Week 3: April 26-May 2 — Sudan In The News

Main points:

· Despite progress in negotiations, the opposition feel that the military is keen to hold onto power.

· The opposition is facing pressure from the street to ensure that it is accountable to the protesters it represents

· There are also questions surrounding the unity of the opposition coalition, and the competition that the Sudanese Professionals Assocaition faces from Sudan’s political parties.

· The opposition continues to face questions about women’s representation.

· Economic issues may lead to the protests being compromised.

Progress?

The Associated Press (April 27) reported that representatives of Sudan’s civilian opposition and the transitional military council said that their talks had been “fruitful.”

After the opposition appointed their negotiation team (Sudan Tribune, April 27), multiple sources (April 27-8) reported the military and opposition agreed “in principle” to forming a joint council to lead Sudan’s democratic transition.

BBC Africa editor Fergal Keane (April 26) argued that Sudanese protesters are "more fortunate" than their Algerian counterparts, citing various military concessions, and that TMC Abdulfattah Al Burhan has been "quick to react to opposition initiatives."

What are the continued differences?

The military council and the civilian opposition continue to differ on the continuation of the sit-in, and the composition of the hybrid civilian-military council to lead Sudan’s democratic transition.

The TMC held a press conference denying the Sudanese Professional Association accusations that the army was increasing its troop presence, in attempts to disperse the ongoing sit-in (Sudan Tribune, April 30). Associated Press (April 30) reported that TMC deputy chief Himedti warned Sudanese protesters against any further chaos, demanding that roads and railways are cleared because seven provinces are running low on food, water and fuel.

Reuters (April 25) reported that the TMC spokesman Shamseddine Kabbashi said that the TMC will retain sovereign authority, while civilians will hold the post of prime minister and head all government ministries.

Multiple sources (27-8 April) reported that Elasam said that the military want to limit civilian representation in the joint council. As a result, Sudanese Professionals Association spokesman Mohammed Naji Elasam accused the military council of “not [being] serious about handing over power to civilians.”(Reuters, April 30). In a mark of escalating tensions, Associated Press (May 1) reported that the organisers of Sudan’s protests threatened a general strike and civil disobedience.

There are fears of the military backsliding unless a transition to democracy is quickly cemented, wrote David Pilling (Financial Times, April 28). Pilling (Financial Times, April 30) cited the Rapid Support Forces troops led by TMC deputy leader Himedti, "dotted strategically around town in trucks bristling with weapons," to highlight suspicions that the military will not relinquish decision making power.

Nonetheless, Pilling stated that protesters have the leverage “unless the military council is prepared to shoot.”

The importance of the sit-in as the protesters most important negotiating tool was emphasized by Amira Osman (African Arguments, April 29), who stated that the Sudanese military headquarters is the Sudanese revolution’s central gathering point, “where the power of the masses couldn’t be ignored.”

What are the issues facing the opposition?

The acceptance of the Declaration of Freedom and Change, and the Sudanese Professionals Association, as the representatives of Sudan’s protesters, has come with wider scrutiny on their ability to represent Sudanese people, as well as the need to hold them accountable. The opposition, a broad coalition of parties (arguably) led by the Sudanese Professionals Association, may also be hampered by internal disagreements.

Sudan’s civilian opposition wants to lead Sudan for a four-year transitional period, to prepare the county for elections. However, Fergal Keane (BBC, April 26) highlights dangers to this approach: an unelected transitional civilian government still lacks a popular mandate, which could be problematic in the event of unpopular decisions or outbreaks of violent conflict.

The Guardian (April 26) reported that Sudanese protesters are closely watching the leaders of the new opposition movement, “anxious that their interests are being sold out.” The Guardian (May 1) also reported that protester Ali Elhassan said that he is participating in the sit-in to keep up pressure on the [opposition coalition] so that they understand that their negotiations with the Transitional Military Council are on behalf of the protesters.”

The opposition also face competition from Sudanese political parties, who are unlikely to give the Sudanese Professionals Association a free hand in molding Sudanese politics, according to Hassan Elhag Ali, a professor of political science at the University of Khartoum (Financial Times, April 30).

There are also question marks about the civilian opposition’s unity. The Economist (April 25) reported that the Declaration of Freedom and Change coalition parties are “jostling for position,” with Osman Mirghani warning that the military will maintain power unless the opposition coalition has a “clear plan.”

In addition, the matter of women’s representation in the civilian opposition made it into the news this week.

Will the matter of women’s representation be addressed?

In the Washington Post (April 26), Tahani Abbas, a lawyer for an organization called No to Women’s Oppression, called for women’s representation in Sudanese parliament to be raised to 50%. The same article quoted SPA representatives saying that they discussed raising women’s representation to 40%.

In Reuters (April 30), activist Hadia Hassaballa expressed dissatisfaction about the number of women represented in the negotiating committee, adding that it does not reflect the "reality of [women's] participation in the revolution and their numbers in the sit-in."

How will Islamists fit into a democratic Sudan?

The fall of Omar Al Bashir, the resignations of 3 TMC members judged to be Islamists, visibly anti-Islamist sentiments of among Sudanese protesters, and the support provided to the TMC by anti-Islamist Arab powers Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE – all seem to indicate that the door has closed for Islamists in Sudan.

But the Islamists will not go down without a fight. Associated Press (April 26) reported that famous Islamist preacher Abdel-Hay Youssef called for a pro-military rally, accusing the protest movement of seeking to “dictate their own will on the people,” and attempting to “divorce God’s Shariah from the government?.” The TMC pre-emptively responded to the planned rally by promising to not cancel Sharia (Sudan Tribune, April 29).

Multiple sources (April 28) reported that the TMC condemned an attack on the Islamist Popular Congress Party. The attack allegedly wounded 64 PCP members. Sudan Tribune (April 29) then reported that the PCP announced its refusal to recognize a government formed without them.

Nonetheless, Ahmed Soliman (Chatham House, April 26) warned that the Sudanese opposition should be careful to not alienate reformist Islamists, who also joined the protests against Al Bashir.

Can the economy handle the protests?

Economic considerations have led to a questioning of the sustainability of the protests. The Sudanese economic climate could lead to the protests being compromised. The military could shift its focus to cooperating with international actors that are critical to solving the economic problems: South Sudan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite the perceived aversion of the latter two to democracy in Sudan.

Michael Jones (African Arguments, April 25) raises the prospect of the TMC scapegoating the opposition for increasing Sudan’s economic crisis, should the TMC use Saudi-Emirati money to buy off their critics.

Reem Abbas (The Nation, April 26) stated that “Sudan…remains at a standstill. Most people do not go to work, businesses have limited office hours…and government institutions are still in limbo.”

Reuters (April 29) reported that the IMF is unwilling to overhaul Sudan’s debt due to US imposed sanctions. Matters are further complicated by the Sudanese reliance on aid for Saudi-Emirati aid, countries deemed hostile to democracy (Financial Times, April 30).

Sudanese protester Mohammed Al Noor was quoted in the Wall Street Journal (April 28) saying “we would rather go hungry than take [Saudi-Emirati] money...we want to be in charge of our own destiny.”

Suspicions of Saudi-Emirati economic support from Sudanese protesters were a prominent theme in seven articles this week:

· 25/4: Economist - Sudan's junta clings to power as protests grow

· 25/4: Financial Times - Gulf allies shore up Sudan's interim military rulers

· 26/4: New York Times - Amid U.S Silence, Gulf Nations Back the Military in Sudan's Revolution

· 26/4: Bloomberg - Sudan Becomes Pawn in Middle East Chess Match

· 27/4: Wall Street Journal - As Sudan Grapples With a Post-Bashir Future, Regional Powers Circle

· 30/4: Guardian - Fall of Bashir risks leaving Sudan prey to rival regional powers

· 30/4: Financial Times - Sudan: protesters plot the next stage of the revolution

Another pressing issue is the South Sudan peace deal. South Sudan’s stability is important to Sudan, as the secure flow of oil would alleviate the economic grievances which inspired the protests. Matthew LeRiche (African Arguments, April 30) argues that Sudan’s internal turmoil means that its leaders "may be unable to turn their attention to issues beyond the country’s borders," resulting in the possible collapse of South Sudan’s peace deal.