Will east Sudan become another Darfur?
What is happening in Port Sudan and Kassala?
With eastern Sudan facing a spike in tribal violence during July-August 2020, this report is split into four parts, covering the following:
East Sudan states. From top to bottom, the states with the darker shade of red are: the Red Sea state (home to Port Sudan), Kassala and al-Gadarif.
1. A brief history
Clashes between the Beni Amer and Nuba tribes in eastern Sudan have been dated back to 1986. A month after al-Bashir’s ouster, the tensions re-emerged and continue to intensify.
Meanwhile, in Kassala, fighting between the Beni Amer and Beja Hadendawa tribes was triggered by the July 2020 appointment on Beni Amer tribesman Saleh Ammar as state governor.
2. Key events
Between July and the start of September 2020, Beni Amer-Nuba fighting in Port Sudan has killed and wounded at least 33 and 123 respectively.
At least eight were killed and 20 were wounded in Beni Amer-Beja Hadendawa clashes in Kassala.
3. Five key issues
3.1 - The appointment of Saleh Ammar as civilian governor of Kassala has led Beja Hadendawa chiefs to threaten self-determination. Ammar’s opponents argue his military background makes him unsuitable for a fragile state with security challenges. Ammar’s supporters suggest that his experience as an award-winning human rights journalist poses a threat to Beja leader Sayed Tirik, a former electoral candidate for Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party.
3.2 - Foreign interference: Given its proximity to the geostrategic Red Sea, violence in Port Sudan is allegedly fuelled by foreign intelligence services. Activists and analysts predominantly note UAE and Eritrean interests in eastern Sudan.
3.3 - Weak response of Sudanese security forces to conflicts in east Sudan have been attributed to factors such as: reluctance to use force due to fears of violating human rights, a lack of capacity, and alleged pursuits of foreign intelligence services.
3.4 - Another Darfur? With firearms being increasingly used in Port Sudan’s clashes, analysts warn that eastern Sudan’s conflicts may become “another Darfur,” a potentially more dangerous fate for the central government in Khartoum.
3.5 - Political factors fuelling tribal violence, including: poor public service delivery, strained citizen-state relations and irresponsible media practices.
4 Five solutions
The five solutions for the east Sudan’s conflicts proposed by Sudanese civil society groups and journalists fit into two categories. Firstly, legal solutions to enforce the rule of law and media censorship to combat hate speech. Secondly, solutions that revolve around addressing the root causes of the tribal violence, including: providing basic services, disarmament, conducting greater research, and countering “gunpowder tribalism” via public discourses.
1. A brief history
The eastern Sudanese states of the Red Sea and Kassala are highly multi-ethnic. In Kassala and Port Sudan, the capital of the Red Sea State, residence has been taken up by the eastern Sudanese Beja tribe, including the Hadenawa clan, and members of the Beni Amer tribe. In addition, migrants to eastern Sudan include displaced persons from conflict zones, such as: the Nuba tribe, originally from South Kordofan, and the Zaghawa from Darfur.
The clashes between the Beni Amer and the Nuba tribes are among the fiercest of the inter-tribal conflicts in eastern Sudan. With origins spanning western Eritrea and eastern Sudan, “to some [the Beni Amer] are considered foreigners from Eritrea who were granted citizenship in Sudan under the former Omar al-Bashir government” according to Khattab Ahmed (Global Voices, 19 August).
Charting the history of Beni Amer-Nuba tensions in Port Sudan, Ahmed Fadl writes that the first confrontation began in 1986 following political disagreements among parliamentary candidates over the legal status of alcohol. Then, security forces “imposed” control over the Beni Amer dominated Dar al-Na’eem neighbourhood and the Nuba-dominated Filib neighbourhood, until the security presence was allegedly reduced a month after Omar al-Bashir’s fall (al-Jazeera, 27 August).
In May 2019, in the eastern Sudanese state of al-Gadarif, Beni Amer-Nuba tensions emerged over water and other resources. Then, in August 2019, clashes in Port Sudan killed at least 36 from both sides (AP, 12 August). The declaration of a state of emergency in the Red Sea state saw the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) expand to eastern Sudan for the first time, adding to its presence in the gold mining havens in the western region of Darfur. After Beni Amer tribal leaders called for allegiance to the RSF, a reconciliation deal was signed in September 2019 (Reuters, 13 August).
September 2019: Nuba and Beni Amer leaders are congratulated by RSF commander Himedti after signing a peace accord in Port Sudan.
However, by January 2020, renewed Beni Amer-Nuba clashes in Port Sudan killed nine (AP, 12 August). In Kassala, in early May 2020, three days of fighting between the Nuba and Beni Amer and el-Habab tribes killed eight and wounded over 80, before renewed clashes at the start of July killed one and wounded over a dozen (Radio Dabanga, 6 July).
Towards the end of July and the start of August, the appointments of civilian governors sparked a new round of tribal violence. As members of the Nuba tribe protested the appointment of the National Umma Party’s Hamid el-Bashir as the governor of their home state, South Kordofan, Beni Amer-Nuba clashes killed at least 32.
By contrast, the hostilities in Kassala were predominantly between the Beni Amer and Beja tribes. The tribes came into conflict after the Beja protested against the appointment of Beni Amer tribesman Saleh Ammar as Kassala’s civilian governor, emphasising that his military background makes him an unsuitable candidate as governor of a state plagued by insecurity.
After central government in Khartoum postponed Ammar’s arrival, the Beni Amer staged counter protests demanding Ammar’s assumption of duties, culminating in Beja leaders threatening to fight for self-determination in the eastern Sudanese states of the Red Sea, Kassala and al-Gadarif.
2. Key events
This section provides more detail on the six major security incidents that occurred in Port Sudan and Kassala in between July and the start of September 2020.
Key event in east Sudan August 2019-September 2020
Port Sudan
10 August - Nuba and Beni Amer clashes kill at least 32 and wound 98: Beni Amer-Nuba fighting led a curfew to be imposed in Port Sudan (Reuters, 13 August). In a press release, the Office of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok (12 August) responded by explaining that Hamdok met with tribal leaders and politicians and decided to: send a team from the Central Reserve Forces (CRF) to Port Sudan, create a quad committee from the council of security and defense to investigate, request that Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) participate in making a proposal to solve the conflict, and support the strict curfew implemented by the state governor to help quell the violence. By August 14, Radio Dabanga reported that Port Sudan “witnessed calm” after over 100 Rapid Support Forces (RSF) arrived in the city, joining joint military forces and members of the paramilitary Central Reserve Police.
1 September - One killed and 25 wounded in clashes between government forces and residents of Filib district: A man was killed, with 17 civilians and eight members of the military forces wounded, in clashes between government forces and resident of the Filib District in Port Sudan. Filib’s Resistance Committees alleged that when a joint force of army troops and RSF searched the district for weapons, they beat up and detained people, before shooting at those who resisted arrest (Radio Dabanga, 2 September). It is worth noting that the Filib is a district with a sizeable Nuba presence (al-Jazeera, 27 August).
Kassala
End of July - Beja-Beni Amer clashes kill 5: At the end of July, clashes then erupted between the Beja and Beni Amer tribes, due their contrasting views on the appointment as civilian governor of Saleh Ammar, a Beni Amer tribesman with a military background. Four were killed in fighting that coincided with marches against Ammar headed by Beja Hadendawa leader Sayed Tirik, and Beni Amer marches calling for Ammar to arrive from Khartoum and assume his duties. Despite a police curfew, the Beni Amer marched again, and a man was killed in renewed clashes (Radio Dabanga, 28 July).
End of July - Protesters block roads and Beja chiefs threaten self-determination: Protesters then closed a number of government institutions and ministries to protest against Ammar’s appointment, as well as staging a 3-day blockage of the Khartoum-Port Sudan highway. The High Council of Beja Nazirs (a state-appointed administrative chief of a tribe, according to the native administration system in Sudan) and Independent Chieftains conditioned the opening of the road with an official response to their demands for Ammar’s removal. Beja chiefs also threatened to opt for self-determination in the eastern Sudanese states of the Red Sea state, Kassala, and al-Gadarif if their demands are rejected (Radio Dabanga, 29 July).
Zaghawa (Darfuri tribe) attack in New Halfa kills two and wounds 28: Two were killed and 28 were wounded after the village of 10 Iskan was allegedly attacked by members of the Zaghawa tribe, who originate from Darfur but settled in New Halfa to work as farmers (Sudan Tribune, 2 August).
Three killed, 19 injured, one missing in renewed Beja-Beni Amer clashes: A man was killed and 17 were wounded in fighting triggered by renewed Beni Amer protests urging Saleh Ammar to come to Kassala and assume his duties (Radio Dabanga, 26 August). Ignoring the curfew imposed, Beni Amer marched again re-iterating their demands, resulting two being killed, two being wounded and one going missing during clashes in al-Sawagi district (Radio Dabanga, 27 August).
3. The key issues
This sections covers five key issues, starting with: (3.1) Saleh Ammar’s polarising appointment as civilian governor. Opposed by the pro-Islamist media, Beja Hadendawa leader Sayid Tirik and the National Umma Party, Ammar has the support of eastern Sudan’s local activist community. (3.2) Then, we cover allegations of foreign interference in eastern Sudan, before exploring (3.3) factors behind the weak response of Sudanese security forces. After a brief summary of (3.4) warnings that east Sudan can become “another Darfur,” this section concludes by looking at (3.5) political issues fuelling tribal violence.
3.1 - The contentious appointment of Saleh Ammar as Kassala governor
In Kassala, the selection of Saleh Ammar, a Beni Amer tribesman with a military background, as civilian governor triggered protests. Ammar is opposed by Beja Hadendawa leaders, the National Umma Party, the pro-Islamist media affiliated to Omar al-Bashir. However, the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) stick by Ammar, who’s main rival is linked to al-Bashir’s regime.
Saleh Ammar - appointed the civilian governor of Kassala
I. Opposition to the appointment of Saleh Ammar as Kassala governor
Severely condemning Ammar’s appointment, Sayed Tirk, native administration leader of the Beja Hadendawa tribe warned they will increase the protests “until Khartoum reverses its decision” (Radio Dabanga, 24 July). Indeed, the High Council of Beja Nazirs (a state-appointed administrative chief of a tribe, according to the native administration system in Sudan) and Independent Chieftains warned that they will opt for self-determination for eastern Sudan (Red Sea state, Kassala, and El Gedaref) in the event their demands are rejected (Radio Dabanga, 29 July).
Sayid Tirk - the Nazir of the Beja Hadendawa.
According to reports, Ammar’s military background is viewed as problematic within the context of Kassala. First, the son of National Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, Siddig, accused the government of violating agreed principles by appointing governors with a military background for fragile states such as Kassala, warning that this may lead to armed conflicts (Radio Dabanga, 24 July).
Similarly, Tirk re-iterated calls for Ammar’s resignation to “save the government from embarrassment,” adding that Kassala has unique specifications for a governor as it is a border state challenged by insecurity, human trafficking, and smuggling. In addition, spokesperson for the Beja High Council, Abdallah Obashar, criticised “the intransigence of the FFC regarding the new governor” (Radio Dabanga, 21 August).
Nonetheless, it is worth noting the anti-Ammar sentiments have been echoed in the Islamist newspaper al-Intibaha (2 August). Columnist al-Sheikh Saleh criticised Ammar’s appointment as civilian governor on the grounds of his military background, within the context of Kassala’s “suffering from many security threats, such as smuggling problems, lack of resources, and tribal wars”. Al-Sheikh Saleh further suggested that Ammar lacks practical experience, and citing protests against him in neighbouring Red Sea and Gadarif states to argue that he lacks local acceptance.
Columnist al-Sheikh Saleh writes in the pro-Islamist Sudanese newspaper al-Intibaha: ‘Why insist on appointing Saleh Ammar?’
II. FFC unwavering support for Saleh Ammar as Kassala governor
Despite the controversy surrounding Ammar’s appointment, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) in eastern Sudan defend their decision and call on the government to allow him to commence his duties. Abdelazim Abdelkarim, a leading member of the Kassala FFC council, said that the procedures for selecting Ammar were carried out in an “institutional and legal manner.” His colleague, Hamour Hussein added that allowing Native Administration leaders – such as Sayed Tirk - to select state governors “will disrupt the social fabric,” alongside expressing dissatisfaction with tribal polarisation and racist rhetoric in the state, attributing the emergence of “tribal discourse” to “the divide-and-rule policies of the former regime,” appealing to the Kassala residents to distance themselves from tribalism (Radio Dabanga, 24 August).
Calling on the central government to urgently find a solution, the acting governor of Kassala, Arbab el-Fadul said “responding to the demands of the rejectionist group will open the door to more pressure and blackmail concerning important national issues, such as fighting corruption and removing the remnants of the old regime”. El-Fadul further emphasised that that it is “impossible” to achieve consensus on any new governor at this stage (Radio Dabanga, 27 August).
Taking into account the strong Beja opposition to Ammar, and the difficulty in achieving a consensus in a fragile state such as Kassala, it begs the question: why would the FFC be so strongly in favour of him?
III. Opposition to Ammar is viewed as counter-revolutionary
Sudanese activists allege that the campaign by Beja leader Sayed Tirik to prevent Beni Amer tribesman Saleh Ammar’s appointment as Kassala governor is an exploitation of tribal divisions to pursue the political interests of the ousted al-Bashir regime. Kassala Resistance Committee member Ammar Salih says that Sayed’s father al-Amin “was a parliamentary member of the former ruling National Congress Party…had considerable influence in the National Intelligence and Security Service…and continues to remain a powerful figure in the security forces” (People’s Dispatch, 5 September).
Moreover, the image below is a poster of Sayed Tirik’s parliamentary candidacy as a representative of the National Congress Party in the 2015 elections.
With al-Amin Tirik facing allegations of embezzling money from the 2006 Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund, Salih claims that Ammar’s appointment is particularly concerning as he is a former journalist who investigated the embezzlement.
Thus, Ammar is said to hold “information against many people with corrupt vested interests in the region,” and those he can implicate “are the main drivers in this conflict” (People’s Dispatch, 5 September).
Digging deeper in Ammar’s background, we found that Ammar was the deputy editor of al-Taghyeer, an independent Sudanese newspaper that has faced restrictions under al-Bashir’s regime. In 2016, under the name ‘Salih Amar Hamid’ won the prestigious journalism award – the Thomson Foundation prize - for a “powerful story about migrants in Sudan”. Amar quoted analysts who criticised al-Bashir regime’s management of the refugee crisis in Kassala.
Saleh Ammar receives his prestigious journalist award alongside with the then-UK ambassador to Sudan, Michael Aron.
3.2 - Foreign interference
Journalist Hanadi Siddiq attributes the violence in Port Sudan to the “hands of foreign intelligence services,” adding that Hamdok’s government has failed to address a root cause of the conflict – that “most foreigners who live in eastern Sudan by granted citizenship by al-Bashir’s regime.” Siddiq further suggests that officials within Sudan’s security apparatus are aware of this, and are implementing the agenda of foreign intelligence services through their relations with selected tribes that are fuelling the conflict (al-Jareeda, 15 August). Similarly, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS, 25 August) also state that the Beni Amer-Nuba clashes stem from tribal conflicts being inflamed by regional actors.
Ahmed identifies states with interests in eastern Sudan, citing Eritrea’s reliance on Sudan as a source of goods, “usually through smuggling,” whereas the United Arab Emirates “has had its eye on Sudan's main port, Port Sudan” (Global Voices, 19 August). Indeed, Sami al-Sayegh, chief engineer of the coastal terminal in the southern port in Port Sudan, said the UAE is seeking, through the Dubai Ports Company, to control Sudan's ports
Furthermore, in alleging that that foreign intelligence services inflame eastern Sudan’s tensions, retired police officer Lt. Gen Osman Fagray highlights interests including: Eritrea’s Red Sea fishing aims, Saudi projects, Egypt’s aversion to Sudanese democracy and the UAE’s support for the Beni Amer (al-Jazeera, 13 August).
3.3 - Weak security apparatus response
According to ACJPS (25 August) sources, the security forces failed to intervene to eastern Sudan’s conflict in a timely manner, despite their presence, claiming they had not received instructions from their leadership. Several factors may be responsible for the slow response, including fears of violating human rights, a lack of capacity, or, as some analysts have pointed out, sinister objectives to fuel the violence.
I. Fears of violations
Sudanese Information Minister Faisal Mohammed Salih attributed the slow response of the security forces to the rising violence in Kassala to a lack of confidence between civilians and the security forces. Salih said that security services and regular forces are reluctant to intervene in all these crises because they fear accusations of violating human rights (Sudan Tribune, 26 August). Lt. Gen Osman Fagray specifically noted that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) lack experience in dealing with civilians and might fear using force for fear of accountability (Al-Jazeera, 13 August).
Indeed, Radio Dabanga (2 September) reported that a man was killed, 17 civilians wounded, with a further eight members of the military forces wounded, in clashes between a joint force featuring the RSF and residents of Filib, a district of Port Sudan with a large Nuba population. The Resistance Committee of Filib said when joint force of army troops and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) searched the district for weapons, they beat up and detained people, accusing them of violating the curfew. When people attempted to stop them taking the detainees with them, the troops shot at them.
II. Limited capacity
Port Sudan locals close to the conflict have noted the authorities limited abilities to intervene. Dr. ‘Asjad Abdelmoneim, a doctor treating victims of the violence in Port Sudan said that the lack of local police stations and hospitals limits the authorities’ ability to anticipate conflicts, with another local, Saleh Ahmed, saying that the same security services which contained Beni Amer-Nuba tensions in 2018, are now unable to access weapons and saboteurs (al-Jazeera, 27 August).
As a result, al-Noor Hamad questions the continued existence of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services if it was “unable to penetrate the population, gather information and submit daily reports to the ruling authorities, to be on standby before the violence erupted”. Moreover, Hamad labels the dispatch of armed forces and Rapid Support Forces to Port Sudan to be “nothing but a public relations campaign” (al-Tayyar, 18 August).
III. Fuelling the violence?
As noted earlier, Hanadi Siddiq alleges that Sudan’s security are implementing the agenda of foreign intelligence services through their relations with selected tribes that are fuelling the conflict (al-Jareeda, 15 August).
3.4 - Could east Sudan turn into another Darfur?
Fears that the tensions in eastern Sudan could turn into “another Darfur” have been echoed by Sudanese voices, with journalist Hanadi Siddiq (al-Jareeda, 15 August) and Hamour Hussein (Radio Dabanga, 24 August) of the FFC eastern Sudan council both issuing such warnings unless the situation is contained. Hussein in particular identified allowing Native Administration leaders – such as Sayed Tirik - to select state governors as a factor which may “disrupt the social fabric” and spark further violence.
Indeed, the Darfur scenario that Port Sudan is “moving quickly towards” would be “more painful for Khartoum, as the east is strategic and close,” warns retired police officer Lt. Gen Osman Fagray (al-Jazeera, 13 August).
Alarmingly, it seems that firearms are pouring into eastern Sudan at an unprecedented rate. The intensified tensions are seemingly becoming more brutal, with Dr. Asjad Abdelmoneim, who has been treating victims in Port Sudan, saying that live bullets are being used by the tribes, in contrast to previous injuries predominantly caused by sticks (al-Jazeera, 27 August).
3.5 - Political problems fuelling tribal divisions
With ACJPS (25 August) blaming the clashes between the Beni Amer-Nuba clashes on “poor service delivery,” the editor of al-Tayyar newspaper, Osman Mirghani, delves further into structural issues behind the “gunpowder tribalism” fuelling eastern Sudanese conflicts (al-Rakoba, 28 August).
For Mirghani, gunpowder tribalism fills a vacuum left by the absence of a public sense of direct interest that leaves a “citizen’s view of their relationship with the government confined to the narrowest scope between rights and duties”. Mirghani concludes that tribalist wars are fuelled by the “absence of hope and the darkness of poverty and the weakness of the state’s civilised structure”.
The Eastern Sudan Lawyers' Association also argue that the rising tensions in east Sudan are political rather than tribal, blaming “the negative role of the media by using hate speech and stirring up tribal strife…contributing directly to tribal mobilisation” (Radio Dabanga, 22 May).
4. Solutions
Sudanese civil society organisations and journalists proposed solutions for the rising conflicts in east Sudan range from legal solutions to provide accountability and censor media that enflames tribal tensions, as well as addressing root causes, conducting research on the causes of the violence, and finally, developing a new public and government discourse to counter the impact of the “gunpowder tribalism.
4.1 - Legal solutions: accountability
Journalist Shama’il al-Noor calls for serious legal enforcement that does not spare tribal components, with the transitional needing to “lay down the groundwork of the rule of law, beginning with the periphery,” thereby ensuring that those who instigated the Port Sudan clashes are held accountable. Al-Noor criticises previous attempts at reconciliation, suggesting that they offered “faint conciliatory tones…at the expense of justice” that encourage further feuding, and fail to address to “lax law towards the grave grimes committed” (al-Tayyar, 18 August).
The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (25 August) call for the suspension of any governmental figure suspected of involvement in the conflicts, and if found guilty following a transparent investigation, charged and prosecuted in compliance with international standards. The Eastern Sudan Lawyers call for the formation of an independent investigation committee and the establishment of special courts in Red Sea state, Kassala, and al-Gadarif (Radio Dabanga, 22 May).
4.2 - Legal solutions – media censorship
To address “the negative role of the media by using hate speech and stirring up tribal strife,” the Eastern Sudan Lawyers’ Association also call for the establishment of a special prosecution office for information crimes (Radio Dabanga, 22 May). Similarly, the Port Sudan Résistance Committees call for the activation of a law on cybercrime (Radio Dabanga, 14 August).
4.3 - Addressing the root causes
ACJPS (25 August) call for a disarmament campaign to be launched across Sudan, and the provision of basic services to address the root causes of the conflict. The Eastern Sudan Lawyers Association suggest the end of illegal housing “that forms the basis for many crimes” (Radio Dabanga, 22 May).
4.4 - Conducting research
Eastern Sudan Lawyers’ Association recommend the establishment of a forum of “wise and influential people in Red Sea state, Kassala, and al-Gadarif, and that eastern Sudanese universities research the causes of the violence and offer appropriate solutions (Radio Dabanga, 22 May).
The Port Sudan Résistance Committees request that the results of previous investigations into Port Sudan tribal fighting are made available for public review (Radio Dabanga, 14 August).
4.5 - A new public and governmental discourse
To counter the impact of the “gunpowder tribalism” plaguing eastern Sudan, Osman Mirghani, editor of al-Tayyar Newspaper, calls for a “national project that injects hope and desire for a decent life for all Sudanese,” and public and governmental discourse that develops a “sense of interest and a prosperous future for the average citizen” (al-Rakoba, 28 August).