DARFUR REPORT 3: February-March 2021 - Musa Hilal released, SLM-AW clashes, views on UNAMID and solutions

Summary 

At the start of 2021, violence has continued to rise in Darfur, with more displaced (183,000) in three days of January alone than compared to the whole of 2020. In the West Darfur, the death toll of the January 2021 massacre in al-Geneina rose to 163, with the suspected perpetrators detonating a granite bomb in an attempt to escape detention. In South Darfur, recurring clashes between the Fallata and Masalit tribespeople killed 11, whereas in Jebel Marra, the holdout Sudan Liberation Movement faction of Abdelwahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) has claimed to kill government forces in ongoing clashes. The SLM-AW has also clashed with the government in North Darfur, which also witnessed the looting of a United Nations-African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID) site and clashes between the Arabised Fur and Tama tribes that killed 11 – both in Saraf Omra.

In political news relating to Darfur, former Janjaweed militia leader Musa Hilal, accused of “serious crimes” in the Darfur conflict between 2002-2005 was released from prison, in what analysts state reflects a “new reality” in Sudanese politics whereby militant leaders from marginalised peripheries such as Darfur as seizing an opportunity for national leadership.

The key issues highlighted in this report are: the growth of inter-communal conflicts which are exacerbated by the grievances held by Arab tribes accused of being affiliated to the ousted al-Bashir regime. In addition, traditional conflict resolution methods are considered ineffective. Furthermore, government security forces are considered lacking the capacity to protect Darfuri civilians, as evidenced in their inability to collect weapons. Moreover, the war economy in Darfur provides financial incentives for rebel combatants, with the SLM-AW particularly profiting from gold-mines in its territories by buying weapons and recruiting fighters.

Several analysts, policymakers and activists continue to criticise UNAMID’s “premature” withdrawal, with the overwhelming theme being concerns about the capacity or willingness of Sudanese authorities in securing the region. Alongside calls for the UN to reconsider the end of UNAMID’s mandate, solutions for Darfur proposed by Sudanese civil society include: accountability mechanisms, transitional justice and for state authorities in Khartoum to deal with bringing violent perpetrators to justice.

Events 

Musa Hilal free

Former Janjaweed militia leader Musa Hilal was released by Sudanese authorities following more than three years in detention (Radio Dabanga, 12 March). According to Human Rights Watch (15 March), Hilal “ gained notoriety playing a well-documented role leading the Janjaweed militia as serious crimes were committed in Sudan’s Darfur conflict between 2002 and 2005”. As noted by Reuters (15 March), human rights groups accuse Hilal of coordinating Arab militias blamed for atrocities in Darfur that left an estimated 300,000 dead and 2.5 million displaced, although Hilal claims that he mobilised his (Rizeigat) tribesmen to defend their lands after a government call to popular defence against non-Arab rebels.

Hilal attributed his release to meetings with Lt Gen Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo, Deputy Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the brother of Himedti, RSF commander and deputy chairman of the ruling sovereign council, which pardoned Hilal after his arrest in 2017 for refusing to respond to the government’s disarmament campaign (Radio Dabanga, 15 March), although analysts suggest that Himedti’s rivalry with Hilal played a key role in the arrest of the latter.

 Reuters (15 March) note that both Himedti and Hilal, who both hail from the Rizeigat tribe, “remain in competition for political and economic influence in Darfur”, with both holding gold mining interests and many Arab militias still active in Darfur remaining loyal to Hilal. Analyst Alex de Waal wrote that Himedti’s rivalry with “his former master [in the Janjaweed militias]” Hilal intensified after gold was discovered in North Darfur’s Jebel Amir in 2012 (BBC, 20 July 2019). Indeed, researcher Jerome Tubiana suggested that Himedti “eventually managed to have his rival [Hilal] arrested in 2017” after competition for gold concessions (Foreign Policy, 15 May 2019).

Crucially, the apparent reconciliation between Darfuri rivals Hilal and Himedti may have a major impact on Sudan’s history and political make-up. Yousif al-Sondy argues that Hilal’s release with Himedti’s assistance, and Hilal’s recent meetings with rebel leaders Minni Minnawi and Yasser Arman, reflects a “new reality” in which leaders from Sudan’s marginalised peripheries have their “greatest chance for leadership”. Al-Sondy argues that years of wars triggered by the center’s underdevelopment of the peripheries means that the former is no longer in a better condition than the latter, leaving Sudan in a delicate “balance” that can culminate in either: a) the beginning of a unified new Sudan or b) “the fragmentation of Sudan into many states” (al-Rakoba, 14 March).

West Darfur

Radio Dabanga (26 January) reported that the death toll of the massacre in al-Geneina, West Darfur rose to 163, with the local Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) committee attributing the incident to “a political struggle supported by elements of the former regime who have taken advantage of tribal divisions”. Meanwhile, Arab tribespeople in al-Geneina held a sit-in against the local government – demanding the removal of camps for internally displaced persons. However, al-Geneina’s Resistance Committees claimed: "the sit-in was started in the name of certain tribes and was led by a number of supporters of the ousted Omar al-Bashir regime" (Radio Dabanga, 29 January).

Imprisoned suspected perpetrators of the Kerending displacement camp massacre then allegedly attempted to escape prison through the explosion of a bomb. Kamal al-Zein of the High Committee for the Management of the West Darfur Crisis, who made the aforementioned claims, also accused Public Prosecutor of complicity for not lifting the immunities of those accused of participating in the massacre, “most of whom are Rapid Support Forces personnel” (Radio Dabanga, 5 March).

South Darfur

In Gireida, South Darfur, 11 killed and 26 wounded in recurring tribal clashes between the Fallata and Masalit tribes stemming from cows being stolen (Radio Dabanga, 4 March). In Jebel Marra, South Darfur, 3,000 were forced to flee after gunmen attacked villages on consecutive days – leading to 11 being killed, dozens wounded and others missing (Radio Dabanga, 27 January). 

In eastern Jebel Marra, the holdout rebel Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) – which maintains its stance of refusing to enter peace talks - accused a "government militia" of launching a three attacks in ten days on their positions. Following an alleged attack on 25 January,  SLM-AW military spokesman Walid Mohamed Abaker “Tongo” claimed that his group killed 17 gunmen and wounded a further 23 the following week (Sudan Tribune, 1 February). Four days later, Tongo claimed that the SLM-AW killed 24 gunmen, captured a soldier and seized weapons  (Sudan Tribune, 5 February).

North Darfur

The SLM-AW have also been active in North Darfur, where the Tongo claimed that they repelled an attack in Touha Shalal, Tawila locality (Radio Dabanga, 1 February). In Saraf Omra in North Darfur, a site of the United Nations-African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was ransacked and ‘levelled’ by looters on February 17, just weeks after it was handed over to the Sudanese government (Radio Dabanga, 24 February). Also in Saraf Omra, at least 10 were killed 32 were injured in tribal clashes, with the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)* saying that 16 families and a total of 74 individuals had been displaced after their homes were burned during the clashes (Radio Dabanga, 9 March).

 Reports provide conflicting accounts of the origin of the dispute between the Tama tribe and the Arabised Fur tribe. Radio Dabanga (4 March) sources said clashes erupted following preparations for the reception of Sultan Mohamed al-Tama, with several groups, including a Fur group, denouncing the organisation of an event celebrating his reception. However, AP (3 March) report that the dispute originated over a piece of land. Nonetheless, the security committee in charge of dealing with the escalated security situation in Saraf Omra arrested 10 leaders from Fur and Tama tribes (Radio Dabanga, 9 March).

7 key issues

1. The growth of inter-communal conflicts

AP (February 10) attribute the fighting in South and West Darfur which killed around 470 to “a familiar scenario: a dispute between two people or a minor crime turning into all-out ethnic clashes.” Indeed, the same article reference a UN experts report covering March to December 2019 which said tribal clashes and attacks on civilians increased sharply “in both frequency and scale,” with acts of sexual and gender-based violence committed daily and going unaddressed.

Furthermore, Amnesty International (1 March) note that the UN “recorded an alarming increase in inter-communal clashes in Darfur, with 28 incidents between July and December 2020, an 87% increase compared to 2019”. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 18 February) the “unaddressed” conflict triggers: ethnic disputes between herders and farmers over scarce resources overlap with disasters such as flooding and political instability.

IDMC further note that in January, more people were forced to flee their homes in three days between 15-18 January, than in the whole of 2020, with violence between armed militias from the Massalit and Arab communities culminating in around 183,000 new displacements, alongside displacements in West Darfur’s al-Geneina, South Darfur’s Gereida and Jebel Marra and North Darfur’s Tawila.

2. Arab grievances

As the revolution attempts to address inequality between non-Arabs and Arabs in Darfur, Arab communities are revealing grievances over land, power and resources. In West Darfur, Arab tribespeople held a sit-in demanding the dismissal of the local governor, who belongs to the Masalit, a non-Arab sedentary tribe, alongside his employees. As previously mentioned, the local resistance committee distanced themselves from a protest it said was organised by those affiliated with the former ruling regime of Omar al-Bashir. In addition, the Arab tribespeople demanded the removal of camps of internally displaced persons (Radio Dabanga, 29 January), which emphasises ethnic competition over land in Darfur.

As noted by Sudan Tribune (2 March), land ownership is a key demand of Darfur war victims, but there are fears that the expulsion of [Arab] settlers in areas deserted by the displaced and refugees will lead to the outbreak of new conflicts in Darfur. The matter is further complicated by the usage of traditional conflict resolution methods for land disputes.

3. The use of traditional conflict resolution methods

Sudan Revolutionary Front rebel leader and member of the ruling sovereign council Hadi Idris, said that the soon-to-be established Land and Hawakeer Commission will use traditional conflict resolution methods and customs to ensure the return of the displaced to their areas and to resolve the conditions of settlers (Sudan Tribune, 2 March). However, as reported by Radio Dabanga (2 March), South Darfur governor has reiterated his rejection of any inter-ethnic conflict resolutions through traditional reconciliation conferences, with the article noting that reconciliation conferences between Fallata herders and Masalit farmers failed to bring peace to Darfur. With conflict resolution continuing to pose an obstacle to security in Darfur, concerns remain that Sudanese authorities are unable to contain the violence.

4. Limited government capacity

Mohammed Osman, a researcher at HRW, noted that witnesses to the deadly fighting in South and West Darfur said that the response of the government forces was “too little, too late” (AP, 10 February). In the case of the clashes in Gireda, South Darfur, which killed at least 11, locals reportedly alleged that two attacks in consecutive days “took place before the eyes of the joint forces” (Radio Dabanga, 3 March). In North and South Darfur, protests have erupted over the alleged inaction of security forces, with demonstrators demanding the resignation of local governors, Mohammed Arabi and Mousa Mahdi respectively (Radio Dabanga, 11 March). In Arabi’s case, the local Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) committee claim that he did not intervene despite prior warnings about the “tense situation”. Furthermore, the government is accused of failing to disarm militias accused of the violence in Darfur. 

5. The inability to collect weapons

A key obstacle to security in Darfur has been the failed disarmament process. Radio Dabanga (10 February) report that the Darfur Bar Association (DBA) legal group alleges that the government fails to collect weapons in Darfur despite multiple attempts. Noting the proliferation of militiamen in several major towns and cities, especially in Nyala, Zalingei, and Kabkabiya, al-Hadi Idris cited the inability of “leaders of the security services [in distinguishing] between the signed and non-signatory movements [of the peace agreement]” as a contributing factor. He also warned of “the massive proliferation of armed intruders who travel regularly and carry out assassinations and violations”, and referred to “the widespread sale of military ranks from the rank of major general and below”, describing them as “fraudsters” (Radio Dabanga, 10 March). Indeed, the proliferation of weapons and militias in Darfur contribute to a war economy that provides financial incentives for militias and rebel combatants.

6. The war economy

Nafisa Hajar, head of human rights at DBA, said that children are being forcibly recruited by armed groups (Radio Dabanga, 10 February). As reported by the UN Security Council Sudan Sanctions Committee, Sudanese rebel groups engaged in extensive recruitment campaigns and recruited child soldiers to maximise their leverage in the implementation of security arrangements (Sudan Tribune, 26 February). It is also claimed that the rebel groups have international ties, with Sudan Tribune adding that they “consolidated their relations with Libyan parties and their backers particularly: the UAE, who convinced them to leave some troops in Libya.”

With rebel groups competing over resources and territory, it also claimed that inter-fighting between different rebel groups reportedly displacing over 20,000 civilians, with the rebels reportedly committing human rights violations. Consequently, the UN has threatened to sanction all Darfur armed groups, whether signatory or non-signatory to the Juba peace agreement. One of the rebel groups that is particularly accused of funding militancy in Darfur is the SLM-AW, who remain the only rebel group to refuse to enter peace talks.

7. The SLM-AW in Jebel Marra

The SLM-AW has reportedly increased its capability by recruiting new fighters and purchasing weapons, thanks to its territory in Jebel Marra, a site rich with gold mines (Sudan Tribune, 26 February). As the only rebel group that refuses to hold peace talks, the SLM-AW both rejected the Juba Peace Agreement and accused the armed groups who signed it of “seeking government jobs” (Sudan Tribune, 1 February).

Given that the SLM-AW’s territory and access to gold mines provides it with no financial incentive to end the rebellion, it has strong bargaining power with regards to conflict and it can defer being co-opted by the government. Indeed, SLM-AW spokesperson Tongo stressed that “the repeated attacks” may push the SLM-AW to reconsider its decision to stop “hostilities” from its side, which it claims it has been abiding by “despite repeated acts of aggression against SLM-AW in areas it controls” (Radio Dabanga, 1 February).  

4. Views on UNAMID’s “premature” withdrawal

AP’s (10 February) feature piece states that the “latest burst of violence” after the joint U.N.-African Union peacekeeping force that had been in Darfur (UNAMID) for a decade ended its mandate, and was “replaced with a much smaller, political mission [UNITAMS]”. Indeed, the end of UNAMID’s mandate continues to be criticised in the context of rising violence in Darfur, with several activists, analysts and analysts expressing concerns over UNAMID’s “premature withdrawal”.

John Prendergast (The Sentry)

John Prendergast, co-founder of The Sentry, an organisation that tracks human rights violations in Africa, was quoted by AP (February 10) to say: “anyone could have predicted that as soon as the UN troops departed, some of these militias would begin attacking”. 

US Senator Bob Menendez

US Senator Bob Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (25 February), calls for US President Joe Biden to appeal to the UN Security Council to reconsider UNAMID’s withdrawal. The rising violence in Darfur suggests that the Sudanese government’s security plans "have yet to be adequately fleshed out, let alone implemented", argues Menendez. “Most worryingly”, Menendez adds, those likely to be charged with protecting civilians in Darfur, including components of the Sudanese military and the RSF “are the same actors that for years worked to implement Omar al-Bashir’s campaign of terror and genocide.”Menendez further criticised the government’s refusal to extend UNAMID’s mandate to work with the “political” UNITAMS, stating that “supporting the transition and protecting vulnerable civilians are not mutually exclusive”.

 Ahmed Elzobier (Amnesty International)

Echoing Menendez’s calls for the UN Security Council to “re-evaluate the security situation in Darfur”, Ahmed Elzobier, Amnesty International (1 March) researcher for East Africa, also calls for the mandate and resource of UNITAMS to “protect civilians in Darfur until Sudanese military and civilian leaders prove they are willing and able to protect them.” Elzobier argues that “premature withdrawal of UNAMID” alongside the “the failure of Sudan’s government to protect civilians [and] the weakness or in some cases, lack of, justice mechanisms” have emboldened some tribal militia fighters in Darfur to indulge in gruesome acts of violence”. Elzobier concludes UNAMID’s “premature withdrawal has created a security vacuum in Darfur and exposed civilians to violence”.

Niemat Ahmadi (Darfur Women Action Group)

Similar criticisms of the Sudanese government’s capacity to secure Darfur came from Niemat Ahmadi of the Darfur Women Action Group, who said: “it’s too early to abandon the people of Darfur without sustainable solutions on the ground. [Al-Geneina massacre] is the result of the state's failure and the lack of political will at the central level to protect the civilians, disarm militias or hold criminals accountable” (Radio Dabanga, 25 January).

Solutions

Accountability mechanisms

Alongside calls for Sudanese authorities to “vigorously investigate” Musa Hilal, Human Rights Watch (15 March) assistant researcher Mohammed Osman suggests that the government “should also take concrete steps towards establishing and operationalizing accountability mechanisms laid out in the Darfur peace agreement that include cooperation with the International Criminal Court and setting up a special court for Darfur”.

Transitional justice

Protesters in Gireida, South Darfur, demand that state authorities prosecute criminals, form an international investigation committee into the recent violence, compensate those affected by recent arson attacks, recover looted property, enforce the rule of law, and provide shelter material for the newly displaced. The protesters stressed that displaced people must be enabled to return to their villages and engage in agricultural, pastoral and commercial activities (Radio Dabanga, 10 March).

State authorities in Khartoum to deal with cases

Kamal al-Zein of the High Committee for the Management of the West Darfur Crisis accused the Public Prosecutor of complicity for the massacre in al-Geneina and the subsequent prison escape attempt of arrested suspects, alleging that the prosecutor did not lift the immunities of those accused of participating in the massacre, “most of whom are RSF personnel.” Thus, al-Zein demanded that cases are transferred to Khartoum, warning that the absence of accountability would lead to repeated massacres. He also spoke of “deteriorating humanitarian conditions in 25,000 shelters for the displaced,” calling for food and medical aid supplies and the immediate initiation of transitional justice in West Darfur (Radio Dabanga, 5 March).

DARFUR REPORT 2: UNAMID withdraws, key issues and proposed solutions

Summary

 The joint UN-African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID) ended its mandate on 31 December 2020, despite protests from Darfur’s internally displaced persons (IDPs). Less than three weeks after UNAMID’s withdrawal, South and West Darfur were rocked by deadly tribal clashes that killed at least 200. In West Darfur’s al-Geneina, at least 159 were killed and over 90,000 were forced to flee their homes in a massacre triggered by a Masalit tribesman killing an Arab herder. In al-Gereida locality of South Darfur, clashes between the Arab-identifying Rizeigat tribe and the Fallata, who trace their origins to west Africa, killed over 40. This report identifies seven key issues contributing to insecurity in Darfur.

1.     Darfur’s pre-existing legacy of conflict.

2.     Isolated incidents between two people rapidly mushroom into violent episodes that kill swathes.

3.     To compound matters, UNAMID’s withdrawal is viewed as premature given the increasing levels of intercommunal conflict in Darfur.

4.      In addition, UNAMID provided reassurance to Darfur’s IDPs, despite being viewed as “imperfect”.

5.     The Sudanese government is now tasked with peacekeeping responsibilities despite question marks over security forces capacity to maintain security.

6.     Darfuri mistrust towards government forces lingers from the Darfur War.

7.     The distrust is further intensified given that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are tasked with protecting Darfur despite their connection to Janjaweed militias that “terrorised” the region.

The proposed solutions for security in Darfur include: disarming militias, transitional justice, security and legal reforms, a new civilian protection mandate and a reversal of UNAMID’s withdrawal.

Events

A timeline of key events - please read the full briefing for more detail on specific events.

14 December - A sit-in in Kalma camp near Nyala, South Darfur, entered its second week, where protesters demanded that UNAMID is not withdrawn at the end of 2020. Similar protested occurred in IDP camps in Kabkabiya in North Darfur (Radio Dabanga, 14 December).

26 December - Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Darfur have called for more sit-ins against the withdrawal of UNAMID before the achievement of comprehensive peace, security, disarmed militias, expelled settlers from IDP lands and the hand-over of war criminals to the International Criminal Court (Multiple sources, 26 December).

28 December - At least 15 tribesmen were killed and 34 were wounded during tribal clashes between Masalit farmers and Fallata herders in al-Gireda, South Darfur. The dispute began at a water well, before escalating into a firefight between the tribes in which two Fallata were shot dead. In retaliation, Fallata militants attacked Masalit neighbourhoods (Multiple sources, 28 December).

30 December – UNAMID (30 December) announced the end of its mandate, stating the drawdown will be undertaken in a phased manner across six months. The Sudanese government will “fully assume its primary role” in supporting the peace process, protecting civilians, including facilitation of delivery of humanitarian assistance and supporting the mediation of intercommunal conflicts.

7 January - Following the end of UNAMID’s mandate, its replacement mission, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), will be headed by German diplomat Volker Perthes, who will also be the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General to Sudan (Multiple sources, 7 January).  

18 January – Over 40 people were killed in clashes between the Fallata and Rizeigat tribes in Al-Tawil area of Gereida locality South Darfur. The Fallata, who trace their origins to the Fulani people of west Africa, and the Rizeigat, an Arab-identifying tribe, clash often over stolen livestock (Multiple sources, 18 January).

20 January - The death toll of the massacre in al-Geneina, West Darfur rose to 159, with over 90,000 fleeing their homes. The attacks were triggered by the killing of an Arab herdsman by a Masalit tribesman. Although the perpetrator was arrested, Arab militias took revenge (Radio Dabanga, 20 January). 

20 January - Armed men opened fire trying to storm the residence of West Darfur Gov. Mohammed Abdalla al-Douma’s residence in the provincial capital of Geneina (AP, 20 January).

Seven key issues

1.     Legacy of conflict

Darfur’s pre-existing legacy of war is further complicated by the rise in intercommunal violence which is exacerbated by the excess of weapons in the region and rivalries.  Ahead of UNAMID ending its mandate on December 31, its Special Representative Jeremiah Mamabolo noted “major” challenges for security in Darfur including rising numbers of displaced people whenever conflict erupts, factional fighting between rebel groups, intercommunal conflicts and that the Sudan Liberation Movement of Abdelwahid al-Nur continuing to fight. While the major fighting in Darfur has stopped, sporadic intercommunal clashes in the region have increased in 2020, Mamabolo added (Radio Dabanga, 24 December). Indeed, Mohammed Osman, a Sudan researcher at Human Rights Watch (HRW), said HRW has documented an increase in intercommunal violence, exacerbated by the involvement of government forces (AP, 9 December).

Providing context on intercommunal conflict in Darfur, AFP (18 January) state that “decades of conflict have left the vast western region awash with weapons and divided by bitter rivalries,” despite the recent peace agreement. Key issues include land ownership and access to water, AFP add.  

Following clashes that killed at least 159 in al-Geneina, West Darfur - Radio Dabanga (20 January) also provide context on the tensions between Rizeigat and Fallata herders, which “have a long history of fighting in South Darfur.”  The Fallata are cattle herders from non-Arab ethnic origins. They race their roots to the Fulani of west Africa (AFP, 18 January). On the other hand, the Rizeigat are nomadic Arab herders who mainly herd cattle in South Darfur. When the Darfur War began in 2003, “many young Rizeigat herders were recruited to join the 'Janjaweed militia’”(Radio Dabanga, 20 January). As noted by Reuters (13 January) the RSF that are tasked with protecting Darfur “incorporated members of the Janjaweed militias that terrorised Darfuris.

2.     Rapid mushrooming

The rapid mushrooming of the latest conflicts in South and West Darfur, from a market fistfight into violent interethnic episodes that killed over 200, “illustrates the persistent insecurity in Darfur as well as the folly of the Sudanese government’s premise that security in the region had improved sufficiently” for the peacekeepers to leave, said Jonas Horner of the International Crisis Group (New York Times, 20 January).

For example, the massacre in al-Geneina was reportedly triggered by the killing of an Arab herdsman by a member of the Masalit tribe. Although the perpetrator was arrested, the relatives of the victim sought revenge – culminating in large groups of armed men attacking al-Geneina and the two Kerending camps for the internally displaced “from all directions. According to the Darfur Bar Association (DBA), they were supported by groups of gunmen from North and Central Darfur and the border area with Chad (Radio Dabanga, 20 January). With regards to the clashes in South Darfur between the Fallata and Rizeigat, despite their aforementioned history of conflict, the most recent fatal episode was reportedly sparked by the killing of a shepherd (AP, 18 January).

3.     UNAMID’s premature withdrawal

The withdrawal of UNAMID is considered concerning within the context of Darfur’s rising insecurity. Mohammed Osman, a Sudan researcher at Human Rights Watch, said the tribal violence in Darfur is an example of why many displaced people protested the end of UNAMID’s mandate (AP, 18 January). Indeed, Sheikh Ishag Abdallah, head of Kalma camp, told Radio Dabanga (26 December) that the withdrawal of UNAMID “is unacceptable in light of the current security situation”. He warned for further deterioration of the situation after the withdrawal of the UNAMID peacekeepers, and called for “alternative international protection if the mission will have to withdraw”. Similarly, Jan Egeland, secretary general of the Norwegian Refugee Council, warned that the security situation "could worsen" with peacekeepers "on their way out" (AFP, 18 January). According to Sudanese activist Nazek Awad, the risk of harm to Darfur is exacerbated by the absence of provisions for an independent party to monitor the situation on the ground after the exit of UNAMID. “The insecurity for displaced people will continue and increase,” she said (AP, 9 December).

The risks of UNAMID’s premature withdrawal have also been highlighted by various diplomats. Germany’s UN ambassador, Christoph Heusgen, cited the floods, poor harvest, COVID-19, reports of internal fights over control of gold mines, attacks against government forces, and low representation of women in transitional bodies to emphasise the risks of UNAMID’s withdrawal. Jose Singer, the Dominican Republic’s UN ambassador, said he was reminded of what happened in neighbouring Haiti after “the premature withdrawal” of UN peacekeepers, a reference to the ongoing insecurity in the country. Estonia’s UN ambassador, Sven Jurgenson, said “rushing the withdrawal risks losing the significant gains made by UNAMID over the years” (AP, 9 December). In addition, the symbolic presence of UNAMID also provided assurance to Darfuris.  

4.     UNAMID reassurance

Despite criticism of UNAMID’s failure to protect civilians, Darfuris have said its presence acts as a deterrent to militant attacks. Tanja Müller, a Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Manchester’s Global Development Institute (5 January), argues that the presence of UNAMID “did make a difference – even if not on the scale and scope hoped for or expected by those it aimed to protect.” Müller quotes a Darfuri refugee who said that while UNAMID “never went after the perpetrators” but “the UNAMID work of reporting incidents and coming to visit places where incidents have taken place made perpetrators feel that they have to be careful as their actions might be reported and they might be held responsible”.

Furthermore, Müller cites a 2016 academic report on UNAMID entitled ‘No One on the Earth Cares if We Survive, Except God and Sometimes UNAMID’ as a reflection of Darfuri beliefs that “UNAMID served as the only protection for the displaced, even if often imperfect”.

In a press release announcing their departure, UNAMID (30 December) said that the Sudanese government will “fully assume its primary role” in supporting the peace process, protecting civilians, including facilitation of delivery of humanitarian assistance and supporting the mediation of intercommunal conflicts. However, UNAMID’s withdrawal is compounded by the limited capacity of the Sudanese government in containing the violence in Darfur. 

5.     Government incapacity

Despite a belief that Sudan’s post-revolution government has a higher appetite for peace in Darfur, analysts have pointed to the failure to protect civilians during the recent attacks across Darfur that killed over 200. Furthermore, locals that witnessed the attacks have also pointed to the absence of government security forces.

According UNAMID’s former Special Representative Jeremiah Mamabolo, Sudan is now “in the right hands” for peacekeeping, in contrast to al-Bashir’s government which “would not allow UNAMID to dispense relief because it saw certain parts of Sudan as enemy territory” (Radio Dabanga, 24 December). Indeed, the Sudanese government has stressed its responsibility to protect and maintains security in Darfur following recent deadly intercommunal violent incidents in South and West Darfur that killed at least 200 (Sudan Tribune, 20 January).

However, following the clashes in al-Tawil Village in South Darfur between the Fallata and Rizeigat tribes that killed 56, Fallata spokesperson Ibrahim Mousa criticised the failure of government forces to intervene, despite the local army garrison being only five kilometres away from where the attack took place (Radio Dabanga, 20 January). Similarly, following the massacre in al-Geneina conducted by an Arab tribe, Masalit tribesman Saad Abdelrahman , expressed his surprise about the “complete absence of the army during the attacks”  (Radio Dabanga, 19 January).

Thus, the violent incidents in South and West Darfur that killed over 200 led Jonas Horner, a Sudan analyst with the International Crisis Group, to conclude that: “the government comprehensively failed its first real test of maintaining security” (New York Times, 20 January).

Indeed, Sudan Tribune (17 January) note that while the government and armed groups agreed to deploy a 16,000 joint force in Darfur after the withdrawal of the UNAMID, it is yet to be on the ground. Columnist Shamael al-Nur said the continued civilian casualties in the region reflects the weak impact of the Juba peace agreement on the ground and the government’s failure to disarm the population. "Nothing makes the gunmen continue to shed blood more than their certitude that the law does not and will not affect them," she wrote.  Moreover, not only are there doubts about the Sudanese government’s capacity to protect Darfuris, there is also mistrust among the population, particularly given the history of state-sponsored attacks on Darfur under the regime of Omar al-Bashir.  

6.     Mistrust

UNAMID’s Special Represenative Jeremiah Mamabolo cautioned that mistrust still runs deep and urged the transitional government in Khartoum to embark on the “huge task” of gaining the trust of the locals. Mamabolo said Darfuris “have been betrayed ... A lot of crimes and injustice have been committed against them, so they feel insecure” (AP, 9 December).

While “Darfuris say UNAMID offered a weak but necessary deterrent against militias originally armed by former president Omar al-Bashir to fight rebels,” community leader Sheikh Mousa Bahar Adam said IDPs are being “left with criminals” (Reuters, 13 January). Similarly, a leader of protests against UNAMID withdrawal in Kalma, South Darfur said  “protection of the displaced cannot be entrusted to those who killed them” (Radio Dabanga,14 December). Such sentiments of distrust are partly caused by the protection of Darfur being entrusted to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.

7.     RSF

With Sudan deploying a 20,000 peacekeeping force to Darfur, Reuters (13 January) note that IDPs in South Darfur “remain deeply distrustful” of government forces, particularly the RSF, “which incorporated members of the Janjaweed militias that terrorised Darfuris”. As recently as January 2021, RSF troops have reportedly conducted violence on Darfur. Al-Shafee’ Abdallah, coordinator of the camps for the displaced in Central Darfur, told Radio Dabanga (2 January) that RSF members burnt a pharmacy, looted 10 shops, and attacked workers at Zalingei Hospital in Central Darfur, with regular armed forces failing to intervene or stop the perpetrators (Radio Dabanga, 2 January). Similarly, Fallata spokesperson Ibrahim Mousa told Radio Dabanga (20 January) that he was surprised by the heavy weapons used during the militant attacks by Arab tribesmen in South Darfur, and alleged that RSF troops participated.

Furthermore, RSF seniority are also accused of being negligible in containing the violence. According to Adil Ali Yacoub, a resident of Gereda in South Darfur, intercommunal conflict between Fallata pastoralists and Masalit farmers were triggered by the RSF’s local head ignoring a directive to keep Fallata away from the area until a reconciliation conference took place (Ayin Network, 9 January).

Solutions

Disarmament

The Peace Support Committees Coordination organised a protest vigil in Khartoum against the ongoing violence in Darfur, submitting a memorandum which called for the

 “the acceleration of the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, especially the security arrangements protocol, including the establishment of a disarmament mechanism” (Radio Dabanga, 28 December)

Transitional justice

A leader of a sit-in protest against UNAMID’s withdrawal demanded the restoration of lands traditionally used by a particular clan or tribal group, alongside individual and collective compensation for the displaced. The primary demands at the time of protest were that UNAMID remains until peace and security are secured, criminals are tried, settlers on the lands of the displaced are expelled, and militias are disarmed (Radio Dabanga, 14 December).

A new civilian protection mandate

The Darfur Women’s Action Group (DWAG, 8 January) call for the creation and enforcement of a civilian protection mandate that will last throughout the entirety of Sudan’s transitional period, alongside strong international presence with mechanisms for protection of human rights and verifiable measures to demonstrate progress across Sudan.

Security sector and legal reforms

Strategic Initiative for Women In The Horn of Africa (SIHA, 7 January) call for the government to launch a security sector reform taskforce that redefines the concepts of civilian protection and peacekeeping, including training of law enforcement personnel at all levels to ensure that rule of law is reflected on the ground. SIHA also suggest fundamental reforms of Sudan’s legal framework, including investment in rule of law institutions, alongside rewriting the “vague and conflicting” laws concerning sexual violence/abuse, and the reform of laws that provide impunity to military and paramilitary forces. 

Reversing UNAMID’s decision

Columnist Osman al-Sayed calls for the UN and African Union to review the decision to withdraw UNAMID until weapons are collected from fugitives including militias and civilians and the return of the displaced and refugees to their villages until their causes of fear have disappeared (Al-Rakoba, 3 January).

Darfur Report: events, issues, demands and solutions

The Darfur Report: What has been happening in Darfur?

 Summary

Split into five parts, the Darfur report will cover the following:

 1.     Background information: Rising violence in Darfur is attributed to the combination of the gradual withdrawal of the UN-African Union (AU) hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID), alongside conflict over farming land between indigenous Darfuris return to lands they were forced to flee, and occupying militias.

2.     Major events: The Darfur Report then re-caps the major security incidents in Darfur between June-August 2020.

3.     Issues: Seven key security issues causing the spike in violence.

4.     Darfuri demands: The compiled demands of Darfuri protesters in eight locations across the region.

5.     Solutions: 12 proposed solutions aimed at the Sudanese government, international community and Sudanese civil society. 

1.     Background

 Violence has spiked in conflict-ridden Darfur, amid new conflict over land rights, between people returning to Darfur in time for the July-November planting season, and those who took over lands after previous inhabitants were forced to flee after the Darfur War started in 2003 (BBC, 27 July). The spike in violence coincides with the reduced effectiveness of the UN-African Union (AU) hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID), with the Sudanese government judged to lack the capacity to protect civilians in Darfur (Institute for Security Studies, 22 July).

 Initially, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok requested that UNAMID’s planned withdrawal be aligned with Sudan’s peace process, amid concerns expressed by Sudan’s armed groups during their consultations with the government (Sudan Tribune, 19 October 2019).

However, anonymous UN sources told the Guardian (May 28) that UN chief advisor Nicholas Haysom made extensive calls to Hamdok “using personal diplomacy” to lobby Hamdok to accept UNITAMS, with Hamdok losing “a lot of credibility…because he hasn’t stood up for Darfurians and instead let Hemedti and the NCP [National Congress party] dictate Sudan’s response.” The UN denied the allegations.

In a controversial move, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to move toward ending UNAMID, replacing it with a civilian mission focusing on Sudan’s democratic transition - the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) (AP, June 4).  The Guardian (May 28) reported that activists urged the UN and AU to shelve their plans to replace UNAMID with UNITAMS.  Human Rights Watch’s Jehanne Henry added: “any UN mission should have the capacity to protect [at-risk] civilians… Darfur…has a long legacy of state-sponsored violence [leaving] civilians extremely distrustful of state forces”. Indeed, Al-Sadiq Ali Hassan, the secretary general of the Darfur Bar Association (DBA), said: “the political mission won’t solve problems… there will be a huge gap for security chaos and I expect the situation will worsen”.  The spate of violent incidents and proliferation of sit-ins against the declining security situation in Darfur between June-August 2020 prove Hassan’s projections correct.

For their part, while UNAMID (July 28) expressed concern with the increased violence on Darfuri peaceful protesters, it re-emphasised that the primary responsibility of protecting civilians lies with the Sudanese government, “particularly in areas where UNAMID has withdrawn in the context of its drawdown.”

@SudanInTheNews infographic covering latest developments in Darfur

2.     Major incidents

 15 June - UNAMID arrives in Nyala

After two were killed in Kalma camp for the displaced near Nyala, capital of South Darfur, UNAMID sent reinforcements aiming to prevent an escalation (Radio Dabanga, June 15).

17 June - Protests in Kabkabiya

Protesters in Kabkabiya in North Darfur organised a march against the continued violence, assassinations, rapes, and beatings in the camps for the displaced (Radio Dabanga, June 17).

Niertiti sit-in

A sit-in began in Nierteti in Central Darfur against the rampant insecurity in the town and its surrounding villages (Radio Dabanga, June 29). Sit-ins also sprang up in el-Geneina in West Darfur and Kabkabiya (Radio Dabanga, July 2).

A government delegation visits Niertiti, reaches agreement with protesters

A Sudanese government delegation visited the Niertiti sit-in (Radio Dabanga, July 6). An agreement was reached to replace the acting military state governors by civilian governors within two weeks, and to dismiss the local director and police chief, and commanders of the General Intelligence Service (GIS) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the area. The government promised that a joint army, RSF and police force will be formed, to evacuate settlers from the agricultural lands in south-western Jebel Marra, disarm gunmen, collect motorcycles, secure the agricultural season and arrest those who have complaints filed against them.

The government also agreed to arrange traditional mining, improve telecommunication, water and electricity services, and the RSF donated a generator to Niertiti (Radio Dabanga, July 7).

 Fata Borno Massacre kills at least 13

Sit-in protesters at Fata Borno in North Darfur’s Kutum successfully got all motorcycles banned (Radio Dabanga, July 10). However, within three days, “government-sanctioned armed groups” riding motorcycles fatally dispersed the Fata Borno sit-in, killing at least 13 and wounding 11 (Multiple sources, 13 July).

Niertiti sit-in lifted, new protests erupt

The Niertiti sit-in was lifted after the government delivered on its promises, but sit-ins in Kutum and Kabkabiya in North Darfur, Ed Daein, Bahr El Arab and Yassin in East Darfur, and Misterei in West Darfur continued (Radio Dabanga, 16 July). A new protest also erupted in Kass, South Darfur (Radio Dabanga, 17 July).

 The Sudanese government finally replaced military governors with civilian governors across Sudan, but protests were held in Ed Daein, because the appointment was not nominated by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) (Radio Dabanga, 24 July).

 Gereida Massacre kills at least 15

At least 15 people were killed, 25 others wounded, and dozens went missing following an armed attack on Abdos village in South Darfur’s Gereida. The RSF were blamed, and reportedly “fled” when the attack began despite being tasked with protecting the villagers (Multiple Sources, 25 July).

 Masterei Massacre kills at least 60

At least 60 were killed, and 60 were wounded, in an attack by armed men in Misterei in West Darfur. RSF members were reportedly among the attackers. The West Darfur Doctors’ Committee said that they hold the state’s Security Committee responsible for the massacre, which lasted nine hours in total. Witnesses of the attack criticised West Darfur authorities for moving slowly, particularly as the Masterei sit-in was attacked ten days earlier (Radio Dabanga, 27 July). The Sudanese government then announced that troops are being deployed to Darfur (BBC, 27 July).

 Gereida sit-in, RSF provides aid

After the Gereida sit-in entered its fourth day following the July 25 massacre, RSF deputy commander Abdelrahim Hamdan visited the sit-in and announced compensation for the families of the dead, a generator for Gereida, two new hospital wards and water wells each and seeds for farmers (Radio Dabanga, 27 July)

Boronga attacks displace 3,000

3,000 were displaced by “bloody attacks” on villages near Kass in South Darfur (Radio Dabanga, August 6).

3.     Seven key security issues

@SudanInTheNews infographic identifying key security issues in Darfur

 1)    Agricultural season conflict

Meressa K Dessu, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (22 July) notes that the underlying causes of the Darfur conflict remain unresolved, with displaced people attacked by Arab militias when attempting to return to their land.

 According to the BBC (27 July), the spike in violence in Darfur follows a government deal in which it was agreed that those forced to flee their localities in Darfur since the war started in 2003 would be allowed to return in in time for the July-November planting season, triggering conflict over land rights between those who took over the lands, and the returning inhabitants who were forced to flee.

 Indeed, one of the reasons that Darfuri protesters have called for region wide bans on motorcycles is due to farmers being unable to cultivate their farms “for years,” as gunmen on motorcycles claim ownership of farms and impose fees on the farmers to allow them to cultivate these lands (Radio Dabanga, 10 July).

 Disputes over land are reinforced by heightened identity differences. Researcher Jerome Tubiana said that, for Darfuris, the enemy is no longer Omar al-Bashir, but the rather “the centre of Sudan,” in reference to perceived neglect of ‘non-Arab’ Darfur by Sudan’s ‘Arab’ elite. Thus, the Atlantic Council’s Cameron Hudson contends that the Fata Borno massacre was “just another Tuesday in Darfur…not much has changed since the revolution” (New York Times, 30 July).

 2)    UNAMID withdrawal

Arguing that the Sudanese government lacks the capacity to protect civilians in Darfur, Dessu (Institute for Security Studies, 22 July) attributes the rise in violence in Darfur to the reduced effectiveness of UNAMID amid its reduction of military and police officers tasked with peacekeeping, with the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (15 June) echoing similar sentiments.

 Indeed, during the Fata Borno massacre, Radio Dabanga’s sources (13 July) said that UNAMID peacekeepers reached the area but did not interfere.  Such is Darfur’s reliance on UNAMID, that 3,000 displaced villagers, “most of them women and children”, gathered in front of a UNAMID base in Kass, South Darfur, following attacks (Radio Dabanga, August 6).

 Thus, Yagoub Abdallah Furi, a representative of the general coordination of Darfur camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), said that UNAMID (alongside the government) would be “responsible for the consrquences of any hostile action” in Darfur, with UNAMID “the only force entrusted with protecting and supervising [IDP] camps” (Radio Dabanga, 19 June). However, a UNAMID statement (July 28) “re-emphasises” that the primary responsibility of protecting civilians lies with the Sudanese government.

 Nonetheless, amid rampant militant activity in Darfur, Manzoul Assal, professor at the University of Khartoum told Reuters (July 30) that “neither [Darfuri] rebels nor UN peacekeepers have been able to protect civilians.”

 3)    The financial objectives of militias in Darfur

An AFP (July 28) feature piece shed more light on the motivations of Darfuri militias, with analysts attributing the spike in violence to “an attempt to sabotage Sudan’s fragile democratic transition.” Referencing the Masterei massacre, Marc Lavergne, a Sudan expert at the French National Center for Scientific Research said: “the objective is to destabilise the country and show others abroad that the administration in Khartoum is only in control of the capital."

 Rising militant activity in Darfur is argued to be a legacy of Omar al-Bashir’s presidency. Darfur expert Abdallah Adam Khater linked the resurgence of violence to militias formerly backed by Omar al-Bashir’s regime fighting to regain their dominance after Darfuri farmers refused to pay taxes to militias, or allow them to continue occupying lands they were forced to flee during al-Bashir’s presidency. Thus, Lavergne adds that the militias now employ “force and terror” to fight for their existence (AFP, July 28).

 Similarly, the International Crisis Group’s Jonas Horner says militias are “scrambling to secure their gains now that al-Bashir has gone,” with Suleiman, a protester in Niertiti, saying “they want to keep the same privileges” (30 July, Reuters).

4)    Distrust of Sudanese authorities

In Darfur, civilian distrust of Sudanese authorities is high, despite the revolution. Sudanese authorities are seen as either negligent or complicit in the spike of violence. 

 Declan Walsh’s New York Times (30 July) feature piece quoted Adam Mohamed, a senior leader of Darfur’s displaced community, accusing the Sudanese military of “doing nothing” amid Janjaweed attacks. Walsh also states that foreign officials are “reluctant” to blame the Sudanese government for the spike in violence, citing a “narrative” framing the violence “as a seasonal dispute between herders and pastoralists,” despite UN reports revealing that Sudanese troops were not protecting the Darfur displaced.

 Yagoub Abdallah Furi, a representative of the general coordination of Darfur camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), outright accused Sudanese authorities of complicity. Furi said a weapon collections campaign conducted by South Darfur authorities, the Sudanese army and the RSF is a “justification for dismantling the camps that stand as witness to the horrors of [al-Bashir’s] regime [which] gives government militias the greenlight to burn…camps in Darfur.” In calls for militias to be disarmed, Furi added that regional and national authorities “are fully aware the weapons are [only] in the hands of their tribal militias, who protect them and cover-up their crimes” (Radio Dabanga, 19 June).

 Remnants of al-Bashir’s regime are believed to still operate in Darfur’s official bodies, with the Darfur Bar Association (DBA) saying the protests are a request to the authorities to accelerate the purging of the official bodies from affiliates of the defunct regime” adding that “failure to do so will deliver wrong messages to the people” (Radio Dabanga, 30 June).

 Indeed, following the Fata Borno massacre, Radio Dabanga (13 July) reported that the displaced warned North Darfur’s Security Committee of a pending attack, but were not protected. According to the security committee, the evening before the attack, Kutum protesters burned a police station, highlighting the hostility between the parties.

 The RSF is seen as particularly divisive. With the RSF part of the government considering that its commander Himedti is the deputy chairman of Sudan’s sovereign council, domestic and international authorities view the RSF as key in securing Darfur, whereas locals blame them for the violence.

 5)    The divisive RSF

Following a meeting with RSF Commander Himedti, the head of UNAMID, Joint Special Representative/Joint Chief Mediator Jeremiah Mamabolo, commended the RSF’s efforts to prevent fighting in South Darfur’s Kalma camp (Radio Dabanga, 15 June). Then, in response to demands for greater security by sit-in protesters in Niertiti, the Sudanese government promised a joint army, RSF and police force aimed at evacuating settlers from agricultural lands, disarming gunmen, collecting motorcycles and protecting farmers (Radio Dabanga, 7 July).

 However, following the Gereida massacre, Radio Dabanga (25 July) sources said that RSF soldiers fled when the attack began, despite being tasked with protecting the villagers, with a Sudan Liberation Movement rebel spokesman Mohamed Abdel-Rahman al-Nayer directly blaming the RSF for the attack. Yet, RSF deputy commander and Himedti’s brother, Abdelrahim Hamdan, visited the Gereida sit-in following the massacre, announcing: compensation for the families of the dead, a generator for Gereida, two new hospital wards and water wells each and seeds for farmers (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

 On the same day, the RSF were directly blamed for the Misterei massacre that killed 60, after which Hamdok responded by announcing a joint RSF, army and security force will be deployed to secure Darfur (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

 The RSF’s general behaviour in Darfur has been criticised. The Abu Karinka Resistance Committee allege that the heavily armed RSF move through public spaces provoking and ridiculing and intimidating people, using whips, forcibly shaving the heads of young men to degrade them and besieging young women and girls (Radio Dabanga, 8 August).

 6)    The reduction in humanitarian aid

Dessu (Institute for Security Studies, 22 July) notes that the reduction in humanitarian aid for internally displaced people forces them to exit their camps to farm or trade, thereby making them vulnerable to attacks. 

7)    Peace deal unlikely to generate results

Analysts question whether Sudan’s peace talks will bring security to Darfur, as the rebels and militias are fragmented and competing over resources, “often along tribal lines with no clear leadership,” and the Janjaweed militants accused of violations are not deterred by peace talks (Reuters, 30 July).

4.     Protesters demands

Darfuri protesters demands in eight locations across the region.

Fata Borno camp, Kutum, North Darfur

Protesters called for locality director Mohamed el-Zein to: (Radio Dabanga, 10 July).

1.     Evacuate “new settlers” from their farms so they can catch up with the agricultural season

2.     Ban the use of motorcycles and weapons

3.     Deploy security forces to secure the agricultural season

4.     Combat the growing local drug trade.

Kabkabiya, North Darfur

1.     Protesters called on the authorities to put an end to the violence, including attacks on farmers (Radio Dabanga, 17 June).

2.     The presence of the joint UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to be extended until a comprehensive peace has been reached (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

3.     The declaration of a state of equal citizenship (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

4.     The removal of remnants of al-Bashir’s regime from state institutions (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

5.      Disarming of militias disarmed (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

6.     those accused of war crimes extradited to the International Criminal Court (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

7.     New settlers expelled from lands (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

8.     Protection from grazing on farms during the agricultural season (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

 Niertiti, Central Darfur

1.     For the police put an end to attacks by militiamen, and always records complaints filed by victims of crimes (Radio Dabanga, 29 June).

2.     The replacement of the Niertiti locality director and police chief (Radio Dabanga, 29 June).

3.     The protection of farmers during the agricultural season (Radio Dabanga, 30 June).

4.     The dismissal of the executive director and the director of the security committee of Nierteti (Radio Dabanga, 30 June).

5.     The removal of the current security forces, and members of the Military Intelligence and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from the locality Radio Dabanga, 30 June).

6.     The return of the livestock robbed by militias (Radio Dabanga, 6 July).

7.     Opening of pasture tracks to avoid frictions between herders and farmers (Radio Dabanga, 6 July).

8.     Banning of motorcycles (Radio Dabanga, 6 July).

 Yassin, East Darfur (@HatimAlTai2, 21 July)

1.     Protection of citizens during the farming season, especially those who live in villages far away from the locality's HQ.

2.     Dissolve the East Darfur Peace and Reconciliation Committee.

3.     Immediate removal of the local executive director and an immediate restructuring of the executive branch.

4.       Handover of lands to citizens who voluntarily returned to their lands after fleeing due to war.

5.    Disarming those who use their weapons to cause instability.

 Ed Daein, East Darfur (@HatimAlTai2, 15 July)

1. The immediate removal of all administrators working in the ministries and service institutions.

2. The construction of a road between Al-Daein and Al-Nuhood to begin.

3. A resolution to the issue of lacking medical staff across the state.

4. A resolution to the issue of farmland and the opening of paths.

5. The participation of resistance committees in monitoring the performance of state authorities.

6. A restructuring of the Economic Committee so that it may represent all forces of the revolution (particularly resistance committees).

7. The formation of a committee for uprooting NCP influence and returning money stolen by the former regime to the people (in cooperation with the resistance committees).

 Abu Karinka, East Darfur

1.     For the local police chief, the commander of Abu Karinka garrison, and the director of Abu Karinka locality to intervene and stop RSF assaults as soon as possible (Radio Dabanga, 8 August).

 Kass, South Darfur

1.     Protection during the current agricultural season (Radio Dabanga, 17 July).

2.     The dismissal of corrupt locality officials, in particular the Kass police chief (Radio Dabanga, 17 July).

3.     The provision of better services (Radio Dabanga, 17 July).

4.     An urgent investigation into the attacks on Boronga and surrounding villages (Radio Dabanga, 6 August).

5.     Enabling newly displaced people to return to their areas and be able to continue their farming (Radio Dabanga, 6 August).

Gereida, South Darfur

1.     The Darfur Displaced and Refugees Coordination in Gereida demanded the replacements of the Gereida police chief, the commander of the Gereida army garrison, alongside army and RSF troops in the area (Radio Dabanga, 25 July).

2.     An urgent investigation into the RSF involvement in the ‘Abdos massacre’ (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

3.     The opening of police stations in all areas where displaced have returned (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

4.     A specialised Public Prosecutor in the (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

5.      The removal of settlers from the farms of the displaced (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

6.     More army forces in the area (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

7.     Clean drinking water, agricultural machinery and better medical facilities (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

5.     12 Solutions

The report compiled 12 solutions aimed at the Sudanese government, international community and civil society.

@SudanInTheNews infographic identifying solutions for Darfur suggested by research and activist organisations.

 I.               Solutions for the Sudanese government

1)    Restrict arms

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS, 15 June) call on the Sudanese government to launch concerted efforts to control and tighten restrictions on arms and ammunitions in Darfur, alongside controls over the presence of militias and weapons in public places.

2)    Inclusive peacebuilding

The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA, 19 June) call on the Sudanese government to facilitate an “inclusive, just, and fair approach to peacebuilding” in Darfur. Recommendations suggested by SIHA include:

·      Investing in justice and law enforcement infrastructure and survivor support services.

·      Establishing Darfur civilian regional governments and local legislative councils, and supporting them in “setting clear security arrangements and disarmament programmes with firm deadlines.”

·      Developing internal justice mechanisms inclusive of Darfuri civil society, particularly women and youth, and compliant with reparations demands from sexual violence survivors.

·      Ratifying the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, and abide by Resolution 1325.

SIHA re-iterated their demands on 17 July, also calling for:

·      A strategic conflict resolution plan to be constructed and implemented in partnership with civil society stakeholders, and inclusive of women in conflict areas.

·      Cooperation with civil society, women’s groups, local administrative bodies, following transparent processes in the discussion of issues pertaining to peace, including obstacles and threats.

·      The accelerated completion of the civil governance structures, including the formation of the Peace Commission.

3)    Protecting peaceful protesters

In calls for an urgent establishment of an independent and impartial commission into the Fata Borno Massacre ACJPS (16 July) also called for assurances that the right to peaceful protests by civilians is respected and that the police is reformed to play the role of providing protection to civilians.

4)    Security sector reforms

ACJPS and the International Federation for Human Rights call for meaningful reform of the security sector, with the full participation of political actors and civil society, under the monitoring of and the assistance by the concerned regional and international bodies, – which should, among other things, clarify the Rapid Support Forces’ official status and fully integrate them into the Sudanese Armed Forces” (Radio Dabanga, 16 July).

 Amnesty International (14 July) also called for Sudanese authorities to “immediately review their security operations in Darfur” to ensure civilian protection “deliberate, unprovoked attacks”, and to end the “impunity enjoyed by the security forces and armed groups that have inflicted death, pain and suffering on the people of Darfur for 17 years.”

 SIHA (17 July) argue that a peaceful democratic transition requires the prioritisation of new security arrangements that reform security and military institutions and reduce their control over civil spaces. To achieve this, SIHA call for the government to implement a comprehensive legal review replacing discriminatory laws and policies that prevent military and security force accountability with inclusive egalitarian legal frameworks.

5)    Resolving agricultural conflict

Radio Dabanga (17 July) reported on a Native Administrative Forum held in Nyala, which identified solutions for farm protection.  To quell recurrent conflict between farmers and herders at the onset of the agricultural season, the South Darfur Native Administration Forum called for:

·      Pasture tracks to be clearly marked to meet the needs of herders, as part of “a new strategy for the development of the grazing sector”.

·      Renewed demarcation of tracks, pastures, and farmlands to be based on scientific research that takes into account increases in the number of livestock and agricultural expansion.

·      Security forces to be present during harvest time.

·      Region-wide disarmament to restore confidence between herders and farmers, including “clear and binding agreements” that prevent violent conflicts.

6)    Facilitate humanitarian access

Amnesty International (14 July) Director for East and Southern Africa, Deprose Muchena calls for Sudanese authorities to ensure that humanitarian organisations have unrestricted and secure access to Fata Borno, “so they can deliver humanitarian assistance to internally displaced people whose homes were looted and burnt by the armed militia.”

7)    Supporting poor Arabs that have displaced Darfuris

To solve the continued ethnic violence in Darfur, Sudan expert Alex de Waal suggested that part of the solution will be the acceptance that Darfur’s “settlement patterns and demographics have changed for good,” citing “dramatic and accelerated urbanization.” Therefore, to enable a peace settlement, Tufts University’s Helen Young calls for ways to also support poor Arab tribes that have displaced indigenous Darfuri tribes, so to prevent conflict being re-fueled (8 January, New Humanitarian).

II.              Solutions for international community

 8)    Support Sudanese government in its legal obligations

ACJPS (15 June) call for the EU, US, UN and African Union to support the government in meeting its international humanitarian legal obligations.

 9)    Monitoring Sudan

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) call on the UN Human Rights Council to maintain a form of monitoring and reporting on Sudan (Radio Dabanga, 16 July).

 10) Keeping UNAMID

Meressa K Dessu, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (22 July), calls for the joint UN-African Union (AU) mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to remain until Sudan’s political transition can be sustained and the government is capable of civilian protection. Dessu also calls for UNAMID to persuade armed groups to participate in Sudan’s transitional government process and support the political transition, noting that its substitute, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), lacks the AU’s political leverage in Sudan.

 In calls for UNAMID to extend peacekeeping in Darfur, Wibke Hansen, the lead analyst at the Center for International Peace and Volker Perthes, the director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, noted the sentiments of Darfuri citizens  who “underlined that [political changes in Khartoum] had not yet reached them,” as they are dealing with the same armed actors as before Omar al-Bashir’s ouster (World Politics Review, March 17).

 Similarly, Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth (AP, March 19)  called on the UN Security Council to recognise that “that Darfur requires a far more gradual withdrawal” because “civilians can’t trust Sudanese security forces alone and still look to peacekeepers for protection.”

III.            Solutions for Sudanese civil society

11) Community solutions

The Darfur Bar Association (DBA) called on community leaders in Darfur “to adopt and produce community solutions that enhance, serve, and strengthen human relations and social cohesion,” including “learning lessons in a way that enhances, serves, and strengthens human relations and social cohesion,” adding that the community solutions “will encourage society to move past the hateful past of the repulsive regime and establish foundations for societal recovery” (Radio Dabanga, 19 June). 

12) Permanent dialogue mechanisms

Suggesting that the protests are “a model for the reconstruction of Sudan at local and national levels” that can be developed through conferences, workshops, focus groups, interviews, and employing media to display issues, the DBA call for permanent dialogue mechanisms the development of medium to long-term strategic plans which outline proposals for solutions, that are to be implemented by the authorities and those responsible for organising the sit-ins (Radio Dabanga, 13 July).