The Juba Peace Deal Report: 8 key questions
Split into eight parts, the Sudan In The News report on the Juba peace deal asks eight key questions.
1. Who signed the deal?
2. What does the deal entail?
3. Why are two major rebel groups holding out?
4. What engagements have the holdout rebel groups and the government had?
5. Who else opposes the Juba peace deal?
6. What challenges does the Juba peace deal face?
7. What risks does the Juba peace deal face?
8. What solutions have been proposed?
1. Who signed the deal?
The rebel groups who agreed to the deal with the Sudanese government were the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) coalition, including:
The Darfur-based group the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Malik Agar’s faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N Agar) from the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions).
Minni Minawi’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-MM) (Reuters, 31 August).
However, the SPLM-N faction of Abdelaziz al-Hilu (SPLM-N al-Hilu) did not agree to the deal, nor did the SLM faction of Abdelwahid al-Nur (SLM-AW). Their reasons for doing so will be explored in further detail in part 3 of this report.
2. What does the Juba peace deal entail?
The agreement covers key issues around security, land ownership, transitional justice, the return of people who fled their homes because of fighting, and provides for the dismantling of rebel forces and the integration of their fighters into the national army (Guardian, 31 August). Following the integration of rebels, a military institution with a single doctrine will be built, alongside mechanisms supervising its work (Radio Dabanga, 26 September).
The agreement also covers power-sharing stipulations between the government and the rebel groups, alongside specific provisions catering to Sudan’s main conflict zones of Darfur and the Two Areas (South Kordofan and the Blue Nile), and is said to include the separation of religion and the state.
The infographic below summarises key details, but the report provides further depth.
Power-sharing
National power-sharing: The deal stipulates that rebel signatories will get three seats on the ruling council, five ministries, and a quarter of the 300 seats on the transitional legislative council between them (Reuters, 31 August).
Regional power-sharing: The rebels will get 40% of posts in their regional governments, which will receive 40% of locally raised revenues (Reuters, 31 August).
Federal governance system: the Juba Peace agreement also re-establishes a federal regional governance system, with a national conference to be held to review the administrative division of regions (Radio Dabanga, 1 September).
The Two Areas
Self-rule: According to Yassir Arman, the SPLM-N Agar deputy leader and chief SRF negotiator, the Juba agreement establishes self-rule in the Two Areas, with West Kordofan now included in its administrative boundary (Sudan Tribune, 29 August).
Funding economic development and the return of the displaced: 40% of the wealth produced in the Two Areas will be publically redistributed (Sudan Tribune, 29 August).
Power-sharing: SPLM-N Agar will govern the Blue Nile state, deputy govern South and West Kordofan, and have a 30% right to the executive and legislative bodies in the Two Areas (Radio Dabanga, 1 September).
Freedom of religion: To protect the rights of the large Christian population, the Two Areas are granted the right to legislate under a system based on Sudan’s 1973 secular constitution, with a National Commission for Religious Freedom also being established (Sudan Tribune, 29 August).
Darfur
Security: A 12,000-strong joint force comprising of government and rebel troops is scheduled to be formed by November 2020, with full integration planned within 40 months (Bloomberg, 31 August).
Power-sharing: Power in Darfur will be shared between members of Darfur negotiations track (40%), other movements that signed the agreement (10%), federal government (30%) and stakeholders (20%) (Radio Dabanga, 1 September).
Funding economic development and return of the displaced: The Fund for Peace Support and Sustainable Development in Darfur has been established, with the government paying $750 million annually for ten years. The parties agreed to publically redistribute 40% of Darfur’s net revenues from local mineral and oil resources across ten years. The Darfur government will also allocate at least 3% of natural resources revenues to locals from areas of extraction (Radio Dabanga, 3 September). Furthermore, the displaced have the right of voluntary return, and those unable to recover property are entitled to compensation.
Positive discrimination: The deal stipulates that Darfuri students studying outside Darfur are exempt from tuition fees for ten years and 20% of scholarships, rehabilitation, and training opportunities in Sudan and abroad will be allocated to Darfuri people (Radio Dabanga, 3 September).
The role of religion in state affairs
According to Mohammed al-Taayshi, a member of the ruling Sovereign Council, the Juba peace agreement separates “the institutions of religion from the institutions of the state [ensuring] that rights and duties among citizens are based on citizenship,” which will reportedly be guaranteed in the new Sudanese constitution (Radio Dabanga, 26 September).
3. Why are two major rebel groups holding out?
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North faction of Abdelaziz al-Hilu (SPLM-N al-Hilu) and the Sudan Liberation Movement faction of Abdelwahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) have not signed the Juba peace agreement. This is a key factor because these groups possess the most territory out of Sudanese armed rebel movements.
The infographic below briefly summarises their stances with regards to the Sudanese peace process. The report will then cover their respective positions in more detail according to the words and actions of the groups since late August 2020.
SLM-AW rejects the peace agreement, still fighting government forces
In an interview with Voice of America (2 September), Abdelwahid al-Nur labelled the Juba peace agreement “nothing more than a plan to distribute wealth and government positions [which does not] address the underlying reasons for Sudan’s conflicts.” Al-Nur said the agreement is “business as usual,” citing “47 [previous peace agreements since Omar al-Bashir came to power which were not implemented] because they did not address the root causes of the problem.” According to al-Nur, people become rebels due to major issues preventing peace including: the lack of equality citizenship rights, “no distribution of wealth, no equal development, and no equality between black and Arab and Muslim and Christian.”
With al-Nur refusing to participate in the peace talks from their inception as he considered the Sudanese government a continuation of the ousted regime of Omar al-Bashir, Institute of Security Studies (ISS, 7 September) researcher Shewit Woldemichael adds that al-Nur - who “has significant support in Darfur” - believes “Khartoum lacks the political will to meet the demands made by armed groups.” Furthermore, al-Nur adheres to his position that he will only enter peace talks after security and stability have been restored in Darfur (Radio Dabanga, 7 September).
SLM-AW clashes with the government: Al-Nur’s group commands territory in Darfur, particularly in the gold rich Jebel Marra in Central Darfur. Multiple sources (28 September) reported that Sudanese government forces and SLM-AW blame each other for a clash in western Jebel Marra. SLM-AW spokesman Waleed Abakar alleged that “Khartoum government forces infiltrated and launched an attack on our control sites,” before emphasising his movement’s right to deter any attack targeting their areas of control.
SPLM-N al-Hilu suspends negotiations
On August 22, Radio Dabanga reported that SPLM-N al-Hilu suspended its participation in the Juba peace negotiations, in opposition to the government delegation’s by Himedti, the Deputy President of the Sovereign Council, and Commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). SPLM-N al-Hilu alleged that the recent involvement of the RSF in violence in South Kordofan, along with “heinous violations” committed against unarmed civilians in various parts of Sudan, led them to withdraw. Himedti “lacks neutrality and is not qualified to lead the negotiation delegation”, SPLM-N al-Hilu said.
Shortly thereafter, eight SPLM-N al-Hilu members were arrested by Sudanese authorities in the Blue Nile state, with an SPLM-N al-Hilu representative claiming that the government also targeted its members al-Gedaref in east Sudan and in al-Geneina in West Darfur (Sudan Tribune, 25 August).
Al-Hilu explains reasons for withdrawal
During an Atlantic Council (25 August) discussion entitled ‘Prospects for Peace in Sudan’, Abdelaziz al-Hilu explained his reasons for withdrawing from the Juba peace negotiations, re-iterating that his group left the talks because government delegation chairman Himedti’s RSF troops are “displacing the displaced all over [Sudan]”.
Al-Hilu’s criticisms of the Juba peace process: Al-Hilu said the process bears similarity to previous ineffective peace agreements that followed civilian uprisings, which “avoiding discussing the root causes and real issues” behind Sudan’s history of conflict. Specifically, al-Hilu said the talks produced “piecemeal solutions” that fail to address the root causes of conflicts plaguing Sudan since independence, namely: the marginalisation of the peripheral regions by Khartoum.
Al-Hilu’s secular stance: Al-Hilu further alleged that the transitional government’s “insistence” on Islamic law fits into a wider historical pattern of Sudanese state failure caused by the inability of ruling elites to manage Sudan’s religious and ethnic diversity. Thus, al-Hilu called for the adoption of secularism in order to: “lay the foundations for a multicultural state” that can guarantee peace, “loosen the grip” of the Islamists, “neutralise” the state, and build a common national identity that will achieve peace and justice.
Al-Hilu also emphasised his position that the Juba peace talks should have formed the basis for a secular constitution, rather than deferring the matter to a constitutional conference. He referenced Sudan’s post-independence history to argue that constitutional conferences are “tactically” employed by political elites to “avoid” discussing the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts.
4. What engagements have the holdout rebel groups and the government had?
After the Juba agreement was initialled, al-Hilu had a separate agreement with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and SPLM-N al-Hilu has subsequently expressed an openness to resuming peace talks. While various civilian Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition parties have expressed support for the Hilu-Hamdok agreement, religious groups have shown opposition. displaced have shown opposition. SLM-AW has also submitted an alternative proposal for security in Darfur.
Hamdok-Hilu agreement
Following a meeting in Ethiopia, Prime Minister Hamdok and Abdelaziz al-Hilu signed an agreement that stipulates that SPLM-N al-Hilu will remain armed until:
Sudan’s racial, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity is recognised.
Complete political and social inequality are guaranteed by law.
The right to self-determination must be respected in the absence of a secular democratic state, with no religious discrimination and freedom of belief, worship and practice guaranteed “in full to all Sudanese citizens”.
The people of the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile retain the right to self-protection until separation between religion and state are actualised.
The constitution must realise fair sharing of power and wealth among Sudanese people.
Cessation of hostilities until security arrangements are agreed (Radio Dabanga, 5 September).
Both sides will organise informal negotiation workshops to discuss “contentious issues such as secularism and the right to self-determination”, in order “to reach a common understanding that will facilitate the task of the formal negotiation teams” (Radio Dabanga, 5 September). However, the Hamdok-Hilu agreement will not be valid unless concerned parties (Forces for Freedom and Change and the military component of the government) endorse it (Sudan Tribune, 11 September).
Support for the Hamdok-Hilu agreement from FFC parties
The Sudanese Communist Party also met SPLM-N al-Hilu in Ethiopia, after which they agreed on a political declaration that the “constitution… must not violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights…under any pretext” (Sudan Tribune, 6 September).
The Hamdok-Hilu agreement was welcomed by numerous influential FFC civilian political parties, including the Sudanese Congress Party, Democratic Unionist Party and the National Umma Party (NUP). The leader of the latter, former prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi said: “the issue of religion and the state needs everyone’s confidence,” warning that premature discussions will lead to polarisation and sedition. (Sudan Tribune, September 5). Despite al-Mahdi’s support for the agreement, it was condemned by a representative of al-Ansar sect, the religious arm of the NUP, alongside other Islamic groups.
Opposition to the Hamdok-Hilu agreement from religious groups
The Hamdok-Hilu agreement on separating religion from the state was criticised by NUP-linked Ansar Mosque preacher Adam Ahmed Youssef, who labelled it "a violation of the transitional government’s mission,” which he said is “limited” to: securing livelihoods, dismantling Omar al-Bashir’s regime, preparing for free and fair elections, fighting corruption, recovering stolen money, and ensuring a stable purchasing power of the national currency (Sudan Tribune, 11 September).
Previously, the deal faced criticism from Islamist groups who considered it a final agreement on the separation of religion from the state, leading Hamdok’s office to issue a statement clarifying that the Hamdok-Hilu merely specified key issues to be negotiated in the future, that the agreement will only become binding after approval from relevant institutions (Sudan Tribune, 4 September).
Al-Hilu seeks peace negotiations with government
Following the Hamdok-Hilu agreement, SPLM-N al-Hilu Secretary General and head of the group’s negotiation delegation Ammar Daldoum said SPLM-N al-Hilu “is waiting for a new government peace negotiations team” to be formed by Hamdok (Radio Dabanga, 21 September). However, the ruling Sovereign Council denied that Himedti’s chairmanship of the government negotiation delegation had been removed, as demanded by SPLM-N al-Hilu (Sudan Tribune, 28 September).
Nonetheless, it was agreed that the government and SPLM-N al-Hilu will resume negotiations during the third week of October 2020 (Multiple sources, 5 October). Furthermore, the governing FFC coalition agreed with SPLM-N al-Hilu to form a committee to develop a common understanding on the relationship between the state and religion, laying the foundations for SPLM-N al-Hilu’s return to peace talks (Sudan Tribune, 4 October).
Abdelwahid al-Nur proposal
A proposal for internal dialogue on Darfur’s security was submitted by Abdelwahid al-Nur to the region’s five governors. The initiative, which addresses issues faced by displaced people and refugees, focuses on coexistence, reconciliation, and unity (Radio Dabanga, 12 September).
The SLM-AW proposal was reportedly well received in Darfur’s displacement camps, highlighting al-Nur’s support in the region. Yagoub Abdallah, head of the Darfur Displaced and Refugees General Coordination, said people in Darfur’s displacement camps consider the SLM-AW’s proposed initiative a “real, correct, and radical approach to solve the Sudanese identity crisis and reach a lasting peace,” adding that “an internal dialogue gives the displaced the opportunity to be heard, as most of them cannot travel,” citing the absence of documentation and regional instability facing Darfuri civilians (Radio Dabanga, 17 September).
Abdallah further stated that “the voice of the displaced will only become clear until we all meet as Sudanese…and participate in drafting Sudan’s constitution,” adding that the displaced care most about how Sudan is governed rather than who governs it.
5. Who else opposes the Juba peace deal?
The infographic below provides a brief summary of influential groups that have rejected the Juba peace deal, although the report will provide more detail and context.
Protesters in Darfur
In Darfur’s state capital of Zalingei, hundreds in the Hamidiya and Tur Kalami displacement camps staged protests against the Juba peace agreement. Reportedly issuing support for Abdelwahid al-Nur’s position, the demonstrators displayed banners likening the agreement to previous ineffective peace accords agreed under al-Bashir’s regime. Ahmed Juma, a coordinator of the Hamdiya Camp, said that that all agreements on Darfur that have been signed so far “trade the rights of the displaced” (Radio Dabanga, 7 September).
Protesters in East Sudan
In East Sudan, the High Council of Beja Nazirs (state appointed tribal leaders appointed by the government under Sudan’s native administration system), said the Juba peace agreement’s eastern Sudan accord “will only increase the crisis,” and that it places eastern Sudan in the hands of regional and international actors in search of resources to exploit in the Red Sea basin. The group warned that the agreement will bring “a major demographic change in eastern Sudan, which will threaten Sudan’s sovereignty and national security,” calling on political parties and “honourable national forces” to oppose the track and stop compromises being made “at the expense of the homeland” by leaders of “the foreign agenda” (Radio Dabanga, 4 October).
Protests: In the Red Sea state, protesters demonstrated against the agreement by blocking four strategic ports in Port Sudan’s harbour, in what the FFC described as the result of accumulated grievances in eastern Sudan “which requires our government to rethink its policies concerning the region’s issues” (Radio Dabanga, 6 October).
Other Beja groups denounce the protests: However, it is worth noting that three Beja groups – the Ababd, Amarar and Bisharin issued a joint statement denouncing the protests organised by the High Council of Beja Nazirs. The three tribes allege that leader of the High Council, Sayid Turk of the Hadendawa clan who was close the ousted regime, is implementing a counter-revolutionary plan aiming to destabilise eastern Sudan. The three tribes further stated that the High Council of Beja Nazirs is “an illusory body that does not exist on the ground,” and does not represent the tribe (Sudan Tribune, 5 October).
The Sudanese Communist Party
The Sudanese Communist Party also rejected the Juba peace agreement, warning that it will create new tensions and conflicts in Darfur and the Two Areas due to the power granted to parties in regions that reject them, including provisions for civilian protection by tribal militias (Sudan Tribune, 1 October).
Other rebel groups
Armed Struggle Movements (ASM) coalition, consisting of eight Sudanese rebel groups, said the peace agreement is “incomplete and distorted, citing “the double standard approach,” whereby certain groups were allegedly excluded from negotiations after “comrades of the struggle were divided into first and second degree fighters based on an incorrect evaluation of the situation”.
The agreement was also opposed by non-ASM rebel groups, the New Justice and Equality Movement (NJEM) led by Mansour Arbab, and the Revolutionary Awakening Council (RAC) headed by imprisoned former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal, who said the Juba peace deal “contains halfway solutions, fragments crucial issues, and [its] outcomes will prolong war” (Radio Dabanga, 4 October).
6. What challenges does the Juba peace deal face?
The Juba peace agreement is impeded by obstacles to its implementation. The infographic below summarises the key challenges, although the report covers the insights in more detail.
Implementation
As noted by Jonas Horner, Sudan analyst at the International Crisis Group, the Juba peace is “far from comprehensive” and “significant hurdles remain in the way of its implementation.” Horner added that “international financial and diplomatic support, or even pressure if needed, will be imperative to make sure the parties implement the agreement” (AP, 31 August).
Speaking to Radio Dabanga (15 September), Ahmed Adam, a Darfuri specialist in international law and conflict resolution, highlighted various challenges in implementing the Juba peace agreement: ”the most important of which are the absence of regional and international guarantees and the lack of donors and financiers,” alongside the continuing insecurity in Darfur and that two main rebel groups have not signed the agreement. Thus, Adam warned that “new wars may erupt in the event the implementation of the peace accord fails due to the absence of funds.”
Funding
With regards to arrangements for returning the millions of displaced, alongside the “massive: investments required for peripheral regions to “repair the damage of war and compensate for decades of neglect,” Bloomberg (8 September) columnist Bobby Ghosh warns that Sudan’s economic woes may undermine the Juba peace agreement. In particular, Ghosh highlights the obstacle of a Sudanese economy “which was moribund even before the debilitating impact of the coronavirus pandemic, now facing a new crisis: devastating floods,” citing Sudan being $1.3 billion in arrears to the International Monetary Fund and external debt topping $55 billion in 2020.
State Sponsor of Terrorism designation: Furthermore, analysts Edward Thomas of the Rift Valley Institute and Alex de Waal of the World Peace Foundation have identified Sudan’s state sponsor of terrorism designation as another obstacle to the implementation of the Juba peace agreement that “comes with a big price tag”. Thomas and de Waal argue that “until the US officially recognises that Sudan is not a ‘sponsor of terror’, there is no debt relief and little foreign investment,” leaving Sudan’s lifeline is “in the hands of Saudi Arabia and the UAE which give cash-in-hand to their favourite military powerbrokers such as Gen Burhan and Himedti” (BBC, 9 September).
Separation between religion and state
Political resistance to a secular Sudan further hinders attempts to resolve Sudanese conflict., despite the separation of state and religion demanded by SPLM-N al-Hilu, the rebel group with the most territory in Sudan. As noted by ISS consultant Peter Fabricius (7 September), Sudanese political parties “fear they would lose substantial public support if they abandoned sharia.”
Indeed, Suliman Baldo, senior advisor at The Sentry, cited the Juba peace agreement’s absence of a “clear separation of state and religion” demanded by SPLM-N al-Hilu to suggest that “peace will remain far from comprehensive until the reasons that motivated the boycott of non-signatories are satisfactorily addressed” (AP, 31 August).
Moreover, Hamza Hendawi (National.ae, 9 September) argues that the steps required to bring peace may “spark resistance” from Islamists and supporters of the National Umma Party who “have a sense of ethnic and cultural superiority over the people living in Sudan’s western and southern regions.”
Reforming the military
While the Juba peace agreement plans to integrate the rebels into a national army, AFP (9 September) note that old foes are brought together “in often uneasy joint forces. Indeed, Mohammed al-Taayshi, a member of the ruling Sovereign Council, admitted that security arrangements are complicated by the large number of combatants in various rebel movements (Radio Dabanga, 26 September).
In addition, the Atlantic Council’s Cameron Hudson suggests that the deal does not address the “underlying illness” that has kept Sudan in a state of perpetual war since independence in its failure to reform the armed forces “who are ultimately responsible for most of the past violence” (New York Times, 31 August).
Moreover, Ahmed Adam, a Darfuri specialist in international law and conflict resolution suspects that stipulations in the peace agreement concerning the restructuring of the military may not be implemented as “peace is not a priority for certain parties in the government” (Radio Dabanga, 15 September).
The deal does not respond to prevailing patterns of violence
Analysts view the deal as ineffective due to Sudan’s evolving conflict dynamics. Independent researcher Jean-Baptiste Gallopin suggests that the deal, signed by Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) who “haven’t seriously fought the government in years,” will not bring peace as it fails to respond to the prevailing patterns of intercommunal violence in Sudan’s peripheries since the revolution (War on the Rocks, 22 September).
According to Dr. Dan Watson, a postdoctoral researcher with Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED, 27 August), Sudan’s patterns of conflict have considerably evolved since 2016. Watson argues that Sudanese conflicts have evolved from recurrent clashes between rebel and state-aligned forces, to urbanised and ethnicised clashes, joined by frequent attacks on IDPs and farmers enacted by militias linked to the semi-periphery of Arab-identifying groups. Watson further suggests that the motivation behind the militias attacks against “weaker non-Arab groups” are the latter’s declining fortunes in Sudan’s political economy.
Watson further warns that the post-2016 patterns of violence have contributed to the relevance of the rebel groups, potentially culminating in their usage of the Juba peace process as a platform for power.
7. What risks does the Juba peace deal face?
The Juba peace agreement faces considerable risks, mainly relating to the power they afford to the SRF rebel signatories. The infographic below briefly summarises those risks, although the report provides the insights in more detail.
Rebels may not be viewed as representatives of people in conflict zones
The Juba peace agreement risks being ineffective if rebel leaders lack legitimacy in the conflict zones they claim to represent. Yasir Zaidan, a politics academic specialising in the Horn of Africa, draws parallels between Juba and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which led to South Sudan’s secession, writing that both “exclude the majority of Sudanese people” by enabling armed groups to represent the conflict areas (Radio Dabanga, 18 August).
As a result, ISS researcher Shewit Wondemichael (7 September) argued that the deal will not deliver sustainable peace amid the absence of groups with combatants on the ground. Even if rebel leaders sign the deal, “conflict will continue, because soldiers reject it or the group splits,” as has happened “many times in Sudan’s history,” Wondemichael added.
Juba being used as a platform by rebel groups to gain power
Analysts suggest that the Juba peace agreement bears similarities to previous ineffective peace deals that co-opted rebel leaders rather than resolve conflicts. With the details of the Juba peace deal “mirroring the ineffective or eventually unravelled” peace deals signed under previous dictators Omar al-Bashir and Jaafar al-Nimeri, Hendawi identifies concerns that Sudan’s government “may simply offer rebel groups political bribes as part of shaky agreements…which failed to secure peace or led to the rise of new rebel groups” (National.ae, 9 September).
Zaidan suggested that the Juba peace process has been transformed “into a political market place to satisfy by power seeking elites,” citing its presence of new regional negotiation tracks in areas with no history of post-independence conflict such as North and Central Sudan (Radio Dabanga, 18 August).
Moreover, if SRF groups are using Juba to gain power, Sudan’s democratic transition may be weakened, as argued by Watson and Gallopin.
The deal may weaken Sudan’s democratic prospects
Both Watson and Gallopin raise the prospect of the SRF groups using Juba to gain power and ultimately weaken Sudan’s democratic transition. Watson suggests that rebel groups may become “part of a reactionary alliance, taking their place alongside paramilitary and security elites in Khartoum, and entrenching militarised rule in the peripheries” (ACLED, 27 August).
Similarly, Gallopin warns that Sudan’s democratic prospects will fade if the deal becomes an “instrument for the ambitions of Himedti and the SRF”. Gallopin notes Sudan’s age-old divide between the “riverine” Arab elite from the Centre of Sudan and the peripheral regions, with the civilian component of the government predominantly comprising of the former, and Himedti and the SRF predominantly comprising of the latter. Thus, Gallopin raises the prospect of a Himedti-SRF coalition of peripheral leaders, with both parties now allowed to run for elections that have been postponed until 2022 (War on the Rocks, 22 September).
Violence may increase
There is a risk that violence may worsen if rebel groups with limited local legitimacy are granted power in conflict zones. Watson warns that the rebel groups who have been rendered “near irrelevant” by Sudan’s evolving conflict landscape may “ultimately exacerbate” the violence should the Juba peace process be exploited to expand their presence (ACLED, 27 August).
Moreover, Gallopin argues that “there are there are signs that the peace negotiations have fueled some of the communal violence by empowering SRF representatives whose local legitimacy is contested,” citing incidents of hostilities in eastern Sudan and South Kordofan (War on the Rocks, 22 September).
In addition, AFP (9 September) also raise the prospect of fresh conflict if displaced return to their homes and current occupants refuse to return property.
8. What solutions have been proposed?
While four of the five proposed solutions are in the infographic below, the fifth, from the European Council of Foreign Relations, suggests that Hamdok could use the deal to strengthen Sudan’s democratic transition.
Bottom-up approach
Abdallah Adam Khatir, a social studies professor at Zalingei University in central Darfur says full enactment of the deal needs a buy-in from Darfur’s internally displaced people. “We want the peace building to be a bottom-up approach, not just through negotiations between elites,” while rebels who are yet to sign need to be encouraged to join, he said (Bloomberg, 31 August).
Involving civil society
Amnesty International (31 August) East Africa director Deprose Muchena calls for the Sudanese government to “strive to include and involve other interest groups, including internally displaced people and civil society” in the peace process “so they too can provide solutions to the multiple challenges Sudan faces.”
Nation building project
Dr Mohamed Mahgoub Haroun, Professor at the University of Khartoum and former director of the University’s Peace Studies, argues that the Juba peace process will not secure peace without a “paradigm shift that envisions the peace process as a nation-building project” (Radio Dabanga, 18 August).
International support for implementation
For Sudan’s “cash-strapped” government to implement the Juba peace agreement, former UK ambassador to Sudan Dame Rosalind Marsden calls for Sudan’s regional and international partners to provide “sustained and generous support,” including removal from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list, “which is preventing debt relief, access to concessionary loans and large-scale foreign investment” (Chatham House, 14 September).
Hamdok to use the peace deal to strengthen democracy
Theodore Murphy, the director of the Africa Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR, 2 September), calls for Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to make leadership of the Juba peace process a “personal priority” in order to win back the support of the Sudanese protest movement.
Murphy argues that the key to securing the civilian character of Sudan’s democratic transition is addressing the major paradox of the protest movement - that it is the most representational political force, yet unwilling to engage in party politics. However, the constitutional conference envisaged by the Juba peace agreement presents an opportunity to incorporate the protest movement into a “renewed national compact.”