Al-Burhan's speech to Sudanese troops stationed near the border with Ethiopia

Al-Burhan speech to Sudanese troops stationed near the border with Ethiopia (Translated)

  1. We did not chose to be in this position, but Sudan’s circumstances put us here. This is our land. This is Sudanese land.

For 25 years, we have been patient. We have been quiet. We endured these threats. But everything has a limit. Everything has a solution. We have been patient [despite these] threats, attempts to scare and dishonour us.

Yesterday, they killed women. They killed five or seven women. And we’re observing silently. For how long can we stay quiet? Everything has a solution, but the issue has gone beyond its limit.

This our land. This belong to us. And we will all die here. And when we’re done, others will come after us until nobody else can come and say “get out of here, this is not yours”. 

It’s true that we’ve neglected this land for many years, but now we’re back. After this, we can only leave it if we all die. Relay what I’ve said to your brothers.

We have come here to protect Sudan and Sudanese women. 

2. We did not expect any violence from our Ethiopian neighbours. But they started it. Yesterday they killed our women, and before that they killed our farmers and burned our land and took our land. And yesterday, they were saying that this land is not Sudanese and that Sudan entered their territory.

This is Sudanese land. We will stand here until we are done.

Sudanese blood and land is not cheap. We all have to stand together to protect our people, land and family. To protect the vulnerable and the women. How can anybody kill women?

There are crops, bread and cotton here, and Ethiopians are here in the hundreds of thousands.

But our Sudanese manners mean that we can never lift weapons in the faces of women and children. The person who acts like this deserve the same treatment.

We want everybody to hold on to their manners, to defend the truth, Sudan and families of Sudan. We don’t want anything more.  

3. We have a legitimate right to protect our land, whether it is by force or by kindness. We did not transgress on anyone, we did not cross our borders. This is Sudanese land, and these are our people. Majdi (al-Burhan’s military colleague who was sat nearby) was here 25 years ago. He was a Lieutenant. How can those people come and say this land is theirs?  

We are with you. We will stand together. We will not transgress on anyone. We will not take what belongs to anyone. But this land is ours and nobody can prevent us or tell us that we can’t defend it. We are standing our position to defend the nation, to defend Sudan.

We stand here until it becomes clear that this is ours, or we go and those who replace us come to protect and defend Sudan

4. We have many agreements with neighbouring countries. But there was no response to our requests.

We are going to close all the ports of Sudan. It is our duty to protect and defend Sudanese land, with our blood. The women died in defence of this country. They are martyrs. We are going to visit the locals and tell them that their women are like our soldiers here. There is no difference between them.

They killed five women here, the death toll rose to seven. And with them was a one-year-old child. And before that we had soldiers who died in this location. These are all things that we have to remember.

We can’t let it go. We will die over it like the aforementioned people died. And then those that come after us will find that we secured the country and made it peaceful for them in protection of the country.  

The whole Sudanese population is standing with you, including those in the sovereign council and council of ministers.

5. We, and the whole of Sudan, do not accept the ugly reasons for which these people died. They were women. Women, in our customs and traditions, even in a war they don’t get touched.

Whether someone dies in Khartoum, or here, or anywhere else – it’s all the same. Everyone feels the pain. None of us accept this. We consider the people who died here the same as our soldiers. We are all one.

We are not going to go back. Just like our family died here, we will die here too.

#SudanUprising Briefing: Slow progress on security sector reforms and human rights, as the RSF complains of marginalisation

#SudanUprising Briefing: Slow progress on security sector reforms and human rights, as the RSF complains of marginalisation

 With a security sector reforms being a key demand of the Sudanese revolution, recent developments indicate setbacks and complications, after Sudanese security forces fired tear gas at protesters who demonstrated against the dismissal of soldiers who joined the uprising against Omar al-Bashir’s regime in 2019.

 The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, who continue to emphasise their democratic credentials, complain about their marginalisation by the civilian-led government. Nonetheless, concerns about the impact of the RSF’s financial and military power on the democratic transition remain, with the Sudanese government called upon to accelerate reforms that would regulate the RSF financially and hold them accountable for allegations of responsibility for the June 3 massacre.  

 1.     Protests

At least 17 were wounded in clashes between Sudanese security forces and protesters who demanded the reinstatement of army officers who were dismissed for refusing to crack down on demonstrations against former president Omar al-Bashir (20 February, Multiple Sources).

 The protests rose out of public anger following reports that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has retired 79 military officers from the medium and junior ranks, among them a sub-lieutenant called Mohamed Siddiq Ibrahim Ahmed, who was the first military officer to join protesters outside the army headquarters during the first week of April 2019, before Omar al-Bashir’s ouster. (18 February, Sudan Tribune).

 In response, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) called for the minister of the interior and the police general director to be sacked and replace them with “national elements who belong to the revolution.” The SPA also called for soldiers and military officers who had been “arbitrarily excluded from military service” to be reinstated, and for those who “protected and sided with the people’s revolution to be celebrated, promoted and given a leadership position.” (20 February, Multiple Sources). 

2.     Is the RSF a partner in the revolution?

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander, and deputy chairman of Sudan’s sovereign council, Himedti, complained of marginalisation by the civilian government. Therefore, Himedti has called for “code of conduct in which [the sovereign council, cabinet, FFC, the youth and all supporters of change] pledge - to work for the interest of [Sudan].” (16 February, Sudan Tribune).

 Denying efforts to obstruct the civilian-led government, Himedti said that he can leverage his relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia to help solve Sudan’s economic crisis, but complained that the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) are not allowing him to do so. (16 February, Sudan Tribune)

 The RSF continues to emphasise its democratic credentials. An RSF “human rights consultant” who “illustrates the RSF’s hints of reform and change,” told the Guardian (February 9) that the security sector has a key role to play in Sudan’s democratic transition. The consultant added that the RSF are champions of minority rights and that Himedti is a “challenge against political elites.”

 However, the Guardian note that the RSF’s military and financial power pose a threat to a peaceful democratic transition in Sudan. The RSF dominates Sudan’s lucrative gold industry via Al Gunade company, which has been exempt from attempts by Sudanese authorities to dissolve mining companies linked to Omar al-Bashir’s regime.

 Moreover, Sudan lacks safeguards to prevent Al-Gunade and the RSF operating illegally, with the gold industry lacking transparency and Sudanese authorities unable to regulate supply chains plagued” by smuggling and controlled by militias.

 Nonetheless, in a positive sign for the RSF’s reputation, Human Rights Watch (20 February) declined naming Himedti or the RSF in calls for a committee investigating the June 3 2019 Khartoum massacre to meet international standards. Human Rights Watch (HRW) called for the committee to possess the necessary protection to “investigate those responsible higher up the chain of command… as a member of the Sovereign Council may be implicated.” (HRW, 20 February).

 It is worth noting that in HRW’s earlier calls for an independent inquiry into the June 3 massacre (published on July 9 2019), it was stated that: “In June alone, government forces including the RSF killed over 130 protesters,” and “opened fire on protesters and burned down their sit-in camp” on June 3.

3.     Human Rights

 HRW (20 February) has also noted that the Sudanese government is yet to implement the  reforms envisaged in the constitutional charter, including the formation of legislative council and establishment of rights-focused commissions.

 Therefore, HRW call for Sudan’s transitional government to accelerate legal and security sector institutional reforms and progress on domestic justice initiatives, in comprehensive justice system reforms to ensure the protection of rights, ensure adequate public participation, and address gender discrimination.

Conflict Resolution: Progress and Issues (January 2020)

Conflict Resolution: Progress and Issues (January 2020)

Prospects for Sudanese conflict resolution in 2020 continue to be impeded by disputes among rebel groups, suspicions that al-Bashir’s deep-state is spoiling the peace process, and differences on the issue of secularism.

Nonetheless, in positive signs for Sudanese conflict resolution, Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok became the first government official to visit Kauda, a rebel stronghold, since 2008. Sudan’s transitional government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement faction under the leadership of Malik Agar (SPLM-N Agar) signed a framework peace agreement.

Progress

Hamdok visits Kauda

Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok visited Kauda, stronghold of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North faction led by Abdelaziz El Hilu (SPLM-N El Hilu). The visit is historic as it has been a no-go area for Sudanese government officials since the war broke out in South Kordofan in 2011. (9 January, Radio Dabanga). According to Jerome Tubiana, the visit was a successful indication that “Hamdok had started to compete with Himedti and some officers in the military council for support in the peripheries.” (17 January, Foreign Policy)

Agreement on the root causes of conflict

In further encouraging signs for conflict resolution, Hamdok said that he agreed with Abdelaziz El-Hilu that peace negotiations must address the root causes of the conflict in South Kordofan – highlighting issues such as marginalisation, identity, governance, how to administrate Sudan, and the constitution. Furthermore, Hamdok acknowledged El-Hilu’s demands that Sudan adopts secularism, raising hopes that an understanding can be reached on “a project that unites all Sudanese.” (10 January, Sudan Tribune)

Support for el-Hilu on the secularism issue

Growing support for SPLM-N El-Hilu on the secularism issue has also come from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP),which was part of the ousted al-Bashir regime. The SPLM-N El-Hilu and DUP issued a joint statement which expressed commitment to resolving conflicts and the "need to prohibit the establishment of political parties on a religious basis, and the need to respect pluralism and cultural diversity.” (30 January, Sudan Tribune).

The end of tribal reconciliation mechanisms

In terms of settling tribal conflicts, the Sudanese government has announced that the traditional reconciliation mechanisms – such as state interference, holding tribal reconciliation conferences and paying blood money - are no longer valid. Faisal Mohamed Saleh, the Minister of Information and the government spokesman, stressed that the judiciary should hold accountable responsible for violence in peripheral regions. (9 January, Sudan Tribune).

Government peace agreement with SPLM-N Agar

Further progress towards conflict resolution came after Sudan’s transitional government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement faction under the leadership of Malik Agar (SPLM-N Agar) signed a framework peace agreement. (26 January, Multiple Sources).

The agreement includes political, security arrangements and humanitarian issues, as well as stipulating rights to legislate power, land issues, resources and power sharing. Indeed, SPLM-N Agar Deputy Leader Yasir Arman told reporters that Himedti, who signed the agreement on the government’s behalf, is “serious about peace.”

However, the agreement is not accepted by other SPLM-N factions. While SPLM-N Agar demands the right to legislate the Two Areas without Islamic legislation, it rejected the inclusion of secularism as pre-condition to conflict resolution in the negotiations, arguing that the matter is not only related to the Two Areas. Consequently, differences with SPLM-N El-Hilu have been re-ignited.

Issues

SPLM-N factions differ on secularism

SPLM-N El-Hilu said it is “not concerned” with the SPLM-Agar peace framework agreement on South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states (27 January, Sudan Tribune).  SPLM-N El-Hilu, which maintains its threats to fight for self-determination unless secularism is adopted across Sudan, says the issue of secularism should be settled during the ongoing peace negotiations. By contrast, the transitional government hopes to defer the issue to a constitutional conference.

Indeed, SPLM-N El-Hilu split from the Agar faction in 2017 due to the latter’s refusal to accept the threat to fight for self-determination in SPLM-N territories unless secularism is adopted as a focal point of peace negotiations. (February 1, Sudan Tribune). Malik Agar re-iterated his rejection of El-Hilu’s stance, questioning why the people of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile alone should “pay this exorbitant bill” regarding the fight for secularism in Sudan.

Agar concedes that the demands for secularism and self-determination are “legitimate,” but says that the priority should be placed upon creating a conducive environment for nationwide negotiations of a secular state – such as conflict resolution and the peaceful return of refugees to their villages.

National Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi also re-iterated his rejection of El-Hilu’s position, telling his supporters” “someone cannot say that if you do not accept my political programme, I will not accept peace.” (13 January, Sudan Tribune).

Suspicions of interference from al-Bashir’s loyalists.

Distrust continues to pose an obstacle in the peace negotiations, as rebel groups accuse the transitional government of continuing the agenda of al-Bashir’s regime.

Peace negotiations suffered a setback after a tense exchange between the government and Minni Minnawi, a factional leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) (16 January, Sudan Tribune). Regarding the Darfur negotiations, Minnawi tweeted: "the government delegation reversed its position on all the items that were agreed upon…Unfortunately, history repeats itself shamelessly."

Minnawi went on to slam El-Hadi Idris, the leader of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, a coalition of rebel groups participating the negotiations, tweeting: “I do not know how and why [Idris] responds to my Tweets at a time when the government owns all private and public media…a new beginning of divide and rule policy".

Indeed, further worries of figures affiliated to Omar al-Bashir’s regime spoiling the peace process were reflected in several key stakeholders boycotted the eastern Sudan peace conference. (15 January, Radio Dabanga).

Hamrour Hussein, a leading member of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) in Kassala, alleged that most conference participants selected by the acting governors of the three eastern Sudanese states are native administration leaders and academics affiliated with the former regime. Ramzi Yahya, an FFC leader from El Gedarif cited acting military governors in eastern Sudan “still implementing the agenda of the former regime.”

Sudan Liberation Movement (Abdelwahid el-Nur faction) strengthens its military capacity.

According to a report by a UN panel, the Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Abdelwahid el-Nur (SLM-AW) strengthened its military capability thanks to the significant goldfields in Torroye, a rebel-controlled area in Jebel Marra . (20 January, Sudan Tribune).

The report said that the gold-mines have funded a recruitment drive and purchase of weapons from local militias. In addition, the SLM-AW gold discovery has triggered conflict between rebels, security forces and militias, with clashes between miners and the Sudanese military in East Jebel Marra causing two deaths in September 2019. 

Security Briefing (January 2020): Mutiny in Khartoum, massacre in Abyei

Sudan Security Report | January 2020

Security Incidents in Sudan during January 2020 saw an intensification of Sudan’s two main security threats – instability within the security apparatus, and ethnic/tribal violence in peripheral regions.

A mutiny on January 14 has shone a spotlight on the inherent fragility of Sudan’s military alliances, and the obstacles this presents for security reforms.

The Sudanese security apparatus continues to show signs that it is unable to maintain security across Sudan, following a series of violent incidents across Sudan. Most notably, a massacre in Abyei, the disputed oil-rich area on Sudan’s border with South Sudan, has seen the Sudanese army and militias affiliated to Omar al-Bashir accused of responsibility.

To solve the instability within the security apparatus, solutions have focused on addressing the fragile power-balances within it. To prevent friction between militias and the armed forces, commentators have called for the civilian government to take leadership of security sector reforms. In addition, it has been suggested that a unified leadership would prevent conflict being triggered by disenfranchised Islamist groups.

To resolve the conflicts in the marginalised peripheries, the prospect of devolution has been raised, as well as a peace settlement which also takes into account the drastic change of demographic patterns in West Sudan.

A mutiny in Khartoum

Multiple sources (January 14) reported that former employees of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) launched a mutiny in Khartoum, as well as shutting down to oilfields in Darfur, in protest about their severance packages. The deputy chairman of Sudan’s sovereign council, Himedti, said that former NISS chief Salah Gosh was behind the unrest. However, Gosh told Foreign Policy (January 17) that Himedti is “playing political games.”

For the background story on the NISS revolt, more context on the Himedti-Gosh rivalry, and the implications of the failed mutiny for Sudanese democratic development, please watch our Sudan Security Report on YouTube, where we highlight arguments that well-armed yet disenfranchised sections of Omar al-Bashir’s regime will continue to pose a security threat to Sudan, and the democratic transition.

Indeed, Jean-Baptiste Gallopin’s analysis of the NISS mutiny suggested that the mutiny indicates the fragility of Sudanese military alliances, with the mishandling of NISS severance packages “inspiring little confidence that [Sudanese] authorities have the means and expertise to prevent other, potentially more serious, rebellions.” (19 January, Washington Post).

To intensify matters, Hamid Suleiman, the undersecretary for the Sudanese Ministry of Energy and Mining, confirmed that elements of Omar al-Bashir’s regime planned to sabotage oil fields in East Darfur and West Kordofan “by causing a rift between the local tribes.” (26 January, Sudan Tribune).

Violence across Sudan

Further signs that the Sudanese security apparatus is unable to maintain security are reflected in incidents across Sudan. In Bout, Blue Nile state, Sudanese Human Rights and Democracy Organisation (HUDO) claimed that the police failed to act after three churches were targeting by arsonists, twice in the space of three weeks.  (20 January, Radio Dabanga). HUDO called upon the Sudanese government “to take urgent action to safeguard the constitutional rights of the affected citizens.”

In East Sudan, the The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) in El Gezira held the police responsible for the shooting of two demonstrators who protested against a march of Islamists in Wad Madani, El Gezira.  (13 January, Radio Dabanga). In Kassala, widespread protests were sparked after the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) shot and killed a civilian who was falsely suspected to be a smuggler. (21 January, Radio Dabanga).

In West Sudan, leaders in displaced camps in El Geneina, continue to demand that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia leave the city, located in Darfur, saying that they cannot return to the city following the massacre at the end of 2019. (22 January, Radio Dabanga). Indeed, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) said that clashes in West Darfur forced over 11,000 to flee into Chad following El-Geneina massacre. (28 January, AP). UNHCR spokesman Babar Baloch added that the violence in El-Geneina may have displaced 46,000 in Sudan alone, with Chadian villages on the Sudanese border already hosting 128,000 Sudanese refugees.

Meanwhile, in Abyei, the disputed oil-rich region on Sudan’s border with South Sudan, saw the Sudanese security apparatus directly blamed for massacre inspired by tribal differences.

Abyei incident

 Three were killed in clashes between Dinka Ngok and Misseriya (Arab) tribesmen in Kolom in north-west Abyei on 20 January. Misseriya allegedly retaliated on January 22, by killing 32, wounding 24, abducting 15 children and burning 22 houses. The allegations were made by Dinka Ngok leaders. (24 January, Sudan Tribune).

However, Akon Akol, governor of Abyei told Radio Dabanga (22 January) that the assailants are “affiliated to the Sudanese Armed Forces.” These allegations were re-iterated by the head of the Abyei Administration from the South Sudanese side, Kuol Alor, who accused the Sudanese army and Misseriya militiamen, supported by the Popular Defence Forces, a militia linked to Omar al-Bashir. (24 January, Sudan Tribune).

Nonetheless, the Sudanese sovereign council blamed the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNIFSA) for the failure to protect civilians in Abyei. (24 January, Sudan Tribune).  Sovereign Council spokesman Mohamed al-Faki said the protection of civilians in Abyei is full responsibility of UNIFSA, “given that the region is disputed and under the umbrella of the UN.”

Solutions

Civilian leadership of security sector reforms

Gallopin raised the prospect of security sector reforms triggering in-fighting between Himedti’s RSF and the SAF. To prevent such outcomes, he suggested that security sector reforms should be overseen by civilians, although this would be unlikely “without an initiative from Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok.” (19 January, Washington Post).

However, Foreign Policy (January 17) note Hamdok’s precarious position, whereby he “has gone out of his way not to directly antagonise Himedti,” despite “quietly” outmaneuvering him by liberalising the gold sector to choke off RSF gold mining revenues.

Unified leadership:

According to UK-based academics Andrew Edward Tchie and Jihad Salih Mashamoun, security sector reforms would necessitate a unified leadership, so as to prevent the mobilization of disenfranchised Islamist conservatives and isolated security personnel.  Therefore, Tchie and Mashamoun call for the Sudanese government to “deal carefully” with the “fractured” military, security and intelligence apparatus. (23 January, Africa Report).

Supporting poor Arab tribes that have displaced indigenous Darfuri tribes

To solve the continued ethnic violence in Darfur, Sudan expert Alex de Waal suggested that part of the solution will be the acceptance that Darfur’s “settlement patterns and demographics have changed for good,” citing “dramatic and accelerated urbanization.”

Therefore, to enable a peace settlement, Tufts University’s Helen Young calls for ways to also support poor Arab tribes that have displaced indigenous Darfuri tribes, so to prevent conflict being re-fueled. (8 January, New Humanitarian).

Addressing structural marginalisation

To prevent violence from flaring up in Sudan’s peripheral regions, Tchie and Mashamoun call for a vision of governance that addresses structural marginalization. Tchie and Mashamoun suggested the “real change” can be created and embedded through “innovative, sustainable, inclusive and law-abiding” policies such as devolution of powers.  

Security Briefing: 4 key obstacles in Sudan's peace negotiations (January 2020)

Introduction:

This briefing explores four key obstacles preventing conflict resolution in Sudan at the start of 2020.

1. The Sudanese security apparatus has been blamed for deteriorating security situations in peripheral regions in south, west and east Sudan*.

Further obstacles are posed by a lack of progression in the peace negotiations:

2. Sudan Revolutionary Front has been unable to resolve its differences with the Forces for Freedom and Change.

3. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (faction led by Abdelaziz El-Hilu) continues to threaten to fight for self-determination in its territories unless the transitional government adopts secularism.

4. Divergence over the matter of secularism reflects the wider, historic obstacle to Sudanese conflict resolution – the issue of national identity.

Among the solutions presented include:

  • Transforming rebel groups into a civilian political parties.

  • Security sector reforms in which rebel groups would be integrated into a unified national army.

  • International intervention to bolster Sudanese security in the regional peripheries, amid suspicions that the security apparatus is fuelling conflict.

  1. Worsening security situations across Sudanese peripheral regions.

While El-Geneina massacre grabbed headlines, violence has erupted across Sudan towards the end of 2019, for which the transitional government has been blamed.

*As we have dedicated an individual briefing to el-Geneina massacre (which you can read about here) – it will not be covered in this briefing.  

Southern Sudan: In Abyei, an area disputed between Sudan and South Sudan, the Sudanese government was blamed after more than a dozen people were killed by militiamen aiming to displace indigenous people. (Radio Dabanga, 25 December)

Eastern Sudan: In El-Gedarif, near the Sudan-Ethiopia border, three Sudanese people were killed and four were wounded by Ethiopian gunmen. El-Gedarif locals blamed both the Sudanese government and Ethiopian army for the recurring attacks on Sudanese citizens by Ethiopian militants, which have included kidnappings, and the robbery of livestock. (Radio Dabanga, January 3).

Eastern Sudan: In Port Sudan, continued clashes between the Bani Amer and displaced Nuba tribes saw nine killed and 100 wounded (AP, January 4). The transitional government has also been blamed, with SPLM-N el-Hilu spokesman Omar Shurkian citing the firearms carried by Bani Amer tribesmen as indications that “they must have been receiving support from somebody somewhere.” (Sudan Tribune, January 7).

In a previous briefing - State of Emergency in Port Sudan - we linked to a video in which a Bani Amer tribal leader gave an oath of allegiance called for his fellow tribesmen to swear allegiance to the Rapid Support Forces.

West Sudan: The RSF were blamed for the El-Geneina massacre in West Darfur. In North Darfur, dozens were forced to flee their homes after gunmen attacked their villages (Radio Dabanga, January 5). In Nyala, South Darfur, UNAMID (29 December) called for the government to take action after its former headquarters – hosting assets worth approximately $100 million - were looted by “individuals in uniform.”

2. Continued friction between rebel groups and the civilians in the transitional government

The Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) announced its rejection of the participation of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) in the Juba peace negotiations, citing “relations [that are] marred by chaos.” (Sudan Tribune, December 12).

The issue stems from the FFC’s rejection of SRF demands that a peace agreement precedes the formation of the transitional government.

According to SRF Chairman El Hadi Idris, the four disputed issues between the SRF and FFC are as follows: (Radio Dabanga, 15 December)

  1. The SRF demands that the appointment of state governors is delayed until a peace agreement is reached, with SRF suspicions that the FFC is seeking to allocate state governor positions to its members and supporters.

  2. The postponement of the formation of a Legislative council.

  3. The suspension of the appointment of civil service employees

  4. And finally, the amendment of the Constitutional Document to ensure that any peace agreements prevail over the charter. 

Another key issue that is impeding the peace negotiations is that while the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) demand the inclusion of national constitutional issues in the peace agenda, the transitional government insists on restricting negotiations to areas that the SPLM-N controls in South Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile states. (Radio Dabanga, 18 December).

A reflection of this divergence are demands by a faction of the SPLM-N led by Abdelaziz El-Hilu, who control the most territory out of Sudan’s rebel groups, threatening to fight for self-determination in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan unless the transitional government commits to nationwide secularism.

3. SPLM-N El-Hilu and the demand for secularism

Despite SPLM-N El-Hilu’s demands for self-determination unless secularism is adopted, the transitional government takes a pragmatic stance, rooted in fears of future friction with Islamist groups. The transitional government seeks to stage a constitutional conference that gathers all the political forces to decide on the separation between politics and religion (Multiple sources, December 17), but El-Hilu dismissed the conference as merely representative of [Arab] elites (28 December, Radio Dabanga).

The El-Hilu faction believes that a secular state would end the marginalisation of non-Muslims in Sudan. (Sudan Tribune, December 23). El-Hilu attributed the stalled peace talks to the government’s ambiguity on the secularism question, and re-iterated his view that secularism would preserve Sudan’s unity. (Sudan Tribune, January 3).

El-Hilu is not isolated in his preference for a secular Sudan. Siddig Youssef, a prominent Communist in the FFC, said that El-Hilu’s demands are in line with the Constitutional Document.  (Sudan Tribune, December 23). El-Hilu has also claimed that the UAE “showed understanding” regarding his factions demands for a secular state. (Sudan Tribune, 1 January).

Although the UAE has not released a statement, there are reasonable grounds to assume UAE for support for El-Hilu. Given the UAE’s influential role in the Middle-East’s anti-Islamist axis, its reported role in overthrowing al-Bashir, and its influence over Sudan’s security apparatus, an El-Hilu-UAE alliance would add authority, credibility and perhaps financial backing, to El-Hilu demands.  

4. National Identity

The issue of Sudanese national identity continues to pose an obstacle to Sudan’s chances of resolving conflict.

Speaking at the University of Khartoum, El-Hilu argued that national identity is the primary cause of Sudanese conflicts. (28 December, Radio Dabanga). El-Hilu said that Sudanese elites have not learned from past mistakes of insisting on coercive unity by “imposing” Arab-Islamic identity, adding that the Darfur war is due to western Sudanese having different identity to central government in Khartoum.

Solutions

For rebel groups

Sudanese political expert Dr Elwathig Kameir, argues that a peace agreement is contingent upon rebel groups transforming into civilian political organisations prepared for participation in the general elections (Radio Dabanga, 18 December).

Security sector reforms  - a united national army

Both Elwathig Kameir, and Yasir Arman, the deputy head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North faction under the leadership of Malik Agar (SPLM-N Agar), suggest that the road to conflict resolution can be paved by the integration of rebel groups into a united single army.

Arman attributed Sudanese insecurity to the existence of five armies within Sudan – calling for the merger of the Sudanese Armed Forces, Rapid Support Forces and armed rebel groups into a single professional national army, with a new military doctrine that prioritises the protection of the state, democratic promotion and economic stability. (Radio Dabanga, 6 January).

Security sector reforms  - Appointing democrats to security positions

Meanwhile, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) has called for structural changes in the administrative structures of the police and security services. Stating that the insecurity Sudan is witnessing are “well organised acts rather than coincidences,” the SPA has called for the chiefs of police, heads of departments, and public administrations to be replaced “with those who believe in change and freedom”. (Radio Dabanga, 5 January)

International intervention

Clinton Yak, the head of the Abyei civil society, urged the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to implement its mandate to protect civilians in the region.  Yak also called for the international community to supervise a new referendum on the disputed territory of Abyei, noting the conflict of interests between the Sudanese and South Sudanese governments. (Radio Dabanga, 25 December)

Demilitarisation

Yak also called on the Sudanese transitional government remove all militias and demilitarise Abyei.

Echoing similar sentiments, SPLM-N El-Hilu called for the transitional government to take “drastic measures” in combatting recurrent tribal violence in Port Sudan, having implied that the Bani Amer tribe is being armed. (Sudan Tribune, January 7)

Security Briefing: Are the Rapid Support Forces the "protectors of the revolution"?

Introduction

The end of 2019 heralded a series of public relations victories for the Rapid Support Forces and their commander Himedti, suggesting that Canadian lobbying firm Dickens & Madson is succeeding in its promise to generate positive media coverage for the RSF.

Himedti has emphasised his support for the civilian government, and has earned praise from powerful figures in Khartoum. However, recent events in Darfur – the El-Geneina massacre - have re-enforced perceptions of the RSF as a brutal force guilty of genocide and ethnic cleansing.

1) Positive publicity

In an interview with the Independent (17 December) Himedti:

  • Called for a partnership with the UK

  • Said his priority is the success of the civilian government rather than ruling

  • Denied allegations that the RSF was being used to pursue his interests in gold mining.

In a move that was seen as a mark of Himedti’s support for Hamdok’s civilian government, it was also reported that Himedti began to handover the lucrative mining areas in North Darfur’s Jebel Amer to the Sudanese government. (Radio Dabanga, 16 December).

Himedti also labelled the RSF the “guardians of Darfur” and “protectors of the revolution.” Following his usual narrative on the June 3 Khartoum massacre, he also claimed that the violence perpetrated by “an invisible group disguising itself as RSF militiamen”. (Radio Dabanga, 19 December).

Himedti’s revolutionary credentials have also been supported by influential figures in Sudanese politics. The leader of the National Umma Party, Sadiq al-Mahdi, called for the end of hostile statements against Himedti and said his support for the revolution was sufficient in accepting him in the nation-building process. (Sudan Tribune, 15 December). Sudan’s official leader and the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces,  Abdelfattah El Burhan, said that the RSF are an integral part of the Sudanese army. El Burhan labelled the RSF “messengers of peace and love…who can protect the revolution and fight terrorism and illegal immigration.” (Radio Dabanga, 23 December)

2) Ongoing fears

Fears remain about the RSF’s financial and military power as a factor in Sudanese instability, particularly in connection with continued allegations of ethnic cleansing. Such fears create uncertainty with regards to the RSF’s democratic commitment, given Himedti’s claim that his troops are the “guardians of Darfur” and the “protectors of the revolution”.

A measure of RSF financial power is reflected in the financial opportunities they provide in poverty-ridden Darfur, particularly with regards to the war in Yemen.  (Independent, 22 December).  While Sudanese minimum wage is $190 a month, RSF soldiers can earn £17,000 for six-months in Yemen, with officers making double.

However, the RSF is said to prefer enlisting Arab tribes, fuelling tensions in Darfur. Internally displaced persons told the Independent that the RSF are returning from Yemen “better equipped, trained and financed, ready to kill our people.” Malaria and dengue fever outbreaks in North Darfur have also been attributed to RSF soldiers returning from Yemen.

The RSF’s alleged presence in Libya also poses concerns for Sudanese democratic development. Canada’s Globe and Mail (December 15) reported that the UN is investigating Dickens & Madson, amid allegations that it has played a “direct role” in the illegal deployment of about 1,000 troops to Libya, in breach of UN sanctions. Indeed, the Guardian’s report (December 23) on Sudanese mercenaries in Libya quoted mercenaries to say that they were in Libya to have a secure base, weapons and other military logistics, before planning to return to Sudan to fight the government.

3) El Geneina massacre

At the end of 2019, the RSF deputy commander in West Darfur, Mousa Ambelo, was accused of genocide and ethnic cleansing after a massacre was carried out in Kerending camp for internally displaced people in El Geneina, West Darfur. (31 December).

According to El Geneina Crisis Committee, the massacre – which killed more than 80, injured at least 190 and affected 80,00 - was carried out by the RSF, with the knowledge of West Darfur local authorities (Radio Dabanga, 3 January).

While the massacre has been reported as tribal clashes between Arab Maaliya herders and Masalit tribesmen in the western media, the El Geneina Crisis committee labelled the attacks “systematic crimes in an orchestrated operation intended to reproduce the [Darfur] genocide.”

For more about the reactions to El Geneina massacre, read our briefing here: https://www.sudaninthenews.com/sudan-peace-and-security-briefings/security-briefing-el-geneina-massacre

4) Solutions

For Sudanese democracy to succeed, John Hursh, a former Policy Analyst for the Enough Project, calls for Sudan’s removal from the US state sponsor of terrorism (SST) list. In doing so, Hursh argues that the civilian government would have the finances available to outmanoeuvre Himedti by winning popular support and stabilising the economy. (Just Security, 19 December)

Security Briefing: El-Geneina Massacre

Introduction

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been accused of conducting a massacre in el-Geneina, west Darfur – with the blessing of local government authorities. Sudanese civilian organisations have labeled the massacre as ethnic cleansing and genocide. In remedies suggested by international actors, the UN has called for durable solutions that address the drivers of the Darfur conflict, with the US calling for the incident to not be used as a political weapon in the peace negotiations. However, Sudanese entities have called for the dismissal of the West Darfur governor and the removal of the RSF from the region.

1. What happened?

Reuters (December 30) reported that violence flared in el-Geneina, West Darfur, after a Rapid Support Forces (RSF) soldier was stabbed to death, with two of his relatives, in apparent retaliation for incidents in which locals had been hit by cars. Arab groups then responded to the soldier’s death by raiding camps for internally displaced people near el-Geneina.

Radio Dabanga (31 December) initially reported the El-Geneina massacre as clashes between Arab Maaliya herders and non-Arab Masalit tribespeople.  According to early reports, more than 70 were killed or injured, with Masalit tribesmen accusing the RSF of complicity

Masalit tribesmen said the “Janjaweed” who attacked Kerending camp for the internally displaced were riding vehicles belonging to the RSF, who also fired indiscriminately at people in other districts in el-Geneina, under the watch of the army and the police. The RSF also allegedly attacked wounded people at El Geneina Teaching Hospital. (Radio Dabanga, 31 December).

On January 3, Radio Dabanga reported that the El Geneina Crisis Committee put the death toll at over 80, with at least 190 wounded. It was reported that 80,000 people have been affected, with:

  • · 8,111 families fleeing their homes

  •    More than 5,000 heads of livestock, 200 motorcycles, 300 rickshaws, more than 180 vehicles of all kinds, and millions of Pounds in cash were stolen.

2. How has Sudan reacted?

Sudanese civilian associations disputed reports that the casualties were a result of tribal conflict, instead describing the attacks as state-orchestrated ethnic cleansing.

The El Geneina Crisis Committee said the attacks constitute the “continuation of systematic crimes in an orchestrated operation intended to reproduce the genocide that started in [Darfur] 2003.” (Radio Dabanga, 3 January)

A delegation of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) said that the attacks were the result of “elements of the deep state achieving their personal interests”. (Radio Dabanga, 6 January)

The Darfur Bar Association also labelled the attacks “an organised crime committed by militiamen,” accusing the security services of complicity.  (Radio Dabanga, 7 January)

The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebel alliance suspended peace talks concerning Darfur, adding that they hold the government in Khartoum responsible, and demand that it “fulfils its full duty to protect unarmed civilians and provide security”. (Radio Dabanga, 31 December).

3. Remedies suggested by international actors

The solutions to the massacre presented by the UN (January 3) have been directed at the transitional authorities. UN secretary-general António Guterres, and the United Nations-African Union Joint Mission In Darfur (UNAMID) both called on Sudanese authorities to conduct an investigation, hold the perpetrators to account, and restore security around the el-Geneina region.

Guterres emphasised the need to find peaceful and durable solutions to the situation in Darfur, that address the key drivers of conflict.

Meanwhile, the US State Department called on Sudan’s peace negotiation parties to refrain from using the “tribal clashes” for political gain. (Sudan Tribune, 3 January). The same article also reported that the committee investigating the violence involves state officials, despite allegations that the government-linked RSF is behind the massacre.

4. Remedies suggested from Sudan

The El Geneina Crisis Committee also demanded that Sudan’s Sovereign Council and Cabinet conduct a “transparent and fair investigation,” hold the perpetrators accountable, and “be fair in dealing with the grievances.” (Radio Dabanga, 3 January)

However, Masalit tribal leaders accused Mousa Ambelo, the deputy commander of the RSF militia in West Darfur, of genocide and ethnic cleansing. They called for the dismissal of the West Darfur governor and security committee, the expulsion of the RSF and district-wide disarmament.  (Radio Dabanga, 31 December).

Masalit calls were supported by the Darfur Bar Association, who demanded the removal of the governor and the leaders of the security services in West Darfur. (Radio Dabanga, 7 January)

Security Briefing: Government Agrees Separate Peace Deal With the SRF

Overview

The latest developments in Sudan’s peace process reflect the magnitude of the task at hand for Sudan's transitional authorities, as different rebel groups have different agendas, and different appetites for negotiations.

Progress

On the behalf of the rebel groups, Sudanese Prime Minister Hamdok has requested that the UN and the African Union halt the planned June 2020 withdrawal of their Darfur peacekeeping mission. (Sudan Tribune, 19 October).

The UN's leading peacekeeper Jean-Pierre Lacroix said that two proposals will be made to the UN Security Council concerning the peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Either:

A) UNAMID reduces its presence to 5 locations from 13, mainly located where armed fighting is fiercest or B) that the UNAMID peacekeeping mission will withdraw completely from Darfur by June 2020 as previously planned.

The latter option would go against the wishes of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, who say that government-linked militias continue to attack civilians across Sudan.

SLM Al-Hilu signs peace talks roadmap (Multiple sources, 18 October)

A positive development has been that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction) has agreed to a roadmap to allow suspended peace talks to resume. The movements spokesman El Jak Mahmoud deemed the agreement “a factual break-through”, given their previous experiences with the former regime headed by ousted President Omar al Bashir.

The focus of negotiations will be political issues, followed by humanitarian concerns and security arrangements.

Government agrees separate deal with the SRF (Sudan Tribune, 20 October).

The Sudanese government and SRF (not including Sudan Liberation Movement factions led by Abdelaziz El-Hilu or Abdelwahid El-Nur) made a political agreement on peace which included a renewed ceasefire for humanitarian purposes and the negotiation of all issues relating to armed conflict and other national issues.

Most significantly, Sudan agreed to open humanitarian access to war-torn areas for the first time in 8 years. SRF deputy leader Yasir Arman said: “we believe we have a partner in Khartoum and there’s a new environment created by the revolution.” (Reuters, 21 October).

Challenges

Firstly, the Sudan Liberation Movement-North (Abdelwahid El-Nur faction) still refuses to join peace talks. Abdelwahid El-Nur is adamant that a referendum must be held on the legitimacy of the transitional government before he recognises it. As a result, UN’s leading peacekeeper Jean-Pierre Lacroix has called on the UN Security Council to exert more effort to bring the SLM-N (AW) to the peace negotiations table. (Sudan Tribune, 19 October).

Secondly, despite the SLM-N Al Hilu faction agreeing to peace talks roadmap, Abdelaziz al-Hilu re-iterated its threats to fight for self-determination in South Kordofan, unless Sudan becomes a secular state. (Multiple sources, 21 October). Al-Hilu’s calls reflect the lack of coordination and unity among Sudan’s various rebel groups. His calls for religion to play no part in Sudanese politics contrasts greatly from the Islamic-leaning position of the Justice and Equality Movement, which is a part of the SRF.

It is also worth noting that Abdelaziz al-Hilu's SPLM-N faction broke away from the one led by Malik Agar, because the latter is unwilling to fight for self-determination until Sudan repeals Islamic laws.

Proposed Solution (International Crisis Group, 21 October).

To resolve conflict amid competing rebel agendas, the International Crisis Group recommended that the transitional government negotiate inclusive peace deals, with the international community needed to offer technical support in the road towards sustainable peace.

The ICG also proposed that Abdelaziz al-Hilu and Abdul-Wahid al-Nur be offered positions in transitional institutions “lest they conclude that yet another betrayal is in the offing.”

Explainer: A Profile of Sudan's Main Rebel Groups

 The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF),

·      An alliance of rebel groups including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army faction led by Minni Minawi.

·      Wants a role transitional government

·      Wants its fighters formally integrated into the Sudanese military.

 Sudan Liberation Movement-North, Abdel-Aziz Al-Hilu faction

·      Not a part of the SRF

·      Largest rebel group in Sudan - controls large chunks of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile.

·      Abdel-Aziz Al-Hilu refuses to hold talks with the military council or the pro-democracy movement.

·      Al-Hilu threatens an independence movement unless Sudan becomes a secular state, al-Bashir’s militias are disbanded and the military is revamped.

  • As a result of these demands, Al-Hilu’s faction broke away from other components of the SLM-N, who remain in the SRF.

 The Sudan Liberation Movement, Abdelwahid al-Nur faction (SLM-AW)

·      SLM-AW reject the transitional government, and the peace talks.

 Challenges

·      The rebels lack a common political ideology, contrasting the Islamic-leaning JEM to the secular SLM-N.

Security Briefing: Juba Peace Talks Suspended

Overview

Talks between the transitional government and rebel groups in Juba have been suspended, after the Rapid Support Forces allegedly attacked civilians. This reflects the three main challenges for conflict resolution in Sudan. Government-linked militias remain active, rebel groups feel that their preconditions for negotiations are unmet and ceasefires have not been implemented.

Who is involved in the talks?

Achieving peace is crucial to the Sudanese government, which is seeking to revive the economy by slashing military spending (14 October, AP). The government for Juba’s peace talks will be led by Himedti, who will be joined by his fellow sovereign council military representatives Shamseldine Kabbashi and Yassir al-Atta. The civilian government delegation includes sovereign council members Mohammed al-Faki and Mohammed al-Taayshi, and Cabinet Ministers Omar Manis and Yousef El Dei. (14 October, Radio Dabanga).

Notable absences

Although the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) is participating in the talks, some key rebel groups are refusing to participate. The Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Abdelwahid al-Nur does not recognise the transitional government. Meanwhile, the Sudan Liberation Movement-North led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu is not a part of the RSF, and also refuses to hold talks with the military council or the pro-democracy movement. It is worth noting that the SLM-N Al-Hilu faction is Sudan’s largest rebel group, controlling large chunks of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. (AP).

The Forces of Freedom and Change are also absent from the peace negotiations, which has been strongly criticised by the leader of the Sudanese Congress Party, Omar al-Digair. In criticisms directed at Sudan’s transitional government, the government of South Sudan, and the Sudanese armed movement, al-Digair called for remediation, stating that the FFC were instrumental in the formation of the interim government. (17 October, Radio Dabanga).

Unhappy with Juba hosting peace talks

Ahead of its participation in the peace talks, the SRF wanted to address its concerns about Juba hosting the peace talks, suspecting that the South Sudanese government of Salva Kiir wants to dictate the agenda of the talks. (12 October, Sudan Tribune).

Niemat Ahmadi of the Darfur Women's Action group also criticised South Sudan’s capacity to host the peace negotiations given its interests in Sudan. (16 October, Radio Dabanga).

Talks Suspended (16 October, Multiple sources)

Peace talks collapse after the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North accused the Rapid Support Forces militia of occupying new areas and attacking and arresting traders. SPLM-N chief negotiator Ammar Amoun said that his group’s preconditions to returning to the negotiating table include the release of all prisoners, the withdrawal of government forces from areas they’ve taken and a halt to all hostilities.

Response

Mohammed al-Taayshi a civilian member of Sudan’s sovereign council said: “the government is shocked...[we are] ready to investigative those behind the attack and will bring them to justice.”

In addition, Abdelfattah al-Burhan, the leader of the Sudan’s ruling sovereign council, and the chairman of the High Peace Council, announced a permanent ceasefire in Sudan's three main conflict zones - Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile.

Security Briefing: Cairo Forum and Radio Dabanga Interviews

Overview

In the latest developments of Sudan’s road to internal peace, Radio Dabanga held exclusive interviews with Prime Minister Hamdok and Abdelwahid El Nur, a faction leader of the Sudan Liberation movement. In addition, a forum in Cairo brought together Sudanese rebel and political groups. This briefing highlights the important statements made.

Hamdok (Radio Dabanga, 1 October)

In an exclusive interview with Radio Dabanga, Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok said his Paris meeting with SLM-AW faction leader Abdelwahid El Nur – initiated by the French foreign ministry – covered, in detail, “issues of peace and the root causes of Sudanese problems, such as…marginalisation, national identity, equality, distribution of resources, or unbalanced development.”

Hamdok said he appreciated and acknowledged the role of the armed movements in the revolution and change in Sudan. He added that the dialogue with the armed movements is not difficult “because we have similar views regarding the root causes of the problems”.

Finally, Hamdok said that the issue of displaced persons and refugees is the highest priority and primary aspect in achieving peace, as well as the importance of meeting the needs of marginalised groups.

Abdelwahid El Nur (Radio Dabanga, 3 October)

Sudan Liberation Movement faction leader Abdelwahid El Nur told Radio Dabanga that he met Hamdok in a personal rather than official capacity: “because we do not recognise the new government or its Sovereign Council, which represents the Al Bashir security infrastructure.”

Nonetheless, El Nur insists that he has no problem with Hamdok, nor many of those appointed in the transitional government.

Cairo Forum (Radio Dabanga, 3 October)

Organised by the Sudan Revolutionary Front and the Sudan Call coalition of rebels, opposition parties and civil society organisations, the Cairo Forum saw various Sudanese political actors call for an end to racism in Sudan.

Minni Minawi, a factional leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement, and Yasir Arman, deputy head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, both stressed the need to draw lessons from the experience of the secession of South Sudan, calling for the end “hatred and systematic racism.”

Omar El Degeir, chairman of the Sudanese Congress Party (SCP), called for putting the issues of displaced persons and refugees at the top of the political agenda, which he considered “the biggest humanitarian tragedy in Sudan”

Security Briefing: Sudan Liberation Movement Disputes with Government and FFC

Overview

Despite the ceasefire agreement between the government and the rebels, resolving conflict in Sudan not only remains elusive, but it is getting more complicated. As expected from a broad, wide-ranging coalition, the Forces of Freedom and Change - a collection of political parties and rebel movements opposed to Al-Bashir's regime - is divided over how to pursue peace. These divides are being played out publicly.

*SLM-AW = Sudan Liberation Movement, Abdel-Wahid Nur faction

*The Sudan Revolutionary Front, which includes the SLM-AW, is part of the FFC coalition.

SLM-AW refuses to recognise transitional government

After meeting with prime minister Hamdok in Paris, a factional leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement Abdel-Wahid Nur reiterated his refusal to join peace negotiations, because he does not recognise Hamdok's government nor its constitution. (Sudan Tribune, 29 September).

Al-Nur said the transitional government must first:

  • Disband government militias

  • Compensate for conflict-affected civilians

  • Return land grabbed under al-Bashir’s regime and hand him over to the International Criminal Court

  • Hold a referendum on the transitional constitution

SLM-AW rejects confidence building measure

As a confidence-building measure, Sudan's sovereign council (which has 5 FFC civilian representatives and no rebels) dropped 8 Darfuri rebel death sentences. The rebels were from the Sudan Liberation Army (Abdel-Wahid Nur faction). (AFP, September 19).

However, the SLM-AW response to the confidence-building measure reflects how tense the divide is. They said that the decision has no value and reflects the same approach used by Al-Bashir's regime to confuse the public and evade international law. (Sudan Tribune, 20 September).

The SLM-AW also claimed that promises to release 18 other rebels were not followed, and called for the sovereign council to address the root causes of the Darfur crisis.

Internal disputes between rebels and civilians in the FFC

With the rebel movements feeling that they have been excluded from the transitional process, former prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, an FFC leader, added fuel to the fire. Sudan Tribune (21 September) reported that al-Mahdi called for the rebels to accept that the revolution was achieved peacefully, before engaging in the political process in Sudan.

The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) then dismissed Al-Mahdi's calls for a peace conference inside Sudan, arguing that his proposed solution is insufficient for broader conflict issues. (Sudan Tribune, 25 September). Instead, the SRF said it will hold public debates in Sudan. Their belief is that meaningful public participation and interaction with masses in peace-making process is best way to address public interests. (Sudan Tribune, 26 September).

To further complicate matters, an FFC spokesman said that the ceasefire agreement in the Juba Declaration contradicts the new constitution - as it delays the formation of parliament and the appointment of state governors until the peace process is concluded. (Sudan Tribune, 29 September).

Security Briefing: Military exploiting disagreements between the rebels and the FFC.

Overview

Although the Sudanese government agreed a new peace roadmap with the rebels, the picture is complicated. The threat of the military exploiting the rebels continued disagreements with the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition remains.

Ceasefire

Although rebels and bandits remain active in western Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile state, a ceasefire was agreed between the transitional government and some rebel groups in Juba, with a view to ending war in Sudan by the end of the year. (Multiple sources, September 12).

Bloomberg's Okech Francis (September 11) raised the prospect of Himedti using the ceasefire as an opportunity to support his political ambitions.

Divide and rule

An alliance with the rebels would provide Himedti a support base in Sudan's peripheral regions, which have long accused the Khartoum government of neglect. This would also compensate for the support that Himedti lacks among the Khartoum elites who have traditionally led Sudan.

Then, we saw a sign that the military would be more willing to give the rebels what they want. Yasir al-Atta, a military representative of the Sudan's ruling sovereign council, hinted at the possibility of increasing sovereign council members to include the rebels, or creating a deputy prime minister post if necessary (Sudan Tribune, September 16).

Since the power-sharing negotiations began, the FFC been firmly opposed to the idea of quotas to guarantee the representation of Sudan's armed movements in the transitional government. As a result, rebels feel that the FFC is not fully supportive of the rebels' insistence that peace should be a priority of the power-sharing document.

Meanwhile, the FFC re-iterated its position that the Constitutional Declaration will not be amended to include rebels in the transitional government, until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached.

The disagreements between the rebels and the FFC may spell danger for the Sudanese democratic transition, As academic Yasir Zaidan noted (Foreign Policy, September 9) - to protect against the military's divide-and-rule tactics, a broader consensus in forming the new constitution will be needed.

"Where is the peace?": Darfur youth reject the Forces of Freedom and Change

Overview

In a representation of anger at the under-representation of those from Sudan’s peripheries, youth in El-Fasher, Darfur chant “where is the peace?” during a rally by the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition. Meanwhile, leaders of two factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement, who the youth are said to support, have issued statements accusing the FFC of racism and being a reincarnation of Omar al-Bashir’s regime.

This briefing is also available as a Twitter thread, with videos and pictures included.

Sudan Tribune (2 September) reported that Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) leaders were forced to cancel their public meeting in North Darfur, following a hostile protest. High-profile FFC representatives from leading opposition parties and the Professionals Association went to Darfur in an attempt to build national support for the transitional government.

The FFC delegation included Sara Nagdalla of the Umma Party, Khalid Omar of the Sudanese Congress Party and Mohammed Nagi Alasam of the Sudanese Professionals Association.

Alasam is widely viewed as the poster-boy of #SudanUprising - he is received very positively by the public. But it was reported that stones were thrown at the FFC once he took to the stage.

The group of youth who protested against the FFC reportedly sympathise with Darfuri rebel groups. They carried banners against the Political and Constitutional Declarations that mark Sudan’s power-sharing agreement.

For reference, Sudanese rebel groups have continually publicly attacked the FFC for ignoring the rebels insistence that peace in Sudan’s conflict zones is a priority of the transitional government.

In a Facebook statement, the rebel group the ‘Sudan Liberation Movement’ (Abdelwahid Nur faction) likened the Sudanese transitional government to the second reincarnation of Omar Al Bashir’s regime, labelling the power-sharing agreement a “blood-stained compromise”

Meanwhile, Minni Minawi, the leader of his Sudan Liberation Movement has outright accused the FFC of racism and hijacking the Sudanese revolution. (Radio Dabanga, September 1).

Security Briefing: State of Emergency in Port Sudan

Overview

With a state of emergency declared in Port Sudan, the security situation on Sudan’s eastern coast presents an opportunity for Himedti and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to increase their domestic and international power.

This briefing is also available as a Twitter thread, with videos included.

Domestic legitimacy

In a video we posted on Twitter, a Bani Amer tribal leader issues a call to join Himedti’s Rapid Support Forces. In Port Sudan, the Bani Amer and Nuba tribes are gripped in a deadly conflict.

As Jerome Tubiana warned back on July 9 (Foreign Policy), Himedti is poised to build up a support base in Sudan’s peripheries, to compensate for his lack of support in Khartoum. Analysts fear that Himedti will exploit perceptions in the western periphery (such as Darfur) and the east (such as Port Sudan) that Sudan’s democratic movement is an Arab-elite movement with a narrow set of interests, only catering to urban Sudanese in Nile Riverain cities of Khartoum, Bahri and Omdorman.

However, experts on Sudanese politics and security such Suliman Baldo of the Enough Project and academic Alex de Waal told the Associated Press (August 6) that Himedti’s history of atrocities mean he has too many enemies to build up support in Sudan’s peripheral regions.

Nonetheless, Himedti and the RSF can still de-legitimise the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition, particularly following the FFC’s public disputes with Sudanese rebels. The rebels accuse the FFC of being disinterested in securing peace for Sudanese conflict zones outside Khartoum.

Noting that the urban Sudanese who dominate the FFC prioritise civic rights, whereas peripheral Sudanese prioritise peace and safety, former UK ambassador to Sudan Dame Rosalind Marsden called for the FFC to compromise with the rebels. (Chatham House, August 9).

.Therefore, we can view the state of emergency in Port Sudan, and the Bani Amer tribal leaders allegiance to Himedti, as an expansion and legitimisation of the RSF. The RSF has a chance to add to its influence in West and Central Sudan by gaining a foothold in the East, under the auspices of “restoring order”.

Following the June 3 massacre which it is blamed for, the RSF can now brand itself as a peacemaker.

International legitimacy

It must also be noted that Port Sudan is a highly strategic location. Although Himedti lacks support in the capital city, he acquired wealth via control of gold mines in West Sudan.

Gaining influence in the Port Sudan provides easy access to the Red Sea, a major shipping route. More importantly, the oil refinery in Port Sudan handles oil transported from South Sudan, which upon independence in 2011, took away 75%(!) of Sudan’s proven oil reserves.

The RSF can also use its dominance in Port Sudan as leverage for international legitimacy. Russia and China have business interests there, while Qatar-Turkey compete with Saudi-UAE for influence in the Red Sea.

Like East African leaders before him - from Ethiopia’s Mengistu during the Cold War, to Omar Al Bashir until very recently - Himedti could play-off the Red Sea strategic interests of regional and global powers against each-other - to secure a better deal for himself.