Week 1: April 10-17 — Sudan In The News

‘Sudan In The News’ has re-capped the biggest the biggest week in recent Sudanese history, and how it has been covered in the media. It raises pertinent questions for Sudanese democracy advocates:

Should Sudanese democracy activists object to having the Sudanese revolution placed into a wider Arab Spring narrative, as long as it guarantees the global media’s attention?
Should Sudanese democracy activists feel grateful or undermined about an A-list celebrity like George Clooney advocating for the cause?

Alaa Salah – “it’s going to be image of the revolution.”

Multiple sources (April 9) reported the viral video of Alaa Salah leading chants at a protest. Influential Sudanese twitter user Hind Makki was quoted (New York Times, April 10) saying “it’s going to be image of the revolution.” Sudanese Twitter users initially celebrated Salah, before their mood soured after various non-Sudanese Twitter users wrongly described Alaa Salah as the leader of the Sudanese revolution.

Al Bashir falls

Multiple sources (April 11) reported Omar Al Bashir’s fall to a military coup. The media insights that followed broadly agreed that economic failures were to blame.

Sudanese columnist Nesrine Malik (Guardian, April 11) argued that Al Bashir was ousted by Sudanese people "armed with nothing but 30 years of anger.” The following day, Malik stated that “a government can be repressive or impoverishing, never both.”

Sudanese author Jamal Mahjoub (New York Times, April 12) argued that “nothing of substance was achieved” during Sudan’s oil boom, citing the lack of economic and agricultural strategies, decaying public services, inflated military spending and Al Bashir’s inner-circle enriching themselves.

Guardian Africa correspondent Jason Burke (April 11) noted that analysts attribute Al Bashir’s downfall to the secession of oil-rich South Sudan triggering a “massive” cut in revenues, thereby impeding Al Bashir’s ability to use state resources to buy off his rivals.

On that note, Nandita Balakrishnan (Washington Post, April 17) raised the possibility of Al Bashir miscalculating his military’s will or capacity to remove him, suggesting that the military coerced him into a “negotiated settlement.”

Ibn Auf resigns – Sudan’s divided transitional military council

Multiple sources (April 12) reported that Sudanese coup leader Awad Ibn Auf resigned within a day, with Abdelfattah Al Burhan announced the new head of Sudan’s transitional military council (TMC).

Simon Tisdall (Guardian, April 13) raised the possibility of Ibn Auf’s sudden resignation being triggered by the US not viewing him as a leader they “could respectably do business with,” given US accusations of his complicity for genocide in Darfur.

Alex de Waal (BBC, April 12) disputed that the coup is a step towards to democracy, highlighting a pact between its leaders to share power among themselves.

In African Arguments (April 12), de Waal argued that the new regime’s pre-occupation with infighting and power consolidation apprehends Sudan’s democratic transition prospects, and increases the possibility of further repression. Naunihal Singh (Washington Post, April 16) attributed the TMC’s internal divides to Al Bashir’s attempts to mitigate the risks of a military coup by building up different security organisations.

Exit Salah Gosh, Enter Himedti

Reuters (April 13) reported the resignation of Sudanese national intelligence and security service (NISS) chief Salah Gosh. On the same day, Reuters reported that Mohammed Hamdan Dagallo, also known as Himedti, was appointed the deputy president of the TMC. Himedti is the leader of the paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). These events hold major implications for the TMC’s power balance.

Alex de Waal (African Arguments, April 12) noted that NISS and its “brutal” leader Gosh, would be unwilling to play a secondary role in the TMC, and that the RSF would be willing to use violence to achieve its goals.

On Twitter (April 14), Influential Sudanese journalist Yousra Elbagir raised the abuses that the RSF has been accused of to challenge those who perceive Himedti positively. That positivity partly stemmed from reports (Sudan Tribune, April 13) that Himedti called for the transitional period to civilian government to not outlast 3-6 months.

However, as the Financial Times editors (April 15), Declan Walsh and Joseph Goldstein (New York Times, April 16) noted, Sudanese opposition members are calling for a longer transition period, to avert a situation as in Egypt where premature elections justified longer authoritarian rule.

Sudan and the Arabs

The Associated Press (April 14) reported that Saudi Arabia and the UAE issued statements in support of Sudan’s TMC, just a day after Simon Tisdall (Guardian, April 13) argued that “meddling foreign powers back [the TMC] for selfish ends.”

Sudan In The News provided a translated summary of the leading Saudi journalist Abdulrahman Al Rashed (Alsharq Alawsat, April 14), calling on the TMC to deliver on its promises of handing over authority to civilians. Al Rashed is believed to be the unofficial voice of the Saudi royal court.

Swathes of Sudanese Twitter reacted negatively to the April 14 Reuters article “Arab Spring comes later in Sudan and Algeria,” feeling that the Sudanese struggle is undermined by its placement into a wider Arab narrative.

Yet, the Reuters article was not unique in conjuring Arab Spring comparisons. Ishaan Tharoor (Washington Post, April 12) argued that Sudanese protesters face a comparatively higher risk of state violence than Algeria. Simon Tisdall (Guardian, April 13) argued that the demands of Sudanese and Algerian protesters are contradicted by Middle-East powers’ demands for authoritarian rule.

Even the influential Sudanese journalist Ismail Kushkush (The Atlantic, April 13) examined the Sudanese and Algerian lessons learned from the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, Kushkush’s article clearly focused more on Sudan. Could it be that his editor changed the headline for clickbait purposes?

More importantly, would Sudanese democracy activists object to having the revolution placed into wider Arab Spring narrative, as long as it guarantees the global media’s attention?

White saviour complex

The most controversial article this week was written by George Clooney and John Prendergast (Washington Post, April 14). Some influential sections of Sudanese Twitter dismissed the article, with an implied disapproval of ‘white saviour complex’.

Yet Clooney and Prendergast’s article was among the few to practically suggest ways to support Sudanese democracy – calling for the US to financially punish ex-Bashir regime officials, and to condition debt relief on the TMC facilitating civilian governance.

What next for Al Bashir?

Multiple sources (April 17) reported that Omar Al Bashir was moved to prison. The “what next?” for Al Bashir has been of media interest, given his International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant. Multiple sources (April 12) reported that the TMC said that it will not extradite Al Bashir, with various TMC members also complicit in war-crime allegations.

Mattia Cacciatori (All Africa, April 12) argued that the ICC should not prosecute Al Bashir as it would incentivise other dictators to retain power, and reflect negatively on the ICC given their need to cooperate with, and pardon, TMC members complicit in the war crimes.

Patrick Gathara (Washington Post, April 12) noted that Al Bashir may opt to settle in Kenya, where President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto have both overturned the ICC indictments. Reuters (April 17) reported that Uganda would consider an asylum application for Al Bashir.

What next for Sudan? – Unfinished business

Despite Al Bashir’s ousting, Declan Walsh and Joseph Goldstein (New York Times, April 16) note that Sudanese protesters fear that “the generals will cheat them of their victory by thwarting a promised return to civilian rule.”

Reuters and the Guardian (April 11) reported that the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) called for protests to continue immediately after Al Bashir was toppled, demanding the end of ‘deep state’ left behind by Omar Al Bashir and “completely [rejecting]” the TMC (BBC, April 15). Mai Hassan and Ahmed Kodouda (Washington Post, April 14) argued that the SPA’s continued demands for civilian government “[reflect] lessons learned from Egypt’s failed popular uprising.”

The TMC has responded to SPA demands by promising civilian government (Reuters, April 12), insisting that it is not greedy for power (Reuters, April 12), announcing the restructuring of state institutions, release of political prisoners and pledging respect for human rights (BBC, April 13), firing three top public prosecutors (Multiple sources, April 16), and ordering the Sudanese central bank to seize “suspect” funds (Reuters, April 17) in an anti-corruption drive.

Nonetheless, the Financial Times editors (April 15) argued that the main task of the TMC is to negotiate a credible interim government with the opposition, and turn around the Sudanese economy. The FT editors concluded that the latter is unlikely, increasingly the likelihood of the TMC’s fall.

Calls for western powers to support Sudanese democrats have not been in short supply. Eli Lake (Bloomberg, April 12) called on the US and its allies to resist the temptation to reach out to Sudan’s new military regime, isolate Sudan “until it is free,” and closely align with the democracy movement.

Alex de Waal, (New York Times, April 11) called on US and African leaders to join forces in supporting Sudan’s democratic transition.

Naunihal Singh (Washington Post, April 16) argued that it would be in the US’ national interest to condition the removal of Sudan’s state sponsor of terror designation on the formation of a civilian government, and support the Sudanese democracy movement by pursuing the overseas assets of corrupt Al Bashir regime officials.

For Sudanese democracy advocates, the business remains unfinished. The final quote, from Jamal Mahjoub (New York Times, April 12), emphasizes that the success of the revolution hinges on:

“[Sweeping] away… the stagnation that has dominated Sudanese politics for decades and turned indifference into an ideology.”

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