Hilaliya deaths: RSF poisoning or cholera?

Over 500 civilians have been reportedly killed during the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia’s genocidal campaign in the town of Al-Hilaliya in Al-Jazira state.

But is this due to the RSF’s intentional poisoning of civilians, or - as claimed by the RSF and reported by Reuters – a cholera outbreak?

REUTERS REPORT

On 7 November, Reuters reported that at least 73 have died of mysterious causes in the Sudanese town of Al-Hilaliya – one of dozens of villages under an RSF siege to the east of central Sudan’s Al-Jazira state following the defection of RSF commander Abu Agla Keikel on 20 October 2024.

Attributing their inability to “determine the exact cause” to a network blackout enforced by the RSF, Reuters’ article made no mention of poisoning. Nonetheless, Reuters added that Al-Hilaliya is the home to Keikel’s family “which locals say may explain the siege”.

Then, on 15 November, Reuters reported that cholera is the suspected cause of “mystery deaths” in Al-Hilaliya. Their latest article

stated that “rumours swirled about the cause of the deaths and whether RSF soldiers had intentionally poisoned people”. So, where did these so-called “rumours” come from?

LOCAL SOURCES

Claims that the hundreds of deaths in Al-Hilaliya are caused by the RSF deliberately poisoning food and water supplies came from credible local sources that monitor the humanitarian situation in Al-Jazira.  

Resistance Committees

In a statement published on 11 November, the resistance committee of Al-Jazira’s state capital Wad Madani said that “the civilian death toll in Al-Hilaliya has risen to more than 350 martyrs… [with] hundreds killed because the RSF brought chemically treated flour into the city, leading to the poisoning of civilians and their deaths by the dozens every hour”.

Reuters have previously described the Wad Madani Resistance Committee as a “pro-democracy” group for a 26 October article that cited them as a source for the death toll of an RSF massacre in Al-Jazira’s Al-Sireiha village in revenge for Keikel’s defection.

Al-Jazira Conference

In several statements published on their Facebook page since the RSF’s siege of Al-Hilaliya began, Al-Jazira Conference, which is described by Sudan Tribune as “a civilian organization monitoring human rights violations in the state” also accused the RSF of poisoning citizens.

On 8 November, Al-Jazira Conference reported that “40 deaths from poisoning were monitored in [Al-Hilaliya] in the past 24 hours, including two families”. Al-Jazira Conference added that the number of martyrs rose to 166, with 151 attributed to poisoning.

In an 11 November update, Al-Jazira Conference said that the Al-Hilaliya martyrs rose by 23 to 382 “due to complications from poisoning and the absence of health care”.

But could the credibility of Al-Jazira Conference as a source be questioned due to possible biases towards Sudan’s army-led government? Their most recent statement, published on 15 November, strongly criticised the so-called “Port Sudan government” for “leaving” Al-Jazira residents as “spoils” for the RSF militia.  

Central Sudan Call

Another organisation monitoring violations in Al-Jazira to report that the RSF is poisoning citizens in Al-Hilaliya is Central Sudan Call. Unlike the previous two sources, Central Sudan Call provide lists of names of those killed by the RSF alongside how they died.

In their 8 November update, they stated that: “the death toll has reached 161 martyrs…147 due to the deterioration of their health and food poisoning after eating spoiled and poisoned food distributed to them by the [RSF]”.

In Central Sudan Call’s 9 November update, it was reported that: “the number of martyrs until today exceeded 216. Deaths due to poisoning are steadily increasing, and it has been confirmed that the only available source of water is not fit for use or drinking after [the RSF] deliberately sabotaged and looted the solar energy systems operating [al-Hilaliya’s] water supply”.

On 10 November, Central Sudan reported that the death toll exceeded 350 “[with] the causes of death ranging between food poisoning, hunger, thirst, deterioration of health, and lack of access to medicine and medical care”.

Moreover, on 11 November, Central Sudan published evidence of poisoned wells in Al-Hilaliya, with a video showing the poisoning of a drinking water source at Sheikh Al-Tayib Mosque, a site where the RSF are said to be imprisoning civilians.  

Their statement read: “local sources confirmed that the drinking water in the well was poisoned, so that all who drank from it became ill and died a few hours later”. 

Central Sudan call added: “the matter was not limited to drinking water only, but the [RSF] also put toxic substances such as urea, lead and mercury in the food supplies that they distributed to the detained residents, which led to hundreds of deaths”.

 WHAT DID THE UN SAY?

Reuters’ November 15 article noted that, earlier this week, the UN said “there was a suspected cholera outbreak among people who escaped eastern Al-Jazira…but did not specify Al-Hilaliya”.

However, the 11 November update from the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) stated that: “there have been reports of 54 civilians who have reportedly died and another 90 that got sick allegedly due to poisoned food in Hilaliya village”.

CHOLERA

While the Reuters article did not explicitly deny that the RSF intentionally poisoned civilians in Al-Hilaliya, the allegations were described as “rumours”. Nor did the Reuters neglect mentioning the RSF’s role in an article that suggested that a cholera outbreak was the primary cause of mass civilian deaths.

Citing medics and an eyewitness, Reuters reported that the RSF “took solar panels and electrical wires used to extract groundwater, forcing at least some of the residents to rely on a shallow traditional well that had gone unused for decades and may have mixed with sewage, according to the medics and an eyewitness”.

THE RSF’S CHOLERA CLAIMS

Nonetheless, the cholera explanation is more favourable to the RSF than more sinister accusations of the militia deliberately poisoning civilians.

Indeed, as reported by Radio Dabanga (12 November), Siddig Osman, the head of the Civil Authority in Al-Jazira established by the RSF described the deaths as an epidemic, with “sources close to the RSF corroborated this, describing the situation as a cholera epidemic”.

Sat beside Osman during a press conference, the supervisor of the RSF’s central region advisory council Montasir Habani said the following:

“The righteous people are tested. When people are tested, it means God loves them. We want to send a message that there are rumours that there is poisoning and a siege. Is this true? Is there a siege on Al-Hilaliya by the RSF? We deny the rumours [on regional Arab news stations]. This is a cholera epidemic and it is a trial from God. We say the epidemic came as a form of love for the tested people”

MEDICAL SOURCES

On 7 November, Reuters’ report that 73 “died of mysterious causes” in Al-Hilaliya cited the Sudanese Doctors Union (SDU). The following day, the SDU’s 8 November statement explicitly blamed both chemical poisoning and cholera.

“Some of those [imprisoned by the RSF] lost their lives due to being forced to eat wheat grains contaminated with chemical fertilisers used as seeds and are not fit for human consumption, while others were forced to drink unfit water from an old closed well that has not been used for a very long time,” the SDU said.

Yet, a week later, Reuters’ 15 November article cited medical sources for claims that a cholera outbreak primarily explain civilian deaths in Al-Hilaliya that exceed 300 to 400.

It is worth noting that there is a precedence for politically-motivated Sudanese medics using their expertise to exonerate the RSF of crimes in Al-Jazira, as indicated in our documentation of Taqadum spokesperson Alaa Nugud’s parroting of RSF narratives.  

INVESTIGATION: Claims that Sudan's army attacked the UAE ambassador's home in Khartoum

On 29 September, the UAE alleged that Sudan’s army bombed the UAE ambassador’s residence in Khartoum during a counter-offensive that took back swathes of Sudan’s capital city from the UAE-sponsored Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. Sudanese diplomat to the UN, Ammar Mahmoud, then posted satellite images refuting the allegations showing the building intact.

However, this evidence did not stop diplomatic missions across the world from condemning Sudan’s army. On the 14th of October, Sudanese government ministers then produced evidence denying the Emirati accusations during a press conference in Port Sudan.

Nonetheless, “evidence” validating the UAE’s claims have come from Sudanese open-source intelligence (OSINT) researcher, a Sudanese media outlet and the UAE themselves. However, our own investigation revealed the pro-RSF and UAE stances of the Sudanese researcher and media outlet. In addition, the geolocation of RSF battlefield footage shows how the militia was conducting military operations near the ambassador’s residence. Finally, the evidence put forward by the UAE has been described as “self-incriminating” given its lack of resemblance to the aftermath of an airstrike.

Dubious open-source intelligence

 Open-source intelligence researchers affiliated to OSINT Sudan appeared to “verify” the Emirati claims. OSINT Sudan is a partner of the Sudan War Monitor­, an outlet frequently cited as a credible source by the mainstream global media, despite its history of unfounded speculation and growing suspicions of its motives.

The OSINT Sudan team features Haytham Hamid who, on the 2nd of October, posted a satellite image from two days earlier purporting that a nearby café was on fire as proof that the UAE’s ambassador’s residence was targeted. Hamid then promised visual confirmation showing damage and smoke rising from the ambassador’s residence to prove it was bombed.

The day after that, there was still no visual confirmation, although his tweets shed light on his political biases. 

-       4 October 2024: Hamid quoted the UAE foreign ministry’s statement refuting Sudan’s denial by using Emirati and RSF rhetoric with claims that the Muslim Brotherhood misled the world.

-       5 October 2024: Hamid retweets a known pro-RSF account which wrote: “the Islamists specialise in bombing embassies and diplomatic headquarters”.

 A scan of Hamid’s Facebook account reveals his open support for the RSF. 

-       14 April 2­­­­023: A day before the war erupted, Hamid uploaded a speech from RSF commander Himedti with a post that read: “gold is smuggled from Merowe Airport. From Himedti’s speech in Karari”. The context for this is that days before the war began, amid high tensions between the army and the RSF, the latter deployed in Merowe, northern Sudan without army approval. This was one of the final straws before the war began.

-       16 June 2023: Two months into the war, Hamid uploaded pictures of RSF troops with the caption “We are of you and for you, from the womb of this people”, which implied that the RSF is akin to the Sudanese people. Hamid’s post read: “after the severing of ties between the army and the RSF, [RSF] support is now for those who remain”.

-       14 July 2023: Hamid uploaded a picture of a wounded army soldier smiling at an RSF media figure known as Al-Jofani. The caption reads “the facial expressions of the army officer when he remembers the name given by RSF personnel to the army force moving from Hattab camp after [the soldier] was injured, captured and treated in today’s clashes in Khartoum Bahri. The name: Al-Burhan [made a regretful mistake]”.

-       5 September 2023: Hamid responded to a post that said RSF commander Himedti’s speech is “improvised, confused and suggests extreme weakness and a deep sense of defeat and bitterness. Nothing more and nothing less”. Hamid wrote: “Rather it suggests the determination to defeat the army's Islamists, the Islamists who deceive the army personnel and the citizens mobilized in a futile war to restore their ownership of the wealth of Sudan”. Hamid then made a reference to Himedti’s tribal background as a western Sudanese nomadic Arab by writing “understanding the nature of the Bedouin is a basic introduction to understanding his words and his aims”.

OSINT Sudan’s partner Sudan War Monitor has been accused of downplaying army and gains and exaggerating those of the RSF. Haytham Hamid’s Facebook post on 27 September 2024 hints at him also using OSINT Sudan for this purpose. A day earlier, the army launched a counter-offensive in Khartoum known as ‘the battle of the crossing’. Footage circulated online of the army crossing Al-Halfaya and the Medical Corps bridges, as reported by Radio Dabanga. Yet Hamid wrote: “there is no crossing, [it is just] lies. Stay tuned to OSINT Sudan’s map for the events of [yesterday]”.

On 6 October, Hamid and finally fulfilled his promise to “verify” Emirati claims that Sudan’s army bombed its ambassador’s residence in Khartoum. The image he posted was only reposted by OSINT Sudan and Sudan War Monitor. Alongside featuring the satellite images uploaded by Sudanese diplomat Ammar Mahmoud which showed how the building remained intact, there was another still that was titled “visible damage”. But where did that still come from?

Doubts about the UAE’s “proof”

The “visible damage” came from a video that first appeared on an outlet with a following exceeding 200,000 called Barq Sudan, who published a tweet that read:

“Evidence proving that the Sudanese army targeted the headquarters of the head of the UAE diplomatic mission in Khartoum. The attack represents a flagrant violation of diplomatic norms”. In an investigation, we revealed why there are credible allegations that it is a pro-UAE influence campaign given its history of promoting the UAE’s domestic policies and geopolitical interests.

 Other “proof” put forward by the UAE or affiliated media were questioned for several reasons, including:

1. Doubts about how the claimed army soldier got to the residence.

2. Evidence that the RSF conducted military operations near the home.

3. UAE evidence submitted to the UN described as “self-incriminating”.

1. The home is in RSF-held territory

In another Sudan Barq video, a man claiming to be an army soldier recorded the UAE ambassador’s residence and “confirmed” that the "attack was successful”. There was skepticism about the video for several reasons.

Firstly, there were questions as to how an army soldier was able to get to the home given that it is in the south Khartoum neighbourhood of Al-Raqi, which is under RSF control.  Indeed, the ambassador’s home was rented from Jamal Zarqan, a pioneering figure in Sudan’s military defence industry, who was killed by the RSF next door in July 2023.

Secondly, the video showed the building to be in tact, thereby challenging claims that an air strike targeted the ambassador’s residence.

Thirdly, the man recording sends his greetings to the commander-in-chief of Sudan’s army Abdulfattah Al-Burhan. Army soldiers do not typically communicate in this manner. By contrast, RSF fighters regularly send their greetings to the militia’s commander at the start of their videos.

2. RSF military operations near the ambassador’s residence

Denying the UAE’s allegations, Sudan’s government pointed to the RSF’s presence near the ambassador’s residence. Indeed, there is documentation of the militia’s activity either said of the UAE ambassador’s residence: Al-Cardinal’s palace around 250 meters south-west of the ambassador’s residence, and Al-Abrar mosque, around 200 metres to the east of the residence.   

On 28 July 2023, RSF commander Himedti released a video titled “my words to our people and the RSF heroes during my inspection of the forces in a number of areas under our control in the capital”. Given Himedti’s suspension from the X platform, the video can be viewed through Sky News Arabia’s Facebook account. 

 The RSF presence was geo-located to the palace of businessman Ashraf al-Cardinal, which is around 250 meters south-west of the UAE ambassador’s residence.

In the background of the video is a nearby building, around 98 meters away.

Then, videos of RSF Katshuya rockets being launched showed Al-Abrar Mosque in the shot, which is around 200 meters to the east of the ambassador’s residence.

The direction of the RSF rockets fired from Al-Abrar mosque suggests that they were targeting Al-Shajara military district which hosts the highly strategic Armoured Corps that is about 12 kilometres to the west of the ambassador’s residence.

 This means that the rockets would have passed the UAE ambassador’s residence on the way, thereby lending credence to the claims of Sudan’s government that the damage caused to the ambassador’s home were caused by RSF activity.

The broken windows at the UAE ambassador’s residence can also be attributed to shockwaves from a January 2024 precision drone strike targeting a UAE-supplied RSF howitzer placed near Al-Cardinal’s palace which destroyed the canon while keeping the building intact.

This is why veteran Sudanese journalist al-Tahir Satti told the New Arab that the RSF aims to manipulate international perceptions by provoking the army into confrontations near sensitive locations like diplomatic missions which “makes it increasingly difficult for the army to conduct operations without causing collateral damage, which the RSF seeks to exploit for propaganda."

 3. Questions over UAE’s evidence to the UN

On 6 October 2024, the UAE mission to the UN submitted a document with “evidence” that the Sudanese army’s “heinous” airstrike on the UAE ambassador’s residence “resulted in extensive damage to the building and property”.

 Sudanese social media users described the complaint as “self-incriminating” given that cars were not stolen as with most diplomatic missions, alongside asking who took the photos given the house sits in an RSF occupied area with the UAE embassy relocating to Port Sudan. Furthermore, photos of the damage of actual airstrikes in Khartoum showed a huge difference to the alleged “extensive damage” claimed by the UAE.

RSF attacks on diplomatic missions

While the UAE claimed that the alleged attack ensured Sudan breached the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Sudan’s foreign ministry previously claimed that the UAE-sponsored RSF had in fact attacked over 40 diplomatic missions through the course of the war.  Satellite images were broadcast on state television comparing how other diplomatic missions in Khartoum – except the UAE’s - were looted by the RSF.

While there has been extensive documentation of the RSF’s systematic campaign of looting civilian homes and aid agencies, diplomatic missions have not been spared. Amid a stream of reports of attacks on embassies and ambassador’s residences in Khartoum, the RSF have been explicitly blamed for some. While various foreign ministries that had their premises attacked opted to not name a perpetrator in their statements condemning the incidents, they nonetheless fall into a pattern of RSF looting. We covered them in the hyperlinked article.

INVESTIGATION: Claims that Sudan’s army executed 70 in Al-Halfaya, Khartoum North (Bahri)

Days after Sudan’s army launched an offensive in capital city Khartoum which liberated various neighbourhoods from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, a UN expert called for the urgent protection of civilians in Khartoum amid alarming reports of summary executions. Citing videos circulating social media, the designated Sudan expert of the UN’s human rights body alleged that the army and the Baraa bin-Malik brigade executed 70 young men in the neighbourhood of Al-Halfaya in Khartoum Bahri. Nonetheless, there are suspicions that the UN has again fallen prey to disinformation about the war in Sudan.

Therefore, this investigation explores:

1. The dubious nature of the original source and their history of disinformation.

2. The lack of confirmation that the incident occurred from credible local sources

3. Doubts over the video “evidence”.

 1. INITIAL REPORTS

On 30 September, social media accounts affiliated to the Taqadum coalition – which is accused of siding with the RSF - circulated reports that the Baraa bin Malik brigade and the Sudanese army jointly executed 33 young men volunteering at communal kitchens in Al-Halfaya.

 One of the first accounts to post about this incident was Ameen Nasir Mekki, a Taqadum leader who has faced repeated accusations of publishing misleading news that has then been reported by credible media outlets.

Amin Mekki’s history of disinformation

In July 2023, Mekki was accused of hijacking the Ministry of Health’s Khartoum state official Facebook page, and posting on it from France.

@LienaAbdu tweeted: “the Ministry of Health page was stolen by [RSF supporter] Ameen Mekki, who cannot even say that [lab specialist Musab Abdullah Ibrahim was] killed by the RSF!”

The tweet was accompanied by two screenshots. The first one was from a comment made by Ministry of Health employee Talal Omer, who said: “[I requested that Ameen] return the page of the Khartoum Ministry of Health. [Ameen] stole it and took to France to use it as a political tool. Us in the ministry are harmed by this as we are unable to [use the page] to guide people to hospitals. The page is verified by Facebook but this despicable person controls it and blocked me when I confronted him about it”.

 In the second screenshot shows the Khartoum Ministry of Health page announcing the death of lab specialist Musab Abdullah Ibrahim.

A statement subsequently released by the Sudanese Pharmacist Professionals Association accused the Khartoum health ministry page of obscuring that the lab specialist was killed by the RSF in an attempt to “mislead public opinion”.

Then, in July 2023, mainstream media outlets including the BBC, AP, AFP, Reuters and the Guardian cited the Health Ministry page to report that army air strikes killed 22 in Omdurman.

A condemnation followed from the UN Secretary General.

However, Reuters withdrew their story, citing doubts about the truthfulness of the website that posted the information.

Under Mekki’s administration, the page was accused of following an anti-army and pro-RSF agenda, leading to a social media hashtag campaign that translates to “Return the page Ameen Makki”.

 At the start of 2024, Mekki wrote a Twitter post claiming that the Sudanese army executed a doctor Abdelmonem Abdelhafeez, citing a statement from the doctor’s family.

 The doctor’s own daughter had to refute this by saying her late father was killed by a stray bullet in RSF-held territory.

In June, Mekki would go on to regurgitate RSF narratives following the militia’s massacre in Wad al-Noura village. In response to a question about the RSF attacking innocent people, Mekki said the village hosts volunteer fighters.

The report spreads from social to traditional media

Another person to circulate reports of the army executing communal kitchen volunteers was a pro-Taqadum activist named Ammar Al-Sadig. A resident of al-Halfaya, who has not left the neighbourhood since the war began, denied the reports and said the army has been delivering aid to Al-Halfaya. He was subsequently blocked by Al-Sadig.

Then, a post from an influencer called Mohamed Khalifa claimed that at least 120 were killed in the Halfaya communal kitchen executions. Khalifa said that the army arrived with a list of names and summarily executed those accused of collaborating with the RSF.

 On the first of October, Taqadum then released a press statement on the alleged extrajudicial killing of civilians in Al-Halfaya. The statement was carried in Beam Reports, an outlet aiming to combat misinformation and disinformation in Sudan.  Al-Taghyeer, a Taqadum linked outlet, reported that “dozens of civilians liquidated by Sudanese Army and Islamist brigades”. The “Sudanese army accused of executing civilians in Khartoum Bahri,” reported Sudan Tribune. “Various sectors of Sudanese society condemned the killing of a group of young men in Halfaya” reported Radio Dabanga.

In their report, Dabanga cited a social media post written by “Ma Reena” that quoted unnamed residents of Al-Halfaya.

2. LACK OF CONFIRMATION

Yet, in the comments of the said Facebook post, Abdulmoneim Abdulmajid, a man from Al-Halfaya, repeatedly asked for just ten names of those executed by the army. The original poster said they can only send videos.

When massacres of this level occur, such as for the RSF’s mass killing in Wad Noura, it is expected that “martyrs” lists are published, with the local resistance committee making a statement. 

 Up until now, this not occurred for the reported executions in Al-Halfaya, nor have victim’s families come forward. The absence of such confirmation has been questioned by Sudanese social media users.

 Denials from credible local sources

Bahri Emergency Rooms, who are responsible for the kitchens, have not made a statement on the so-called executions. Their first Facebook post after the alleged incident, which came five days after the reports, was a generic appeal for support.

 Nonetheless, only nine hours after Amin Mekki’s initial Facebook post, Bahri Emergency Room volunteer Eiman Hamad Elnil, said the news about the army liquidating the Bahri communal kitchen volunteers is completely untrue, and aims to create panic among them.

 Photos from her Facebook account further cement proof of her closeness to the Bahri communal kitchens, as indicated by posts announcing food deliveries to the neighbourhoods of Al-Droshab and Al-Danagla, which are situated to the north and south of Al-Halfaya respectively.

Three days later, Eiman also denied a statement circulating social media that was written in her name confirming the incident. 

By this stage, however, the UN had already published a statement citing the incident to call for civilian protection in Khartoum.

 At 6.37pm on the 30th of September, around eight hours after Amin Mekki’s initial post, Mosab Aljak, who is close to the Bahri communal kitchens, also denied reports of the executions.

Aljak is treated as a credible source considering that his Facebook also documents the work of the local communal kitchens in Bahri. The two screenshots below announce the arrival of food donations to the neighbourhood of Shambat (17 August and 14 September), which is roughly a ten minute drive from Al-Halfaya. 

Furthermore, on the 5th of October, the resistance committee of Al-Halfaya, where the executions are said to have happened, published a statement saying that the reports are incorrect.

 But what about the circulating videos mentioned in the UN report?

3. THE VIDEOS

Radio Dabanga pointed to a two-minute video clip showing armed men in a house in Bahri standing near young men’s bodies wearing civilian clothes after they had killed them.

 Yet screengrabs from the videos show one of the men wearing the RSF kabdi – the militia’s distinctive light beige camo.

Another young man has the distinctive RSF kadmol scarf wrapped around his neck.

 The journalist Muzzamil Abu Al-Gasim then shared a voice recording from a man named Ahmed Mostafa, who said the house in the video belongs to his family, and that it was occupied by the RSF militants after its inhabitants were evicted. He said the following:

People are pointing at the army over the video where they said there were executions at communal kitchens in Al-Halfaya. Of course, this house was ours. All of these houses are ours…

These are all our family. Our cousins and so on. We know these houses. We were born and raised in them. We know this area alley by alley.

The information that was published is very false. We have all the evidence. With photos of the house, with the [armoured] vehicles and canon with which [the RSF] broke and entered.

[RSF] broke a wall between the houses.

Our uncle Mustafa is an expatriate in Saudi Arabia. He’s a teacher. He’s an elderly man, almost 80 years old. An expatriate since the late 70s. Our uncle Taj Al-Deen is also in Saudi Arabia, Riyadh. He’s also an expatriate for over 40 years. All of these people left very early.

Then the dirt [RSF] came, they entered the home, kicked out its people. We have been following this story from the start. From when they kicked out our sons, the sons of my uncles Mustafa and Taj Al-Deen. They were kicked out of the house. [RSF] occupied the houses.

[RSF] turned uncle Mustafa’s house into a kitchen, and uncle Taj Al-Deen’s house became a base for an RSF commander.

In the comments, his daughter Aram said the house was not a communal kitchen, with the RSF said to have broken a wall in the home in order to bring in an armoured vehicle.

Nonetheless, Radio Dabanga linked to another circulating video – this one purporting the show the executions as they occurred. The video was uploaded by a known RSF propaganda account claiming to be a woman called Sammar Othman, who also tagged other RSF propaganda accounts in the post.

Marc Owen-Jones, an expert on social media disinformation, noted how UAE-sponsored disinformation networks targeting Sudan tend to use pictures of attractive women to drive engagement. This is prevalent among RSF propaganda accounts including "Sammar Othman’s”.

A reverse search for Sammar Othman’s profile picture show that it first appeared on Tumblr in 2016 as part of photographer Ahmed Abushakeema’s 1,000 Faces of Sudan project.

Another RSF propaganda account - @WidadAlMahdi - uses the same tactic.  The profile picture was taken from Pinterest, with the face belonging to a UK-based influencer of South Asian origin named Thaslima Akkas.

The video was also posted by the largest RSF propaganda account, Wad al-Behair,

But a reverse search of the video showed how it began circulating social media on the 24th of June 2024, where users uploading it described RSF militants executing civilians.

 And yet, despite the denials of local activists on the ground and the dubious nature of the video evidence used, the designated Sudan expert of the UN’s human rights body used reports of unspecified persons as a basis to call for civilian protection in Khartoum.

Sudan Barq: a suspected Emirati influence campaign targeting Sudan

On 30 September 2024, Sudan’s army rejected Emirati accusations that the army bombed the UAE ambassador’s residence in Khartoum. Five days later “evidence” of the damage appeared through a video published by an outlet called Sudan Barq.

The tweet reads: “Evidence proving that the Sudanese army targeted the headquarters of the head of the UAE diplomatic mission in Khartoum. The attack represents a flagrant violation of diplomatic norms. This incident may give a negative image of the general security situation in Sudan, which may lead to a decline in international confidence in Sudan’s ability to achieve real stability.”

The outlet, which has over 200,000 followers including ambassadors and UN agencies, faces credible accusations that is affiliated to the UAE and supportive of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.

On 3 June 2023, prominent Sudanese social media user Mohamed Abdulrahman alleged that Sudan Barq accounts are managed from the UAE, adding that it ignored the Sudanese civilian uprising (2018-2023) and gradually started aligning with the RSF in a tweet shared over 120 times.

The tweet was posted in response to Sudan Barq uploading a video titled ‘Life returns to normality in the East Nile’, a district where mass displacement was triggered by the RSF’s occupation.

Translation: “Barq Sudan” accounts are managed from the Emirates and were the ones attacking Qatar. It started focusing on sports, and they held competitions to increase the number of followers in the latter half of 2018. They pretended they couldn’t see the December movement, and gradually began to align with the Rapid Support Forces with fluctuations in tweets, until this was completed in the first part of 2020.”

Sudan Barq also has a presence of Facebook, where it boasts over 35,000 followers. Facebook has a page transparency setting allowing users to see the location a page is managed from. However, Sudan Barq’s location is hidden by the page manager.

But Sudan Barq’s management did not obscure the page’s location on Instagram, where it has over 3,000 followers and 14,000 posts. Clicking on the ‘about this account’ button will show how Sudan Barq’s Instagram account is based in the UAE.

Nonetheless, as indicated in an investigation of Sudan Barq’s Twitter posts before the war, the account has the hallmarks of a pro-UAE influence campaign aiming to align the discourse on Sudan with the UAE’s agenda. Sudan Barq regularly published tweets that promoted the UAE’s policies and achievements, alongside adopted the UAE’s geopolitical positions. This included a series of attacks on Qatar during a diplomatic crisis between the two Gulf states. It is worth noting that, for most of those tweets, Sudan was not mentioned at all and had little relevance to the “reports” being published.

Keyword search: the UAE

A keyword search for Sudan Barq tweets featuring ‘the Emirates’ reveals how the outlet adopted positive tones about the UAE’s internal and foreign policies. Due to the amount of times the term is used in Sudan Barq tweets, we have only selected tweets that did not even mention Sudan. The tweets had a theme. Interspersed with routine announcements about UAE internal policy were reports that promoted Emirati development and innovation, alongside its geopolitical stances.

2020

In 2020, Sudan Barq sought to promote the UAE’s internal and foreign policies – often with little relevance to Sudan. 

-       14 March 2020: a tweet announcing that the UAE has temporarily suspended Visas in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

-       August 15 2020: An announcement that Arab and international states welcome the peace agreement between Israel and the UAE.

-       September 15 2020: The Emirati, Israeli and Bahraini flags imposed onto the Arabic word for peace, with the caption “the signing ceremony of peace agreements between [the aforementioned states] begins at the White House”.

-       October 15 2020: A picture of UAE and Israeli flags together with the caption “Tel Aviv ratifies the peace agreement between Israel and the UAE”. 

2021

During 2021, pro-UAE tweets were that had no relevance to Sudan were posted, instead promoting Emirati charity, development and innovation, and refuting allegations relating to human rights abuses.  

-       14 April 2021: A thread promoting the Emirates Red Crescent concluded with “we ask God Almighty on this Holy Month to forgive and have mercy on Sheikh Zayed [the UAE’s founding father]”.

-       24 July 2021: A tweet announcing that the Arab Union for Human Rights “confirmed that the UAE has been interested in sponsoring the principles of human rights in accordance with the Universal Declaration”.  

-       25 July 2021: An infographic showing that the UAE ranks 12th globally for indicators of social development and quality of life. 

-       15 September 2021: Promotion of UAE ruler Mohamed bin Zayed’s (MbZ) visit to France.

2022

Similarly, pro-UAE tweets from Sudan Barq in 2022 projected the UAE as an innovative and promoted internal UAE developments. 

-       13 July 2022: Promotion of an MbZ speech addressed to UAE citizens.

-       10 November 2022: During the COP Climate Summit in Cairo, a link to an article with a tweet reading “The Emirates experience inspires the world”.

-       29 November 2022: A link to an article with a tweet reading ‘The UAE… immortal achievements and promising prospects’ which used the hashtag #UAE51 which promoted the 51th anniversary of the UAE’s founding day.

-       25 November 2022: A tweet promoting the UAE’s first mission to the moon.  

Anti-Qatar campaign

Another key sign that Sudan Barq is an influence campaign aiming to promote the UAE’s geopolitical interests are tweets with the search term Qatar in Arabic. Between 2017-2011, a diplomatic crisis erupted after the UAE accused Qatar of supporting Islamist groups in the region. During that time frame, Sudan Barq would publish a series of attacks on Qatar. Those tweets also had a theme. Tweets that did not mention Sudan focused on accusing Qatar (and Turkey) of supporting Islamists and extremism in the region. There were also critical reports on the topic of football ahead of Qatar hosting the 2022 World Cup. Tweets that mentioned Sudan aimed to portray Qatar as a destabilising force in the country.

Allegations about Qatar relating to Sudan

In 2019 and 2020, Sudan Barq’s reports on Qatar often revolved around allegations that Qatar supports terrorism and Islamists in Sudan.

-       9 May 2019: Report that Qatar’s investment in Sudan was intended to protect the Muslim Brotherhood and develop a centre for exporting terrorism protected by Turkey.

-       31 May 2019: According to Sudan Barq sources, communication devices were seized for Al-Jazeera’s offices in Sudan that were delivered to Omar al-Bashir supporters and linked directly to Qatar.

-       30 July 2019: An infographic and report that Qatar is creating a hub of terrorism in Khartoum.

-       26 June 2020: A report that the “Brotherhood camp” of Qatar and Turkey “refused” to provide any donations to Sudan at the Berlin donor conference.

-       30 August 2020: A report suggesting that Qatar aims to infiltrate the Juba peace negotiations in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood.

 Allegations about Qatar’s regional involvement

In a series of tweets that did not even mention Sudan, Sudan Barq’s reports aimed to portray Qatar and Turkey as destabilising Sudan’s region through their alleged support of terror, Islamism and political violence.

-       25 May 2019: A report that Qatar and Turkey’s support for Islamist groups makes their alliance a danger to Middle East security and stability.

-       23 July 2019: A report that Qatar’s ambassador to Somalia was involved in planning terrorist bombings.

-       30 September 2020: A report that Qatar, “through its media arm Al-Jazeera”, is leading a Facebook campaign to influence the elections in Somalia. 

-       29 July 2021: A thread alleging that Qatar interferes in Tunisian affairs in support of the Islamist Ennahda movement. 

-       31 July 2021: An infographic titled ‘Qatar’s financing of terrorist groups’.

-       5 October 2021: A thread alleging that Qatar is buying votes from members of the Somali House of Representatives.

-       19 February 2021: A video reportedly showing Somali government forces “using armored vehicles provided by Turkey and Qatar killing peaceful demonstrators, instead of using them to  combat the terrorism of the Al-Shabaab movement”.

Allegations about Qatar relating to football

Sudan Barq also published a series of negative reports covering the theme of football ahead of Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 World Cup.

-       18 June 2019: A report that the former president of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Michel Platini was arrested as part of a corruption investigation into the decision to award Qatar the 2022 World Cup.

-       10 March 2019: A report that Qatar made bribes in order to “buy” the 2022 World Cup.  

-       15 May 2020: A report that Facebook removed fake accounts praising Qatar and targeting [UAE-owned English football club] Manchester City.