Weekly Report: May 15-22 — Sudan In The News

Points of discussion:

Is the revolutionary honeymoon over?
Was taking down the barricades, after the military’s insistence, the right decision?
Are protest leaders acting with accountability to the protesters?
Is Himedti genuine about supporting democracy?
How dangerous are the divides within the military?
Do Sudanese democrats need more international support? (particularly western)
Is the opposition negotiating team representative of the protesters?

Sudan’s “revolutionary honeymoon” is over, argues Jason Patinkin (May 22, Washington Post). How have we got to this stage?

Deadlock continues

When multiple sources (May 15) reported that the military and opposition agreed on a three-year transition, there was hope.

But the previous week’s violence on protesters – allegedly perpetrated by Himedti’s Rapid Support Forces troops – continued (May 15, multiple sources). Multiple sources (May 16) then reported that the opposition decried the army’s suspension of negotiations for 72 hours.

According to TMC chief Abdelfattah Al Burhan, protesters broke an understanding on de-escalation as talks were ongoing, also accusing the protesters of causing “disruption to life in Khartoum” via the barricades erected outside the protest zone. (May 16, multiple sources).

The talks resumed (May 19, AP) after protesters agreed to the military’s demands to clear the roads. However, Jason Patinkin (May 22, Washington Post) noted how this decision caused friction between “cautious” protest leaders, and the “young radicals” who were not pleased with this concession. Protester Ilaf Usama was quoted threatening to refuse following protest leaders’ instructions again.

With splits remaining over whether the military or civilians will lead the transition (21 May, multiple sources), the Sudanese Professionals Association called a general strike (21 May, Reuters).

Sudan’s democratic transition is complicated by internal divisions within both the military and the opposition.

According to Sudan Tribune (May 22), the opposition coalition - Declaration of Freedom and Change (DFC) denied that they proposed ceding presidency of the sovereign council to the military. Nonetheless, a DFC official admitted that: “some of the coalition forces, such as the Sudan Call and the Gathering of Unionists, have no objection to ceding the presidency…provided the [DFC] gets the majority, while the National Consensus Forces and the Communist Party…are opposed to the move."

The Atlantic Council’s Cameron Hudson (May 22, Foreign Policy) attributed the opposition’s division to the military “[learning] under Bashir how to spend a long time arguing over minute details…letting the opposition weaken itself.”

But the military also seems divided. Sudanese prosecutors alleged that National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) agents prevented them from arresting their former boss Salah Gosh, on corruption charges (21 May, multiple sources). Justin Lynch stated that this reflects how NISS “marches to its own beat.” (May 22, Foreign Policy)

There is also talk of division between the Himedti’s RSF and the army, which is not resolvable without war, according to political analyst Magdi el-Gizouli (May 22, Washington Post). Justin Lynch (May 22, Foreign Policy) argued that the previous week’s fatal attacks on protesters, allegedly perpetrated by the RSF, are “evidence that someone from the military wanted to undermine the negotiations.”

Himedti.

The week has seen increasing media focus on Himedti, the TMC vice-president. Jerome Tubiana (May 15, Foreign Policy) argued that Himedti is the true power in Sudan’s ruling military council, in an article which profiled the rise of Himedti’s RSF as a “third pole of power within Sudan’s security apparatus, rival to both army and intelligence.” Tubiana credited Himedti for removing both Omar Al Bashir and his successor Awad Ibn Auf from power.

Himedti continues to talk the talk. Reuters (May 18) reported that he said democratic elections are his goal. He told Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram “we want to hand over power today not tomorrow…[we] are not politicians and we are waiting for the government to be formed.” (May 22, Reuters).

The AP (May 20) stated that “there have not been widespread calls for Himedti to step down,” with Magdi el-Gizouli adding that: “many people, including some of Sudan’s finest democrats, consider him a counterweight to the Islamic movement.”

However, when we asked Sudanese Twitter (20 May, @Sudan_Voices) whether they feel that Himedti genuinely supports democracy – 84% of respondents (from a sample of 247) voted ‘No.’

Will Sudanese democrats gain international support?

AFP (May 17) reported that Washington hosted talks between representatives from the UN, African Union and European powers, who urged Sudan's military rulers and protesters to resume suspended negotiations. Tibor Nagy, the US assistant secretary of state for Africa said: “we also expressed concern about the recent violence directed by security forces against protesters, and agreed to call for the TMC to allow peaceful protests and hold accountable those responsible for recent violence.”

Then, the UK-US-Norway troika insisted that economic support for Sudan is dependent on the establishment of a civilian-led authority. (May 22, Sudan Tribune).

However, the extent to which the US will support Sudanese democrats remains unclear, with 4 DFC members describing difficulties dealing with Steven Koutsis, the top US official in Sudan (May 22, Foreign Policy).

The same article also gave news that Russia joins Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt in supporting the military council, with Saudi Arabia’s $250 million deposit into Sudan’s central bank (reported by multiple sources on May 19), reflecting the Kingdom attempt to “buy support inside the military.”

There are also fears that the African Union is “being used as a conduit to bring back repression and corruption to Sudan and instability to the region,” according to the head of the Sudanese Diplomat Association, Ibrahim Taha Ayoub (May 21, Sudan Tribune). These fears stem from allegations that the African Union Commission chairperson Moussa Faki is advised by Amira Elfadil, a former minister of Omar Al Bashir’s government.

Nonetheless, Cameron Hudson (May 17, Atlantic Council) called for the US to attach a State Department envoy to Sudan, albeit emphasising US strategic interests in doing so. Hudson argued that a US envoy in Sudan would:

Mitigate the risks of ISIS exploiting potential instability if a US envoy mediates between the military and civilians.
Reassure Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE of their common interests, preventing Sudan from being a regional battleground
Create a strong western alliance to prevent China and Russia “scuttling hopes for Sudanese democracy.”

Women.

CNN (May 17) reported on a gruesome Sudanese military campaign of sexual abuse, harassment, and intimidation targeting women at the heart of Sudanese protests. Nahed Jabrallah, the founder of SEEMA, a charity tackling violence against women, said at least 15 women were raped, although the number is likely to be higher given the stigma attached to sexual abuse in Sudan. The report encouraged women who also experienced abuse to come forward on Twitter and speak out, sparking sentiments of support and solidarity.

The oppression that women faced under Al Bashir’s regime has been a key driver for them being at the forefront of the protest movement, argues Dr Luka Kuol (May 21, Sudan Tribune), who called for female leadership of Sudan’s democratic transition. Kuol also used empirical evidence to highlight the positive role women can play in peace process leadership and peacebuilding.

Representation in the negotiations.

However, as Jason Patinkin noted, (May 22, Washington Post), women are excluded from the opposition’s negotiating committee, despite playing a key role in the protests. The same article saw Darfuri academic Adeeb Yousif criticize the exclusion of Darfurians from the negotiating committee, stating that he thinks “this is a Khartoum-Khartoum dialogue to decide for the rest of Sudan”

The future.

So, what next for Sudan?

The Washington Post editorial board (May 15) called for Sudan’s opposition to “hold fast for control” of the sovereign council, to ensure that “real change, and eventually, democracy are able to flower.” The Washington Post’s editors added that should Sudanese protesters be successful, it would also be valueable for the Arab world, “particularly those suffering under the regimes that have been trying to save Sudan for dictatorship.”

Sudan can be Africa’s next economic success story, argues geopolitical intelligence firm Stratfor (May 20), should a civilian-led government emerge to trigger Sudan’s removal from the US’ terror designation list. Potential benefits that Stratfor highlight include:

· Attracting international investment

· Supporting a tourism sector “brimming with opportunity”

· Investment into infrastructure

· Peace with Darfur would open up Sudan’s “untapped” mining market, enabling gold reserves to be used as a guarantee to secure international financing.