ANALYSIS OF RSF COMMANDER HIMEDTI'S SPEECH (9 OCT 2024)

Summary

RSF commander Himedti’s latest speech raises more questions than gave answers.

This is why we translated and analysed EIGHT excerpts from his speech, with a particular focus on parts that did not generate much media attention, to ask whether this marks a new stage in the war and the RSF’s communications strategy.

Unlike previous speeches, Himedti’s latest was not scripted or subtitled in English. It also departed from the carefully crafted image his advisers have attempted to forge of Himedti as statesmanlike figure palatable to the international community.

 But what did Himedti try to achieve with in a speech described by analysts as incoherent and confusing. Therefore, we ask the following questions:

·      Is Himedti ignoring his advisers or is he poorly advised?

·      Was this a desperate attempt to boost troop morale following recent battlefield defeats?

·      Has Himedti admitted that he does not have control over his troops, and that RSF is facing supply issues?

·      Can we expect the tribal incitement espoused in his speech to become part of the RSF’s official communications policy?

·      Why did Himedti lash out at the international community including – indirectly – the UAE which is accused of supporting the RSF?

·      Why has Himedti gone public over his tensions with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition widely accused of being the RSF’s political ally?

 CLIP 1: Himedti blames international community for supporting an agreement he says caused the war.

“This is a message for the international community under the leadership of the Americans. We told you about the Framework Agreement. We told you it will bring problems. I spoke about it with all of you: from [former UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Sudan chief] Volker [Perthes], to the Quartet [Saudi Arabia, UK, US, UAE] to the Troika [Norway, UK, US], to the African Union. I told all of you. So that I can prove that I have witnesses. There was a meeting attended by [army generals] Shams Al-Deen Kabbashi to Ibrahim Jabir, and the Americans and the Saudis. In the Saudi ambassador’s house. The Saudi staff were present and the American staff were present led by [US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs] Molly Phee. The Saudi staff were led by the Saudi ambassador.

“I rejected [the Framework Agreement]. After the Forces of Freedom and Change [FFC] concluded their words, I rejected what they said. I was criticised by [FFC leader] Yassir Arman. I disagreed with Arman in front of them. Even Molly Phee said ‘this is frustrating’! I told them it’s better if I go. The Saudi ambassador told me to stay. Kabbashi said he believes in every word said by Arman. I’m the one who rejected it! I’m not sure what Ibrahim Jabir said, but it had no worth. Then they went and wrote a statement and published it. I wasn’t a part of this.

“OK, international community – under the leadership of the Americans. If you wanted to bring the Islamic Movement – yesterday Kabbashi was dancing like a girl – with Ahmed Abbas, the former governor of Sennar. Yesterday, Ibrahim Mahmoud was received. If you wanted to bring the National Congress Party, why did you destroy the country? If you wanted the Islamic Movement to rule the country, why did you destroy the country with the Framework Agreement? The Framework Agreement caused the war, there’s no other reason. The Framework Agreement caused the war. We didn’t reject the Framework as the start of a transition. No – the Framework includes things that we told you about and said in the media that this cannot be! Why? Why did you do all of this? To destroy Sudan, right?

“Now I’m speaking about the international community. From the US to the EU, to those supporting the Framework Agreement. If you’re in agreement with Islamists, Why did you destroy our country? I hold you fully responsible! You must take full responsibility for the war? Because you made the Framework Agreement. And I told you that the Framework will bring problems. It will bring Sudan to war. I told you thi and it was witnessed. You can’t deny it. Neither the Saudis or the Americans or the Europeans or Volker. They can testify what I said. You won’t be able to deny it. Why did you destroy our country? And you’re in agreement with Islamists? Why destroy our country?”

 Analysis

·      Are frictions developing between the RSF and the UAE?

·      Is Himedti borrowing from the Bashir-era playbook by stoking fears of an international conspiracy to inspire his loyalists?

·      Is the end of the RSF partnership with the FFC?

·      Is the RSF Islamist faction winning the battle for influence within the militia?

UAE-RSF friction
While Himedti’s speech was addressed to RSF fighters and the Sudanese people, he lashed out at the international community, with a particular focus on “all of [the states]” who supported the Framework Agreement for a democratic transition.

While not referring to the UAE by name, the Gulf state was among the Framework Agreement’s supporters. Himedti also explicitly blamed the outbreak of the war on the Quartet (KSA, UK, USA and UAE). This raises questions as to whether friction is brewing between the RSF and the UAE - who continue to publicly deny assisting the RSF despite mounting evidence of its covert support. But what would lead the RSF to become a liability for the UAE?

Beyond the reputation damage caused by associating with a genocidal militia, there is a chance that the RSF may increasingly become a financial burden. The army’s recent victories - not only territorially but also in terms of depleting RSF resources - show how it is not a foregone conclusion that the UAE investment in the RSF will guarantee their interests in Sudan. In addition, while the UAE is believed to support the RSF as part of its global war on the Islamists, there are signs that the Islamist faction within the RSF is growing in influence.

Borrowing from the Bashir-era playbook

Himedti’s speech raises questions as to what is happening behind the scenes at the RSF. His verbal attacks on the international community contradicted the consistent communications position adopted by the RSF: that the Islamist former regime isolated Sudan from the world, with the RSF portrayed as more cooperative and compliant.

Yet, in his latest speech, Himedti borrowed from ex-president Omar Al-Bashir’s playbook: by stoking fears of an international conspiracy in order to cultivate a “them vs. us” mentality among his loyalists. This would suggest that Himedti’s speech aimed to boost troop morale amid recent battlefield losses across Sudan.

Nonetheless, it is worth considering whether: a) the RSF’s communication strategy has changed as part of a battle for influence within the militia’s advisory office or b) Himedti is ignoring his advisors, especially given that Himedti made public his disagreements with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition over the Framework Agreement.

 RSF friction with the FFC

In a tweet, independent researcher and consultant Nada Wanni argued that Himedti’s speech reflect his frustration that FFC were not able to politically market him and his ‘rationale’ for the war to western states, thereby helping him to avoid sanctions and – in other words – “to do what he expected of them, given their relations with the International Community”.

In the summer, Himedti fired his main advisor - Yousif Izzat - a smooth-talking Sudanese-Canadian lawyer said to be responsible for shaping Himedti’s ideology. As we reported, a key factor for Izzat’s sacking were his disagreements with Abdulrahim Hamdan Dagalo - Himedti’s older brother and the militia’s second-in-command. With Izzat said to coordinate between the RSF and the FFC, Abdulrahim’s frictions with Izzat grew over the former’s distrust of the FFC.

We also reported on the amount of former regime Islamists serving the RSF as advisors. There are also murmurs that the powerful Islamist faction within the RSF is growing in influence given their political expedience for two key reasons:

Firstly, many of them have experience of serving in government on a national or regional level thereby ensuring their know-how in terms of getting things done. Secondly, most of the RSF’s Islamist advisors hail from the militia’s tribal or regional bases. With the RSF failing to build a broad national support base, there are signs that it is investing more in tribal loyalties - which is further reflected in the next excerpts of Himedti’s speech.

CLIP 2: Himedti accuses Egypt (and the US) of attacking his militia

“Egypt is fighting us. Egypt attacked us. Right now, during the Geneva negotiations, [Egypt] brought [Sudan] eight K-8 Chinese warplanes. The machines are American. We have the details. The planes that hit us, Egypt used to bring them secretively. Now they bring it in plain sight, through Dongola. Egypt brings 250 kilogram bombs and American bombs. If the Americans didn’t agree, their bombs would not have reached Sudan. I called Molly Phee a year ago and I told her this. I told her the bombs hitting me now are American. She said she’ll talk to the Egyptians, that if the [military aid] Egypt gets from the US, if it’s used in Sudan we reject it. I said this. I dare Molly Phee to come out and say I didn’t tell her this. A year ago! I said American bombs are hitting us.”

 Analysis

·      Shift in RSF messaging given recent internal tensions over an RSF leader’s threats towards Egypt.

·      Nonetheless, Himedti’s comments also help him connect with his base given that they validated the rife pre-existing anti-Egyptian sentiments present within the RSF’s discourses.

·      Analysis of the escalatory shift in the tone towards Egypt suggests that it may aim to distract from UAE support for the militia

Himedti’s accusations that Egypt was involved in air strikes against his forces generated the most international media attention. Alongside claiming that Egypt provided Sudan’s army with Chinese warplanes and that American bombs were used on the RSF, Himedti also challenged US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee to come out and say that he did not bring up these matters with her.

The Egyptian foreign ministry subsequently put out a statement denying the accusations which addressed the RSF as a “militia”. The RSF responded with a statement of their own accusing Egypt of harbouring Sudanese Islamists.

RSF previous messaging on Egypt

The RSF’s verbal attacks on Egypt reflect a change of communications strategy. As we reported over the summer, a war of words erupted between RSF militants on social media that threatened to evolve into a fully-fledged tribal conflict within the militia.

This was triggered by an RSF commander known as ‘General Jalha’ threatening Egypt. Then, when asked about the comments on an Arab regional news station, UK-based RSF advisor Omran Hassan attempted to distance the RSF, as an institution, from the threats towards Egypt by belittling Jalha and saying that he is “just a solder” who does not have a say in the RSF.

Jalha’s loyalists considered Omran’s comments an affront to them as members of the Misseriya tribe - a key RSF constituent. However, RSF’s media channels, alongside militants from the Mahariya clan of the Rizeigat tribe - the most powerful in the militia - took the side of Omran. This shows how the RSF, as an institution, prioritised avoiding antagonising Egypt above appeasing a key constituent of fighters on the ground.

So, what has changed in just under three months? And what does Himedti have to gain from attacking Egypt?

RSF supporters’ pre-existing contempt for Egypt

While Himedti may genuinely believe that Egyptian intervention has tipped the balance against his militia following its recent battlefield losses, escalating tensions with Egypt also helps him to connect with his base and fighters.

Anti-Egypt sentiments are rife within the RSF, with Sudan’s northern neighbour historically viewed as a colonial power. Those anti-Egypt sentiments also tie into the anti-northern Sudanese discourses of RSF fighters and mouthpieces. For example, two of the RSF’s most influential mouthpieces such as Alrabea Abdelmoneim and Issa Musa Himeidan regularly describe northerners as ‘the sons of Fawzia [an Egyptian princess]’, ‘the slaves of Egyptians’ or ‘the children of colonial [Egyptian] brothels’.

According to a grievance narrative commonly espoused by RSF supporters and fighters, northerners collaborated with Anglo-Egyptian colonial forces to be left in charge of Sudan through control of the army. Portraying northerners as Egyptian rather than “true” Sudanese plays into the narrative that the army and the Sudanese state are illegitimate colonial endeavours, with the RSF and its tribal base argued to be the true rulers of the country.

Thus, Himedti’s accusations that Egypt supports Sudan’s army aims inspire the RSF’s base. Not only do they validate pre-existing anti-Egyptian sentiments, but also the RSF “cause”: to take control of a Sudanese state deemed an illegitimate colonial endeavour.

Himedti’s speech inspired influential UK-based RSF mouthpiece Alrabea Abdelmoniem to threaten Egypt with severe destruction. Immediately after the RSF commander’s speech, a TikTok live was held in which Abdelmoneim made a veiled incitement towards an attack on Aswan High Dam in Egypt.

He said: “We can take a position on the High Dam.” After the host told him to “relax,” Alrabea responded: “but it’s a war. You’re talking about a war, right? All options are available”.

The Dam is of critical importance to Egypt. It controls flooding, is a key source for Egypt’s population of over 100 million and stimulates the country’s pivotal agricultural and fishing sectors. As a result, the attack on the Dam that Alrabea hints at would have severe ramifications for Egypt. It is worth noting that the live was also attended by Albasha Tabiq (to the right of the presenter), an RSF advisor who was a government official in the ousted Islamist regime.

Distraction from UAE support for the RSF

Nonetheless, in comments to Noon Post, journalist Eiman Kamal suggested that Himedti’s accusations towards Egypt aim to divert attention away from credible allegations over the UAE’s involvement in Sudan. She pointed towards a notable increase in RSF mouthpieces, alongside platforms affiliated to its civil alliances, accusing Egypt of killing Sudanese. Indeed, RSF propaganda accounts have started to extensively promote the hashtag #الطيران_المصري_يقتل_السودانيين [Egyptian planes Kill Sudanese].

CLIP 3: HIMEDTI TAKES AIM AT THE SHAWAYGA

“They say ‘the return of the Islamic Movement’. This is not a return. It’s a continuation. They took power on 25 October [2021, military coup]. We participated with them [in the coup]. We corrected our position from the first day.They took total power. They spread their people. All of it was [Islamist leader Ali] Karti.

“All of it was Shawayga [a northern Sudanese tribe]. We’ve stayed quiet for a long time. You said we are diaspora Arabs. The RSF is from all of Sudan. But you? We’ve been quiet about you for too long. Not all Shawayga are criminals. Not all Shawayga want to destroy the country. But – at this moment – the Shaygis and those influenced by Shaygis – like Burhan’s people – you are all responsible [for the war].

“You removed [ex-president] Omar Al-Bashir. A conspiracy between [Shawayga]. You conspired with each other! What [ex-army general] Elfatih Erwa said was right. He said: ‘we replaced a regime with a regime’. But he also said something untrue. He said the RSF has no role. You’re a liar, Elfatih Erwa.”

 Analysis

·      By attributing Sudan’s problems to a Shaygi conspiracy, Himedti appeals to a historical grievance narrative prominent in RSF discourses.

·      Warning signs that this could herald a new pattern whereby the RSF increasingly rely on tribal incitement would be future threats to invade Shendi from official platforms.

Despite dominating discussions among Sudanese people on social media, Himedti’s claims that the northern Sudanese Shaygi tribe are behind Sudan’s problems did not generate attention in English-language reporting of the RSF commander’s speech.
 
It was the first time during the course of the war that Himedti made such explicitly tribalist remarks, hinting at a shift in strategy whereby the RSF directly makes incitements on a tribal basis.

But why did Himedti specifically pick out the Shawayga and suggest that they are conspiring with each-other to rule Sudan?

“The Shaygi conspiracy”
The Shaygi tribe that Himedti suggested are behind a conspiracy to destroy Sudan are one of the four largest northern Sudanese tribes. They feature prominently in the RSF’s historical grievance narrative that certain groups were empowered at the expense of the RSF’s base during the colonial encounter.

As noted by the British Sudan historian Willow Berridge, when the British formed the ‘Sudan Defence Force’ (which would evolve into the army), it was a policy to avoid recruit from Mahdist groups. Of course, the Mahdist state that ruled Sudan from 1885 to 1899 was led by, and predominantly recruited from, the same tribal base as the RSF: western Sudanese nomadic Arabs. Instead, major training institutions such as the military school were set up in northern Sudan, where the majority of recruits were said to be Shawayga.

In this regard, RSF discourses portray the Shawayga as the backbone of the army, and by extension, the “56 state” that the RSF vow to destroy in order to take back what was lost after the fall of the Mahdist state. Thus, in attributing Sudan’s problems to a conspiracy of the Shawayga, Himedti attempted to rile up his base through tribal incitements and reference to their historical grievance narratives.

However, it is worth noting how these comments were followed by “we have stayed quiet for too long,” which implies that the belief in a Shaygi conspiracy was privately held albeit not publicly expressed.

This raises the question as to why he has taken aim at a northern tribe at this stage in the conflict. It could spell Himedti giving up on any pretenses of being a national ruler, which may indicate a shift of strategy towards a greater and more overt investment on tribal incitement and mobilisation.

Shendi
Should threats towards the city of Shendi in the northern Sudanese River Nile state increasingly come from official RSF channels, it would signal an even greater reliance on tribal incitement and rhetoric.

RSF mouthpieces and fighters alike regularly upload provocative messages threatening to enter Shendi, as indicated by a scroll through the city’s hashtag.

Shendi is known for being the home of the Ja’aleen - another of Sudan’s large northern tribes.

While the RSF has only been able to attack Shendi and nearby northern cities with drones, the prospect of its militants entering Shendi en masse plays up to a traumatic incident that occurred in nearby Al-Metemmah during the Mahdist period.

Back in 1897, Mahdist troops - who were predominantly recruited from the same tribal base as the RSF - waged a continuous massacre which infamously led to women jumping into the River Nile to avoid being raped by the Mahdist army. It is for this reason that RSF threatens to enter Shendi hit close to home for northern Sudanese.

CLIP 4: Himedti accuses the army of discriminate airstrikes

“Right now I see that army planes attack the whole of Sudan. Except for the River Nile and Northern states. Look at the difference between us. Who are you [Al-Burhan] to talk? You say Himedti is ignorant to anyone you talk with. Who’s the ignorant one out of us? The ignorant one speaks about tribalism. The ignorant one is a liar. [RSF] are in Garri [north of Khartoum]. [RSF are] in Hajar al-Assal [River Nile state]. Hajar al-Assal is the birthplace of [Islamist leader] Ali Karti. And [Burhan’s birthplace] is nearby in Gandatu. Why don’t you attack them if I’m ignorant like you?

“Why haven’t I attacked them? Instead, I protect them. But there is racism in the attacks themselves. We are in these locations, why don’t you attack them? Why do you attack [various parts of Sudan]? We are close to Garri, Hajar al-Assar and Al-Basabir [northern Sudan]. Why not airstrikes there?” 

Analysis

·      Himedti suggested that the army only spares northern Sudan of air strikes.

·      However, attempts to appeal to unite the rest of Sudan against an army portrayed as solely catering to the north will be challenging given the breadth of opposition to the RSF across Sudan.

Despite RSF fighters and mouthpieces regularly inciting advances into Shendi, the militia’s incursions into northern Sudan have been limited but for drone strikes targeting Shendi, Merowe and Atbara. This has reduced a need for air strikes in northern Sudan but for Khartoum.

Yet Himedti has attempted used the absence of such in order to isolate Sudan’s army from the rest of Sudan, thus uniting the rest of the country against an army portrayed as solely catering to the north.

However, this will be extremely challenging for the RSF provided that it has found itself deeply opposed in all corners of Sudan - even in its regional stronghold and among its tribal base.

Opposition to the RSF across Sudan
In Darfur, the RSF has faced stiff resistance from non-Arab armed movements fighting alongside the army. In West Kordofan, the RSF has found itself opposed in the lands of the Arab Misseriya tribe. While the Misseriya are a key constituency of the RSF given that it is a nomadic western Sudanese group, the tribe’s loyalties are split between the army and the RSF. The militia’s advances into Misseriya land at the start of the year triggered a mass exodus of civilians amid the RSF’s anticipated campaign of looting and killing. It is also worth noting the internal tensions between Misseriya RSF and the Rizeigat who hold the final say in the militia.

In South Kordofan, the RSF has faced resistance from the predominantly Nuba Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, which reportedly joined forces with the army to fight the RSF. This is despite the fact that the SPLM-N al-Hilu, which threatens to declare self-determination in its territories, is itself a rebel group which has long-held grievances grievances on issues such as religion and regional disparities that the RSF have since appropriated.

Meanwhile, central Sudanese areas states such as North Kordofan, Al-Jazira and Sennar have witnessed a rise of popular mobilisation against the RSF in response to RSF advances.

Nonetheless, the army’s success in uniting Sudan against the RSF cannot be attributed to a specific campaign. It is the conduct of RSF fighters that has pushed most of Sudan to either side with the army or resist the RSF, given the militia’s campaign of documented atrocities and genocidal intent.

  CLIP 5: HIMEDTI ORDERS RSF FIGHTERS TO NOT RECORD ON THE BATTLEFIELD

“Filming is strictly forbidden. Filming. Strictly forbidden. In all the battles. Strictly forbidden. The prisoners are a red line. Nobody can challenge a prisoner. There are bodies responsible for the prisoners. Nobody is allowed to interrogate a prisoner and then record the interrogation. You don’t have anything to do with the investigation. There are people responsible for that. You don’t have anything to do with that. Killing prisoners is forbidden. So that we can win with our manners.”

Analysis

·      By publicly issuing orders to his fighters in this manner, Himedti took a huge risk which raises questions as to whether he is a) ignoring his advisors or b) he is poorly advised.

·      If his demands are not implemented, it would serve as proof that Himedti has lost control of his fighters.

Calling upon his fighters to stop recording on the battlefield may have been necessitated by increased pressure on the RSF and its sponsors caused by the documentation efforts of Sudanese people and international organisations.

For example, a recent report by the Centre for Information Resilience compiled clips of RSF militants burning villages. The International Criminal Court has also appealed for evidence to aid an investigation into allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

Nonetheless, the RSF leadership also faces accusations - which it strenuously denies - that it has lost control of its fighters. Himedti’s orders that RSF fighters stop recording on the battlefield will put those denials to test

Should footage of RSF crimes recorded by its militants continue to appear on social media at the same rate, it could serve as proof that Himedti has no control of the militia he formally leads.

This would play into the hands of the Sudanese army, who hold an aversion to negotiations on the basis that the conflict can only be resolved militarily rather than politically. In other words, that the RSF problem should be treated exclusively as a security issue rather than political one.

Thus, it would strengthen the case that a peace agreement with the RSF’s leadership would not resolve the conflict - only the military defeat of the militia would.

Suliman Baldo, the director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, suggested that Himedti’s speech revealed a loss of control of his forces. “Hemedti’s references to the chaotic and criminal behaviour of his troops, including indiscriminate shootings, civilian casualties, and filmed human rights violations, raise alarms about potential war crimes. This indicates Hemedti’s dissatisfaction with his forces and his inability to command their behaviour effectively,” told Radio Dabanga.

CLIP 6: HIMEDTI ORDERS RSF TROOPS TO STOP FIRING BULLETS INTO THE AIR

“3 or 4… the best video…as soon as I see one [celebratory gunshot fired in the air], I close the video and I don’t watch it. Don’t fire your bullets [into the air]. You don’t have reinforcements. You’re not supported by another state. You take from [the army]. That’s why you shouldn’t fire bullets. Firing celebratory gunshots into the air I forbidden from today. Forbidden, forbidden, forbidden.”

Analysis

• This order hints at the RSF facing supply issues. Recent battlefield developments further reinforce this view.

 
Since the start of the conflict, Sudan’s army has adopted a defensive strategy focused on depleting the militia’s resources. As per army sources, this was necessitated by the RSF’s advantage in terms of manpower and its tactic of waging war in urban centres.

Throughout the summer, army generals such as Yasir Al-Atta promised that an offensive is pending. The army’s commander-in-chief Abdulfattah Al-Burhan had also privately stressed the army’s “invisible” victories in terms of depleting RSF resources.

Towards the end of September, the army moved into offensive mode in a campaign that made advance across Sudan including capital city Khartoum, Darfur and Sennar. The timing of these developments suggest that the army is confident that the RSF’s supply issues are significant enough to enable the wave of offensives.

CLIP 7: HIMEDTI PROMISES 1 MILLION TROOPS

“Right now, [RSF] must get organised. Arrange ranks. Arrange themselves. This war, it’s not known whether it will end today or in 1, 2, 3, 4 years. Some people talk about ‘a million troops’. With God’s will, this time we will deliver them a million troops. With God’s will, a million patriotic troops. A million troops that fear God. Not a million looting troops, or thieves, criminals or murderers – No. A million troops that we know. We will deliver them a million troops. I don’t have much to say after this. Greetings to our heroes in the RSF. They have not fallen short. You haven’t come up short. And you’ve been steadfast. No man in the whole world can endure what you have endured.” 

Analysis

• In an escalatory speech that emphasised that it is unknown when the war will end, Himedti declared that the RSF will deliver one million troops.

• This part of the speech has been interpreted as a show of bullish defiance aiming to raise internal morale following recent battlefield losses.

Baldo noted that Himedti’s speech lacked any mention of negotiations or peaceful resolutions and instead “called for further military mobilisation, urging soldiers to prepare for ‘Plan B’, signalling a potential escalation on all fronts,” which reflected a “growing frustration within the RSF due to military pressures on multiple fronts”.

Indeed, Himedti’s promise to deliver one million troops came a week after RSF propaganda accounts began to promote the hashtag #الحرب_بدأت_الآن which translates to “the war starts now” following the army’s counteroffensive in late September.

Himedti’s tone marked a departure from the rhetoric adopted around the Geneva peace talks in August that the army boycotted, where the RSF’s official channels claimed that it supported any initiative to stop the war.

While analysts cast doubt on the RSF’s commitment to peace, the militia’s official position was that it was open to it. It was able to do this because, over the past year, it seemed like momentum was in the RSF’s favour. Thus, the RSF could theoretically enter negotiations with more leverage.  

However, RSF leader Himedti’s escalatory rhetoric suggests a fear that the pendulum has swung the army’s way, thus making it necessary for the RSF - as an institution- to more overtly stress that it will keep fighting “until victory or martyrdom” as their slogan goes.

CLIP 8: HIMEDTI INSULTS ARMY LEADERS

“Al-Burhan – you speak about rape crimes. You yourself are a rapist. Forget about your soldiers. You yourself are a rapist. This will be proven against you. So you don’t just for the sake of it. Your crimes are clear.”

Analysis

Himedti labelled the army’s commander-in-chief a r(a)pist. Throughout the speech, he also made cheap digs at other army generals.

Alongside consistently saying that Shams Al-Deen Kabbashi “raised his nostrils and danced like a girl” in reference to his celebrations over the army taking back the strategic Jabal Moya in Sennar, Himedti also said that Ibrahim Jabir’s words are worthless.

While it was not repeated in his latest speech, Himedti has previously publicly accused other army generals of drinking alcohol and not performing their mandatory Islamic prayers.

With Himedti’s speech being described as an improvised and rambling tangent, those insults play a part in conforming to that view.

The vulgar tone that Himedti adopted is a stark contrast to the image his advisors have attempted to forge.

When it seemed that the RSF was in the ascendancy, Himedti would read from a script that was written for him in an attempt to portray him as a statesmanlike figure palatable to the international community.

As indicated by Himedti’s insults, however, the latest speech represented a return to his roots: the crude leader of a tribal militia.

This also raises the question as to whether the speech is an admittance of defeat.

Is the speech an admittance of defeat?

Analysts take contrasting views over whether Himedti’s speech admits his defeat.

Writing in Noon Post, journalist Mohamed Mustafa Gamea noted how the improvised nature of the speech, alongside the colloquial dialect “far from the language of official speeches”, suggested that he was resorting to addressing his troops through social media in light of his lengthy absence from the field, amid the RSF’s collapse in most axes where fighting is taking place.

However, conflict observer Yasser al-Fadol expressed skepticism about “wishful analyses” considering Himedti’s speech one of defeat. Al-Fadol noted that Himedti appeared defeated in a number of speeches at the start of the war but “was still able to change the situation in his favour,” stressing that he still has men, weapons and the UAE.

Nonetheless, Gamea argued that it is difficult to analyse Himedti’s speech with a logical political approach “as it was dominated by confusion and disorder”.

United Civilian Forces (UCF): The RSF's new political partner

Introduction

At the start of August, we reported on Yousif Izzat’s sacking as an advisor to Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia commander Himedti, and the political rift that was brewing within the militia. Izzat’s sacking was triggered by his tensions with the militia’s second-in-command, Himedti’s older brother Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo.  

A key factor was disagreements over who the militia’s political partners should be. Whereas Izzat was insistent that it should be the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition / Taqadum, Abdelrahim distrusted the FFC due to worries that it may abandon them in the future.

On 22 August, it was reported that new political body called the United Civilian Force (UCF) was formed. RSF propaganda accounts promoted a press conference at Radisson Blu Hotel in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia scheduled for the 24th entitled ‘Together to Stop the War and Alleviate the Suffering of the Sudanese People’, although it was subsequently cancelled.

Unlike the FFC, the UCF is suspected of being connected to the influential Islamist faction of the RSF. Moreover, the UCF’s leadership has strong tribal and regional links to the RSF and its tribal base of nomadic Arabs of the Darfur region of western Sudan. As a result, the UCF is predicted to form the basis of a government in RSF-held territory in Darfur – where the militia controls four out of the five state capitals. Such a government would likely feature many of the former Islamist government officials that the RSF retain as advisors, thereby offering them a path back to power.

UCF leadership: Haroun Medeikhir

The UCF is led by Haroun Medeikhir. His selection as the group’s leader reflects how the militia is co-opting former rivals from its tribal base. Like the Dagalo brothers, Medeikhir comes from the Rizeigat tribe, although they hail from the Mahariya clan whereas Medeikhir is a Mahamid Rizeigi. Medeikhir is one of the leaders of the Revolutionary Awakening Council (RAC) formed by Musa Hilal, the head of the Mahamid clan, to whom Medeikhir was closely associated. 

 The RAC is now split into Medeikhir’s faction loyal to the RSF, and a faction opposed to the RSF under Hilal’s leadership. Hilal gained notoriety playing a well-documented role leading the Janjaweed militia as serious crimes were committed in Darfur in response to the 2003 insurgency, with human rights groups accusing Hilal of atrocities that left an estimated 300,000 dead and 2.5 million displaced.

 Nonetheless, while Hilal and RSF leader Himedti are both Rizeigi leaders of Arab militias known as Janjaweed, they were in a state of rivalry that intensified after gold was discovered in North Darfur’s Jabal Amir in 2012. In addition, Himedti’s Janjaweed militias were formalised into a state paramilitary force in the RSF in 2013 whereas Hilal’s were not. In 2017, Himedti won the battle for influence and gold concessions by getting Hilal arrested.

At the same time, Medeikhir – a close associate of Hilal and the official spokesperson of his RAC - was arrested by the RSF, having opposed the government’s arms collection campaign in Darfur and integration into Himedti’s militia. Both Hilal and Medeikhir were subsequently freed in March 2021, almost two years after ex-president Omar al-Bashir was ousted. In April 2024, a year into the RSF’s rebellion, Hilal declared his support for the army. However, other Mahamid Rizeigat rejected Hilal’s stance and claimed it does not represent them. Hilal’s RAC is split, with a faction loyal to the RSF fighting alongside it in both Sudan and neighbouring Libya.

In contrast to his former boss, Medeikhir was introduced on Lebanese news station Al-Mayadeen ten days into the war as an advisor to Himedti. In June 2024, Africa Intelligence reported that he commands an RSF battalion in Khartoum. Less than two weeks before it was announced that Medeikhir would lead the UCF, he appeared in an RSF social media video announcing the militia’s “Protection of Civilians Force” in Khartoum.

Reactions to the UCF’s formation

While Radio Dabanga report that the UCF “is made up of 68 member groups that reject war,” we have established its president Medeikhir’s connection to the RSF. The reactions to Radio Dabanga’s tweet on the article announcing the UCF’s creation reveal how prominent Sudanese political commentators view the UCF as the RSF’s new political partner. 

Writer Reem Abbas predicts that Medeikhir will be the prime minister of an RSF government soon to be formed.

Activist Ahmed Shomokh asked: “where did the FFC let you down? Did they fail to be a political wing for the UAE project to break-up [the Sudanese] state, destroy its sovereignty, re-engineer its security forces and displace people from their land?”.

 A role for FFC leaders?

Nonetheless, should the RSF declare statehood in territories it controls, there are assumptions that the FFC / Taqadum would play a role. Such a prospect was raised by Amjad Faried, a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Faried, also the executive director of Fikra think-tank, suggested that two Taqadum officials met with Kenyan president William Ruto to “promote scenarios of Sudan's division and discuss Kenya's recognition of the RSF state, and to demand the transfer of gold deposits that the militia had placed in Kenyan banks to the RSF government”.

The two officials – who Faried described as “openly [pro-RSF]” - were Taqadum’s deputy secretary-general Taha Osman Ishaq and Sudan’s former justice minister Nasreddine Abdelbari. The latter was recently spotted in London with the youngest Dagalo brother Algoney, alongside former transitional sovereign council member Mohamed Hassan El-Ta’aishi. This came a month after Izzat’s sacking, which would suggest that the militia maintains ties with the FFC / Taqadum. At around the same time a year earlier, it was Izzat with the two aforementioned FFC politicians at a meeting in Togo. 

Ishaq, Abdelbari and El-Ta’aishi were all Faried’s government colleagues during the transitional period, given that he was the assistant chief of staff for current Taqadum president: ex-prime minister Abdallah Hamdok.

It is worth noting that Ishaq, Abdelbari and El-Ta’aishi are all originally from the RSF’s stronghold in Darfur, although only El-Ta’ishi comes from the militia’s tribal base of nomadic Arabs. In this regard, if communal relations dictate a potential RSF government in Darfur, there is a possibility that they may play a role.  

A path to power for Islamists from the RSF’s tribal base?

There is also speculation that the Islamist faction within the RSF were behind the launch of the UFC as a civilian front for the militia, which hints at the UCF offering a path back to power for former regime Islamists. While Sudan In The News cannot confirm this, it is worth pointing out a face that is regularly found on Medeikhir’s official social media channels.

On his Twitter account, a picture was posted without any comment of Medeikhir and Huzayfa Abunouba, who also appears on the header of Medeikhir’s Facebook account. In Sudan In The News’ Janjakezan report, a profile of Islamists in the RSF, Abounuba was listed as an RSF electronic monitoring officer formerly in the Islamic Movement’s youth sector. It is therefore likely that Abounuba manages Medeikhir’s pages.

The likelihood that the influential Islamist faction in the RSF was behind the creation of the UCF is increased if we consider the amount of advisors to the militia who were officials of the Islamist National Congress Party (NCP) that governed Sudan for over two-thirds of ex-president Omar Al-Bashir’s 30-year regime. Lt. Gen. Yasser al-Atta, the assistant commander-in-chief of Sudan’s army, alleges that 95% of RSF advisors were in leadership positions in their states under the NCP banner.

While Sudan In The News cannot verify the validity of al-Atta’s comments, our Janjakezan report profiled some of them. Of the 30 RSF Islamists we profiled, 10 were senior NCP leaders, mostly in Darfur, holding positions ranging from local government commissioner to acting state governor. They also mostly come from the RSF’s tribal base of western Sudanese nomadic Arabs.

This raises the prospect of ex-NCP senior government officials employed by the RSF forming the basis of a UCF-administered government in RSF-held territory in western Sudan. If that is the case, the UCF would offer a path back to power for ex-NCP officials from the RSF’s tribal base who lost their positions after ex-president Omar al-Bashir was ousted in April 2019.

The most senior of those officials is Hassabo Abdelrahman, the NCP regime’s former vice-president who hails from the same Mahariya Rizeigi clan of the RSF’s leadership. The Janjakezan report noted that he was earmarked to be appointed the governor of Darfur should the region fall to the militia as per Africa Intelligence. While the RSF deny that he is their advisor, the Sudanese Islamic Movement expelled him in April 2024 for joining the militia. Hassabo is thought to be leader of the RSF’s Islamists and the key figure driving the formation of the UCF.

Nonetheless, the history of tension between Hassabo and Medeikhir reflects the RSF’s reliance on ethnic and tribal loyalties on both a political and military level.

Tribal loyalties

In August 2017, then-vice president Hassabo launched an arms collection campaign in Darfur. Days later, Medeikhir publicly resisted handing over arms as the spokesperson of Musa Hilal’s RAC, leading to his eventual arrest in November 2017.

However, Hassabo, Medeikhir, RSF leader Himedti and many of his ex-NCP advisors all hail from Darfur’s nomadic Arab tribes - particularly the Rizeigat. This lends credence to the view that the RSF is an Arab nomadic supremacist militia waging war for ethnic dominance and control rather than fighting Islamists as claimed.  

In a leaked recording started circulated Sudanese social media in January 2024, days before the RSF launched a siege on the 22nd army Infantry Division in Babanusa, West Kordofan. In what appeared to be a call to RSF leaders, Hassabo allegedly made racist remarks including:

“The majority of ours sons [RSF fighters] went…all that’s left is the 22nd Division falls…the most importance thing is Al-Obeid (North Kordofan). If Al-Obeid falls, you have sieged the whole country. After al-Obeid falls, where will the northerners go? It’s full of Shawayga [northern tribe] and dirt and filth. Just like Kassala [east Sudan]. If you hurt them economically, their screams will mean nothing”.

Sudan In The News cannot verify whether the recording is fabricated. Yet we can confirm the genocidal and racist rhetoric of Medeikhir’s son – As’ad Haroun Medeikhir.

The radicalisation of Medeikhir’s son

Haroun Medeikhir’s son As’ad is an outspoken RSF supporter as reflected by his Twitter account. Created in April 2019, it is an indicator of how As’ad political stances developed in accordance to his father’s situation.

In 2019, As’ad’s account mainly posted selfies, where his resemblance to his father is apparent. A year later, he was part of the 30 June nationwide protests on the 31st anniversary of the coup that brought ex-president Omar al-Bashir’s Islamist regime to power.

In September 2020, he would upload a picture of his father for the first time. He did so again in January 2021, this time with a hashtag translating to ‘May God free you, dad’. In March 2021, he announced his father’s freeing from prison.

In August and September 2021, As’ad published two tweets calling for the release of Ali Rizkallah, also known as Al-Safana. A prominent member of the RAC, he was captured in November 2017 at the same time as Musa Hilal and Haroun Mideikhr. Al-Safana was subsequently freed days before 2022. By May 2024, he was an RSF commander for the militia’s siege of Al-Fashir, with a video broadcast of him turning off one of the city’s main water pumping stations, and a critical water resource for an estimated 270,000 people.

Another indication of how As’ad’s political positions developed in alignment with his father’s stances is a tweet from 3 October 2021 accused the FFC of hypocrisy in the name of Sudan who do not know the colour of the Sudanese flag. The RAC, which was united at the time, was part of the FFC when it started in 2019. It withdrew from the coalition on 13 October 2021, just two weeks before the military coup.

 As’ad would then post on Twitter less frequently until the war on April 2023, where his radicalisation would become more apparent as he would regularly spout RSF propaganda, engage in arguments and post provocative tweets justifying genocide and ethnic targeting. These include:

22 April 2024: In response to his father’s former RAC boss Musa Hilal siding with the army, As’ad wrote: “we, as the sons of Mahamid, do not care about this and we do not recognize Musa. If he announced standing with the Jalaba [northerner’s] army, he will be soaked [in blood] from us as Mahamid before the RSF. We will not abandon this issue. F*ck Musa and f*ck the army”.

15 July 2024: As’ad justified the RSF’s collective punishment of civilians in Al-Fashir by writing: “the people staying in Al-Fashir are all volunteer fighters. The civilians left early, [the RSF] provided them with safe passages. Those who remain should just handle [the violence]”.

15 July 2024: As’ad justified the RSF genocide targeting the non-Arab Masalit community in Darfur, with a tweet that read: “the war was between Arabs and Masalit. For your information, [Arabs] didn’t kill only 15,000 of them, the real number is above 28,000…15,000 [were only killed] in [West Darfur] state. Now, we say to the sons of the armed movements, if your war is against Arabs buckle up and the smart one wins”.

9 August 2024: Asa’d responded to a video showing severe floods in Al-Matamah, River Nile state with a tweet saying: “more floods, oh God”. When asked “what is the fault of these citizens,” he responded: “two days ago they were happy with the floods in Darfur… now we can only be happy and more floods for them [northerners].  

The end of the FFC-RSF partnership?

Despite indications that the formation of the UCF could spell the start of an alternative political partnership for the RSF, suspicions remain that the FFC / Taqadum is the militia’s political partner.  

An indication of this was the recent controversy where by Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, the younger brother of RSF leader Himedti, was spotted in London with two FFC leaders: former justice minister Nasreddine Abdelbari and former sovereign council member Mohamed Hasan El-Ta’aishi. This came a month after Izzat’s sacking. It is worth noting that, at around the same time a year earlier, it was Izzat with the two aforementioned FFC politicians at a meeting in Togo.

In addition, accusations were renewed that the FFC / Taqadum are the militia’s political partners, following pro-RSF statements made by Taqadum spokesperson Alaaeldin Nugud that will be explored in the next article.  

Alaa Nugud: Taqadum's controversial spokesperson

Introduction

Dr. Alaa (Alaadin) Nugud is a spokesperson for the Taqadum coalition and member of the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC) that dominates it.

Taqadum and the FFC-CC are widely accused of being the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia’s political partner. Such accusations were renewed following Nugud’s latest controversy, as reflected in a tweet posted on 25 August 2024 that was shared almost 80 times. It read: “after Alaa Nugud’s words, nobody can say that the political wing of the Rapid Support militia has ended”.

This report will explore eight of Nugud’s controversies. One of them relates to his medical profession, while the remainder were remarks interpreted as pro-RSF and triggered allegations that Taqadum is allied to the militia.

Summary of Nugud’s controversies

1.    May 2023: Nugud emphasises the RSF’s democratic commitment

2.    January 2024: Nugud defends the UAE’s role in Sudan

3.    March 2024: Nugud denies RSF rapes

4.    June 2024: Nugud legitimises the RSF’s genocidal campaign in Al-Fashir

5.    June 2024: Nugud legitimises the RSF’s massacre in Wad Al-Noura

6.    July 2024: Nugud exclusively blames the army for the war

7.    August 2024: Nugud paints a positive picture of the RSF’s conduct in Al-Jazira

8.    August 2020: Omdurman Hospital during the pandemic

Profile

Nugud came to the attention of global mainstream media at the end of May 2023, when the Guardian reported that he was arrested by Sudanese intelligence officers after accusing the army of diverting medical aid. His wife said she believed it was due to his activism. Nugud was subsequently “discharged in good health and without any charges being brought against him” eleven days after his rest, according to human rights organisation Frontline Defenders. Nugud was described as a ‘human rights defender’.

Nugud’s professional achievements played a role in his rise to political prominence. As a distinguished medical doctor and surgeon, Nugud is recognised for being a member of the first Sudanese team to perform a liver transplant in Sudan, and one of two in his specialty. In addition, Nugud is said to have treated wounded pro-democracy protesters. Nonetheless, while this report outlines seven of Nugud’s political scandals, his professional career is also not without controversy.

Nugud’s Twitter activity

Nugud is very active on Twitter. His activity on the site reflects the evolution of his political stances. For example, in July 2022, just under a year before the war in Sudan erupted, Nugud was critical of the RSF - even using a hashtag that translates to ‘no militia rules a state’. This hashtag is prominent in anti-RSF discourses on social media and it was a chant that was popularly used in pro-democracy street protests during the transitional period between ex-president Omar al-Bashir’s ouster in April 2019 and the military coup of 25 October 2021.

Since the war began in April 2023, however, Nugud has been exclusively critical of the army. A regular theme of Nugud’s tweets are inferences that the Muslim Brotherhood / National Congress Party and the Sudanese army are the same. His most used hashtags are #NCPIsATerroristOrganization and its Arabic iteration. By contrast, Nugud has failed to criticise the RSF on Twitter since the war began.

 On the morning that the war began, Nugud applied the RSF narrative that the war was initiated by Islamists in the army attacking the RSF in a coup attempt. More recently, Nugud would explicitly defend the RSF. 

In May 2024, he wrote a tweet claiming that Islamists in the army are against the concept of a single professional army “not the RSF”.

Then, in July 2024, he uploaded a phone call recording “which showed RSF refusal to join [the army] in suppression of processions after 25th Oct. coup”.

 Nugud expressed similar sentiments for the first controversial statements that he went viral for, when Nugud stressed the RSF’s commitment to democracy.

1. Nugud emphasises the RSF’s democratic commitment

In May 2023, a month into the war, Nugud was asked by a presenter on regional news station Al-Hadath: “why is there a clinging on to a hope, even if little, that [RSF commander] Himedti will bring democracy to Sudan?”. Nugud argued that the RSF is more committed to democracy than the army and that RSF commander Himedti regretted the 25 October 2021 military coup. He said the following:

Quote

It’s not that Himedti will bring democracy to Sudan – but, but - we say that the path to democracy, the threat to democracy is multiple armies. And there must be a single, professional army with a unified national doctrine.

How do we reach such an army on the path of Security Sector Reform (SSR)? How to complete SSR on democratic foundations?

The SSR process should be led by civilian authority. The military and security strategy should be under civilian authority, and the army should not be independent. It must be submissive to civilian authority.

The RSF agreed to these three conditions, but the army did not agree to them. That’s the first thing.

Second, yes, Himedti was the second leader of the 25 October coup, but what happened after this coup failed to change Sudanese lives? When the Framework Agreement was signed on 5 December 2023, Himedti said this coup was a very big mistake and the coup failed in the administration of the Sudanese state

Context

Given that the comments were made five months before Taqadum was formed, Nugud was introduced as a member of the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC) – a coalition of entities that selected the civilian component of the transitional government. The comments were controversial as, firstly, they aligned with the RSF propaganda narrative that brands the militia’s war as ‘the battle for democracy’. Yet, at the time of the comments, almost a million Sudanese were displaced, with the RSF systematically evicting citizens from their homes and occupying them. In addition, Nugud’s emphasis on the RSF’s commitment to democracy were contentious given the motivations behind the RSF and FFC-CC alliance due to their shared positions over the Framework Agreement.

Framework agreement

Days before the war began, a two-year civilian-led transition towards elections was meant to commence as part of the Framework Agreement signed on 5 December 2022 by the army, RSF and FFC-CC. The agreement, which aimed to end the political crisis triggered by the 25 October 2021 coup, stipulated the establishment of a single professional army with the RSF integrated into it.  However, analysts suggested that the RSF’s signing of the agreement – and their alignment with the FFC-CC - reflected political manoeuvring rather than a commitment to democracy.  

Why did Himedti say the coup is a mistake?

As Nugud said, Himedti did indeed say that the October 2021 coup was a “mistake”, as reported by multiple sources in February 2022. However, Himedti’s comments came in the context of his increasing rivalry with Abdulfattah Al-Burhan – the Transitional Sovereign Council’s (TSC) chairman and the army’s commander-in-chief.

At the time, Himedti – as the TSC deputy chairman – was competing with Al-Burhan “over control of the civil service, an important source of patronage and an essential ingredient in actually running a government,” as per former US diplomat in Sudan Alberto Fernandez. According to political analyst Mohamed Idris, Himedti initially refused to support the coup as it weakened his leverage of a civil service in which he was reportedly using his wealth to buy influence and soft power in.

Security sector reform

While Nugud suggested that the RSF was committed to security sector reform, analyses and news reports cast doubt on Himedti’s claims that he was committed to integrating the RSF into a reformed national army. Rift Valley Institute analyst Magdi al-Gizouli argued that Himedti sought a restructuring of the top army command to ensure that he is a part of it before integration, which was confirmed by Reuters’ military sources.

Similarly, Monte Carro, an outlet that provided exclusive insider information on developments relating to the army and RSF, suggested that Himedti sought to ensure that integration occurs “according to his vision,” allegedly seeking to reap gains by prolonging the process. Thus, as reported by Reuters, while the army preferred a two-year timeline for integration, the RSF wanted the process spread across 10 years.

RSF alliance with the FFC-CC

Nugud claimed that the RSF agreed that the army should be submissive to civilian authority.  In light of the threat posed to the RSF’s expansion by the army, analysts suggested the militia adopted FFC-CC positions with the aim of allying with the civilian coalition, thereby using them as a civilian base and potentially whitewashing the RSF’s image.

Al-Gizouli argued that Himedti sought to use the Framework Agreement "to improve his competitiveness" and bill himself as "an ally to the [FFC-CC]”. Under a month before the war began, four anonymous FFC-CC leaders told Reuters said Himedti shares their civilian government goals.

 Suliman Baldo, the executive director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, suggested that the ties Himedti cultivated with the FFC-CC reflect his aims to become "a force to be reckoned with in the national power structure”. As a result, Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory think-tank, argued that Himedti was the “winner” of the Framework Agreement, describing his nods towards inclusivity as “a masterclass in empty gestural politics”.  

FFC: the political arm of the RSF

Nonetheless, Nugud’s arguments for the RSF’s democratic commitment are also controversial if considering the view held by analysts that the FFC-CC is the political arm of the RSF. Writer and researcher Reem Abbas suggested the partnership “has been in the making since 2019,” explaining how “Himedti wanted the FFC to do some damage control for him after the [3 June 2019] sit-in massacre and the FFC saw this as an opportunity to strengthen their position as opposed to the military institution”. Thus, Abbas adds, “the FFC does not [fully] believe in civil work, which is why they are interested in having guns to support their rule”.

2. Nugud defends the UAE’s role in Sudan

In January 2024, Nugud suggested that the UAE supports democracy in Sudan during an interview with Sudan Bukra. The comments generated controversy as they were seen as a defence of a state that is strongly suspected by Sudanese of arming the RSF, and by extension, sponsoring the killing of Sudanese people

Quote

When you look at the role of the UAE, or influential foreign states, whether the UAE or Egypt, their positions towards the revolution. The UAE supported the transition. Yes, it supported the transition. Egypt did not support the transition. Egypt spoils the transition or it spoiled the transition. Then came the [25 October 2021] coup. The UAE did not support the coup, Egypt supported the coup. Al-Burhan was in Cairo 48 hours before the coup.

Context

Both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal have covered the UAE’s support for the RSF, which have been described as “credible” reports by an independent panel of UN experts. As a result, Sudanese public resentment towards the UAE due to its alleged support for the RSF militia is reflected in the popularity of an Arabic hashtag that translates to #UAEKillsSudanese.

Nugud’s attempts to compare the UAE and Egypt’s positions towards Sudan stems from their stances on the Framework Agreement, whereby Egypt pursued an alternative track with political factions closer to the Sudanese army. By contrast, the UAE supported an agreement which analyst Kholood Khair argued enabled their suspected ally - RSF leader Himedti - to emerge as the “winner” at the army’s expense. 

3. Nugud denies RSF rapes

At the start of March 2024, Nugud dismissed reports of gang rape in RSF territory by an organisation called Doctors Around the World by claiming that it is affiliated to the former Islamist regime. Later that month, Nugud was at the centre of a controversy relating to messages leaked from a WhatsApp group. In comments to FFC media committee member Hussam Abualfatah, Nugud suggested that reports of rapes conducted by the RSF in territories held by the militia are exaggerated. In addition, the burden of proof to verify rape cases proposed by Nugud face considerable logistical challenges. Given that RSF’s use of rape as a weapon of war is highly documented, Nugud was widely condemned on social media, by prominent activists and women’s groups and even his own Taqadum / FFC colleagues.

Quote

Husam – there is not a doctor who does not claim to have identified rape cases. This report is valid if it came from known medical sources [such as] Doctors Without Borders or Al-Gineina Teaching Hospital etc. But you cannot attribute the identification of rape to local sources. This is something medical. You can say it is suspected or possible when you talk about local observers but if you want to confirm a case there has to be a medical examination.

Brother – it is possible that in some cases, sexual intercourse happened with a woman’s consent or a rape occurred. How can you tell the difference between the two without a clinical examination? Firstly, there would be no traces of resistance or anything. Secondly, there would be bruises and many other effects may be present in other parts of the body indicating resistances. These would be included in a clinical examination of the Ornik 8.  

Context

Screenshots of Nugud’s comments appeared on Twitter via a post from @MadaniMohmed that was shared 240 times with a caption that stated:

“it’s unfortunate that [Taqadum] have gone this far. The official spokesman for Taqadum denies rape cases and said [intercourse] might have been with consent, and that there is no such thing as local monitors. Seriously, [are they being] threatened? Did they voluntarily become defence committees for the militia?”.

Nugud’s comments were also strongly condemned in an open letter by the Sudan Change activist coalition. Among its signatories included prominent women’s rights activists including Hala al-Karib – the regional director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA).

Civil society response

Sudan Change labelled it “shameful and disgraceful” that Nugud cast doubts about sexual violence crimes that are “documented professionally and in detail by dozens of international and local organisations, [alongside] United Nations offices in various regions of Sudan”.

Furthermore, Sudan Change accused Nugud of engaging in “legal defences clearly intended to justify the RSF’s heinous violations and crimes” that contradicted documented reports and testimonies of victims and witnesses, “which confirm that crimes of sexual violence are horribly widespread in the areas under RSF control”.  

In addition, the arguments that Nugud made for the verification of rape cases also garnered controversy and were challenged by activists and social media users. In particular, these were: Nugud’s requirement for an Ornik 8 to verify rape cases, casting doubt on local observers and the suggestion that intercourse may have occurred with consent.

Ornik 8

The Ornik 8 is a form used in Sudan that is used to prove a case of crime through official medical and police reports. In the event of rape, it requires victims to file an official report with the authorities. Describing it as “infamous”, Sudan Change said “this form is exactly what the Sudanese feminist movement, the Sudanese doctors’ union, and human rights activists have been fighting to abolish for decades”.

Nugud’s comments suggested that the burden of proof is on the victim to produce an Ornik 8 in order to verify rape cases. This is controversial due to the practical challenges obtaining one. To begin with, social stigmas prevent survivors from coming forward. Moreover, the absence of police in RSF-controlled territory means the victim would rely on the RSF’s cooperation to raise a complaint of rape perpetrated by RSF militants.

This is why one of the most popular comments responding to Nugud’s messages – shared 67 times – came from @itsnasserr, who wrote:

“Do you expect the victims to go to RSF checkpoints in their areas and tell them they want an Ornik 8 because your fellow RSF militants raped us? The Ornik 8, of course, can only be found in the checkpoints because there is no police station. Ornik 8? Aren’t you ashamed, man?! What Ornik 8 during a state of war while international reports prove the existence of rape cases. This doctor is a disgrace to the medical field. We believe the survivors” 

Similarly, in a tweet shared 18 times, @abdelo_b: wrote: “How can victims verify [rape cases] if they were living in areas under the control of the [RSF]? From where can they get you an Ornik 8, Alaa El Din, you crazy man?”

Local observers

Another controversial part of Nugud’s comments were his claims that rape can only verified by “known” medical sources rather than local observers. Even before the war, access to healthcare facilities was limited, particularly in rural areas. However, since the war erupted,  almost 80% of Sudan’s healthcare facilities are now out of service according to the World Health Organisation. The RSF’s systematic targeting of healthcare facilities across Sudan is a key contributor to the country’s crippled health system.

Thus, Sudan Change criticised Nugud for casting doubt on the credibility of local observers, organisations and volunteers on the ground, “who represent the only refuge for survivors to provide aid and assistance at the present time”.

In addition, in a tweet shared 44 times, @AbazarHassan questioned how Nugud can deem local observers unreliable when the FFC previously accepted their statements. Hassan cited a statement from 25 November 2021 when the FFC condemned sexual violence against protesters with reference to local reports.

Consent

Nugud was also criticised for suggesting that rape cases may have occurred with consent. Sudan Change’s open letter said that Nugud “questioned the fact that sexual contact may have occurred with the consent of women and girls, explaining that there were no signs of resistance!”.

 Hassan said: “Dr. Alaa, your justification for rape is the same approach used by the National Congress Party (NCP)”. Criticism of the Islamist NCP who ruled Sudan for the last 20 years of Al-Bashir’s rule are a constant theme of Nugud’s political remarks. This is why Hassan suggested that “the only thing that separates [Taqadum] from the NCP are [positions of authority]”.

 Taqadum stance

Directly addressing Taqadum’s president, the former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok, Sudan Change called upon Taqadum to clarify its position on women’s rights. Abualfatah confirmed and condemned the comments while sharing a Taqadum statement distancing themselves from Nugud’s comments by stating that they were “purely [his] personal opinion”. 

However, Sudanese social media users questioned why Taqadum did not sack Nugud. The most shared response to Taqadum’s statement read: “if [Taqadum] was a respectable political alliance, the dirty Alaa Nugud would have been held accountable and dismissed. But what do you expect from an alliance of dirty traitors?”. Indeed, in his capacity as a Taqadum spokesperson, Nugud would continue to make remarks that were deemed pro-RSF without being removed from his position.  

4. Nugud legitimises the RSF’s genocidal campaign in Al-Fashir

In comments to Al-Hadath in June 2024, Nugud held the army and its allies responsible for the conflict in Al-Fashir, the last remaining of Darfur’s five state capitals not to have fallen to the RSF. Since April 2024, the RSF has been laying siege on Al-Fashir in what numerous analysts describe as a genocidal campaign. As a result, by absolving the RSF of blame for atrocities in Al-Fashir, Nugud triggered renewed accusations that Taqadum is the RSF’s political wing.

Quote

The provocation began from the army, which, on 13 April, [alongside allied forces led by Minni Minnawi and Jibril Ibrahim], attack the forces of Alhadi Idris at the UNAMID base after they notified [the Joint Forces] they withdrew from UNAMID to outside of Al-Fashir.

 Before this, on 16 November 2023, Minnawi and Jibril announced their bias to the army at a press conference in Port Sudan. Before this, Al-Fashir was a safe area. Its governor Nimr Abdulrahman facilitated an agreement between locals to calm the situation, which calmed [hostilities] between the army and the RSF. But Al-Burhan sacked him on 8 January.

These steps caused the conflict in Al-Fashir and turned Al-Fashir from a safe area, to an area of military operations thanks to Minnawi and Jibril. They cannot deny this. They cannot falsify history.

Context

By blaming the army and the Joint Forces for the conflict in Al-Fashir, Nugud was considered to have legitimised the RSF’s genocidal campaign in the Darfur region of western Sudan. With Al-Fashir becoming the last place of refuge for non-Arabs escaping the RSF’s ethnically motivated crimes in the region, analysts warn that the RSF would complete its genocidal project should Al-Fashir fall to the militia. However, standing between the RSF are the forces that Nugud blames for the conflict – Darfuri armed movements fighting alongside the army led by the non-Arab Zaghawa tribe.  

 RSF genocidal campaign in Darfur

The RSF are the successors to the Janjaweed – Arab militias who, according to UN estimates, killed 300,000 non-Arabs during the Darfur genocide of the early 2000s. Highlighting the RSF’s “systematic dehumanisation” of non-Arabs in Darfur, Sudanese lawyer Mutasim Ali described the RSF as a “rebranded” Janjaweed with the same commanders, ethnic tribes and victim groups, albeit with sophisticated technology and weaponry due to “significant [UAE] support”.

Since the war began, however, the RSF’s “genocidal intent [became] much more explicit” according to Confluence Advisory think-tank founding director Kholood Khair. The current RSF atrocities in Darfur are unprecedented in Sudan’s history, according to Omer Ismail, an acting foreign minister during the transitional period (2019-21) and now a researcher for the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab.

This has particularly been the case in Darfur. Most notably, a Reuters investigation detailed a “rolling ethnic massacre” by the RSF and allied Arab militias in Al-Gineina, West Darfur.  As per Human Rights Watch, the RSF and allies have killed at least thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands in “widespread war crimes committed in the context of an ethnic cleansing campaign against the ethnic Massalit and other non-Arab populations”.

RSF genocidal campaign in Al-Fashir

By April 2024, Al-Fashir in North Darfur was the last remaining of the region’s five state capitals not to have fallen to the RSF. The militia’s ethnic cleansing campaigns in Al-Gineina (West Darfur) and Nyala (South Darfur) makes Al-Fashir the last refuge for Darfur’s non-Arab citizens. The RSF subsequently embarked on siege which has been described as a “genocidal campaign” by international human rights lawyer Yonah Diamond. 

According to the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, the RSF has been “systematically destroying civilian dwellings” in areas that have a significant population of the (non-Arab) Zaghawa tribe. Thus, the militia’s ethnic cleansing campaign in Al-Fashir has been identified as a “scorched earth strategy”. Hager Ali, a researcher at the German think-tank GIGA Institute for Global and Area Studies, defined this as the destruction of important agricultural goods, razing villages, the systematic killing of non-Arabs, widespread sexual violence against women, with the aim of ensuring that "even when [the RSF] retreat, [their] enemy has absolutely nothing to gain”

As a result, should Al-Fashir fall to the RSF, the militia would “complete their genocidal project” against Darfur’s non-Arab population, argued David Simon, the director of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program. Such warnings were echoed by the New York Times.

Joint Forces

However, standing between an RSF genocide in Al-Fashir are the Joint Forces that Nugud blames for the conflict in the city. This is an anti-RSF armed coalition comprising of the army and Zaghawa-led Darfur armed movements: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by finance minister Jibril Ibrahim and the Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Darfur governor Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM).

The Joint Forces, alongside other militias representing African tribes, are fighting to defend Al-Fashir “while Arab groups from as far afield as northern Nigeria…have joined up with the RSF – and have no intention of going home” according to Daily Maverick journalist Phillip Van Niekerk. Nonetheless, the RSF and allies are not solely fighting the Joint Forces confronting them.

RSF targeting civilians

A reflection of the RSF’s genocidal intent is the explicit targeting of civilians. This has included: 

·      RSF fighters shutting down a water reservoir which supplies 20% of Al-Fashir’s water needs.

·      The systematic campaign of attacking hospitals with the aim of crippling Al-Fashir’s healthcare system.

·      A campaign of attacks on camps for internally displaced persons, including Abu Shouk, which hosts many displaced due to the RSF genocide in other parts of Darfur, alongside the indiscriminate shelling of residential neighbourhoods.

·      Even those fleeing have been subjected to ethnically motivated attacks and killings on RSF-controlled roads in

Reactions on social media

In the context of the RSF’s genocidal campaign in Al-Fashir, social media users responded negatively to Nugud’s arguments absolving the militia of responsibility for the conflict. Sentiments included accusing Taqadum of being allied to the RSF and suggesting that Nugud is legitimising the collective punishment of Al-Fashir’s civilians.  

In a tweet shared 44 times, Usamah Mohamed wrote: “If you notice, Alaa Nugud is reading from a paper in front of him. His words are not improvised, casual words that he said in a moment of surprise in response to a question from a presenter. Rather, they are prepared, organised, and written words that represent the official viewpoint of Taqadum: the attack on Al-Fashir and Wad Al-Noura is the responsibility of the army, not the Rapid Support Forces”

In a tweet shared 20 times, @abdelo_b asked: “what is the difference between what [Nugud] said and what the Islamists would say when they destroyed an entire village in Darfur and said they bombed it because there were rebels there?”. Yet Nugud would continue to legitimise the collective punishment of civilians.

5. Nugud legitimises the RSF’s massacre in Wad Al-Noura

In June 2024, the RSF perpetrated a massacre in the village of Wad al-Noura in central Sudan’s Al-Jazira state, which killed at least 200 and wounded at least 300. The village’s local resistance committee described the massacre as a genocide. However, in comments to Al-Hadath, Nugud blamed the army and the Popular Resistance. Nugud said the following:  

Quote

Also the same thing [the RSF] was accused of in Wad al-Noura. Yes, a big tragedy happened but the cause was the army and the Popular Resistance. There are three clear videos showing the Islamic Movement supplying weapons to citizens and putting them in RSF military areas. They bring out the fighters, and arm them with light weapons like [rifles]. And then Naji Mustafa, one of the Islamist leaders, on a Friday sermon said: ‘how many are left in Wad al-Noura? 2,000? They will become martyrs’.  

Context

As with the RSF’s genocidal campaign in Al-Fashir, Nugud absolved the militia of responsibility by legitimising the collective punishment of civilians. On this occasion, Nugud adopted the RSF narrative that the massacre targeted volunteer fighters mobilised by Islamists. While there is a trend of civilians mobilising to defend their communities from the RSF’s brutality, they deny that they are backed by Islamists.

RSF narrative

The RSF’s statement on its massacre in Wad Al-Noura did not acknowledge civilian casualties and claimed it was targeting Islamist forces preparing to attack the militia. RSF propaganda accounts also regurgitated this narrative. For example, @wdalbehair uploaded a screenshot from Facebook showing a Popular Resistance delegation meeting religious leaders from Wad Al-Noura village with the caption “whoever carries arms is a legitimate target for the RSF”.

A day later, Nugud uploaded the same screenshot with a tweet that read ‘NO FOR POPULAR RESISTANCE… THIS WAR IS [MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD / NATIONAL CONGRESS PARTY] WAR TO REGAIN POWER’.

In response, a tweet shared 41 times from Khartoum Aid Kitchen co-founder @TurtleYusuf accused Nugud of “attempting to push the RSF propaganda line that those killed civilians were armed combatants mobilised by the army,” adding that “there is no moral justification for the RSF bombarding a village full of innocent civilians with heavy weaponry and killing over 100. Yet since Taqadum is the political arm of the RSF, they will still try.”

Details of the massacre

The Wad al-Noura massacre was the latest in a string of dozens by the RSF on small villages across al-Jazira after it took control of the capital Wad Madani in December 2023. According to Sudan Tribune, the RSF has been raiding villages, committing heinous crimes against unarmed residents, including killing, kidnapping, forced displacement, looting and offering to recruit individuals in exchange for “protection” since taking control of the state. 

According to eyewitnesses, the RSF used around 15 combat vehicles and heavy weaponry including Katyusha rockets and anti-aircraft guns in their attack, with a local medical source saying most of the casualties were deliberate targets. The Middle East Eye reported that the massacre was prompted by the militia’s growing fear of resistance.

Popular Resistance

The Popular Resistance that Nugud referred to in justification of the massacre are a growing trend of volunteer fighters mobilising to protect their communities in anticipation of the RSF’s expected brutality. However, contradictory to Nugud’s claims, groups forming defence groups in areas attacked by the RSF deny accusations that they are backed by hardline Islamists.  

6. Nugud blames the army [alone] for the war

On Al-Jazeera in July 2024, Nugud was asked how the war can be stopped. Of the three solutions that Nugud proposed, two were directed at the army and third called upon the international community to attack Sudan’s Islamic Movement (which, as previously noted, Nugud conflates with the army).

 The absence of any criticism of the RSF, or acknowledgement of the militia’s role in the war, led to questioning of Taqadum’s claims of neutrality. Not only did Nugud call for the army’s assistant commander-in-chief Yassir Al-Atta to “shut up”, but he also said that the army is “defeated” and should not demand the RSF’s withdrawal.

 As a result, one of the top responses to Nugud’s words, shared 16 times, came from @MohWadAhmed who wrote: “Alaa Eldin Nugud and his gang are worse than the RSF itself and they should be held accountable for their betrayal”.

Quote

The first solution – the army must participate with sincerity in the current Geneva discussions.

 [Second solution] The army should make [assistant army commander] Yassir al-Atta shut up! Silence this Yassir al-Atta! Who says that: ‘we will fight for 100 years’ and ‘no ceasefire, no negotiations’. [The army] should silence this Yassir al-Atta! Shut him up totally! He shouldn’t speak! [Army commander] Al-Burhan should fix his words. [He says] ‘no negotiations, [RSF] should leave Al-Gineina, [RSF] should leave South Darfur’. He should speak according to what he can do. The army cannot do anything right now. The army are the defeated ones until now. The army cannot demand conditions of surrender. The army should be satisfied with ceasefire conditions. This is what is logical and possible, and what the present circumstances force. This is what should happen.

[Third solution] The international community should know how to hit the Islamic Movement. There should be arrest warrants for its leaders, wherever they are. Arrest [Ali] Karti, arrest Ahmed Haroun. Arrest any of them. Arrest warrants in any state they are in, anywhere, wherever they are, they should be arrested. Like this, there will be a view towards controlling the Islamic Movement’s weapons. Even if it is international or African forces, so they can control the Islamic Movement’s weapons inside the army. They are threatening that they will fight even if the army stops warring. These are the three things that can stop this war.

7.  Nugud whitewashes RSF’s conduct in Al-Jazira

During a panel discussion on Alsharq TV on 24 August, Nugud defended the Taqadum-RSF Addis Ababa agreement of January 2024 by providing a positive appraisal of the RSF’s presence in Al-Jazira state.

Quote

“The agreement we signed with the RSF achievement various things. It established a civilian administration in Al-Jazira, from the citizens of Al-Jazira. Services are now running.

This administration has ensured the stability of farmers and their return to farming. Due to this declaration, there have been meetings with RSF and Sufi sheikhs. 

 There have been donations of around 200 billion SDG from the RSF to the farming season. You can host the president of Al-Jazira farming steering committee to confirm this.

This declaration led to the formation of a civilian protection force that has reduced violations. Yes, they do not all stop, but it is in control of many locations. Life is stable and secure in many of Al-Jazira areas, except [army] planes”.

Context

Nugud’s attempt to paint a positive picture of the RSF’s conduct in Al-Jazira is challenged by independent media coverage of the issue, with reports on the RSF’s campaign of brutality in the state. In addition, Nugud’s claims that the RSF supports the farming sector in Al-Jazira is contradicted by reports of the RSF crippling production of the Jazira scheme to a historic low, thereby ensuring that parts of a state that produced much of Sudan’s daily food needs now faces famine. As a result, Nugud was strongly condemned by a local organisation and Taqadum again distanced themselves from his statement. Nonetheless, he remains a member and spokesperson of the coalition.

RSF conduct in Al-Jazira

A Reuters report published on 9 August that interviewed 43 people from 20 communities including residents, activists and RSF recruits described “a spiral of looting, kidnapping and killing after the [RSF] seized most of the state” in December 2023. The report noted that while the RSF sought to convey “that it is protecting civilians and providing food and services,” residents said the RSF relies on a mix of irregular fighters that it struggles to control who are motivated by bounty. RSF fighters reportedly “cleaned out stocks of wheat, sorghum and other crops and blocked farmers from their fields,” with tractors stolen, fertiliser and seeds scarce and diesel prices soaring.

Agricultural production 

Al-Jazira state also hosts the Jazira scheme, one of the largest irrigation projects in the world. Given that Al-Jazira produces much of Sudan’s daily food needs, veteran human rights activist Amjad Farid attributed the RSF’s presence in the state to Sudan’s deteriorating food security situation. As a result, a UN-backed food security monitoring network warned that parts of Al-Jazira are at risk of famine.

 Sudan Tribune reported on the challenges facing the Jazira scheme due to the RSF’s occupation of Sudan’s agricultural centre.  In May – farmers reported a near-total failure of cotton and wheat harvests in areas under RSF control. They described instances where the RSF forced farmers to harvest crops only to confiscate them and transport them out of the state for the RSF’s own benefit.

By August, it was reported that the scheme’s agricultural production plummeted by 72% compared to the previous season due to the ongoing conflict, according to a local farming alliance. Cultivation dropped as low to 6% of the previous year in RSF-controlled areas, with the militia accused of destroying vital infrastructure.

Civil society response to Nugud

In response to Nugud’s remarks, Al-Jazira Conference, a local activist group, released a statement labelling him a liar. Alongside listing eight RSF massacres in the state, the militia was also blamed for: mass displacement, deaths, rape and the destruction and theft of farming products. In addition, the group disputed Nugud’s claims that the RSF restored services in the state by noting that people are living without water, electricity, care, medicine, education and clothing. Nugud’s claims of the RSF collaboration with Sufi religious leaders were challenged on the basis that the RSF are subjecting them to “terrorism”.

Taqadum distances itself from Nugud

Al-Jazira conference also called on Taqadum to either condemn Nugud’s statement or to stand by it. Taqadum chose the former option, with a statement that claimed their spokesperson’s comments reflect his personal opinions rather than the official positions of the coalition. Taqadum’s statement distancing itself from Nugud was then responded to by Sali Osman, the presenter who hosted the discussion in which Nugud made the initial comments. She said:

“If [Nugud] is not authorised to make a statement on the behalf of [Taqadum], it is best practice to notify members to either reject media interviews and statements, or to introduce themselves in a personal rather than professional capacity. For example, through titles such as consultant, doctor or political activist that are not attributed to [Taqadum]. Alaa Eldin Nugud has spoken to us more than once under the title of ‘a member of [Taqadum’s] leadership office’…and we have not received any objection from Taqadum previously”.

 Despite this being the second time that Taqadum has distanced itself from Nugud’s remarks, he remains a Taqadum member and spokesperson.

8. Omdurman Hospital during the pandemic

Nugud’s professional career has not been without controversy either. During the COVID-19 pandemic in the summer of 2020, Nugud was the acting general director of Omdurman Hospital. Having dismissed emergency doctors, Nugud offered unfavourable terms to their replacements which included:

·      40 hours a week and 160 hours a month for seven thousand Sudanese pounds.

·      A ban on working anywhere else without his permission.

·      Two-month salary deduction if the new doctors go on strike. 

For reference, 7,000 SDG in summer 2020 would have barely covered public transport expenses, especially as their prices increased during the pandemic.