Introduction

Dr. Alaa (Alaadin) Nugud is a spokesperson for the Taqadum coalition and member of the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC) that dominates it.

Taqadum and the FFC-CC are widely accused of being the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia’s political partner. Such accusations were renewed following Nugud’s latest controversy, as reflected in a tweet posted on 25 August 2024 that was shared almost 80 times. It read: “after Alaa Nugud’s words, nobody can say that the political wing of the Rapid Support militia has ended”.

This report will explore eight of Nugud’s controversies. One of them relates to his medical profession, while the remainder were remarks interpreted as pro-RSF and triggered allegations that Taqadum is allied to the militia.

Summary of Nugud’s controversies

1. May 2023: Nugud emphasises the RSF’s democratic commitment

2. January 2024: Nugud defends the UAE’s role in Sudan

3. March 2024: Nugud denies RSF rapes

4. June 2024: Nugud legitimises the RSF’s genocidal campaign in Al-Fashir

5. June 2024: Nugud legitimises the RSF’s massacre in Wad Al-Noura

6. July 2024: Nugud exclusively blames the army for the war

7. August 2024: Nugud paints a positive picture of the RSF’s conduct in Al-Jazira

8. August 2020: Omdurman Hospital during the pandemic

Profile

Nugud came to the attention of global mainstream media at the end of May 2023, when the Guardian reported that he was arrested by Sudanese intelligence officers after accusing the army of diverting medical aid. His wife said she believed it was due to his activism. Nugud was subsequently “discharged in good health and without any charges being brought against him” eleven days after his rest, according to human rights organisation Frontline Defenders. Nugud was described as a ‘human rights defender’.

Nugud’s professional achievements played a role in his rise to political prominence. As a distinguished medical doctor and surgeon, Nugud is recognised for being a member of the first Sudanese team to perform a liver transplant in Sudan, and one of two in his specialty. In addition, Nugud is said to have treated wounded pro-democracy protesters. Nonetheless, while this report outlines seven of Nugud’s political scandals, his professional career is also not without controversy.

Nugud’s Twitter activity

Nugud is very active on Twitter. His activity on the site reflects the evolution of his political stances. For example, in July 2022, just under a year before the war in Sudan erupted, Nugud was critical of the RSF - even using a hashtag that translates to ‘no militia rules a state’. This hashtag is prominent in anti-RSF discourses on social media and it was a chant that was popularly used in pro-democracy street protests during the transitional period between ex-president Omar al-Bashir’s ouster in April 2019 and the military coup of 25 October 2021.

Since the war began in April 2023, however, Nugud has been exclusively critical of the army. A regular theme of Nugud’s tweets are inferences that the Muslim Brotherhood / National Congress Party and the Sudanese army are the same. His most used hashtags are #NCPIsATerroristOrganization and its Arabic iteration. By contrast, Nugud has failed to criticise the RSF on Twitter since the war began.

On the morning that the war began, Nugud applied the RSF narrative that the war was initiated by Islamists in the army attacking the RSF in a coup attempt. More recently, Nugud would explicitly defend the RSF.

In May 2024, he wrote a tweet claiming that Islamists in the army are against the concept of a single professional army “not the RSF”.

Then, in July 2024, he uploaded a phone call recording “which showed RSF refusal to join [the army] in suppression of processions after 25th Oct. coup”.

Nugud expressed similar sentiments for the first controversial statements that he went viral for, when Nugud stressed the RSF’s commitment to democracy.

1. Nugud emphasises the RSF’s democratic commitment

In May 2023, a month into the war, Nugud was asked by a presenter on regional news station Al-Hadath: “why is there a clinging on to a hope, even if little, that [RSF commander] Himedti will bring democracy to Sudan?”. Nugud argued that the RSF is more committed to democracy than the army and that RSF commander Himedti regretted the 25 October 2021 military coup. He said the following:

Quote

It’s not that Himedti will bring democracy to Sudan – but, but - we say that the path to democracy, the threat to democracy is multiple armies. And there must be a single, professional army with a unified national doctrine.
How do we reach such an army on the path of Security Sector Reform (SSR)? How to complete SSR on democratic foundations?
The SSR process should be led by civilian authority. The military and security strategy should be under civilian authority, and the army should not be independent. It must be submissive to civilian authority.
The RSF agreed to these three conditions, but the army did not agree to them. That’s the first thing.
Second, yes, Himedti was the second leader of the 25 October coup, but what happened after this coup failed to change Sudanese lives? When the Framework Agreement was signed on 5 December 2023, Himedti said this coup was a very big mistake and the coup failed in the administration of the Sudanese state

Context

Given that the comments were made five months before Taqadum was formed, Nugud was introduced as a member of the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC) – a coalition of entities that selected the civilian component of the transitional government. The comments were controversial as, firstly, they aligned with the RSF propaganda narrative that brands the militia’s war as ‘the battle for democracy’. Yet, at the time of the comments, almost a million Sudanese were displaced, with the RSF systematically evicting citizens from their homes and occupying them. In addition, Nugud’s emphasis on the RSF’s commitment to democracy were contentious given the motivations behind the RSF and FFC-CC alliance due to their shared positions over the Framework Agreement.

Framework agreement

Days before the war began, a two-year civilian-led transition towards elections was meant to commence as part of the Framework Agreement signed on 5 December 2022 by the army, RSF and FFC-CC. The agreement, which aimed to end the political crisis triggered by the 25 October 2021 coup, stipulated the establishment of a single professional army with the RSF integrated into it. However, analysts suggested that the RSF’s signing of the agreement – and their alignment with the FFC-CC - reflected political manoeuvring rather than a commitment to democracy.

Why did Himedti say the coup is a mistake?

As Nugud said, Himedti did indeed say that the October 2021 coup was a “mistake”, as reported by multiple sources in February 2022. However, Himedti’s comments came in the context of his increasing rivalry with Abdulfattah Al-Burhan – the Transitional Sovereign Council’s (TSC) chairman and the army’s commander-in-chief.

At the time, Himedti – as the TSC deputy chairman – was competing with Al-Burhan “over control of the civil service, an important source of patronage and an essential ingredient in actually running a government,” as per former US diplomat in Sudan Alberto Fernandez. According to political analyst Mohamed Idris, Himedti initially refused to support the coup as it weakened his leverage of a civil service in which he was reportedly using his wealth to buy influence and soft power in.

Security sector reform

While Nugud suggested that the RSF was committed to security sector reform, analyses and news reports cast doubt on Himedti’s claims that he was committed to integrating the RSF into a reformed national army. Rift Valley Institute analyst Magdi al-Gizouli argued that Himedti sought a restructuring of the top army command to ensure that he is a part of it before integration, which was confirmed by Reuters’ military sources.

Similarly, Monte Carro, an outlet that provided exclusive insider information on developments relating to the army and RSF, suggested that Himedti sought to ensure that integration occurs “according to his vision,” allegedly seeking to reap gains by prolonging the process. Thus, as reported by Reuters, while the army preferred a two-year timeline for integration, the RSF wanted the process spread across 10 years.

RSF alliance with the FFC-CC

Nugud claimed that the RSF agreed that the army should be submissive to civilian authority. In light of the threat posed to the RSF’s expansion by the army, analysts suggested the militia adopted FFC-CC positions with the aim of allying with the civilian coalition, thereby using them as a civilian base and potentially whitewashing the RSF’s image.

Al-Gizouli argued that Himedti sought to use the Framework Agreement "to improve his competitiveness" and bill himself as "an ally to the [FFC-CC]”. Under a month before the war began, four anonymous FFC-CC leaders told Reuters said Himedti shares their civilian government goals.

Suliman Baldo, the executive director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, suggested that the ties Himedti cultivated with the FFC-CC reflect his aims to become "a force to be reckoned with in the national power structure”. As a result, Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory think-tank, argued that Himedti was the “winner” of the Framework Agreement, describing his nods towards inclusivity as “a masterclass in empty gestural politics”.

FFC: the political arm of the RSF

Nonetheless, Nugud’s arguments for the RSF’s democratic commitment are also controversial if considering the view held by analysts that the FFC-CC is the political arm of the RSF. Writer and researcher Reem Abbas suggested the partnership “has been in the making since 2019,” explaining how “Himedti wanted the FFC to do some damage control for him after the [3 June 2019] sit-in massacre and the FFC saw this as an opportunity to strengthen their position as opposed to the military institution”. Thus, Abbas adds, “the FFC does not [fully] believe in civil work, which is why they are interested in having guns to support their rule”.

2. Nugud defends the UAE’s role in Sudan

In January 2024, Nugud suggested that the UAE supports democracy in Sudan during an interview with Sudan Bukra. The comments generated controversy as they were seen as a defence of a state that is strongly suspected by Sudanese of arming the RSF, and by extension, sponsoring the killing of Sudanese people

Quote

When you look at the role of the UAE, or influential foreign states, whether the UAE or Egypt, their positions towards the revolution. The UAE supported the transition. Yes, it supported the transition. Egypt did not support the transition. Egypt spoils the transition or it spoiled the transition. Then came the [25 October 2021] coup. The UAE did not support the coup, Egypt supported the coup. Al-Burhan was in Cairo 48 hours before the coup.

Context

Both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal have covered the UAE’s support for the RSF, which have been described as “credible” reports by an independent panel of UN experts. As a result, Sudanese public resentment towards the UAE due to its alleged support for the RSF militia is reflected in the popularity of an Arabic hashtag that translates to #UAEKillsSudanese.

Nugud’s attempts to compare the UAE and Egypt’s positions towards Sudan stems from their stances on the Framework Agreement, whereby Egypt pursued an alternative track with political factions closer to the Sudanese army. By contrast, the UAE supported an agreement which analyst Kholood Khair argued enabled their suspected ally - RSF leader Himedti - to emerge as the “winner” at the army’s expense.

3. Nugud denies RSF rapes

At the start of March 2024, Nugud dismissed reports of gang rape in RSF territory by an organisation called Doctors Around the World by claiming that it is affiliated to the former Islamist regime. Later that month, Nugud was at the centre of a controversy relating to messages leaked from a WhatsApp group. In comments to FFC media committee member Hussam Abualfatah, Nugud suggested that reports of rapes conducted by the RSF in territories held by the militia are exaggerated. In addition, the burden of proof to verify rape cases proposed by Nugud face considerable logistical challenges. Given that RSF’s use of rape as a weapon of war is highly documented, Nugud was widely condemned on social media, by prominent activists and women’s groups and even his own Taqadum / FFC colleagues.

Quote

Husam – there is not a doctor who does not claim to have identified rape cases. This report is valid if it came from known medical sources [such as] Doctors Without Borders or Al-Gineina Teaching Hospital etc. But you cannot attribute the identification of rape to local sources. This is something medical. You can say it is suspected or possible when you talk about local observers but if you want to confirm a case there has to be a medical examination.

Brother – it is possible that in some cases, sexual intercourse happened with a woman’s consent or a rape occurred. How can you tell the difference between the two without a clinical examination? Firstly, there would be no traces of resistance or anything. Secondly, there would be bruises and many other effects may be present in other parts of the body indicating resistances. These would be included in a clinical examination of the Ornik 8.

Context

Screenshots of Nugud’s comments appeared on Twitter via a post from @MadaniMohmed that was shared 240 times with a caption that stated:

“it’s unfortunate that [Taqadum] have gone this far. The official spokesman for Taqadum denies rape cases and said [intercourse] might have been with consent, and that there is no such thing as local monitors. Seriously, [are they being] threatened? Did they voluntarily become defence committees for the militia?”.

Nugud’s comments were also strongly condemned in an open letter by the Sudan Change activist coalition. Among its signatories included prominent women’s rights activists including Hala al-Karib – the regional director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA).

Civil society response

Sudan Change labelled it “shameful and disgraceful” that Nugud cast doubts about sexual violence crimes that are “documented professionally and in detail by dozens of international and local organisations, [alongside] United Nations offices in various regions of Sudan”.

Furthermore, Sudan Change accused Nugud of engaging in “legal defences clearly intended to justify the RSF’s heinous violations and crimes” that contradicted documented reports and testimonies of victims and witnesses, “which confirm that crimes of sexual violence are horribly widespread in the areas under RSF control”.

In addition, the arguments that Nugud made for the verification of rape cases also garnered controversy and were challenged by activists and social media users. In particular, these were: Nugud’s requirement for an Ornik 8 to verify rape cases, casting doubt on local observers and the suggestion that intercourse may have occurred with consent.

Ornik 8

The Ornik 8 is a form used in Sudan that is used to prove a case of crime through official medical and police reports. In the event of rape, it requires victims to file an official report with the authorities. Describing it as “infamous”, Sudan Change said “this form is exactly what the Sudanese feminist movement, the Sudanese doctors’ union, and human rights activists have been fighting to abolish for decades”.

Nugud’s comments suggested that the burden of proof is on the victim to produce an Ornik 8 in order to verify rape cases. This is controversial due to the practical challenges obtaining one. To begin with, social stigmas prevent survivors from coming forward. Moreover, the absence of police in RSF-controlled territory means the victim would rely on the RSF’s cooperation to raise a complaint of rape perpetrated by RSF militants.

This is why one of the most popular comments responding to Nugud’s messages – shared 67 times – came from @itsnasserr, who wrote:

“Do you expect the victims to go to RSF checkpoints in their areas and tell them they want an Ornik 8 because your fellow RSF militants raped us? The Ornik 8, of course, can only be found in the checkpoints because there is no police station. Ornik 8? Aren’t you ashamed, man?! What Ornik 8 during a state of war while international reports prove the existence of rape cases. This doctor is a disgrace to the medical field. We believe the survivors”

Similarly, in a tweet shared 18 times, @abdelo_b: wrote: “How can victims verify [rape cases] if they were living in areas under the control of the [RSF]? From where can they get you an Ornik 8, Alaa El Din, you crazy man?”

Local observers

Another controversial part of Nugud’s comments were his claims that rape can only verified by “known” medical sources rather than local observers. Even before the war, access to healthcare facilities was limited, particularly in rural areas. However, since the war erupted, almost 80% of Sudan’s healthcare facilities are now out of service according to the World Health Organisation. The RSF’s systematic targeting of healthcare facilities across Sudan is a key contributor to the country’s crippled health system.

Thus, Sudan Change criticised Nugud for casting doubt on the credibility of local observers, organisations and volunteers on the ground, “who represent the only refuge for survivors to provide aid and assistance at the present time”.

In addition, in a tweet shared 44 times, @AbazarHassan questioned how Nugud can deem local observers unreliable when the FFC previously accepted their statements. Hassan cited a statement from 25 November 2021 when the FFC condemned sexual violence against protesters with reference to local reports.

Consent

Nugud was also criticised for suggesting that rape cases may have occurred with consent. Sudan Change’s open letter said that Nugud “questioned the fact that sexual contact may have occurred with the consent of women and girls, explaining that there were no signs of resistance!”.

Hassan said: “Dr. Alaa, your justification for rape is the same approach used by the National Congress Party (NCP)”. Criticism of the Islamist NCP who ruled Sudan for the last 20 years of Al-Bashir’s rule are a constant theme of Nugud’s political remarks. This is why Hassan suggested that “the only thing that separates [Taqadum] from the NCP are [positions of authority]”.

Taqadum stance

Directly addressing Taqadum’s president, the former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok, Sudan Change called upon Taqadum to clarify its position on women’s rights. Abualfatah confirmed and condemned the comments while sharing a Taqadum statement distancing themselves from Nugud’s comments by stating that they were “purely [his] personal opinion”.

However, Sudanese social media users questioned why Taqadum did not sack Nugud. The most shared response to Taqadum’s statement read: “if [Taqadum] was a respectable political alliance, the dirty Alaa Nugud would have been held accountable and dismissed. But what do you expect from an alliance of dirty traitors?”. Indeed, in his capacity as a Taqadum spokesperson, Nugud would continue to make remarks that were deemed pro-RSF without being removed from his position.

4. Nugud legitimises the RSF’s genocidal campaign in Al-Fashir

In comments to Al-Hadath in June 2024, Nugud held the army and its allies responsible for the conflict in Al-Fashir, the last remaining of Darfur’s five state capitals not to have fallen to the RSF. Since April 2024, the RSF has been laying siege on Al-Fashir in what numerous analysts describe as a genocidal campaign. As a result, by absolving the RSF of blame for atrocities in Al-Fashir, Nugud triggered renewed accusations that Taqadum is the RSF’s political wing.

Quote

The provocation began from the army, which, on 13 April, [alongside allied forces led by Minni Minnawi and Jibril Ibrahim], attack the forces of Alhadi Idris at the UNAMID base after they notified [the Joint Forces] they withdrew from UNAMID to outside of Al-Fashir.
Before this, on 16 November 2023, Minnawi and Jibril announced their bias to the army at a press conference in Port Sudan. Before this, Al-Fashir was a safe area. Its governor Nimr Abdulrahman facilitated an agreement between locals to calm the situation, which calmed [hostilities] between the army and the RSF. But Al-Burhan sacked him on 8 January.
These steps caused the conflict in Al-Fashir and turned Al-Fashir from a safe area, to an area of military operations thanks to Minnawi and Jibril. They cannot deny this. They cannot falsify history.
Context

By blaming the army and the Joint Forces for the conflict in Al-Fashir, Nugud was considered to have legitimised the RSF’s genocidal campaign in the Darfur region of western Sudan. With Al-Fashir becoming the last place of refuge for non-Arabs escaping the RSF’s ethnically motivated crimes in the region, analysts warn that the RSF would complete its genocidal project should Al-Fashir fall to the militia. However, standing between the RSF are the forces that Nugud blames for the conflict – Darfuri armed movements fighting alongside the army led by the non-Arab Zaghawa tribe.

RSF genocidal campaign in Darfur

The RSF are the successors to the Janjaweed – Arab militias who, according to UN estimates, killed 300,000 non-Arabs during the Darfur genocide of the early 2000s. Highlighting the RSF’s “systematic dehumanisation” of non-Arabs in Darfur, Sudanese lawyer Mutasim Ali described the RSF as a “rebranded” Janjaweed with the same commanders, ethnic tribes and victim groups, albeit with sophisticated technology and weaponry due to “significant [UAE] support”.

Since the war began, however, the RSF’s “genocidal intent [became] much more explicit” according to Confluence Advisory think-tank founding director Kholood Khair. The current RSF atrocities in Darfur are unprecedented in Sudan’s history, according to Omer Ismail, an acting foreign minister during the transitional period (2019-21) and now a researcher for the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab.

This has particularly been the case in Darfur. Most notably, a Reuters investigation detailed a “rolling ethnic massacre” by the RSF and allied Arab militias in Al-Gineina, West Darfur. As per Human Rights Watch, the RSF and allies have killed at least thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands in “widespread war crimes committed in the context of an ethnic cleansing campaign against the ethnic Massalit and other non-Arab populations”.

RSF genocidal campaign in Al-Fashir

By April 2024, Al-Fashir in North Darfur was the last remaining of the region’s five state capitals not to have fallen to the RSF. The militia’s ethnic cleansing campaigns in Al-Gineina (West Darfur) and Nyala (South Darfur) makes Al-Fashir the last refuge for Darfur’s non-Arab citizens. The RSF subsequently embarked on siege which has been described as a “genocidal campaign” by international human rights lawyer Yonah Diamond.

According to the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, the RSF has been “systematically destroying civilian dwellings” in areas that have a significant population of the (non-Arab) Zaghawa tribe. Thus, the militia’s ethnic cleansing campaign in Al-Fashir has been identified as a “scorched earth strategy”. Hager Ali, a researcher at the German think-tank GIGA Institute for Global and Area Studies, defined this as the destruction of important agricultural goods, razing villages, the systematic killing of non-Arabs, widespread sexual violence against women, with the aim of ensuring that "even when [the RSF] retreat, [their] enemy has absolutely nothing to gain”

As a result, should Al-Fashir fall to the RSF, the militia would “complete their genocidal project” against Darfur’s non-Arab population, argued David Simon, the director of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program. Such warnings were echoed by the New York Times.

Joint Forces

However, standing between an RSF genocide in Al-Fashir are the Joint Forces that Nugud blames for the conflict in the city. This is an anti-RSF armed coalition comprising of the army and Zaghawa-led Darfur armed movements: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by finance minister Jibril Ibrahim and the Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Darfur governor Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM).

The Joint Forces, alongside other militias representing African tribes, are fighting to defend Al-Fashir “while Arab groups from as far afield as northern Nigeria…have joined up with the RSF – and have no intention of going home” according to Daily Maverick journalist Phillip Van Niekerk. Nonetheless, the RSF and allies are not solely fighting the Joint Forces confronting them.

RSF targeting civilians

A reflection of the RSF’s genocidal intent is the explicit targeting of civilians. This has included:

· RSF fighters shutting down a water reservoir which supplies 20% of Al-Fashir’s water needs.

· The systematic campaign of attacking hospitals with the aim of crippling Al-Fashir’s healthcare system.

· A campaign of attacks on camps for internally displaced persons, including Abu Shouk, which hosts many displaced due to the RSF genocide in other parts of Darfur, alongside the indiscriminate shelling of residential neighbourhoods.

· Even those fleeing have been subjected to ethnically motivated attacks and killings on RSF-controlled roads in

Reactions on social media

In the context of the RSF’s genocidal campaign in Al-Fashir, social media users responded negatively to Nugud’s arguments absolving the militia of responsibility for the conflict. Sentiments included accusing Taqadum of being allied to the RSF and suggesting that Nugud is legitimising the collective punishment of Al-Fashir’s civilians.

In a tweet shared 44 times, Usamah Mohamed wrote: “If you notice, Alaa Nugud is reading from a paper in front of him. His words are not improvised, casual words that he said in a moment of surprise in response to a question from a presenter. Rather, they are prepared, organised, and written words that represent the official viewpoint of Taqadum: the attack on Al-Fashir and Wad Al-Noura is the responsibility of the army, not the Rapid Support Forces”

In a tweet shared 20 times, @abdelo_b asked: “what is the difference between what [Nugud] said and what the Islamists would say when they destroyed an entire village in Darfur and said they bombed it because there were rebels there?”. Yet Nugud would continue to legitimise the collective punishment of civilians.

5. Nugud legitimises the RSF’s massacre in Wad Al-Noura

In June 2024, the RSF perpetrated a massacre in the village of Wad al-Noura in central Sudan’s Al-Jazira state, which killed at least 200 and wounded at least 300. The village’s local resistance committee described the massacre as a genocide. However, in comments to Al-Hadath, Nugud blamed the army and the Popular Resistance. Nugud said the following:

Quote

Also the same thing [the RSF] was accused of in Wad al-Noura. Yes, a big tragedy happened but the cause was the army and the Popular Resistance. There are three clear videos showing the Islamic Movement supplying weapons to citizens and putting them in RSF military areas. They bring out the fighters, and arm them with light weapons like [rifles]. And then Naji Mustafa, one of the Islamist leaders, on a Friday sermon said: ‘how many are left in Wad al-Noura? 2,000? They will become martyrs’.

Context

As with the RSF’s genocidal campaign in Al-Fashir, Nugud absolved the militia of responsibility by legitimising the collective punishment of civilians. On this occasion, Nugud adopted the RSF narrative that the massacre targeted volunteer fighters mobilised by Islamists. While there is a trend of civilians mobilising to defend their communities from the RSF’s brutality, they deny that they are backed by Islamists.

RSF narrative

The RSF’s statement on its massacre in Wad Al-Noura did not acknowledge civilian casualties and claimed it was targeting Islamist forces preparing to attack the militia. RSF propaganda accounts also regurgitated this narrative. For example, @wdalbehair uploaded a screenshot from Facebook showing a Popular Resistance delegation meeting religious leaders from Wad Al-Noura village with the caption “whoever carries arms is a legitimate target for the RSF”.

A day later, Nugud uploaded the same screenshot with a tweet that read ‘NO FOR POPULAR RESISTANCE… THIS WAR IS [MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD / NATIONAL CONGRESS PARTY] WAR TO REGAIN POWER’.

In response, a tweet shared 41 times from Khartoum Aid Kitchen co-founder @TurtleYusuf accused Nugud of “attempting to push the RSF propaganda line that those killed civilians were armed combatants mobilised by the army,” adding that “there is no moral justification for the RSF bombarding a village full of innocent civilians with heavy weaponry and killing over 100. Yet since Taqadum is the political arm of the RSF, they will still try.”

Details of the massacre

The Wad al-Noura massacre was the latest in a string of dozens by the RSF on small villages across al-Jazira after it took control of the capital Wad Madani in December 2023. According to Sudan Tribune, the RSF has been raiding villages, committing heinous crimes against unarmed residents, including killing, kidnapping, forced displacement, looting and offering to recruit individuals in exchange for “protection” since taking control of the state.

According to eyewitnesses, the RSF used around 15 combat vehicles and heavy weaponry including Katyusha rockets and anti-aircraft guns in their attack, with a local medical source saying most of the casualties were deliberate targets. The Middle East Eye reported that the massacre was prompted by the militia’s growing fear of resistance.

Popular Resistance

The Popular Resistance that Nugud referred to in justification of the massacre are a growing trend of volunteer fighters mobilising to protect their communities in anticipation of the RSF’s expected brutality. However, contradictory to Nugud’s claims, groups forming defence groups in areas attacked by the RSF deny accusations that they are backed by hardline Islamists.

6. Nugud blames the army [alone] for the war

On Al-Jazeera in July 2024, Nugud was asked how the war can be stopped. Of the three solutions that Nugud proposed, two were directed at the army and third called upon the international community to attack Sudan’s Islamic Movement (which, as previously noted, Nugud conflates with the army).

The absence of any criticism of the RSF, or acknowledgement of the militia’s role in the war, led to questioning of Taqadum’s claims of neutrality. Not only did Nugud call for the army’s assistant commander-in-chief Yassir Al-Atta to “shut up”, but he also said that the army is “defeated” and should not demand the RSF’s withdrawal.

As a result, one of the top responses to Nugud’s words, shared 16 times, came from @MohWadAhmed who wrote: “Alaa Eldin Nugud and his gang are worse than the RSF itself and they should be held accountable for their betrayal”.

Quote

The first solution – the army must participate with sincerity in the current Geneva discussions.
[Second solution] The army should make [assistant army commander] Yassir al-Atta shut up! Silence this Yassir al-Atta! Who says that: ‘we will fight for 100 years’ and ‘no ceasefire, no negotiations’. [The army] should silence this Yassir al-Atta! Shut him up totally! He shouldn’t speak! [Army commander] Al-Burhan should fix his words. [He says] ‘no negotiations, [RSF] should leave Al-Gineina, [RSF] should leave South Darfur’. He should speak according to what he can do. The army cannot do anything right now. The army are the defeated ones until now. The army cannot demand conditions of surrender. The army should be satisfied with ceasefire conditions. This is what is logical and possible, and what the present circumstances force. This is what should happen.
[Third solution] The international community should know how to hit the Islamic Movement. There should be arrest warrants for its leaders, wherever they are. Arrest [Ali] Karti, arrest Ahmed Haroun. Arrest any of them. Arrest warrants in any state they are in, anywhere, wherever they are, they should be arrested. Like this, there will be a view towards controlling the Islamic Movement’s weapons. Even if it is international or African forces, so they can control the Islamic Movement’s weapons inside the army. They are threatening that they will fight even if the army stops warring. These are the three things that can stop this war.

7. Nugud whitewashes RSF’s conduct in Al-Jazira

During a panel discussion on Alsharq TV on 24 August, Nugud defended the Taqadum-RSF Addis Ababa agreement of January 2024 by providing a positive appraisal of the RSF’s presence in Al-Jazira state.

Quote

“The agreement we signed with the RSF achievement various things. It established a civilian administration in Al-Jazira, from the citizens of Al-Jazira. Services are now running.
This administration has ensured the stability of farmers and their return to farming. Due to this declaration, there have been meetings with RSF and Sufi sheikhs.
There have been donations of around 200 billion SDG from the RSF to the farming season. You can host the president of Al-Jazira farming steering committee to confirm this.
This declaration led to the formation of a civilian protection force that has reduced violations. Yes, they do not all stop, but it is in control of many locations. Life is stable and secure in many of Al-Jazira areas, except [army] planes”.

Context

Nugud’s attempt to paint a positive picture of the RSF’s conduct in Al-Jazira is challenged by independent media coverage of the issue, with reports on the RSF’s campaign of brutality in the state. In addition, Nugud’s claims that the RSF supports the farming sector in Al-Jazira is contradicted by reports of the RSF crippling production of the Jazira scheme to a historic low, thereby ensuring that parts of a state that produced much of Sudan’s daily food needs now faces famine. As a result, Nugud was strongly condemned by a local organisation and Taqadum again distanced themselves from his statement. Nonetheless, he remains a member and spokesperson of the coalition.

RSF conduct in Al-Jazira

A Reuters report published on 9 August that interviewed 43 people from 20 communities including residents, activists and RSF recruits described “a spiral of looting, kidnapping and killing after the [RSF] seized most of the state” in December 2023. The report noted that while the RSF sought to convey “that it is protecting civilians and providing food and services,” residents said the RSF relies on a mix of irregular fighters that it struggles to control who are motivated by bounty. RSF fighters reportedly “cleaned out stocks of wheat, sorghum and other crops and blocked farmers from their fields,” with tractors stolen, fertiliser and seeds scarce and diesel prices soaring.

Agricultural production

Al-Jazira state also hosts the Jazira scheme, one of the largest irrigation projects in the world. Given that Al-Jazira produces much of Sudan’s daily food needs, veteran human rights activist Amjad Farid attributed the RSF’s presence in the state to Sudan’s deteriorating food security situation. As a result, a UN-backed food security monitoring network warned that parts of Al-Jazira are at risk of famine.

Sudan Tribune reported on the challenges facing the Jazira scheme due to the RSF’s occupation of Sudan’s agricultural centre. In May – farmers reported a near-total failure of cotton and wheat harvests in areas under RSF control. They described instances where the RSF forced farmers to harvest crops only to confiscate them and transport them out of the state for the RSF’s own benefit.

By August, it was reported that the scheme’s agricultural production plummeted by 72% compared to the previous season due to the ongoing conflict, according to a local farming alliance. Cultivation dropped as low to 6% of the previous year in RSF-controlled areas, with the militia accused of destroying vital infrastructure.

Civil society response to Nugud

In response to Nugud’s remarks, Al-Jazira Conference, a local activist group, released a statement labelling him a liar. Alongside listing eight RSF massacres in the state, the militia was also blamed for: mass displacement, deaths, rape and the destruction and theft of farming products. In addition, the group disputed Nugud’s claims that the RSF restored services in the state by noting that people are living without water, electricity, care, medicine, education and clothing. Nugud’s claims of the RSF collaboration with Sufi religious leaders were challenged on the basis that the RSF are subjecting them to “terrorism”.

Taqadum distances itself from Nugud

Al-Jazira conference also called on Taqadum to either condemn Nugud’s statement or to stand by it. Taqadum chose the former option, with a statement that claimed their spokesperson’s comments reflect his personal opinions rather than the official positions of the coalition. Taqadum’s statement distancing itself from Nugud was then responded to by Sali Osman, the presenter who hosted the discussion in which Nugud made the initial comments. She said:

“If [Nugud] is not authorised to make a statement on the behalf of [Taqadum], it is best practice to notify members to either reject media interviews and statements, or to introduce themselves in a personal rather than professional capacity. For example, through titles such as consultant, doctor or political activist that are not attributed to [Taqadum]. Alaa Eldin Nugud has spoken to us more than once under the title of ‘a member of [Taqadum’s] leadership office’…and we have not received any objection from Taqadum previously”.

Despite this being the second time that Taqadum has distanced itself from Nugud’s remarks, he remains a Taqadum member and spokesperson.

8. Omdurman Hospital during the pandemic

Nugud’s professional career has not been without controversy either. During the COVID-19 pandemic in the summer of 2020, Nugud was the acting general director of Omdurman Hospital. Having dismissed emergency doctors, Nugud offered unfavourable terms to their replacements which included:

· 40 hours a week and 160 hours a month for seven thousand Sudanese pounds.

· A ban on working anywhere else without his permission.

· Two-month salary deduction if the new doctors go on strike.

For reference, 7,000 SDG in summer 2020 would have barely covered public transport expenses, especially as their prices increased during the pandemic.