SUDAN INSIGHT ALERT: African Arguments - Mediation Pitfalls: How the Jeddah Peace Talks Complicate Sudanese Politics

25/6/2024: African Arguments - Mediation Pitfalls: How the Jeddah Peace Talks Complicate Sudanese Politics, by Tahany Maalla

Arguing that the Jeddah peace talks are “out of step with the nuanced dynamics on the ground,” governance specialist Tahany Maalla argues that their design and structure contributed to prolonging the conflict in three significant ways.

Firstly, the focus on achieving ceasefire and coordinating humanitarian efforts at the expense of hosting political discussions is argued to have pushed Darfur’s armed movements to abandon neutrality with the aim of securing a stake in any future political agreement.

Secondly, the lack of a bridge connecting ceasefire and political negotiations is blamed for the “militarisation of civilian discourse,” which is “reinforcing militarised authority and legitimacy.”

Finally, Maalla attributes the peace talks to the conflicting parties both obstructing aid access and exploiting to enhance international legitimacy, citing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) redirecting their strategy to targeting aid distribution routes with intentions to assert itself as a de-facto authority by controlling aid flows.

SUDAN INSIGHT ALERT: International Rescue Committee - Sudan Watchlist Crisis Alert (Solutions)

25/6/2024: International Rescue Committee - Sudan Watchlist Crisis Alert (Solutions)

 TWO SUMMARIES

1. Diplomatic solutions

The International Rescue Committee provided diplomatic solutions for ending the conflict in Sudan including:

·      Elevating engagement with the warring parties and their sponsors to the highest diplomatic level as a reflection of the severity of the crisis and a demonstration of international commitment to addressing it.

·      Deploying levers of influence including encouraging the UAE and Saudi Arabia to halt the import of Sudanese gold and livestock until a ceasefire is implemented, alongside extending the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts and using their findings to increase public scrutiny of the roles of regional actors.

·      Expanding investigative mechanisms, potentially including a Commission of Inquiry on Sudan, to hold those responsible for violations of international law to account.

·      Establish one inclusive negotiation track to end the fighting.

2. Five solutions for resetting the humanitarian response.

·      Food insecurity: donors and the UN urgently scaling up funding for and delivery of cash operations, and support Sudanese farmers to plant crops and improve food production by expanding access to agricultural inputs.

·      Increased funding for local responders, alongside reforming structures to increase opportunities for local responders to directly access grants, prioritising reforming the Sudan Humanitarian Fund which failed to fund any local responders in 2023.

·      Senior access coordinator appointed by the UN Secretary General.

·      Strengthen and decentralise UN response leadership in Sudan with UN operational hubs across the country led by senior staff, and an Emergency Telecommunications Cluster increasing capacity to all humanitarian actors can access services.

·      Increase the UN Security Council’s scrutiny of the crisis by holding regular, open briefing sessions led by the secretary general and the emergency relief coordinator, and creating safe opportunities for NGOs and local responders to share their experiences of humanitarian access barriers.

SUDAN INSIGHT ALERT: International Rescue Committee - Sudan Watchlist Crisis Alert (Challenges)

25/6/2024: International Rescue Committee - Sudan Watchlist Crisis Alert (Challenges)

 FIVE SUMMARIES

The International Rescue Committee identified five challenges facing the response to Sudan’s humanitarian crisis.

1. TARGETING OF HUMANITARIAN WORKERS AND LOOTING OF SUPPLIES

Insecurity in Sudan makes it a difficult and dangerous place for aid delivery.

·      Increased violence along ethnic lines makes the situation even more challenging, as agencies must carefully consider the background of staff before deploying them to different regions of the country.

·      UN OCHA said that over 150 vehicles have been stolen from aid organizations, while 61 offices and 57 warehouses have been looted.

·      The World Food Programme (WFP) has estimated that over $13 million of food aid has been looted since the war began.

2. RESTRICTIONS ON AID DELIVERY

Sudan has the highest level for severity of access restraints according to the Assessment Capacities Project, contributing factors include:

·      Since the start of the conflict, hundreds of international NGO staff have faced lengthy delays in obtaining visas.

·      Approximately 30,000 metric tons of aid were sitting in Port Sudan, Al-Obeid and Kosti as of mid-May 2024, awaiting permissions for onward movement.

·      Security services in White Nile and Khartoum regularly seek to “accompany” humanitarian workers delivering aid and reportedly prevent access to certain locations.

·      Fighters at checkpoints sometimes demand pay-ments from humanitarian personnel to be allowed to pass.

3.  HUMANITARIAN ACTORS BLOCKED FROM CROSSING FRONTLINES AND BORDERS TO REACH PEOPLE IN NEED

With Sudan divided into regions of army and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control, aid must move across frontlines and borders to reach those who need it, but “both sides are consistently undermining these efforts”.

Following accusations that the RSF was transporting weapons from Chad, the army revoked its previous non-objection to cross-border aid delivery.

The only way for humanitarian aid to reach millions living in RSF-held parts of Sudan is by bringing it across frontlines within the country. Yet, to date, no sustained agreements on crossline aid access have been reached.

OCHA reported that denial of permission to move within Sudan or to cross an international border, combined with ongoing conflict, blocked the transport of humanitarian aid to over 600,000 in Darfur, 300,000 in Kordofan and 100,000 in Khartoum. Since August 2023, there have been almost no crossline deliveries in Khartoum state due to this.

4. TARGETING AND DESTRUCTION OF ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

·      Sudan’s health care system has virtually collapsed, with at least 307 incidents of violence against health care workers or facilities recorded since the war began.

·      Both sides reportedly use facilities for military purposes.

·      Banking operations are almost completely suspended as many bank headquarters, most of which were based in Khartoum, have been closed due to insecurity, power outages and looting.

·      Both sides were blamed for regular and widespread telecommunications outages

5. WEAK RESPONSE LEADERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT OF LOCAL RESPONDERS

Although humanitarian organisations depend on coordination and information provided by UN agencies, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) say that “a lack of UN leadership and the limited presence of UN agencies and staff across the country, including senior decision-makers and essential monitoring teams, are undermining efforts to ensure assistance reaches those most in need”. 

The IRC add that decisions made by the UN-led Humanitarian Country team lack explanations, instructions or monitoring, with field-level coordination structures “ineffective” and “meetings sporadic”.

The IRC further claim that UN-led coordination efforts take place in English which “excludes many local organizations and responders without whom an appropriate, at-scale response cannot happen”.

Yet, three out of every five dollars provided by donors for the Sudan response has been directed to UN agencies, despite their comparatively limited presence, while locally led organisations and responders have been “woefully underfunded”.

SUDAN NEWS ALERT: Open Democracy - Uganda’s U-turn on refugee policy leaves Sudanese asylum seekers stranded

25/6/2024: Open Democracy - Uganda’s U-turn on refugee policy leaves Sudanese asylum seekers stranded, by Richard Sultan

Open Democracy report that Sudanese refugees in Uganda “feel stuck” after it announced a change to its ‘open door’ policy amid funding crisis.

In January 2024, the Ugandan government announced that Sudanese refugees would no longer be able to register as refugees while living in the capital and other urban towns around the country. All arrivals must instead now live in refugee camps to obtain such documents – and stay in the camps thereafter.

The move is a drastic change of policy for Uganda. Refugees previously had the right to work and move freely throughout the country, with access to health and education. They were also given a small plot of land to cultivate, and food and financial support.

An anonymous Ugandan official told the Ayin network that restrictions were introduced for security reasons and to reduce pressure on local services.

SUDAN INSIGHT ALERT: New Arab - Egypt's evolving diplomatic approach to Sudan's war

25/6/2024: New Arab - Egypt's evolving diplomatic approach to Sudan's war, by Elfadil Ibrahim

Elfadil Ibrahim argues that Egypt’s pragmatic approach to mediating the conflict in Sudan is complicated by the enmity between Sudanese political forces.

While Egypt has recently hosted former prime minister and Taqaddum leader Abdalla Hamdok, an anonymous Cairo-based journalist said “Taqaddum is wary of an Egyptian initiative because of [Egypt’s] closeness to the army and army-aligned groups”.

A central challenge for political dialogue and consensus-building are the differences between the Sudan Charter Forces (SCF), who recognise the army’s legitimacy, and Taqaddum, who do not.  

SCF members such as Minni Minnawi also accuse Taqaddum of standing with Rapid Support militia (RSF), with the formations of local governments led by Taqadum officials in RSF-controlled territory, as stipulated in the Taqadum-RSF Addis Ababa agreement in January 2024, fueling accusations that it is collaborating with the RSF.  

SUDAN NEWS ALERT: Sudan Tribune - UNHCR calls for urgent support for Sudanese refugees in Chad

25/6/2024: Sudan Tribune - UNHCR calls for urgent support for Sudanese refugees in Chad

Sudan Tribune report that the United Nations refugee Agency is calling for urgent international support as the humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad reaches a critical point.

Since April 2023, the conflict in Sudan has reportedly forced over 600,000 refugees and 180,000 Chadian returnees to flee into Chad, with more than 115,000 arriving since the start of 2024.

A third of new arrivals remain in dire conditions along the border, with Adre town, originally home to 40,000 people, struggling to accommodate a six fold population increase. Overcrowded and unsanitary conditions in Adre led to a severe health crisis, with over 1,200 cases of Hepatitis E reported, including three fatalities. The impending rainy season threatens to exacerbate this crisis, potentially leading to outbreaks of waterborne diseases and impeding humanitarian access. 

The potential for further displacement remains high amid fighting in Al-Fashir, widespread looting and burning of villages, a looming famine in Sudan.

SUDAN NEWS ALERT: Sudan Tribune - Egypt hosts over 600,000 refugees, asylum seekers: UNHCR

25/6/2024: Sudan Tribune - Egypt hosts over 600,000 refugees, asylum seekers: UNHCR

Sudan Tribune report that Egypt is hosting at least 672,000 registered refugees and asylum-seekers from 62 countries, with Sudanese forming the largest group. 

This is more than double the number from a year ago with major conflicts across its borders, according to figures from the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). 

The UN agency said more than 617,000 people forced to flee Sudan have approached its office in Egypt since April 2023 as it scales up delivery of cash assistance and registration to address the most urgent needs of new arrivals.

SUDAN NEWS ALERT: Sudan Tribune - RSF continued shelling in El-Fasher kills civilians, targets another hospital

25/6/2024: Sudan Tribune - RSF continued shelling in El-Fasher kills civilians, targets another hospital 

Sudan Tribune report that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) intensified its assault on Al-Fashir, killing at least five civilians in artillery shelling on the Abu Shouk displacement camp.

The RSF also targeted Iqra Hospital, further crippling the city’s healthcare system. This latest attack follows a two-month siege and relentless shelling campaign by the RSF, which began in mid-May and has displaced thousands.

Adam Rijal, spokesperson for the General Coordination for Displaced People and Refugees, confirmed the deaths and injuries in Abu Shouk, warning that the toll could rise due to communication blackouts in the area. 

The camp, home to nearly 400,000 displaced people, has witnessed an exodus of residents seeking refuge in Tawila and Jebel Marra.

SUDAN NEWS ALERT: Sudan Tribune - Sudanese army repels RSF attack on Sennar, triggering mass displacement

25/6/2024: Sudan Tribune - Sudanese army repels RSF attack on Sennar, triggering mass displacement

Sudan Tribune report that fierce battles erupted on the northern outskirts of Sennar between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The fighting triggered panic among residents, leading to a mass exodus from the city.

The RSF launched an assault on army positions, with artillery shells raining down on the Sennar Altakatoa neighbourhood. Military personnel advised residents to evacuate.

The clashes followed a 24-hour offensive by the RSF on the strategic Jabal Moya area, situated on the national highway connecting the states of Sennar, Al Jazirah, and White Nile. Ammar Hassan, spokesperson for the Popular Resistance aligned with the Sudanese army, said Jabal Moya fell to the RSF.

The area experienced a mass exodus of residents fleeing towards Sennar city, following widespread RSF looting.

SUDAN NEWS ALERT: Radio Dabanga - Darfur’s ‘only dialysis centre’ hit by RSF

25/6/2024: Radio Dabanga - Darfur’s ‘only dialysis centre’ hit by RSF

Radio Dabanga report that the only remaining dialysis centre in Al-Fasher, North Darfur was targeted by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), causing severe damage to equipment and buildings, as the militia systematically targets Darfur medical facilities.

Last October, Darfur’s state government upgraded the centre to a regional facility to handle medical cases from the other states of Darfur, after most centres ceased operations.

The centre has ceased operations “indefinitely”, depriving 94 patients from different states of Darfur of dialysis treatment, in fear of further RSF attacks.

The latest attack is the ninth on Al-Fashir’s health facilities since the RSF siege began on 10 May. Al-Fashir Southern Hospital has endured five attacks, forcing it to close. The Babiker Nahar Children’s Hospital was also closed after being bombed. Following the transfer of treatment services to the Saudi Hospital, it was bombed three times

SUDAN INSIGHT ALERT: War On The Rocks – Can Sudan’s Military Be Convinced to Support Democracy

25/6/19: War On The Rocks – Can Sudan’s Military Be Convinced to Support Democracy, by Nathaniel Allen and Sharan Grewal

 Nathaniel Allen, a US Institute of Peace policy advisor and the Brooking Institution’s Sharan Grewal highlights ways in which the Sudanese opposition and the US can incentivise the military to allow Sudanese democracy.

 Allen and Grewal argue that opposition should exploit army-RSF divides, with the army “unlikely to initiate a conflict that risks further destabilizing Sudan.”

 It is suggested that the army could be incentivised to support civilian rule by concessions such as: amnesty for abuses, influence over security policy and reliable funding, with the RSF’s lower ranks also granted amnesty and possibly disbanded or incorporated into the army.

 Allen and Grewal then argue that the US can reduce the “malign” influence of the Saudis, UAE and Egypr by threatening to cut military support, as well as offering to remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List and offering the army assistance once a civilian-led government is in place.

SUDAN NEWS ALERT: Reuters - U.S. to consider sanctions in case of more Sudan violence

25/6/19: Reuters - U.S. to consider sanctions in case of more Sudan violence, by Patricia Zengerle

 Reuters reports that Makila James, deputy assistant secretary for East Africa and the Sudans, told a US House of Representatives hearing that Washington was considering all options, including possible sanctions, if there was more violence after a deadly assault on protesters in Khartoum early this month.

 James said the sanctions could include visa sanctions or economic sanctions. “We want to use the right tool and we want to target the right people,” she said.

 James also told the House Foreign Affairs Africa subcommittee that Washington believes the best possible outcome in Sudan is an agreement between the military authorities and the opposition Declaration of Freedom and Change.

 James added that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had told US officials they want a civilian-led transitional government, because anything else would lead to broader regional instability.

SUDAN NEWS ALERT: Bloomberg – Sudan Rulers Vow to Free Rebel Prisoners as Step to Peace Talks

25/6/19: Bloomberg – Sudan Rulers Vow to Free Rebel Prisoners as Step to Peace Talks, by Mohammed Alamin

 Bloomberg reports that Sudan’s military council has pledged to release all imprisoned anti-government rebels as a step toward talks to end long-running insurgencies in Darfur and the country’s south.

 Himedti, the deputy leader of the military council, announced the plan in an address to supporters. He did not say how many fighters would be freed.

SUDAN INSIGHT ALERT: Financial Times - Atrocities in Sudan are a reminder the regime never left

25/6/19: Financial Times - Atrocities in Sudan are a reminder the regime never left, by Yousra Elbagir

Yousra Elbagir argues that the ousting of Omar Al Bashir signals to protesters and opposition leaders that “the revolution has only just begun.”

 Elbagir notes that the ruling Transitionary Military Council (TMC) is composed of Al Bashir’s old allies, arguing that they deposed him to prolong the regime’s survival, rather than end it.

 Drawing attention to TMC deputy Himedti, Elbagir was told by a National Intelligence and Security Services officer that Himedti’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) “militia-for-hire” would be deployed for the protection of the deep state if the revolution found its way to Khartoum.

Nonetheless, despite the RSF’s brutality (including the June 3 massacre), Elbagir concludes that “resistance has reignited across [Sudan].“