring autocrats”. Thus, Ramani argues, “Moscow would lose out if [Sudan] takes a definitive step toward democracy” (Middle East Institute, 25 April).

Similarly, the ECFR’s Theodore Murphy, after raising the prospect of Al-Burhan openness to working with the Kremlin amid fears of “being outflanked” by his deputy-cum-rival Himedti, argued that civil society is the only "true protection against Russian influence in Sudan, because their ideology is completely opposed to any kind of role for Russia” (DW, 21 April).

Sudan diplomatic briefing: Challenges facing UNITAMS after the military coup in Sudan

Summary

The UN’s political mission in Sudan – UNITAMS - aims to resolve Sudan’s political stalemate by facilitating between the civilian pro-democracy movement and the military junta that staged the coup on 25 October 2021. However, this briefing reports how the UN is attracting the ire of both parties.

On one hand, the military coup regime has threatened to expel Volker Perthes, the UN’s envoy to Sudan, and accused him of trying to destroy Sudan and fight Islam after Perthes submitted a critical report to the UN Security Council.

On the other hand, the UN also faces sharp criticism from Sudan’s pro-democracy movement, with widespread perceptions in Sudan that it is legitimising the coup and favouring the military junta. Criticisms levelled at UNITAMS by analysts include an inability to understand or grasp Sudan’s political and economic issues, with UN officials in Sudan also accused of career politicking.

Furthermore, the launch of a civilian-military dialogue jointly promoted by UNITAMS, the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority in Development (IGAD) – hereby referred to as the UN-AU-IGAD tripartite mechanism – is argued to favour the coup regime and lacks credibility among the Sudanese revolutionary movement.

Nonetheless, solutions for the UN and western diplomats include: investing in mediation pathways that facilitate inclusive participation in the political process, alongside targeting the financial interests of military leaders as an alternative to mediation.

The UN vs. the Sudanese military

• Abdulfattah al-Burhan, the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese army and the chairman of the military-led ruling Sovereign Council, threatened to expel from Sudan Volker Perthes, the head of the UN Integrated Transitional Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that is attempting to mediate a return to Sudan’s democratic transition.

• The coup regime took issue with Perthes’ report to the UN Security Council – particularly the labelling of the 25 October 2021 military takeover a “coup” and allegations that 13 cases of rape were committed by Sudanese security forces suppressing anti-coup protests. With regards to the latter claim, the coup regime charged Sulaima Ishaq, the director of the Combating Violence Against Women Unit at Sudan’s Ministry of Social Development, with ‘Offences Against the State’ for allegedly leaking information to Perthes.

• The army’s official newspaper then launched a scathing attack on Perthes, accusing him of seeking to destroy Sudan and fight Islam in collaboration with western powers and “their leftist [pro-democracy] agents”. 

Al-Burhan threatens to expel UN special envoy

Al-Burhan threatened to expel Perthes from Sudan, accusing him of “flagrant interference” and “exceed the [UNITAMS] mandate” (Multiple sources, 2 April), after Perthes warned that Sudan is heading for “an economic and security collapse” unless it addresses the political paralysis following the October 2021 military coup and moves toward resuming a civilian-led transition. In a report submitted to the UN Security Council, Perthes asserted that the military’s “violent repression” of protests against the coup is continuing and the absence of a political agreement on returning to a transitional path has already led to a deteriorating economic, humanitarian and security situation in Sudan (AP, 29 March).

The coup regime’s issue with the UN report

In response to Perthes’ report, the Sudanese foreign ministry submitted a briefing to the UN Security Council that accused Perthes of focusing on political issues instead of peace implementation and elections (Multiple sources, 2 April). The foreign ministry said that that the methodology of Perthes’ report did not reflect a spirit of cooperation and transparency, as he described the aftermath of the October 2021 coup as a “setback” and focused on human rights violations, rule of law and gender issues (Sudan Tribune, 7 April). However, Saleh Mahmoud, a prominent human rights defender told Radio Dabanga (2 April) that the foreign ministry “has no right to argue that [UNITAMS] is not mandated to talk about the widespread and systematic violations” when Sudanese authorities are responsible for such violations.

In addition, the foreign ministry claimed that Perthes’ use of the word “coup” was “contrary to the truth,” suggesting the term “corrective measures”, alongside criticising Perthes’ report for stating that 13 cases of rape were recorded by the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors whereas the Office of the Public Prosecutor has verified only two cases (Sudan Tribune, 7 April).

Indeed, the coup regime has taken special offence to claims of sexual violence being used by its security forces in its suppression of anti-coup protests. A complaint was filed against Sulaima Ishaq, the director of the Combating Violence Against Women Unit (CVAW), an agency of the Ministry of Social Development, in relation to the UN report. Ishaq said the case was likely lodged by the Sovereign Council or the General Intelligence Service (GIS), and that she is charged with ‘Offences Against The State’ under the Criminal Act upon the accusation of leaking information to Perthes (Multiple sources, 8 April). It is worth noting that Ishaq told the Guardian (16 March) that sexual assault is a “tactic” used by security forces to suppress protests, alleging that “the security apparatus use rape as part of their work”.

Army newspaper fiercely attacks Perthes

The Sudanese military then intensified their fierce criticisms of Perthes and the UN via an article written by Ibrahim al-Houri, the editor-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces newspaper. In a one-page editorial that was the first of its kind since the collapse of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, Al-Houri launched a scathing attack on western countries, accusing them of seeking to destroy Sudan and fight Islam, in call for “jihad” against western powers and “their leftist agents of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Resistance Committee”. Conspiracy theories spouted by al-Houri included that: Perthes is working to spread terrorism in Sudan, and that former civilian Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok  is “British agent” who aimed to dismantle Sudan in collaboration with a “European-American Zionist Masonic lobby” in cooperation with the UN World Food Programme’s David Beasley (Sudan Tribune, 18 April). Al-Houri also shared a similar article by Sudanese journalist Ali Mansour Hasaballa who alleged that US and UK diplomats in Sudan, alongside pro-democracy figures in the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition (FFC), are interior agents working to break down Sudan (Multiple sources, 19 April).

The UN vs. the Sudanese revolution

The UN is also attracting the ire of the Sudanese revolutionary movement, with accusations that it is failing to understand Sudan’s economic or political complexities, and allegations that UN officials in Sudan serve their careers at the expense of helping Sudanese people.  

UN accused of ignorance on Sudan’s economic problems

While UNITAMS report attracted the fierce ire of the military, it has also faced criticism from the revolutionary movement within Sudan. For example, Muzan Alneel, the co-founder of the ISTiNAD think-tank, argued that political charters published by the Resistance Committees have “an incomparably higher chance of bringing stable peace” than UNITAMS’ report that “had largely no impact on public discourses”. Alneel added that the UNITMAS report “confirmed the disconnect of the international community and its unwillingness to seriously address” Sudan’s political landscape as it offered “superficial and internationally-centred” understanding of Sudan’s economy that neglects how pre-coup IMF-related austerity measures already worsened public economic plight (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 26 April).

Alneel has previously argued the case for the UN’s ignorance on Sudan’s economic issues in an article written for Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (25 March), which noted that while Sudanese civil society acknowledges the curse of the rentier economy as the “root causes” of Sudan’s instability, it is not discussed in UN consultations.

Inability to grasp Sudan’s political complexity

Similarly, Kholood Khair, the founding manager of Confluence Advisory think-tank, argued that UNITAMS has not grasped Sudan’s political complexity and power dynamics, citing the failure to consult frequently neglected Sudanese stakeholders or engage with the resistance committees – with latter stated to demonstrate the UN’s “inability” to recognise Sudan’s political shift to broad-based, coalition-led political change (Arab Center DC, 17 June A).

UN employees in Sudan accused of career politicking

Justin Lynch, who experienced Sudan’s transition as a midlevel UN official, claims that pro-democracy institutions missed an opportunity to prevent the coup during the transitional period as embassies that didn’t know how to spend the money they had been allocated,” ended up giving it to UN agencies in Sudan “even though they knew it would be ineffective”. Lynch added that he felt that “the goal of the UN and some NGOs was to grab more money rather than actually help people,” citing a UN official opposed to funding for peacekeepers amid worsening crisis in Darfur, which “spoke to a system that seemed to value milking money at all costs and career politicking rather than actually helping Sudanese” (Foreign Policy, 3 May).

Criticisms of the tripartite mechanism

The latest attempt to resolve Sudan’s political impasse comes in the form of a civilian-military dialogue jointly promoted by UNITAMS, the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority in Development (IGAD) - an eight-national East African regional group (AP, 29 March).

For the purposes of clarity, the initiative will hereby be referred to as the UN-AU-IGAD tripartite mechanism.

The mechanism faces several criticisms, including:

• The dominance of the AU is considered to favour the coup regime.

• The UN-AU-IGAD has failed to generate a buy-in from the major Sudanese revolutionary groups, who consider the talks as a legitimisation of the coup.

• Sudanese public perceptions suggest that the tripartite mechanism supports the military.    

The African Union’s “hijacking” of the UNITAMS process

The UN, African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority in Development (IGAD) – an eight-national East African regional group - agreed to join efforts to facilitate Sudanese-led political talks (AP, 29 March). However, rivalries between the UN on one hand, and the AU and IGAD on the other, are hindering the mediation process. Some in Sudan blame the UN’s secretary-general, Antonio Guterres for being too weak or unwilling to contradict the AU (Africa Confidential, 12 May), which has been accused of hijacking the UN process in the interests of allegedly anti-democratic AU leaders.

Following the publishing of Perthes report – the second step in his mediation was stopped by AU Commission chair Moussa Faki, who appealed to UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, to link the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU to the process, with Faki’s chief of staff Mohamed el-Hacen Labatt publically criticising the UN and saying the AU should take the lead in the political mission (Africa Confidential, 12 May).

Indeed, the incorporation of the AU at the behest of a Sudanese military junta wary of western interference under the guise of “African solutions to African problems” reflects autocrats co-opting anti-colonial refrains when pressured, argues Khlood Khair, the founding manager of Confluence Advisory think-tank (Arab Center DC, 17 June A).

As a result, analyst Khalid Mukhtar Salim argues that the AU “hijacked” the UN’s political process for Sudan’s transition to turn it into “a toothless local process with cosmetic engagement”, citing the removal of Sudan’s portfolio from the African Union Peace and Security Council which includes African leaders with “great” experience of pro-democracy interventions. Salim also suggests that a Sudanese military regime serves the presidential ambitions of Moussa Faki, the chair of the AU Commission and seasoned Chadian politician, who “knows perfectly well that since Chad’s independence, no president has come to power without Khartoum’s support,” with a democratic civilian Sudan is unlikely to interfere in neighbouring affairs. Furthermore, Labatt is “not pro-democracy,” given his experience of being rewarded with ministerial positions for providing civilian backing for coup regimes in Mauritania (Sudan Tribune, 22 April).

“Disruptive” mediation process

Furthermore, the UN-AU-IGAD tripartite mechanism reflects a risk that was raised in African Arguments (1 November 2021) only six days after the coup, in which an anonymous author warned that the proliferation of “self-interested parties rushing in” to mediate a civilian-military agreement “causes confusion”, wastes time, reduces the likelihood potential agreement and may culminate in a “flawed agreement” that “papers over the same unresolved issues:  power-sharing, justice and corruption”.

Lack of credibility among Sudanese revolutionaries

The UN-AU-IGAD promotion of civilian-military dialogue is considered a legitimisation of the coup (Arab Center DC, 17 June A) and has thus far been boycotted by key pro-democracy groups within Sudan – the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), resistance committees and Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) (Al-Monitor, 16 June).

"Most people, especially activists, are quite suspicious of these [dialogue] claims, particularly because there is a perception that the international community seems to be insisting on some kind of negotiated settlement with those who conducted the coup," Mohammed Elnaiem, a Sudanese activist based in London, told DW (8 June).

In addition, Mohamed Yousif Almustafa, a Sudanese activist in Khartoum, said he does not regard a tripartite dialogue as a realistic option. “We cannot consider any talks with al-Burhan under the current circumstances because he is trying to ensure he remains in the driving seat of the government… the ultimate objective of any dialogue with the military is to reproduce the partnership with them, to guarantee their immunity from being accountable for the crimes they have committed”,: Almustafa added (DW, 8 June).

Similarly, Justin Lynch notes the suspicions of Sudanese activists that the talks will potentially entrench military rule by providing cosmetic civilian representation in government that would have even less power than ever before (African Arguments, 13 June). Moreover, the UN-AU-IGAD mechanism is perceived to be on the side of counter-revolutionary forces.

Perception as pro-coup

With the FFC critical of the UN-AU-IGAD mechanism for being dominated by pro-military groups and Islamists from the orbit of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, Khalid Mukhtar said the inclusion of such counter-revolutionary forces was “a mistake that turned the [UNITAMS] process upside down and made it similar to al-Bashir’s national dialogues”, adding that the process has deviated from its objective (Al-Monitor, 16 June).

Furthermore, Kholood Khair noted perceptions that the UN-AU-IGAD process supports the generals, given its treatment of concerns regarding justice and accountability for ongoing violence against peaceful protesters as a “backdrop to the process, rather than central to it” (Arab Center DC, 17 June A).

Solutions

Solutions proposed for resolving the political impasse in Sudan following the coup have been directed at the international community. Kholood Khair calls for the UN-AU-IGAD tripartite mechanism to invest in ways of being more inclusive of a broad range of Sudanese, whereas Justin Lynch identified alternatives to mediation for western diplomats.

Develop new mediation pathways

Kholood Khair, the founding manager of Confluence Advisory, calls for the UNITMAS, AU and IGAD tripartite mechanism to invest in developing new, more relevant mediation pathways that complement Sudan’s rich pro-democracy movement in order to prevent itself from becoming irrelevant.

Alongside suggesting closer engagement with the concerns of the resistance committees, the Sudanese Professionals Association, and the families of martyrs, Khair also calls for better and more targeted outreach, particularly to women, young people, and internally displaced persons “who are entirely left out of the process”.

Khair adds that building credibility with a broad range of Sudanese would both dispel suspicions around international actors’ motivations as well as counter the pre-existing center-periphery inequity and privileging of elite narratives in Sudan (Arab Centre DC, 17 June B).

An alternative to mediation

Arguing that the reversal of the coup through mediation is “implausible,” Justin Lynch proposed alternatives for western diplomats, starting with understanding how they falls for the “traps” of the Sudan’s military, including: siphoning aid to entrench their political interests, superficial changes, cowing diplomats with threats of expulsion to prevent human rights investigations and offering “dubious” terrorism and migration intelligence.

Instead, Lynch calls for western diplomats to undermine Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander and the deputy-chairman of the ruling military-led Sovereign Council Himedti by “changing the behaviour of their diplomatic colleagues from their own nations working in the Gulf” by pressuring Gulf institutions that facilitate Himedti’s finances and use his forces, alongside reforming the export process of Sudan’s gold, and economic empowerment across Darfur (African Arguments, 13 June).

Diplomatic Briefing: March 2020

Diplomatic Briefing:

Key events

·      Gulf states: There are conflicting reports as to whether the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have suspended a $3 billion aid package to Sudan.

·      The UN and Darfur: The UN Security Council is proposing a resolution to substitute its peacekeeping mission in Darfur with a peace-building mission.

·      Nile politics: In a first for Nile politics, Sudan is said to be taking the side of Ethiopia.

·      Sudan-US relations: Sudan’s progress in combatting terror financing and money laundering has earned praise from the US Treasury Department. US Congress has also introduced a bill that conditions debt relief on the full control of the civilian government over the finances and assets of the security and intelligence services.

·      US State Sponsors of Terrorism list: A paper published by Cameron Hudson, an Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, has identified key concerns that culminate in the US’ cautiousness in removing Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list.

Proposed solutions

 The solutions presented in advancing Sudanese prospects for peace, democracy and economic well-being have been directed at the UN Security Council, the US and Sudan. They can be summarised as follows:

·      For Sudan: For Sudan to accelerate SST delisting, it has been called on to build state institutions and pursue confidence building measures that weaken affiliates of al-Bashir’s regime. For foreign debt relief, the government must meet US Congress transparency and governance benchmarks over the finances and assets of the security and intelligence services.

·      For the UN Security Council: The UN has been called on to either extend the peacekeeping mission in Darfur, or at least gradually withdraw, as local civilians “cannot trust Sudanese security forces.”

·      For the US: Alongside calls to provide economic and institutional assistance for democratic development, the US has been called on to pressure Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE to stop supporting Sudan’s security apparatus. The US has also been urged to condition SST delisting on human rights benchmarks that assert the rule of law over security forces, and impose targeted sanctions on Sudanese security members “implicated in grave violations.”

1. Gulf states: have Saudi Arabia and the UAE suspended aid to Sudan?

 There are conflicting reports as to whether, and why, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have suspended a $3 billion aid package to Sudan.

 In initial reports, Sudan Tribune (March 11) stated that KSA and the UAE had complained of public criticisms from Sudan’s governing Forces Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition. The FFC had reportedly requesting the return of Sudanese troops from Yemen, voiced opposition to UAE plans to operate Port Sudan seaport and criticised the UAE’s alleged recruitment of Sudanese youth to work in Libya as security guards.

 Sudan Tribune (March 13) then reported that the US requested the suspension due to a belief that the $3 billion aid package benefits the military component of the Sudanese transitional government. However, the US Embassy in Khartoum has called on KSA and the UAE to “support the Sudanese people and the civilian-led transitional government."

 To add further confusion, the UAE Ambassador to Sudan, Humaid al-Junaibi, reaffirmed the UAE’s continued support for Sudan in overcoming its financial challenges, and that the joint pledge with KSA will be fulfilled (Sudan Tribune, March 19).

2. UN: Proposed move from peacekeeping to peace-building in Darfur

AP (March 19) reported that a proposed UN Security Council resolution would replace the joint UN-African Union peacekeeping Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) with the UN Political and Peace-building Integrated Mission in Sudan (UNPPIMS). The primary aim of UNPPIMS would

be to support Sudan’s “fragile” transition to democracy, including in drafting a new constitution and preparing for elections.

 Starting May 1 for an initial period of one year, UNPPIMS is also authorised to support the implementation of any future peace agreements in Darfur, the Blue Nile and South Kordofan.

3. Nile politics: Sudan to mediate between Ethiopia and Egypt

 Following a two-day meeting with Egyptian president Abdelfattah al-Sissi, Himedti, the deputy head of Sudan’s sovereign council and commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, says Sudan will mediate a deal on an escalating dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt over Ethiopia’s controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River. Ethiopia’s plans to build the dam aims to provide much-needed electricity, but Egypt fears the project could reduce its share of the Nile, its main source of freshwater (AP, March 15).

 According to Addisu Lashitew, a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, “for the first time in Nile politics,” Sudan is taking the side of the Ethiopia in the GERD dispute. With Sudan lacking a major dam on the Nile, Sudan stands to enjoy the benefits of GERD at the expense of Egyptian water supply and electricity generation (Foreign Policy, March 14).

3. Sudan-US relations

 In developments concerning US-Sudan relations, Sudanese progress in combatting terror financing and money-laundering has been noted, with US Congress also introducing a bill to support the democratic transition. The Congressional bill links Sudan’s foreign debt relief to the full control of the civilian government over the finances and assets of the security and intelligence services (Sudan Tribune, March 8).

A delegation from the US Treasury Department met Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and Foreign Minister Asma Abdalla. Marshall Billingslea, the Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing at the US Treasury Department "praised Sudan’s role in combating terrorism and reaffirmed the support of the US government for the transitional period" (Sudan Tribune, March 8).

 Billingsley also said that the removal of Sudan from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) “is a matter of time,” with committees working on the case (Radio Dabanga, March 9). US officials say that while Sudan has taken important anti-laundering measures to improve the banking system and counter terror financing, further steps are needed to enhance the financial system (Sudan Tribune, March 8).

Nonetheless, Stephen Zunes, a Middle East scholar at the University of San Francisco, hints at US policy to “downplay democratic movements.” However, Zunes concedes that he lacks evidence for this claim beyond US President Donald Trump’s alleged fondness for depicting Arab/African countries as chronically violent and in need of authoritarian governments (The Nation, March 20).

4. US concerns for Sudan’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

 Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Cameron Hudson has identified US concerns that impede Sudan’s SST delisting, with the US worrying the premature delisting may empower Sudan’s security apparatus at the expense of the civilians (Atlantic Council, 16 March).

 Hudson suggests that the US is concerned that it may lose the leverage of the SST designation in deterring future bad behaviour, as it does not want to inadvertently empower the armed factions “it wants to see removed from the political scene.”

 According to Hudson, the case often cited by US officials is that of Myanmar, where sanctions were lifted in 2013, only for the military to begin a “genocide against the minority Muslim Rohingya community.”

 In addition, Hudson argues that Prime Minister Hamdok’s survival is crucial for US SST delisting, with the US cautious delisting might ensure that Hamdok “rapidly, and inadvertently, outlive his usefulness in the eyes of the security sector [who are believed to] not yet given up their designs on power.”

Solutions

 The proposed solutions in this briefing are directed towards the UN Security Council, the US and the Sudanese government.

1. What can Sudan do?

 I. Build state institutions: With affiliates of Omar al-Bashir’s regime still powerful, Tchie argues that Sudan is unready for SST delisting. Thus, Tchie calls for Sudan’s transitional government to focus on building state institutions that are “independent, politically impartial and able to develop policies and deliver public services.” Tchie notes Sudan’s weak institutional structures and gaps in governance throughout the country, citing al-Bashir’s National Congress Party’s ongoing influence in South Darfur (Africa Report, February 26).

 II. Confidence building measures for SST list removal: Tchie identifies various confidence-building measures for Sudan to adopt in order to accelerate SST list removal including:

·      The implementation of laws to combat money laundering.

·      Addressing concerns around illicit trade and black market economies.

·      The retrieval of billions that former regime leaders stashed offshore.

·      Security sector reforms that would retire members of the old regime.

 III. Governance and fiscal transparency for foreign debt relief: The US Congress Bill that authorises assistance for development programmes, supports debt relief and multilateral financing from international financial institutions, provided prerequisite governance and fiscal transparency benchmarks to be met (Sudan Tribune, March 8).

 The Sudanese government must therefore:

·      Establish that the security and intelligence services are no longer involved in the "illicit trade in mineral resources, including petroleum and gold".

·      Identify the shareholdings in all companies held or managed by the security and intelligence services, and transfer them to a public civilian entity.

·      Develop a "transparent budget that includes all expenditures related to the security and intelligence services.”

·      Establish and implement a methodology to recover the state assets and profits transferred to the National Congress Party.

 IV. A Nile Agreement to mediate the Egypt-Ethiopia dispute: Lashitew (Foreign Policy, March 14) presents various solutions to reduce the “bickering” between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia amid the GERD dispute. Lashitew suggests that the three:

 ·      Stop seeking “outside support for national agendas”

·      Cooperate in mitigating climate change vulnerabilities such as erratic rainfall.

·      Establish Nile agreement that is part of a cooperative framework for greater regional and economic integration.

·      The joint development of dams to strengthen trust, and optimise and coordinate water usage.

·      Economic integration, with trade and investment incentives, to mitigate against potential hostilities if severe water shortages arise. 

2. What can the UN Security Council do?

 I. Extend peacekeeping in Darfur: Wibke Hansen, the lead analyst at the Center for International Peace and Volker Perthes, the director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, call on the UN Security Council to extend a residual peacekeeping presence in Jebel Marra in Darfur (World Politics Review, March 17).

 Arguing that Sudan’s democratic transition requires a commitment to upholding security in Darfur, Hansen and Perthes note the sentiments of citizens of Jebel Marra region, who “underlined that [political changes in Khartoum] had not yet reached them,” as they are dealing with the same armed actors as before Omar al-Bashir’s ouster.

 II. Gradual withdrawal from Darfur: AP (March 19) quoted Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth calling on the UN Security Council to recognise that “that Darfur requires a far more gradual withdrawal” because “civilians can’t trust Sudanese security forces alone and still look to peacekeepers for protection.”

3. What can the US do?

 I. Economic and institutional assistance: Zunes calls for the US to lift sanctions from Sudan, provide sustainable development aid and democracy assistance. (The Nation, March 20).

 II. Pressure KSA, the UAE and Egypt: Roth (Foreign Policy, March 20) called on the US to urge Gulf states to discontinue their support for members of Sudanese security forces. Similarly, Zunes (The Nation, March 20) called for the US to “make it very clear” to KSA, the UAE and Egypt that support for Sudanese military and autocratic elements is “unacceptable.”

 III. Conditioning SST delisting: Roth argues that the overriding US aim should be to help the Sudanese people in their quest for a more transparent and accountable government based on the rule of law. Thus, Roth urged the US to condition Sudan’s delisting as a State Sponsor of Terrorism on human rights benchmarks that aim to help civilian authorities assert the rule of law over security forces, and fulfil the social and economic rights of the Sudanese people (Foreign Policy, March 20).

 IV. Sanction Sudanese security forces: In addition, Roth called for the US to impose targeted individual sanctions against members of Sudanese security forces “implicated in grave violations” (Foreign Policy, March 20).

Diplomatic Briefing: Can Sudan do more to get removed from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list?

Can Sudan do more to get removed from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list?

This diplomatic briefing will cover the pragmatic measures Sudan has taken in February 2020 to get removed for the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list. After exploring the impact of Sudan’s terrorist designation on economic and democratic development, the briefing will conclude with policy suggestions that have been forward to advance US-Sudan interests.

Introduction

 Sudanese foreign policy interests continue to be dominated by attempts to seek removal from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism (SST). According to former US State Department counterterrorism coordinator Daniel Benjamin, the SST designation is a “diplomatic nuclear bomb,” given that the “politics of getting off the list are always incredibly complicated and draw in issues that don’t directly have anything to do with terrorism.” (13 February, AP).

 Nonetheless, the Sudanese government is taking drastic measures in its aims of removal from the SST list, reflecting the pragmatism with which the matter is being approached. Despite denying involvement in al-Qaeda terrorist attacks committed in the 1990s, Sudan has agreed to pay compensation to victims. In addition, the normalisation of ties with Israel is set to continue, despite moves to do so being met with opposition from key political stakeholders.

 1.     What has Sudan done to get removed from the SST list?

I.               Sudan pays damages for al-Qaeda terrorist attacks

In a bid to get itself removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism (SST), Sudan has agreed to pay a $30 million settlement to the families of 17 US Navy sailors killed in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. Yet, Sudan's government "explicitly denies" its involvement in the attack and says the pay-out is intended to "settle the historical allegations of terrorism left by [Omar al-Bashir’s] regime." (13 February, Multiple Sources).

 As noted by John Hursh, the Editor-in-Chief of International Law Studies at the US Naval War College, while successive Sudanese governments have denied responsibility for the al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, the current government has agreed to pay compensation “only to satisfy the U.S. condition for its removal from the SST list.” (21 February, Just Security).

 However, the pay-out has paved the way for more compensation pay-outs related to al-Qaeda terrorist attacks to be made by the Sudanese government. The US President Donald Trump administration is reportedly poised to argue before the Supreme Court that Sudan should pay $4.3 billion in punitive damages following the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people. (24 February, Multiple Sources).

 Sudan’s willingness to continue taking drastic measures in its attempts to satisfy conditions for its removal from the US SST list would be exhibited if damages are paid for more  al-Qaeda attacks.

II.              Sudan seeks normalisation with Israel

Sudanese normalisation with Israel continues to attract controversy. Sara Abdelgalil of the Sudanese Professionals Association, maintained the position that normalisation with Israel should be left to an elected government. In addition, Abdelgalil said that Israeli ties are antithetical to the Sudanese revolution given that “some people view the political regime in Israel as a terrorist regime.” (21 February, Deutsche Welle)

 However, the chairman of Sudan’s sovereign council, Abdelfattah El-Burhan, said that only “ideologist political groups” opposed normalisation with Israel. El-Burhan added that Israel is “playing a key role” in Sudan’s removal from the SST list (16 February, Radio Dabanga). Indeed, Jonas Horner, backed up El-Burhan’s claim, stating that: “overt Israeli endorsement of a lift for Sudan will provide a key push to the US government” to remove Sudan from the SST list (29 February, Bloomberg).

 Nonetheless, question marks hang over how urgent the US President Donald Trump administration views Sudan’s removal from the SST list. In addition, the economic consequences of Sudan’s SST designation have also been questioned.

2.     How does Sudan’s SST status impact economic and democratic development?

 David Pilling argues that Sudan’s absence of an “obvious champion in Washington” under the US presidency of Donald Trump poses an obstacle to Sudan’s democratic transition (12 February, Financial Times). John Hursh also argued that the US President Trump administration’s lack of urgency in removing Sudan from the SST list threatens to stall Sudanese progress towards peace and democracy, citing its hindrance of sanctions relief and investment. (21 February, Just Security).

 However, Lauren Blanchard, an Africa analyst for the US Congress, noted that while the SST designation is a reputational risk for investors, “concerns about corruption, outdated infrastructure and economic fragility may still deter investment for some time.” (29 February, Bloomberg). Blanchard’s comments highlight priority areas for the Sudanese government focus on, in order to attract investment and provide an economic lifeline for the democratic transition.

3.     Solutions

I.               What can Sudan do?

 If removal from the US SST list continues to be Sudan’s foreign policy priority, security sector reforms will be necessary. Sudan’s Minister of Information, Faisal Mohammed Salih, told AP (13 February) that the “US believe Sudan’s support for terror was carried out through its security apparatus…So they want to be assured that there has been a radical change in the way it operates.”

 Nonetheless, alternative solutions provided for the Sudanese government to improve relations with US (and western) policymakers revolve around building confidence and improving Sudan’s image among the aforementioned parties.

 Pilling suggests that a successful Sudanese democratic transition requires Sudan shifting its perception among “a whole generation of western officials” away from associations with “genocide and terrorism.” (12 February, Financial Times)

 In addition, David L. Phillips, a Director of the Program on Peacebuilding and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights calls for the Sudanese government to adopt confidence-building measures to act as benchmarks for the process of Sudan’s removal from the SST list (19 February, Sudan Tribune)

 Economic benchmarks suggested by Phillips are: the enforcement of money-laundering restrictions and banking reforms, and established control over the gold sector “that has been a major source of corruption.” Security benchmarks suggested by Phillips are: that peace talks with armed rebel groups conclude with security sector reforms and the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of non-state militias.

 Even so, Sudan could still benefit from international, particularly US, support in implementing economic and security sector reforms that would satisfy conditions for Sudan’s re-integration into the international community, and serve an economic lifeline for the democratic transition.

II.              What can the world do for Sudan?

Jihad Mashamoun, a doctoral candidate at the University of Exeter, identified three immediate measures that align US and Sudanese interests. (10 February, Africa Report)

 Firstly, Mashamoun called for the US to appoint an ambassador to Sudan that “clearly” communicates US expectations to Sudanese political stakeholders, in order to help the transitional government, manage popular expectations.

 Secondly, Mashamoun suggests that the US can help solve Sudan’s security dilemmas by working to handover members of al-Bashir’s regime to Sudanese prosecutors. Finally, Mashamoun calls for the international community to help Sudan retrieve the billions that al-Bashir’s regime stashed outside Sudan, rather than following the unpopular “narrow economic agenda” of the World Bank and IMF.

 Indeed, Pilling warned that the absence of external financial support for Sudan’s democratic transition may lead Sudan to the path of Egypt or Myanmar, where revolutions that ousted one military regime saw it replaced by another. (12 February, Financial Times)

Diplomatic Briefing: The normalisation of Sudan-Israel relations

The normalisation of Sudan-Israel relations

In Uganda, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had two hours of talks with Abdelfattah al-Burhan, head of Sudan’s sovereign council. According to Israeli officials, Sudan and Israel subsequently agreed to move towards forging normal relations for the first time. (Reuters, 3 February).

This briefing will provide background information on the meeting, the strategic interests that al-Burhan says that Sudan is pursuing, how Sudan has reacted, and analysis of whether blossoming Sudan-Israel relations will solve Sudan’s economic issues.

1) Who was behind the meeting?

According to an anonymous senior Sudanese military official the meeting was orchestrated by the United Arab Emirates and aimed at helping to remove Sudan’s state sponsor of terrorism designation.  The official added that only a “small circle” of top officials in Sudan, as well as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, knew about the meeting. (AP, 3 February).

Indeed, the Sudanese information minister and government spokesperson, Faisal Salih, told Reuters (3 February) he had no information about the visit. However, al-Burhan told the Arabic media that Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok has notified ahead of the meeting. (Bloomberg, February 5).

The Forces of Freedom and Change released a statement saying it was not consulted ahead of the meeting, but a change in Sudan’s position on Israel is the Sudanese people’s decision. (AP, 4 February).

2) Why was the meeting held?

Blossoming relations between the countries are said to be in the Sudanese national interest. (Bloomberg, 3 February). Recognising Israel, a key US ally, could help Sudan’s campaign to persuade Washington to remove it from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Consequently, the US invited al-Burhan to visit Washington, with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo praising al-Burhan “for his leadership in normalising ties with Israel.” (Reuters, 2 February).

Indeed, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) spokesman Brigadier Amer Mohammed al-Hassan said the motive in seeking to normalise relations with Israel is to end Sudan’s status as an international pariah state. Al-Hassan quoted al-Burhan to tell Sudanese newspaper editors that Sudan’s economic pressures require “bold decisions that shift Sudan’s domestic and foreign policy.” (AP, February 5).

3) The reactions

The meeting has “stirred controversy” in Sudan. Despite some sections of Sudanese social media arguing that blossoming relations with Israel are in the Sudanese interest, others denounced al-Burhan’s alleged attempts “get on the [US President Donald] Trump administration’s good side through Israel.” (AP, 4 February).

The meeting also sparked protests outside Sudanese government headquarters. Tarek Babakir, a protester, told Reuters (4 February) that: “the betrayal that was represented in the meeting with the head of the Zionist entity, is a dagger in the heart of the Sudanese people.”

Key Sudanese political stakeholders also denounced the meeting. Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the National Umma Party, said the meeting “crossed a red line,” and that Netanyahu’s “racist” policies contradict “just and comprehensive” regional peace. The Sudanese Communist Party also denounced the meeting, as “treason” against the Palestinians. (AP, 4 February).

The Sudanese Professionals Association said that normalisation with Israel was a serious decision that should not be taken by a transitional government (Bloomberg, February 5). The FFC said that it stands by Palestinian rights to an independent state.  (AP, 4 February). The Sudanese cabinet then held meetings with the Forces of Freedom and Change leaders, with the latter accusing al-Burhan of breaching Sudan’s constitutional declaration. (Reuters, 4 February).

However, Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council think-tank, said the meeting suggests that al-Burhan and the military “willing to put their reputation on the line” in their commitment to the survivability of the government.” (AP, 4 February).

4) Will improved relations with Israel solve Sudan’s economic issues?

Arguments that Sudan’s relations with Israel would facilitate Sudan’s removal from the US State Sponsor of Terrorism list, and thereby secure an economic lifeline, can be disputed by the notion that Sudan’s economic issues are not primarily caused by its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Tibor Nagy, the US Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African Affairs, said the primary cause of Sudan’s financial struggles is debts to international financial institutions. (28 January, Radio Dabanga).  Similarly, Hilary Mossberg and John Prendergast also attribute Sudan’s inability to secure debt relief to its pre-existing debts to the IMF and World Bank. (The Sentry, 29 January).

Mossberg and Prendergast argue that foreign investment is inhibited by corruption and deep-state’s monopoly in the banking and gold sectors. Therefore, to facilitate Sudan’s economic recovery, Mossberg and Prendergast call for the Sudanese government to enforce anti-money laundering laws and generate transparency across the economy, as well as imposing targeted targeted sanctions on the security sector to prevent it from spoiling economic and democratic reforms. 

Diplomatic Briefing: Progress in Sudan's relations with the US and Russia, troops reportedly withdraw from Yemen

Progress in Sudan's relations with the US and Russia, troops reportedly withdraw from Yemen.

Overview

Sudanese military leader Abdelfattah al-Burhan says that Russia has agreed to continuing its enhancement of the Sudanese armed forces. In positive signs for Sudan’s relationship with the US, four Senators have called for an upgrade to diplomatic relations with Sudan.

Enhanced Sudan-Russia military cooperation

Radio Dabanga (25 October) reports that Sudan is looking forward to continue cooperating with Russia economically and militarily, according to the Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan, who was in Sochi for the Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum.

El Burhan confirmed that Russia is promising to implement its agreement to reform Sudan’s military establishment and enhance the Sudanese armed forces.

Russia has also supported the Sudanese military in its propaganda war with democratic advocates (1 November, Sudan Tribune). It was reported that Facebook has removed 17 accounts, 6 Instagram accounts, 18 pages and 3 groups that are part of a Russian astroturfing attempt - a campaign to delegitimise the Forces of Freedom and Change, under the auspices of a grassroots campaign.

The Russian Wagner Group, which is allegedly close to Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) was reportedly involved.

Positive signs for US-Sudan relations

Four US Senators (25 October) have called on US President Donald Trump to support Sudan’s “fragile” democratic transition by nominating an ambassador to Sudan “as soon as possible.”

In a letter to President Trump, the senators – Cory A. Booker, Timothy M. Kaine, Christopher Coons and Christopher Murphy – argued US support for the transition will be needed to mitigate against the threat of hardliners within Sudan’s security services, “and in particular the RSF,” spoiling Sudan’s democratic transition.

In addition, the US Special Envoy to Sudan Donald Booth said that the US is working to remove the terrorism designation and engaging with the Congress to amend or modify three acts specific to Sudan and other legislations imposing restrictions on Sudan (29 October, Sudan Tribune).

Sudanese finance minister Ibrahim Elbadawi then confirmed that Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok will travel to Washington to discuss Sudan’s rescission from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, although a time-frame was not given (1 November, Sudan Tribune).

Withdrawal from Yemen

Anonymous Sudanese officials have told AP (October 30) that Sudan has withdrawn “several thousand troops,” from Yemen. The troops are reportedly mainly from the RSF, although a “few thousand” will remain to train Yemeni government forces.

RSF commander Himedti’s alleged reasons are that fighting in Yemen has dwindled.

Diplomatic Briefing: Sudan's economic woes continue as prospects of removal from the terrorist list seem unlikely

Sudan's economic woes continue as removal from the terrorist list seems unlikely

Overview

The US views Sudan as a stability partner, but legal constraints are slowing down the process of removing Sudan from the US terror list. Meanwhile, South Sudan’s civil war is hurting oil production, which is to delay compensation payments to Sudan. Saudi Arabia joins calls for Sudan’s removal from the US terror sponsor list, while Egypt is reportedly seeking Sudanese support in its Nile water dispute with Ethiopia.

No immediate prospect of removal from the terrorism list.

US Assistant Secretary of State Tibor Nagy says that he sees “total change” in Sudan, with the US viewing Sudan as a partner in promoting regional stability. However, Nagy also admitted that removing Sudan from the US terror sponsor list will take time amid “legal constraints tied up in [the] process.” (4 October, Radio Dabanga).

The US refusal to delist Sudan from the terror list has had economic consequences, with Sudan’s pound exchange rate hitting a new low. Black market traders told Sudan Tribune (7 October) that the value of the Sudanese pound has fallen due to the government’s inability to provide foreign currencies for important purposes, despite rising demand.

Traders had lowered currency rates due to their confidence that Prime Minister Hamdok’s visits to the New York and Paris would yield concrete economic progress, but this has not been forthcoming.

South Sudan oil

To make matters worse for Sudan, South Sudan said it is renegotiating an oil deal with Khartoum, as it will be unable to meet a December deadline to finish paying the $3 billion agreed as compensation for South Sudan’s 2011 secession. With South Sudan having $600 million to pay, its petrol minister Awou Daniel Chuang has attributed crippled oil production and deferred payments to the South Sudan. (7 October, AFP).

Saudi supports Sudanese economy

However, a promising sign for Sudan is that Saudi Arabia is working on removing Sudan from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism (6 October, Reuters). After a visit to King Salman by the head of Sudan’s transitional sovereign council Abdelfattah al-Burhan, Saudi Arabia has also said that it is working on initiating investments in Sudan and improving existing projects. Sudan is supporting Saudi Arabia in international forums and providing an investment environment that will enable Saudi expansion of its agriculture sector.

Sudan mediating in Ethiopia-Egypt dispute

According to an anonymous diplomat familiar with Egyptian-Sudanese relations, Egypt is attempting to secure Sudanese support in its Nile Water dispute due to Egyptian suspicions that Prime Minister Hamdok is influenced by Ethiopia. (6 October, Al-Monitor).

Diplomatic Briefing: Hamdok at UN General Assembly, Growing Support For Sudan's Removal From US Terror List

Overview

Prime Minister Hamdok went to the UN General Assembly to rally the international community to support Sudan, particularly for Sudan’s removal from the US designation of Sudan as a sponsor of terrorism,

This briefing will outline what Hamdok said, and how key players in the international community have reacted to Hamdok's calls for support.

For reference, Sudanese finance minister Ibrahim Badawi said that Sudan’s removal from the US terrorism list may take 9 months to a year “because it is tied to Congress.” (Reuters, 23 September).

Hamdok’s speech

In Hamdok's speech, he said that Sudan aims to transform its foreign policy, uphold international justice norms and address the economic, ethnic, cultural and religious root causes of its civil wars. (UN, 27 September).

In a message to the US President Donald Trump administration, Hamdok called for the US to differentiate between Sudanese people and the al-Bashir regime, emphasising that the Sudanese people “were never a sponsor or supporter of terrorism.” Hamdok argued that Sudanese people are suffering “the sins of [Omar al-Bashir’s] regime that they were its first victim of, and [became] the main actor of its overthrow.” (Sudan Tribune, 28 September).

Global support for Sudan’s economic recovery

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres (UN, 27 September) called for the world to support Sudan by removing its designation as a terror sponsor, lifting economic sanctions and mobilising massive financial support for development. In addition, Guterres expressed confidence that under Hamdok’s leadership, Sudan’s transitional government will "strengthen governance and the rule of law, uphold human rights, and set the country on a path towards economic recovery.”

France has proposed a conference to help Sudan address its debt issues, although it will be put on hold until the US lifts the sanctions imposed on Sudan. (Reuters, 30 September).

Reactions in the USA

However, an anonymous European diplomat has told Reuters (27 September) that the US is not ready to de-list Sudan as a sponsor of terrorism because “[the US] still think that today’s Sudan must pay for the crimes of yesterday’s Sudan.”

While the US State Department has the finally say on Sudan’s de-listing as a sponsor of terrorism, progress is being made in terms of US-Sudan cooperation. Sudan Tribune (27 September ) reported that the US Treasury Department wants to work with Sudan on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing.

Further positive signs for Hamdok is the proliferation of calls to delist Sudan in the US media. First, Cameron Hudson of the Atlantic Council (Foreign Policy, 25 September) warned that the removal of sanctions will be necessary to prevent the military in Sudan from gaining and keeping power. Hudson called for the international community to support Sudan’s new leadership and empower the new generation of moderate voices by helping to reform “crumbling” Sudanese institutions, re-establish development assistance and creating a pathway for retiring Sudan’s debt.

On a similar note, Rebecca Hamilton, an associate professor at American University Washington College of Law, also noted the continuation of Omar al-Bashir’s deep state, suggesting that delisting Sudan would be the economic lifeline needed for Sudan’s democratic transition to survive. (Washington Post, 30 September).

Diplomatic Briefing: Growing International Support For the Removal of Sudan From US Terrorism List

Overview

In the latest developments concerning Sudan’s foreign affairs, there are growing calls from influential voices for the US to remove Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres initiated the calls for Sudan's removal from the terrorism designation list (Sudan Tribune, 19 September).

Influential voices in the US

In calls for the US President Trump administration to remove Sudan from the US State Department’s list of nations that sponsor terrorism (18 September), Bloomberg columnist Bobby Ghosh argued that the US US should threaten Sudan’s military with sanctions if it stifles Sudan’s democratic transition, thereby sending a clear signal to donors and investors that it is safe to back the democratic government.

Nonetheless, Ghosh warned the US to be mindful of previous mistakes in de-listing Myanmar, Cuba and North Korea, where reform promises were not honoured.

Former US president Jimmy Carter (CNN, 24 September) provided a pragmatic reasoning that appealed to US security interests in calls for Sudan to be de-listed from the US terror list. Carter warned that failure to remove Sudan's terror designation would have economic consequences that would disrupt the democratic transition, and fuel regional instability.

Arab Support

Despite their heated rivalry with each-other, leaders of both Egypt and Qatar were united in their calls for Sudan’s removal from the US terror list, suggesting an unified stance at the Arab League to support Sudan’s economic recovery. (Multiple sources, 25 September).