The Darfur Report: What has been happening in Darfur?

Summary

Split into five parts, the Darfur report will cover the following:

1. Background information: Rising violence in Darfur is attributed to the combination of the gradual withdrawal of the UN-African Union (AU) hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID), alongside conflict over farming land between indigenous Darfuris return to lands they were forced to flee, and occupying militias.

2. Major events: The Darfur Report then re-caps the major security incidents in Darfur between June-August 2020.

3. Issues: Seven key security issues causing the spike in violence.

4. Darfuri demands: The compiled demands of Darfuri protesters in eight locations across the region.

5. Solutions: 12 proposed solutions aimed at the Sudanese government, international community and Sudanese civil society.

1. Background

Violence has spiked in conflict-ridden Darfur, amid new conflict over land rights, between people returning to Darfur in time for the July-November planting season, and those who took over lands after previous inhabitants were forced to flee after the Darfur War started in 2003 (BBC, 27 July). The spike in violence coincides with the reduced effectiveness of the UN-African Union (AU) hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID), with the Sudanese government judged to lack the capacity to protect civilians in Darfur (Institute for Security Studies, 22 July).

Initially, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok requested that UNAMID’s planned withdrawal be aligned with Sudan’s peace process, amid concerns expressed by Sudan’s armed groups during their consultations with the government (Sudan Tribune, 19 October 2019).

However, anonymous UN sources told the Guardian (May 28) that UN chief advisor Nicholas Haysom made extensive calls to Hamdok “using personal diplomacy” to lobby Hamdok to accept UNITAMS, with Hamdok losing “a lot of credibility…because he hasn’t stood up for Darfurians and instead let Hemedti and the NCP [National Congress party] dictate Sudan’s response.” The UN denied the allegations.

In a controversial move, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to move toward ending UNAMID, replacing it with a civilian mission focusing on Sudan’s democratic transition - the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) (AP, June 4). The Guardian (May 28) reported that activists urged the UN and AU to shelve their plans to replace UNAMID with UNITAMS. Human Rights Watch’s Jehanne Henry added: “any UN mission should have the capacity to protect [at-risk] civilians… Darfur…has a long legacy of state-sponsored violence [leaving] civilians extremely distrustful of state forces”. Indeed, Al-Sadiq Ali Hassan, the secretary general of the Darfur Bar Association (DBA), said: “the political mission won’t solve problems… there will be a huge gap for security chaos and I expect the situation will worsen”. The spate of violent incidents and proliferation of sit-ins against the declining security situation in Darfur between June-August 2020 prove Hassan’s projections correct.

For their part, while UNAMID (July 28) expressed concern with the increased violence on Darfuri peaceful protesters, it re-emphasised that the primary responsibility of protecting civilians lies with the Sudanese government, “particularly in areas where UNAMID has withdrawn in the context of its drawdown.”

@SudanInTheNews infographic covering latest developments in Darfur

2. Major incidents

15 June - UNAMID arrives in Nyala

After two were killed in Kalma camp for the displaced near Nyala, capital of South Darfur, UNAMID sent reinforcements aiming to prevent an escalation (Radio Dabanga, June 15).

17 June - Protests in Kabkabiya

Protesters in Kabkabiya in North Darfur organised a march against the continued violence, assassinations, rapes, and beatings in the camps for the displaced (Radio Dabanga, June 17).

Niertiti sit-in

A sit-in began in Nierteti in Central Darfur against the rampant insecurity in the town and its surrounding villages (Radio Dabanga, June 29). Sit-ins also sprang up in el-Geneina in West Darfur and Kabkabiya (Radio Dabanga, July 2).

A government delegation visits Niertiti, reaches agreement with protesters

A Sudanese government delegation visited the Niertiti sit-in (Radio Dabanga, July 6). An agreement was reached to replace the acting military state governors by civilian governors within two weeks, and to dismiss the local director and police chief, and commanders of the General Intelligence Service (GIS) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the area. The government promised that a joint army, RSF and police force will be formed, to evacuate settlers from the agricultural lands in south-western Jebel Marra, disarm gunmen, collect motorcycles, secure the agricultural season and arrest those who have complaints filed against them.

The government also agreed to arrange traditional mining, improve telecommunication, water and electricity services, and the RSF donated a generator to Niertiti (Radio Dabanga, July 7).

Fata Borno Massacre kills at least 13

Sit-in protesters at Fata Borno in North Darfur’s Kutum successfully got all motorcycles banned (Radio Dabanga, July 10). However, within three days, “government-sanctioned armed groups” riding motorcycles fatally dispersed the Fata Borno sit-in, killing at least 13 and wounding 11 (Multiple sources, 13 July).

Niertiti sit-in lifted, new protests erupt

The Niertiti sit-in was lifted after the government delivered on its promises, but sit-ins in Kutum and Kabkabiya in North Darfur, Ed Daein, Bahr El Arab and Yassin in East Darfur, and Misterei in West Darfur continued (Radio Dabanga, 16 July). A new protest also erupted in Kass, South Darfur (Radio Dabanga, 17 July).

The Sudanese government finally replaced military governors with civilian governors across Sudan, but protests were held in Ed Daein, because the appointment was not nominated by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) (Radio Dabanga, 24 July).

Gereida Massacre kills at least 15

At least 15 people were killed, 25 others wounded, and dozens went missing following an armed attack on Abdos village in South Darfur’s Gereida. The RSF were blamed, and reportedly “fled” when the attack began despite being tasked with protecting the villagers (Multiple Sources, 25 July).

Masterei Massacre kills at least 60

At least 60 were killed, and 60 were wounded, in an attack by armed men in Misterei in West Darfur. RSF members were reportedly among the attackers. The West Darfur Doctors’ Committee said that they hold the state’s Security Committee responsible for the massacre, which lasted nine hours in total. Witnesses of the attack criticised West Darfur authorities for moving slowly, particularly as the Masterei sit-in was attacked ten days earlier (Radio Dabanga, 27 July). The Sudanese government then announced that troops are being deployed to Darfur (BBC, 27 July).

Gereida sit-in, RSF provides aid

After the Gereida sit-in entered its fourth day following the July 25 massacre, RSF deputy commander Abdelrahim Hamdan visited the sit-in and announced compensation for the families of the dead, a generator for Gereida, two new hospital wards and water wells each and seeds for farmers (Radio Dabanga, 27 July)

Boronga attacks displace 3,000

3,000 were displaced by “bloody attacks” on villages near Kass in South Darfur (Radio Dabanga, August 6).

3. Seven key security issues

@SudanInTheNews infographic identifying key security issues in Darfur

1) Agricultural season conflict

Meressa K Dessu, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (22 July) notes that the underlying causes of the Darfur conflict remain unresolved, with displaced people attacked by Arab militias when attempting to return to their land.

According to the BBC (27 July), the spike in violence in Darfur follows a government deal in which it was agreed that those forced to flee their localities in Darfur since the war started in 2003 would be allowed to return in in time for the July-November planting season, triggering conflict over land rights between those who took over the lands, and the returning inhabitants who were forced to flee.

Indeed, one of the reasons that Darfuri protesters have called for region wide bans on motorcycles is due to farmers being unable to cultivate their farms “for years,” as gunmen on motorcycles claim ownership of farms and impose fees on the farmers to allow them to cultivate these lands (Radio Dabanga, 10 July).

Disputes over land are reinforced by heightened identity differences. Researcher Jerome Tubiana said that, for Darfuris, the enemy is no longer Omar al-Bashir, but the rather “the centre of Sudan,” in reference to perceived neglect of ‘non-Arab’ Darfur by Sudan’s ‘Arab’ elite. Thus, the Atlantic Council’s Cameron Hudson contends that the Fata Borno massacre was “just another Tuesday in Darfur…not much has changed since the revolution” (New York Times, 30 July).

2) UNAMID withdrawal

Arguing that the Sudanese government lacks the capacity to protect civilians in Darfur, Dessu (Institute for Security Studies, 22 July) attributes the rise in violence in Darfur to the reduced effectiveness of UNAMID amid its reduction of military and police officers tasked with peacekeeping, with the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (15 June) echoing similar sentiments.

Indeed, during the Fata Borno massacre, Radio Dabanga’s sources (13 July) said that UNAMID peacekeepers reached the area but did not interfere. Such is Darfur’s reliance on UNAMID, that 3,000 displaced villagers, “most of them women and children”, gathered in front of a UNAMID base in Kass, South Darfur, following attacks (Radio Dabanga, August 6).

Thus, Yagoub Abdallah Furi, a representative of the general coordination of Darfur camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), said that UNAMID (alongside the government) would be “responsible for the consrquences of any hostile action” in Darfur, with UNAMID “the only force entrusted with protecting and supervising [IDP] camps” (Radio Dabanga, 19 June). However, a UNAMID statement (July 28) “re-emphasises” that the primary responsibility of protecting civilians lies with the Sudanese government.

Nonetheless, amid rampant militant activity in Darfur, Manzoul Assal, professor at the University of Khartoum told Reuters (July 30) that “neither [Darfuri] rebels nor UN peacekeepers have been able to protect civilians.”

3) The financial objectives of militias in Darfur

An AFP (July 28) feature piece shed more light on the motivations of Darfuri militias, with analysts attributing the spike in violence to “an attempt to sabotage Sudan’s fragile democratic transition.” Referencing the Masterei massacre, Marc Lavergne, a Sudan expert at the French National Center for Scientific Research said: “the objective is to destabilise the country and show others abroad that the administration in Khartoum is only in control of the capital."

Rising militant activity in Darfur is argued to be a legacy of Omar al-Bashir’s presidency. Darfur expert Abdallah Adam Khater linked the resurgence of violence to militias formerly backed by Omar al-Bashir’s regime fighting to regain their dominance after Darfuri farmers refused to pay taxes to militias, or allow them to continue occupying lands they were forced to flee during al-Bashir’s presidency. Thus, Lavergne adds that the militias now employ “force and terror” to fight for their existence (AFP, July 28).

Similarly, the International Crisis Group’s Jonas Horner says militias are “scrambling to secure their gains now that al-Bashir has gone,” with Suleiman, a protester in Niertiti, saying “they want to keep the same privileges” (30 July, Reuters).

4) Distrust of Sudanese authorities

In Darfur, civilian distrust of Sudanese authorities is high, despite the revolution. Sudanese authorities are seen as either negligent or complicit in the spike of violence.

Declan Walsh’s New York Times (30 July) feature piece quoted Adam Mohamed, a senior leader of Darfur’s displaced community, accusing the Sudanese military of “doing nothing” amid Janjaweed attacks. Walsh also states that foreign officials are “reluctant” to blame the Sudanese government for the spike in violence, citing a “narrative” framing the violence “as a seasonal dispute between herders and pastoralists,” despite UN reports revealing that Sudanese troops were not protecting the Darfur displaced.

Yagoub Abdallah Furi, a representative of the general coordination of Darfur camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), outright accused Sudanese authorities of complicity. Furi said a weapon collections campaign conducted by South Darfur authorities, the Sudanese army and the RSF is a “justification for dismantling the camps that stand as witness to the horrors of [al-Bashir’s] regime [which] gives government militias the greenlight to burn…camps in Darfur.” In calls for militias to be disarmed, Furi added that regional and national authorities “are fully aware the weapons are [only] in the hands of their tribal militias, who protect them and cover-up their crimes” (Radio Dabanga, 19 June).

Remnants of al-Bashir’s regime are believed to still operate in Darfur’s official bodies, with the Darfur Bar Association (DBA) saying the protests are a request to the authorities to accelerate the purging of the official bodies from affiliates of the defunct regime” adding that “failure to do so will deliver wrong messages to the people” (Radio Dabanga, 30 June).

Indeed, following the Fata Borno massacre, Radio Dabanga (13 July) reported that the displaced warned North Darfur’s Security Committee of a pending attack, but were not protected. According to the security committee, the evening before the attack, Kutum protesters burned a police station, highlighting the hostility between the parties.

The RSF is seen as particularly divisive. With the RSF part of the government considering that its commander Himedti is the deputy chairman of Sudan’s sovereign council, domestic and international authorities view the RSF as key in securing Darfur, whereas locals blame them for the violence.

5) The divisive RSF

Following a meeting with RSF Commander Himedti, the head of UNAMID, Joint Special Representative/Joint Chief Mediator Jeremiah Mamabolo, commended the RSF’s efforts to prevent fighting in South Darfur’s Kalma camp (Radio Dabanga, 15 June). Then, in response to demands for greater security by sit-in protesters in Niertiti, the Sudanese government promised a joint army, RSF and police force aimed at evacuating settlers from agricultural lands, disarming gunmen, collecting motorcycles and protecting farmers (Radio Dabanga, 7 July).

However, following the Gereida massacre, Radio Dabanga (25 July) sources said that RSF soldiers fled when the attack began, despite being tasked with protecting the villagers, with a Sudan Liberation Movement rebel spokesman Mohamed Abdel-Rahman al-Nayer directly blaming the RSF for the attack. Yet, RSF deputy commander and Himedti’s brother, Abdelrahim Hamdan, visited the Gereida sit-in following the massacre, announcing: compensation for the families of the dead, a generator for Gereida, two new hospital wards and water wells each and seeds for farmers (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

On the same day, the RSF were directly blamed for the Misterei massacre that killed 60, after which Hamdok responded by announcing a joint RSF, army and security force will be deployed to secure Darfur (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

The RSF’s general behaviour in Darfur has been criticised. The Abu Karinka Resistance Committee allege that the heavily armed RSF move through public spaces provoking and ridiculing and intimidating people, using whips, forcibly shaving the heads of young men to degrade them and besieging young women and girls (Radio Dabanga, 8 August).

6) The reduction in humanitarian aid

Dessu (Institute for Security Studies, 22 July) notes that the reduction in humanitarian aid for internally displaced people forces them to exit their camps to farm or trade, thereby making them vulnerable to attacks.

7) Peace deal unlikely to generate results

Analysts question whether Sudan’s peace talks will bring security to Darfur, as the rebels and militias are fragmented and competing over resources, “often along tribal lines with no clear leadership,” and the Janjaweed militants accused of violations are not deterred by peace talks (Reuters, 30 July).

4. Protesters demands

Darfuri protesters demands in eight locations across the region.

Fata Borno camp, Kutum, North Darfur

Protesters called for locality director Mohamed el-Zein to: (Radio Dabanga, 10 July).

1. Evacuate “new settlers” from their farms so they can catch up with the agricultural season

2. Ban the use of motorcycles and weapons

3. Deploy security forces to secure the agricultural season

4. Combat the growing local drug trade.

Kabkabiya, North Darfur

1. Protesters called on the authorities to put an end to the violence, including attacks on farmers (Radio Dabanga, 17 June).

2. The presence of the joint UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to be extended until a comprehensive peace has been reached (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

3. The declaration of a state of equal citizenship (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

4. The removal of remnants of al-Bashir’s regime from state institutions (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

5. Disarming of militias disarmed (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

6. those accused of war crimes extradited to the International Criminal Court (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

7. New settlers expelled from lands (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

8. Protection from grazing on farms during the agricultural season (Radio Dabanga, 2 July).

Niertiti, Central Darfur

1. For the police put an end to attacks by militiamen, and always records complaints filed by victims of crimes (Radio Dabanga, 29 June).

2. The replacement of the Niertiti locality director and police chief (Radio Dabanga, 29 June).

3. The protection of farmers during the agricultural season (Radio Dabanga, 30 June).

4. The dismissal of the executive director and the director of the security committee of Nierteti (Radio Dabanga, 30 June).

5. The removal of the current security forces, and members of the Military Intelligence and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from the locality Radio Dabanga, 30 June).

6. The return of the livestock robbed by militias (Radio Dabanga, 6 July).

7. Opening of pasture tracks to avoid frictions between herders and farmers (Radio Dabanga, 6 July).

8. Banning of motorcycles (Radio Dabanga, 6 July).

Yassin, East Darfur (@HatimAlTai2, 21 July)

1. Protection of citizens during the farming season, especially those who live in villages far away from the locality's HQ.

2. Dissolve the East Darfur Peace and Reconciliation Committee.

3. Immediate removal of the local executive director and an immediate restructuring of the executive branch.

4. Handover of lands to citizens who voluntarily returned to their lands after fleeing due to war.

5. Disarming those who use their weapons to cause instability.

Ed Daein, East Darfur (@HatimAlTai2, 15 July)

1. The immediate removal of all administrators working in the ministries and service institutions.

2. The construction of a road between Al-Daein and Al-Nuhood to begin.

3. A resolution to the issue of lacking medical staff across the state.

4. A resolution to the issue of farmland and the opening of paths.

5. The participation of resistance committees in monitoring the performance of state authorities.

6. A restructuring of the Economic Committee so that it may represent all forces of the revolution (particularly resistance committees).

7. The formation of a committee for uprooting NCP influence and returning money stolen by the former regime to the people (in cooperation with the resistance committees).

Abu Karinka, East Darfur

1. For the local police chief, the commander of Abu Karinka garrison, and the director of Abu Karinka locality to intervene and stop RSF assaults as soon as possible (Radio Dabanga, 8 August).

Kass, South Darfur

1. Protection during the current agricultural season (Radio Dabanga, 17 July).

2. The dismissal of corrupt locality officials, in particular the Kass police chief (Radio Dabanga, 17 July).

3. The provision of better services (Radio Dabanga, 17 July).

4. An urgent investigation into the attacks on Boronga and surrounding villages (Radio Dabanga, 6 August).

5. Enabling newly displaced people to return to their areas and be able to continue their farming (Radio Dabanga, 6 August).

Gereida, South Darfur

1. The Darfur Displaced and Refugees Coordination in Gereida demanded the replacements of the Gereida police chief, the commander of the Gereida army garrison, alongside army and RSF troops in the area (Radio Dabanga, 25 July).

2. An urgent investigation into the RSF involvement in the ‘Abdos massacre’ (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

3. The opening of police stations in all areas where displaced have returned (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

4. A specialised Public Prosecutor in the (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

5. The removal of settlers from the farms of the displaced (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

6. More army forces in the area (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

7. Clean drinking water, agricultural machinery and better medical facilities (Radio Dabanga, 27 July).

5. 12 Solutions

The report compiled 12 solutions aimed at the Sudanese government, international community and civil society.

@SudanInTheNews infographic identifying solutions for Darfur suggested by research and activist organisations.

I. Solutions for the Sudanese government

1) Restrict arms

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS, 15 June) call on the Sudanese government to launch concerted efforts to control and tighten restrictions on arms and ammunitions in Darfur, alongside controls over the presence of militias and weapons in public places.

2) Inclusive peacebuilding

The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA, 19 June) call on the Sudanese government to facilitate an “inclusive, just, and fair approach to peacebuilding” in Darfur. Recommendations suggested by SIHA include:

· Investing in justice and law enforcement infrastructure and survivor support services.

· Establishing Darfur civilian regional governments and local legislative councils, and supporting them in “setting clear security arrangements and disarmament programmes with firm deadlines.”

· Developing internal justice mechanisms inclusive of Darfuri civil society, particularly women and youth, and compliant with reparations demands from sexual violence survivors.

· Ratifying the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, and abide by Resolution 1325.

SIHA re-iterated their demands on 17 July, also calling for:

· A strategic conflict resolution plan to be constructed and implemented in partnership with civil society stakeholders, and inclusive of women in conflict areas.

· Cooperation with civil society, women’s groups, local administrative bodies, following transparent processes in the discussion of issues pertaining to peace, including obstacles and threats.

· The accelerated completion of the civil governance structures, including the formation of the Peace Commission.

3) Protecting peaceful protesters

In calls for an urgent establishment of an independent and impartial commission into the Fata Borno Massacre ACJPS (16 July) also called for assurances that the right to peaceful protests by civilians is respected and that the police is reformed to play the role of providing protection to civilians.

4) Security sector reforms

ACJPS and the International Federation for Human Rights call for meaningful reform of the security sector, with the full participation of political actors and civil society, under the monitoring of and the assistance by the concerned regional and international bodies, – which should, among other things, clarify the Rapid Support Forces’ official status and fully integrate them into the Sudanese Armed Forces” (Radio Dabanga, 16 July).

Amnesty International (14 July) also called for Sudanese authorities to “immediately review their security operations in Darfur” to ensure civilian protection “deliberate, unprovoked attacks”, and to end the “impunity enjoyed by the security forces and armed groups that have inflicted death, pain and suffering on the people of Darfur for 17 years.”

SIHA (17 July) argue that a peaceful democratic transition requires the prioritisation of new security arrangements that reform security and military institutions and reduce their control over civil spaces. To achieve this, SIHA call for the government to implement a comprehensive legal review replacing discriminatory laws and policies that prevent military and security force accountability with inclusive egalitarian legal frameworks.

5) Resolving agricultural conflict

Radio Dabanga (17 July) reported on a Native Administrative Forum held in Nyala, which identified solutions for farm protection. To quell recurrent conflict between farmers and herders at the onset of the agricultural season, the South Darfur Native Administration Forum called for:

· Pasture tracks to be clearly marked to meet the needs of herders, as part of “a new strategy for the development of the grazing sector”.

· Renewed demarcation of tracks, pastures, and farmlands to be based on scientific research that takes into account increases in the number of livestock and agricultural expansion.

· Security forces to be present during harvest time.

· Region-wide disarmament to restore confidence between herders and farmers, including “clear and binding agreements” that prevent violent conflicts.

6) Facilitate humanitarian access

Amnesty International (14 July) Director for East and Southern Africa, Deprose Muchena calls for Sudanese authorities to ensure that humanitarian organisations have unrestricted and secure access to Fata Borno, “so they can deliver humanitarian assistance to internally displaced people whose homes were looted and burnt by the armed militia.”

7) Supporting poor Arabs that have displaced Darfuris

To solve the continued ethnic violence in Darfur, Sudan expert Alex de Waal suggested that part of the solution will be the acceptance that Darfur’s “settlement patterns and demographics have changed for good,” citing “dramatic and accelerated urbanization.” Therefore, to enable a peace settlement, Tufts University’s Helen Young calls for ways to also support poor Arab tribes that have displaced indigenous Darfuri tribes, so to prevent conflict being re-fueled (8 January, New Humanitarian).

II. Solutions for international community

8) Support Sudanese government in its legal obligations

ACJPS (15 June) call for the EU, US, UN and African Union to support the government in meeting its international humanitarian legal obligations.

9) Monitoring Sudan

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) call on the UN Human Rights Council to maintain a form of monitoring and reporting on Sudan (Radio Dabanga, 16 July).

10) Keeping UNAMID

Meressa K Dessu, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (22 July), calls for the joint UN-African Union (AU) mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to remain until Sudan’s political transition can be sustained and the government is capable of civilian protection. Dessu also calls for UNAMID to persuade armed groups to participate in Sudan’s transitional government process and support the political transition, noting that its substitute, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), lacks the AU’s political leverage in Sudan.

In calls for UNAMID to extend peacekeeping in Darfur, Wibke Hansen, the lead analyst at the Center for International Peace and Volker Perthes, the director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, noted the sentiments of Darfuri citizens who “underlined that [political changes in Khartoum] had not yet reached them,” as they are dealing with the same armed actors as before Omar al-Bashir’s ouster (World Politics Review, March 17).

Similarly, Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth (AP, March 19) called on the UN Security Council to recognise that “that Darfur requires a far more gradual withdrawal” because “civilians can’t trust Sudanese security forces alone and still look to peacekeepers for protection.”

III. Solutions for Sudanese civil society

11) Community solutions

The Darfur Bar Association (DBA) called on community leaders in Darfur “to adopt and produce community solutions that enhance, serve, and strengthen human relations and social cohesion,” including “learning lessons in a way that enhances, serves, and strengthens human relations and social cohesion,” adding that the community solutions “will encourage society to move past the hateful past of the repulsive regime and establish foundations for societal recovery” (Radio Dabanga, 19 June).

12) Permanent dialogue mechanisms

Suggesting that the protests are “a model for the reconstruction of Sudan at local and national levels” that can be developed through conferences, workshops, focus groups, interviews, and employing media to display issues, the DBA call for permanent dialogue mechanisms the development of medium to long-term strategic plans which outline proposals for solutions, that are to be implemented by the authorities and those responsible for organising the sit-ins (Radio Dabanga, 13 July).