Analysis: the failure of Taqadum's campaign to influence the UK's Security Council resolution
SUMMARY
As the UK assumed the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council in November 2024, the Taqadum coalition embarked on a campaign targeting the British establishment with the aim of ensuring that UK-drafted resolution aligns with Taqadum’s agenda for a no-fly zone, foreign boots on the ground and the establishment of “safe areas”.
This analytical report tells the story of how Taqadum’s campaign failed, despite the backing of wealthy and powerful forces.
INTRODUCTION
The ten-part report will cover the following:
1. Taqadum leader Abdalla Hamdok’s diplomatic woes, given the credibility he lost with western diplomats due to his UAE ties.
2. Taqadum’s inability to influence the UK government or main opposition party.
3. The role of the Chatham House think-tank in pushing Taqadum’s agenda forward, with particular reference to a former UK ambassador to Sudan.
4. How Chatham House’s donors may explain the think-tanks facilitation of Taqadum and the UAE’s interests in Sudan.
5. Proposals made by Hamdok at Chatham House, and the impact of the UK Sudanese community’s protests against his visit.
6. Disinformation and misinformation by pro-Taqadum media aiming to demonise the anti-Hamdok demonstrations.
7. As Taqadum continued its campaign, the contrasting ways the coalition communicates with international and Sudanese audiences exposed Taqadum to renewed accusations that it is an ally of the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.
8. How Taqadum’s campaign failed when a UN Security Council rejected calls for foreign intervention, while another former UK ambassador to Sudan challenged Taqadum’s narrative of the war in Sudan.
9. How the eventual UK-authored resolution reflected the failure of Taqadum’s attempt to dictate the resolution.
10. Reactions to the UN Security Council vote on the resolution.
1. HAMDOK’S DIPLOMATIC WOES
Taqadum’s leader, former Sudanese prime minister Abdalla Hamdok, has lost the capital he once had with western diplomats. With Taqadum increasingly viewed as RSF allies, Hamdok’s ties to a state that is accused of backing the militia are also problematic.
Western diplomats
As reported by Africa Intelligence (24 May 2024), the close links that many Taqadum leaders maintain with [the RSF] have led to a belief in the US and Europe that Hamdok is not the ideal partner to unite Sudan’s civilian front. In addition, many western embassies distanced themselves from Hamdok due to his ties to the UAE – where he lives.
Hamdok’s pro-UAE advocacy
With Hamdok accused of complicity in the UAE plot against Sudan, his favourable activity towards the UAE has been documented extensively. This includes:
· Since March 2023, Hamdok has been a chairman at a UAE-registered think-tank / investment management company named the Center for Africa’s Development and Investment (CADI), where he helps broker deals for Emirati companies in Africa. His son Ali is an investment manager at CADI, while simultaneously studying for Master’s degree at the London School of Economics.
· On 28 September 2023, Hamdok was hosted by the UAE’s National Defence College.
· On 13 November 2023, Hamdok signed a deal with the head of the Emirates Policy Center Ibtisam Al-Katbi in his capacity as CADI’s chair. Al-Katbi later confirmed to the Emirati media that the UAE “has interests in Sudan”.
· In an interview with state-owned Emirati media outlet The National published on 25 June 2024, Hamdok “dismissed reports of the UAE having a nefarious role in Sudan, amid allegations of its support for the RSF”. But when asked about foreign interference in Sudan, Hamdok pointed at Iran instead.
· In a BBC interview from 13 July 2024, Hamdok was asked three times about the UAE’s support for the RSF. He eventually said: “as a civilian faction, we have nothing to do with where weapons come from”.
Despite Hamdok’s waning diplomatic clout, Taqadum still attempted to influence the UK government as London took over the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council in November 2024.
2. TAQADUM’S INABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE UK GOVERNMENT
In November 2024, the UK became the rotating president of the UN Security Council. In the buildup to the UK taking over the presidency, Taqadum targeted the British political establishment with a campaign aiming to ensure that a UK-drafted resolution would align with Taqadum’s agenda: a no-fly zone, foreign boots on the ground, and the establishment of “safe zones”.
While Taqadum’s demands were heard in the UK parliament, the coalition was unable to gain endorsements from either the current Labour government, nor from the opposition Conservative Party that lost power in summer 2024 after governing for 14 years. Instead, Taqadum had to settle for the Liberal Democrats – the UK’s third-largest party.
Lib Dems
The UK’s electoral system ensures that only two major parties consistently dominate the political landscape: Labour and Conservative. Since its founding in 1988, the Lib Dems only entered government between 2010 and 2015 as junior partners in a Conservative-led coalition. This damaged their electoral standing and relegated them to the fourth-largest political party in the following election.
Nonetheless, on 28 October, Hamdok met with the Calum Miller, a Lib Dem member of parliament (MP) and spokesperson for foreign affairs. Miller’s tweet announcing his meeting with Hamdok was met with fierce vitriol from Sudanese social media users.
Taqadum’s demands amplified in the UK parliament
The following day, during a debate at the democratically elected house of the UK Parliament, Lib Dem MP Monica Harding - who holds the party’s international development portfolio - told the House of Commons that she met Hamdok the previous night. Noting that the UK will become the penholder for at the UN Security Council, Harding said the following:
“[Hamdok] is pushing for safe zones for civilians. Will the UK sponsor a new Security Council resolution to designate no-fly areas for aircraft and Iranian drones, and to uphold responsibilities under resolution 2417? Will the Government increase the capacity of their mission in Sudan as a practical means of support?”.
3. CHATHAM HOUSE
In attempts to gain favourable coverage of a political campaign, the best practice targeting institutions likely to generate it. As one of the UK’s oldest and most prestige international affairs think-tanks, Chatham House is a crucial part of Britain’s foreign policymaking processes, with its experts briefing diplomats, politicians and journalists.
In addition, Chatham House think-tank was a likely source of positive publicity for Taqadum and its agenda given their previous positive sentiments towards the coalition, particularly coming from a former UK ambassador to Sudan that was insulted by Sudan’s former president.
Dame Rosalind Marsden
Currently an Associate Fellow in the Africa Programme at Chatham House, Dame Rosalind Marsden was the UK Ambassador to Sudan between 2007 and 2010, and then the EU’s Special Representative for Sudan between 2010-2013.
But it was in 2018 that she became widely known to Sudanese audiences. During a rally in the White Nile state, Sudan’s then-president Omar Al-Bashir said that after Marsden gave him instructions on how to govern Sudan as she was leaving her post, he “offered her from the barakawi” (an innuendo alluding to cursing somebody’s religion).
In this regard, it is expected that Taqadum’s attempts to offer an alternative to the former regime would appeal to Marsden. Indeed, Marsden’s most recent articles have either expressed positivity about Taqadum or aligned with their agenda.
Firstly, an article (Chatham House, 21 June 2024) promoting Taqadum’s founding conference argued “the anti-war, pro-democracy coalition offers a glimmer of hope”, while blaming Sudan’s army and Islamists for allegations that Taqadum is the political wing of the RSF.
A subsequent article published on 18 September 2024, after Sudan’s army refused to participated in the US-led Geneva peace talks, accused Sudan’s army of “setting unrealistic preconditions and objecting to the presence of the UAE, which they accuse of arming the RSF”. Those “unrealistic preconditions” included the withdrawal of the RSF from civilian homes as stipulated by the 2023 Jeddah peace agreement.
While Dame Rosalind’s pre-existing stances on Sudan’s war make her a likely source of positive endorsements for Taqadum’s campaign, it is also worth noting who funds Chatham House.
4. CHATHAM HOUSE’S DONORS
Chatham House rolled out the red carpet for Taqadum leaders as they campaigned to influence the UK’s security council resolution. This is why it is important to explore who funds Chatham House and why such factors may facilitate the think-tank’s enabling of Taqadum’s agenda.
Chatham House’s funders include: a British-Sudanese billionaire with ties to Taqadum’s leader, an Emirati company with interests in Sudan, the UAE and international oil companies.
Mo Ibrahim Foundation
In the financial year ending 31 March 2022, Chatham House’s research activities received donations between £100,000 and £249,999 from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Hamdok has had a relationship with the foundation before becoming Sudan’s prime minister, having spoken at one of its launching ceremonies in South Africa in November 2018.
British Sudanese billionaire Mo Ibrahim also held a lengthy discussion with Hamdok that was broadcast on Youtube in May 2023, a month after the war began. More recently, Ibrahim would support Taqadum’s campaign to influence the UK’s UNSC resolution both through his mouth and pockets.
On 23 October 2024, Ibrahim called for a UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan in comments to the BBC radio. Then, as reported by Africa Intelligence (8 November 2024), Hamdok was meant to attend a forum in Brussels organised by Mo Ibrahim.
DP World
As argued by Sudanese researcher Azza Mustafa, DP World is a core part of the UAE’s attempts take over ports in the Horn of Africa and thereby control global trade routes. In this regard, their funding of Chatham House’s Africa programme raises questions.
In 2021/22, Chatham House received £10,000 to £24,999 from logistics company DP World, who are also among the 2023 funders of Chatham House’s Africa programme. But DP World is not an African company. It is owned by Dubai’s ruling family via its corporate parent, Dubai World.
DP World has considerable interests in Sudan. In 2020, Al-Monitor reported that DP World attempted to lobby the US to support its bid to control Sudan’s ports by hiring Dickens & Madson, a Canadian firm run by an ex-Israeli intelligence agent that was previously paid millions by the RSF to get diplomatic recognition for its commander Himedti.
UAE funding
In 2021/22, Chatham House received between £3,000 and £9,999 from the UAE’s embassy in the UK in what is likely to be a yearly donation that has been made from as far back as 2014/15. In 2015/16, Chatham House received between £50,000 and £99,000 from UAE president Mohamed Bin Zayed, alongside £10,000 to £24,999 from the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Oil companies
Chatham House receive notable donations from international oil corporations. Given that the UAE is one of the world’s top ten oil producers, it is reasonable to expect that these companies would have strong relations with the UAE.
In the financial year ending 31 March 2022, Chatham House’s research activities received donations between £100,000 to £249,999 from the following oil companies:
· Chevron
· Crescent Petroleum
· ExxonMobil
· Shell
Furthermore, among the 2023 funders of Chatham House’s Africa programme include:
· BP
· Chevron
· ExxonMobil
· Shell
· Total Energies
· Tullow Oil
5. HAMDOK AT CHATHAM HOUSE
On 31 October 2024, a Chatham House discussion was held between Marsden and Hamdok, where the latter reiterated calls for a no-fly zone and foreign intervention in Sudan. Hamdok’s presence was met with protests from the Sudanese community of the UK, who accused Taqadum of siding with the RSF.
Hamdok calls for international intervention
In his discussion with Marsden, Hamdok expressed disappointment about the UN Secretary General’s 28 October briefing to the UN Security Council which said that conditions do not exist for the deployment of a UN force to protect civilians in Sudan. Hamdok said the report “fell short of saying anything” and contained “excuses and all that”.
Hamdok then said “we have to work on [Responsibility To Protect], think about enforcing a no-fly zone, safe zones inside Sudan, even to the point that we should boldly talk about bringing boots on the ground”. As further explored in part 9, these demands are considered to be favourable to the RSF and an infringement of Sudan’s sovereignty.
Sudanese protests
In the background of Hamdok’s calls for a no-fly zone and foreign boots on the ground in Sudan were protests outside of Chatham House that were broadcast live on Sudan’s national TV. Hundreds of Sudanese from various Sudanese ethnic groups gathered in London, with some arriving on coaches from other parts of the UK to voice their displeasure at Hamdok and Taqadum, who were accused of being agents of the UAE and allies of the RSF militia perpetrating genocide in Sudan.
Sudanese chants included:
Down with Hamdok.
Hamdok, you traitor. Hamdok, you agent.
Taqadum sold the blood.
Hamdok to the International Criminal Court.
One army, one people.
Escorted by the UK police, Hamdok fled from the demonstrators. The protests had an impact. Hamdok now had to think twice before public appearance wherever there are Sudanese people. As reported by Africa Intelligence, Hamdok failed to attend a forum in Belgium organised by Mo Ibrahim “probably put off by his experience in London”. Nonetheless, the Taqadum-friendly media attempted to demonise the protesters with disinformation and misinformation.
6. DISINFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION
The chant ‘One Army, One People’ was exploited by Taqadum-friendly media outlets and journalists who launched information campaigns aiming to demonise the anti-Hamdok demonstrations. They came from Taqadum-linked Sudanese outlet Al-Taghyeer, and the founder of pro-Taqadum outlet Sudan War Monitor.
Disinformation
An opinion piece circulated on Sudanese social media that was published on Sudanese electronic newspaper Al-Taghyeer which cited the use of ‘one army, one people’ chant to label the demonstrations “pro-war”. The article was “written” by a “freelance journalist” named ‘Holy Hastings’, giving the illusion that Hamdok had western support. As it turned out, no such journalist exists, with the article’s ghost writer spelling the name ‘Holly’ wrong.
It is worth noting that the editor-in-chief of Al-Taghyeer is Taqadum spokeswoman Rasha Awad. In January 2024, Awad openly defended the RSF by saying that the RSF had not committed crimes in Khartoum despite being in the capital for ten years. Yet, over the past ten years, she was herself an outspoken critic of the RSF and personally reported on their crimes across Sudan.
Misinformation
The ‘One Army, One People’ chant was also capitalised on by Daniel Van Oudenaren, the manager of Sudan War Monitor, an outlet that adopts favourable rhetoric towards Taqadum.
In a tweet that received considerable Sudanese backlash, Van Oudenaren tagged the UK terror police in claims that the protesters are “supporters of the military dictatorship in Sudan” that is “a straight line of continuity between the regime in Sudan today and the previous one that hosted Osama bin Laden”.
In a bid to further demonise the protesters, Van Oudenaren disseminated misinformation about the ‘One Army, One People’ chant. Describing it as a “pro-war slogan”, Van Oudenaren wrote out the chant in Arabic letters without translating its meaning. Thus, he neglected to mention the various contexts in which Sudanese people have chanted ‘One Army, One People’.
Rather than being a pro-war chant, ‘One Army, One People’ is a call for solidarity between the people and the army that transcends political stances. Below are some contexts for the chant that are not pro-war slogans:
· As noted by British Sudan historian Willow Berridge, Sudanese people took to the streets in 1976 chanting ‘One Army, One People’ in solidarity with Sudan’s military amid a rebellion backed by former Libyan leader Muammar Gadaffi.
· When Hamdok was prime minister (2019-2021), he himself uttered the phrase ‘One Army, One People’ in a message of solidarity with the army.
· ‘One Army, One People’ was chanted on 26 September 2021 during a rally held by Taqadum’s predecessor the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition.
· In September 2024, women and children at displacement camps chanted ‘One Army, One People’ as they celebrated the army’s advances against the RSF in Khartoum.
7. TAQADUM CONTINUES ITS CAMPAIGN
Despite the anti-Taqadum protests in London, the coalition continued its campaign to dictate the UK’s resolution at the UN Security Council, with one of the coalition’s leaders echoing Hamdok’s calls at Chatham House and on the BBC. At the same time, Taqadum continued to expose themselves to accusations from Sudanese people that they support the RSF due to their different modes of communication with international and Sudanese audiences.
English audiences
Despite the anti-Taqadum protests in London, the coalition continued its campaign to dictate the UK’s resolution at the UN Security Council. On 7 November 2024, Taqadum’s vice-chair Khalid Omar Yousif [Silik] appeared on an episode of Chatham House’s Africa Aware podcast entitled ‘Tagadom’s vision for ending the war in Sudan’. There were no questions about allegations of Taqadum’s alliance with the RSF or its UAE backers.
On 13 November 2024, Silik was given a platform on the BBC World Service’s Newsday programme. Silik, a cabinet affairs minister during the Hamdok-led government, echoed his boss’ calls for foreign intervention in Sudan.
Like Hamdok, Silik criticised the UN Secretary General’s report which ruled out international intervention in Sudan by saying that it “came with a very weak recommendation that made most of the Sudanese disappointed”. Silik then went on to call for the expansion of the UN’s Darfur arms embargo to cover all of Sudan, as well as the establishment of safe zones patrolled by an international force, which, he said, outweighs concerns raised about Sudan’s sovereignty.
Sudanese audiences
While western media and politicians portray Taqadum as a neutral pro-democracy coalition that aims to end the war, the coalition is widely perceived to be pro-RSF among many Sudanese. This can be partly explained by the conflicting way in which Taqadum communicate with international and Sudanese audiences.
On 7 November 2024, uploaded a statement in Arabic on RSF atrocities in Al-Jazira state, followed by an English translation. As spotted by journalist Mohamed Mustafa, the English version explicitly stated that RSF military operations pose a threat to civilian lives. However, the Arabic version simply said that military operations threaten civilian life without mention of the RSF. It is this reluctance to condemn the RSF in their Arabic communication that shape widespread Sudanese doubts about the sincerity of Taqadum’s neutrality and anti-war position.
8. THE FAILURE OF TAQADUM’S CAMPAIGN
By mid-November, Taqadum’s campaign to dictate the UK’s UN Security Council resolution in line with their agenda has been broadly successful.
Taqadum leaders were granted platforms on the UK’s most prominent political and media institutions: the UK’s elected parliament, most influential foreign affairs think-tank and broadcast news programme. Taqadum’s calls for a no-fly zone, safe areas and foreign boots on the ground were heard by policymakers, those who brief them and the British public.
But it was to no avail. UN Security Council permanent member rejected Taqadum’s calls in solidarity with Sudan’s government, while another former UK ambassador to Sudan took a different position to Dame Rosalind’s that is favourable to Taqadum.
Russia rejects foreign involvement
On 12 November, during a UN Security Council session called by the UK, Russia said it rejects proposals to deploy foreign forces to Sudan under the pretext of protecting civilians and delivering aid. To protect civilians, Russia said that the withdrawal of the RSF would be more appropriate than the deployment of UN or African Union forces.
A departure from Taqadum’s claims of neutrality, the Russian statement overtly sided with Sudan. Blaming the RSF for obstructing aid delivery, Russia said that Sudan’s army is the backbone of the state, citing civilians fleeing to army-controlled areas. In addition, Russia called for the support of Sudanese state institutions, adding that it considers the ruling Sovereign Council to be the supreme legitimate authority in Sudan.
Former UK ambassador calls for Sudan’s army to be supported
On 14 November, Sudan’s humanitarian crisis was discussed on leading radio stations in the UK, LBC 97.3. The presenter was Iain Dale, who claims his programme has 620,000 listeners. Taqadum were not invited. One of the guests was Sir William Patey, the UK’s ambassador to Sudan from 2002-2005, who adopted a different stance to Dame Rosalind, another UK diplomat who served in Sudan during Al-Bashir’s regime.
In a blow to Taqadum’s narrative of the war in Sudan, Sir William rejected the ‘both sides’ narratives that equates Sudan’s army to the RSF. Labelling the RSF as “predators”, “rapists” and “war criminals”, Sir William called for the international community to support Sudan’s army, stressing that the defeat of the RSF is crucial for Sudan’s future.
9. UK RESOLUTION
On 16 November 2024, two days ahead of the UN Security Council vote, the UK-authored draft resolution appeared online. It was a diplomatic victory for Sudan’s government, and the failure of Taqadum’s attempt to dictate the resolution.
This was because it failed to include the proposals that Taqadum leaders campaigned for in influential UK political and media institutions: a no-fly zone, safe areas, foreign forces and the extension of the Darfur arms embargo to all of Sudan.
Nonetheless, the resolution also excluded any condemnation of the UAE for backing the RSF or calls to designate the militia as a terrorist organisation, as Sudan would have hoped for.
No-fly zone
The UK authored draft resolution did not include any mention of banning the Sudanese state army’s military aircraft. Particularly amid Taqadum’s failure to condemn the UAE’s arming of the RSF, the coalition’s calls for a no-fly zone are a key reason why the coalition is accused of being the RSF’s ally.
Aerial superiority is the most crucial advantage that Sudan’s army has over a UAE-backed militia possessing advanced weaponry and able to recruit foreign mercenaries at will. In this regard, a no-fly zone could facilitate the RSF’s military victory.
Safe areas
The UK’s resolution omits any mention of “safe areas” under foreign troops as campaigned for by Taqadum. Sudan’s government contends that the “safe areas” in Sudan are those controlled by the army, where citizens flee to whenever the RSF arrive.
In addition, there is a belief that the creation of “safe areas” would encourage the RSF campaign to change Sudan’s demographics by emptying areas of their inhabitants before replacing them with foreign settlers. Indeed, the RSF are already doing this in both western and central Sudan, leading to the militia being dubbed ‘the Rapid Settler Forces’.
Foreign boots on the ground
Despite Taqadum leaders calling for Sudan’s sovereignty to be deprioritised, the UK resolution did not include calls to deploy foreign forces in Sudan without the state’s consent. Particularly concerning to Sudan would be the deployment of troops from RSF allies Kenya and Uganda.
Kenyan president Ruto held talks with RSF commander Himedti and pro-RSF Taqadum leaders. Nairobi is also set to host an RSF press conference, with Sudan recalling its ambassador to Kenya over the latter’s engagement in Nairobi. Himedti has also met with the president of Uganda, from where UAE arms are being funneled to the RSF.
Arms embargo extension
The UK’s resolution did not suggest extending the UN’s Darfur arms embargo to include all of Sudan, as called for Taqadum leaders. Doing so would have weakened the ability of Sudan’s army to defend itself from the UAE-backed RSF militia.
10. UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE
On 18 November 2024, the 15 members of the Security Council voted on a resolution co-authored by the UK and Sierra Leone calling for a ceasefire in Sudan. Russia vetoed the resolution, which was welcomed by Sudan. Taqadum joined the US, UK and UAE in condemning Russia’s veto.
Russian veto
In a speech following the vote explaining Russia’s veto, the Kremlin’s deputy UN ambassador Dmitry Polyanski emphasised Sudan’s sovereignty with regards to the foreign intervention question. Russia accused the UK authors of the draft of taking effort to “delete mention of the legitimate authority of Sudan”, with the wording said to encourage RSF attacks.
Sudan’s reaction
In a speech after the vote, Sudan’s ambassador to the UN Al-Harith Idris criticised the ‘both sides’ narrative of the war in Sudan, and emphasised Sudan’s sovereignty in calls for Sudanese ownership of the peace process. Idris also rejected international intervention in Sudan, highlighted the UAE’s support for the RSF and called for militia to be designated a terrorist group.
While Sudan did not initially object to a resolution that was not dictated by Taqadum’s wishes, the government nonetheless welcomed the Russian veto. Sudan’s foreign ministry said it hopes that the Russian veto will set a precedent for ending the use of the Security Council “to serve the narrow agenda of some powers, with the absence of transparency, democracy and the perpetuation of double standards”.
Taqadum reaction
With the UK and the US lambasting Russia’s veto with claims that Sudan supported the initial resolution, Taqadum condemned the Russian veto for separate reasons.
Taqadum’s statement made no mention of Sudan’s sovereignty nor Russia’s justification that the veto was motivated by emphasis on it. Instead, Taqadum said Russia’s position “serves as a cover for the continuation of massacres in Sudan,” adding the veto “exposes the falsity of Russian claims to support the Global South”. The UAE also expressed disappointment that the resolution was not adopted, which was met with ridicule on social media.
CONCLUSION
As the UK assumed the rotating presidency at the UN Security Council, Taqadum embarked on a lobbying campaign targeting the British establishment. Their aim was to ensure that a UK-authored resolution aligns with a Taqadum agenda that infringes on the sovereignty of Sudan’s government and weakens the state army: foreign boots on the ground, a no-fly zone, “safe zones” and the extension of an arms embargo.
Taqadum achieved favourable exposure. They were able to amplify their agenda in influential British political and media institutions: the UK parliament’s elected house, Chatham House think-tank and BBC World Service radio. However, with regards to political stakeholders, Taqadum’s demands were not championed by the UK government and the coalition had to settle for endorsements from a party with political power that can go no further than being junior partners of a coalition government.
In addition, Taqadum’s endorsements from one former UK ambassador to Sudan were juxtaposed by another who – albeit indirectly - challenged the coalition’s “both sides” framing of the war in Sudan. While Sudan’s government can be satisfied that the eventual UK resolution omitted Taqadum’s demands, there is still work to be done with regards to getting the UN Security Council to condemn the UAE’s support for the RSF, and facilitating the militia’s designation as a terrorist entity.
In December, it will be the US’ turn to be UN Security Council’s rotating president. As this will be the final month of the outgoing Biden administration, the tabling of a major Sudan resolution is unlikely. The council presidents for January and February 2025 will be Algeria and China respectively. Both maintain positive relations with Sudan, and the latter holds veto power. In this regard, it was an opportunity missed for Taqadum to ensure that a UN Security Council resolution aligns with their agenda.
