Sudan Social Media Monitor

Background

· The US invited both the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia to ceasefire talks hosted by Switzerland and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Geneva scheduled for 14 August 2024.

· Three days before the talks were scheduled to take place, Sudan Tribune reported that Sudan’s army expressed reservations and sought reassurance that the talks would focus on implementing the Jeddah Declaration of May 2023 and that the Sudanese government would be represented rather than solely the army.

· Sudan’s government was also displeased with the US’ insistence on the UAE’s observer status for the meeting. Although Sudan’s army rejected the invitation, the Geneva talks will still go ahead, now shifting from mediation talks to technical discussion.

· Although a non-Sudanese analyst suggests that the army’s reluctance to negotiate means that it choses war, briefing explores the sentiments of Sudanese people personally impacted by the RSF’s violations to explore four key reasons for their apathy towards negotiations with the RSF militia.

Summary

The five key reasons obstructing unanimous Sudanese public approval of the Geneva peace talks with the RSF are:

1. A lack of confidence in the RSF implementing any agreement provided that it has not withdrawn from citizen’s homes as promised last year.

2. Objections to the UAE’s participation in the peace talks provided that it is accused of sponsoring the RSF’s crimes against Sudanese civilians.

3. The exclusion of non-army groups resisting the RSF given that the war is viewed as a national battle against the RSF rather than solely being between the army and the militia.

4. The RSF’s ongoing campaign of atrocities and war crimes even in the days leading up to the negotiations reduce confidence that negotiations can cease the militia’s violations.

5. Negotiations with the RSF are considered to legitimise what Sudanese people view as a “terrorist militia”.

Issue 1: RSF in civilian homes

The first unresolved issue hindering Sudanese public approval of peace talks with the RSF is the militia’s refusal to withdraw from citizen homes. In May 2023, just over a month after the war began, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) signed the US-Saudi sponsored Jeddah Declaration, which included a vow to “vacate civilian houses”. However, the RSF has not kept their word, with its militants systematically occupying citizen’s homes.

Activist Roza has been documenting pictures and videos taken by RSF militants in occupied homes. This has included:

· An RSF affiliated woman filming herself inside a citizen’s house, boasting about occupying it, mocking the owners and wearing their clothes.

· Weddings being held inside occupied homes.

· A video in which RSF militants and their family chant from an occupied house: “they took their clothes and fled”.

In a clip from the Shahada podcast that went viral, activist Maha Bakhiet attributes the RSF’s occupation of citizen homes to demographic change in Sudan, with digital activist Saroyah describing the process as “settler colonialism” in a tweet shared over 300 times. Indeed, ‘Liberate Sudan’, an Instagram account dedicated to raising awareness about Sudan dubbed the RSF the “Rapid Settler Forces”.

The RSF’s refusal to exit citizen homes impacts public sentiments towards negotiations with the militia. This is reflected in two hashtags that started to dominate Sudanese political twitter conversations in the week leading up to the Geneva talks:

#RSFOut and an Arabic hashtag that translates to #GetOutRSF. Among the top tweets on those hashtags – shared over 150 times - came from activist Eiman. It shows picture of RSF militants inside citizen’s homes with a caption that read: “Evacuate our homes before negotiations”.

Another team on the same hashtag came from an influential account with over 100,000 followers called Al-Malikah (the Queen). In a tweet shared over 165 times, she wrote: “our demands for the RSF to leave our homes and cities are not a request, but a legitimate right and our most basic rights as Sudanese”.

Given that the Geneva talks are US-mediated, Sudanese displeasure over the negotiations due to the RSF’s refusal to withdraw from citizen’s homes were also directed towards the US’ Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello.

The Sudan Trends account wrote: “The voice of the Sudanese people says that the Rapid Support Militia must leave the homes of citizens, neighborhoods and cities to implement the ceasefire, because the Sudanese people know that the Janjaweed will not leave their homes.”

Similarly, Twitter user Sami said: “I’m a civilian demanding the #RSF militia leave my home. My house is not a bargaining chip in your negotiations. Stop legitimizing these criminals by treating my house as negotiable!”

Issue 2: The UAE’s observer status

The second issue hindering Sudanese public approval of the US-sponsored Geneva peace talks is the presence of the UAE as a neutral observer. Both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal have covered the UAE’s support for the RSF, which have been described as “credible” reports by an independent panel of UN experts. As a result, influential Sudanese Twitter users have condemned the UAE’s involvement in the talks.

Firstly, Amjad Faried – the Executive Director of Fikra think-tank who has over 170,000 Twitter followers - wrote that “the insistence on including the UAE as a neutral observer in peace talks is incongruous, especially given the ongoing attacks by the [RSF] on El Fashir, with undeniable Emirati support”.

Similarly, in a tweet shared almost 500 times, Saroyah wrote: “why would they make the UAE an observer when everyone knows they’re the ones funding the RSF militia who are killing and displacing us[?]”.

Sudanese public resentment towards the UAE due to its alleged support for the RSF militia is reflected in the popularity of an Arabic hashtag that translates to #UAEKillsSudanese. One of the top tweets on the hashtag – shared over 160 times - came five days before the 14 August Geneva talks from Yasin Ahmed – an activist and influencer with over 330,000 followers. He uploaded a video of the RSF firing missiles at a hospital and said: “this is not a militia that you negotiate with”.

Issue 3: Exclusion of other parties resisting the RSF

Amid pre-existing public opposition to the UAE’s participation in Sudan’s peace negotiations, the exclusion of the Sudanese government is another issue hindering approval of the Geneva process. As reported in the Sudanese media, the US insists on inviting only the Sudanese army. This is controversial as it does not take into account the breadth of opposition to the RSF.

A sign of Sudanese public disproval of the exclusion of Sudan’s government can be reflected in a tweet from Khartoum Aid Kitchen co-founder Mohanad Elbalal that was shared over 40 times. He wrote: “much of the unified force fighting this genocidal [RSF] militia are not part of the Sudanese Army…however [they] are all represented in the Sudanese government”.

While Sudan’s government is currently led by the army, it also includes armed movements who signed the Juba peace agreement in September 2020. The army commander-in-chief Abdulfattah al-Burhan’s deputy in the Transitional Sovereign Council is Malik Agar, a factional leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N).

Moreover, Sudan’s government also features Darfur rebel groups that are playing a crucial in resisting the RSF: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by finance minister Jibril Ibrahim and the Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Darfur governor Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM). JEM and the SLM-MM began to participate in operations against the RSF alongside the army in November 2023, but their importance grew after April 2024 when the RSF besieged of North Darfur’s state capital Al-Fashir - the last remaining of the regions five state capitals not to have fallen to the militia.

The RSF siege of Al-Fashir has been described as a “genocidal campaign” by international human rights lawyer Yonah Diamond in an article for CNN. The militia’s systematic targeting of non-Arabs has been well-documented (Sudan In The News, 15-21 June 2024). Should Al-Fashir fall to the RSF, the militia would “complete their genocidal project” against Darfur’s non-Arab population, warns David Simon, the director of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program, in article for the Washington Post. However, standing between the RSF and allied Arab groups from as far afield as northern Nigeria are the Joint Forces: a coalition of the army, JEM and the SLM-MM (Sudan In The News, 7-14 June 2024).

But the strategic importance of the Joint Forces is not constrained to preventing genocide in Darfur. The Joint Forces have the capacity to weaken the RSF across the whole of Sudan given the “desert war” in the Sudan-Libyan-Chad triangular border region of North Darfur. This region is crucial for RSF operations as it means dominance over fuel smuggling routes from Libya, making these battles vital as they aim to cut of RSF supplies, deplete their resources and hinder the militia’s capabilities on multiple fronts across Sudan. Having established the leverage that the Joint Forces hold, the dissatisfaction of one of its key components is significant. At the end of July 2024, Minni Minnawi issued a "strongly worded statement" expressing anger at the US’ exclusion of his movement from the Geneva talks, stressing its influence in the wider war.

Restricting participation in peace negotiations to the army is also controversial when considering the commonly-held views among Sudanese that the RSF is at war with Sudan in its entirety rather than solely the army. In a tweet shared over 50 times, Elbalal – who has over 12,000 followers - wrote that “this has never been a war between two belligerents. The RSF militia is fighting the Sudanese state,” before emphasising how RSF fighters brand their war as one on the ’56 state’ and adding that “that is why you find a long list of armed groups as well as volunteers also fighting the RSF”.

Destroying the ’56 state’ is a core part of RSF propaganda, as regurgitated by its mouthpieces, social media channels, supporters and fighters. As a result, Sudanese activists and academics have pushed back on popular narratives by which the war in Sudan is framed. For example, the “two generals” narrative is particularly contentious, as reflected in over 500 shares on this Twitter post.

In comments to Sudan In The News, academic Yasir Zaidan said portrays of the war in Sudan as a conflict between two generals – army commander Abdulfattah Al-Burhan and RSF commander Himedti – “obscured the reality of the RSF’s major plot to take over the Sudanese state”.

Furthermore, it is also worth noting the non-army armed groups resisting the RSF beyond the Joint Forces. Abdelaziz Al-Hilu’s faction of the SPLM-N has been in a state of rebellion against the Sudanese government since 2011 and threatens to declare independence in the territory it holds unless Sudan adopts a secular constitution. Yet, in January 2024, Sudan Tribune reported that the army and SPLM-N Al-Hilu jointly fought the RSF in South Kordofan. In addition, writing in the Carnegie Endownment, journalist Yousif Bashier shed light on the Popular Resistance: a growing trend of volunteer fighters mobilising to protect their communities in anticipation of the RSF’s expected brutality.

Thus, if taking into account the widespread resistance to the RSF across Sudan, restricting participation in peace negotiations to solely the army undermines both the breadth of opposition to the militia and perceptions that it is at war with Sudan as a whole rather than just the army.

Issue 4: Ongoing RSF violations

Arguably the key impediment to unanimous Sudan public approval of negotiations with the RSF is the lack of confidence that negotiations will stop the militia’s violations.

On July 30, a tweet from the RSF’s official account emphasised the militia’s willingness to participate in the Geneva negotiations, stating that it has an “open and positive attitude towards all emerging initiatives aiming to stop the war,” while accusing the army of having a vested interest in continuing the war. Yet RSF atrocities continued in the two weeks that followed, thereby reinforcing scepticism of the militia’s intent to cease hostilities.

However, the RSF’s ability to comply with a ceasefire is questionable, with eyewitness telling Reuters that it is struggling to control “unruly fighters” recruited for its advances. Days after the RSF’s tweet expressing willingness to stop the war, the militia’s latest massacre in Al-Jazeera state’s Al-Adnab village killed over 20.

The RSF also continued to commit war crimes through its systematic targeting of hospitals. The Darfur Union of the UK highlighted the RSF’s bombing of the Saudi Hospital in Al-Fashir for the 15th time since 10 May to question the insistence on negotiations. The militia also intensified its attacks on Al-Fashir in the past week, with at least 40 killed or injured during morning prayers.

In Omdurman, the RSF killed children in a designated UNICEF safe space. In addition, the militia bombed Omdurman Maternity Hospital just a day after it was partially re-opened and ready to serve expecting mothers, leading influential writer Reem Abbas to write: “we do not want to coexist with this terrorist militia. They despise all signs of life!” in a tweet shared over 30 times.

Thus, in a tweet shared over 70 times, popular Sudanese twitter user Abdelo wrote: “People should remember that the RSF did not show any goodwill towards these negotiations. They bombed and are still bombing Al-Fashir, Omdurman and other areas”.

Moreover, negotiations with the RSF raise the prospect of the militia buying time in order to continue its campaign of repeated violations. Such sentiments are best reflected in a tweet from an influential tweeter named Hilal Nouri who has over 14,000 followers. In a post shared over 185 times, he wrote: “for the benefit of Sudan’s past, present and future” with the hashtags #RSFOut and #GetOutRSF.

The tweet shared a picture of an RSF militant in an occupied civilian home and the date 14 August (when the Geneva negotiations are meant to commence) alongside a caption that read:

“We will never accept to see the killers of our children, the thieves of our homes and the violators of our dignity walking freely in our cities as if nothing happened”.

Issue 5: Legitimising the “terrorist” militia

Sudanese condemnation of negotiations with the RSF are based on the view that they legitimise a militia that Sudanese people label a terrorist entity.

As noted by UK-based think-tank Chatham House, most western governments say that they do not negotiate with terrorists. Yet the atrocities perpetrated by the RSF ensure that Sudanese people increasingly consider it a terror group, as reflected in petitions aiming to get the militia designated as such and a popular Arabic hashtag that translates to #Rapid_Support_Terrorist_Militia.

Such sentiments were echoed in the responses to a tweet from Perriello’s announcing the arrival of the RSF delegation to Switzerland. The most shared response came from Khartoum Aid Kitchen co-founder Turtle Yusuf. In a tweet shared almost 300 times, he accused the US of “actively participating in the [RSF] genocide being carried out against the people of Sudan”.

Numerous Sudanese twitter users also expressed opposition towards what was described as the legitimisation of a “terrorist” militia.

The RSF was also likened to ISIS, with activist Ghaida writing “Stop expecting us to negotiate with a terrorist organization!!! Legitimizing the RSF is the same as giving legitimacy to ISIS!!”. In another tweet, she wrote that: “It’s such a mockery that attempted foreign intervention to ‘end what’s happening in Sudan’ keeps giving legitimacy to the RSF and treats them as an actual political group and not a terrorist organization and expects us to negotiate with terrorists.

Similarly, Saroyah said “[the RSF] terrorists are worse than ISIS & America is trying to gaslight us into accepting their brutality” in a tweet shared over 100 times. In a direct response to Perriello shared almost 200 times, she asked: “Why is a genocidal militia being welcomed anywhere?”.

Sudan In The News’ Social Media Monitor sheds light on the dominant public opinion trends among the Sudanese people, as expressed on social media.

It will also provide English-speaking audiences with a reflection of Sudanese views, opinions and priorities as expressed in Arabic.

Why is it necessary?

While various entities claim to represent the will of the Sudanese people, research into Sudanese public opinion is limited.

The research that does exist is often not done transparently, leading to criticisms that it is not inclusive or accurately represents public opinion.

For example, the findings of a recent “grassroots” Sudanese public opinion research initiative was widely condemned by Sudanese people. It was considered to have failed to represent popular sentiments due to absence of major issues of importance to the Sudanese people as reflected in social media activity and global protests.

Failing to represent Sudanese public sentiments effectively leads to inadequate proposed solutions for Sudan’s complex problems, given that they fail to consider the views of the most important stakeholder and who they are meant to benefit: the Sudanese people.

This is why, in the interests of improving the way that Sudan’s problems are solved, we are launching the Sudan social media monitor.

Why social media?

Social media sheds light on public opinion trends as it provides a statistical reflection of the popularity of sentiments. For example, Sudanese public priorities can be ascertained by the popularity of hashtags.

Thus, social media is a prism for understanding the political divides in Sudan and debates around how the war should end.

In addition, experts on Sudan’s information ecosystem suggest that Sudanese public opinion offline is informed by what is disseminated online.

Building a better understanding of Sudanese public opinion can pave the path for consensus and the development of solutions that are in the public interest. Just as social media played a crucial role in sustaining the revolution, it is pivotal in attempts to end the war.

Nonetheless, we still plan improve the social media monitoring process, and suggestions would be welcomed.

Sudan In The News can be contacted on Twitter or on email at sudaninthenews@gmail.com.

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