SUDAN IN THE NEWS WEEKLY REPORT (May 3-9 2019)

Main points:

·      The military has turned increasingly aggressive and the opposition seems divided.

  • The deadlock continues on whether the military or civilians will dominate the transitional council.

·       Worsening economic crisis may increase reliance on Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

·       Women may be erased from #SudanUprising if civil war breaks out.

  • Calls for a Sudan truth and reconciliation process to create an inclusive democratic identity

 

Increasingly aggressive military

4 weeks on from Omar Al Bashir’s ousting, revolutionary Sudan is "the site of extraordinary scenes... where young Sudanese are reveling in newfound freedoms — to talk politics, to party and even to find love,” reports Declan Walsh (New York Times, May 3).

 But Sudan’s new freedom are “fragile,” and their endurance is “unclear,” argues Walsh, citing the increasingly tense power-sharing talks between protest leaders and the military.

 Foreign Policy (May 2) reported that that the military has turned increasingly aggressive in negotiations. The leader of the TMC in negotiations is reportedly Himedti, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander, and TMC deputy chair.  Jerome Tubiana, a Sudan-specialist researcher, said that while Sudan’s army is unwilling to fire on protesters from their same ethnic background, Himedti’s RSF mostly from Darfur, have no reason to hold fire on anyone except their own limited Arab tribes.

 Indeed, AP (May 5) reported that  18-year old Saad Mohammed Ahmed was shot dead when security forces tried to forcibly disperse a sit-in in Darfur.

 Can the opposition hold-out?

In the Telegraph, Roland Oliphant (May 3) questioned whether Sudan’s protesters can hold out against the military: raising the prospect of Himedti launching a counter-coup, and a civil war if competition between Sudanese security factions grows.

 The military has already rejected a civilian majority on the supreme council that would rule Sudan during the transitional period (BBC, May 3). The Declaration for Freedom and Change (DFC) coalition has in turn toned down its demands for a civilian majority of the transitional council (AP, May 3).

Opposition divides

Senior Sudanese journalist Osman Mirgani told the Telegraph (May 3) that Sudanese civilian opposition is “five different forces with different ambitions.”

 Researcher Jean-Baptiste Gallopin noted that despite many protesters sticking to their demands for a civilian-led council, representatives of the Sudan Call forces, which also comprised the broad DFC coalition,  have adopted a “conciliatory tone” towards the military, after meeting with UAE officials last week.  

 Deadlock continues on whether the military or civilians will dominate the transitional council

According to the BBC’s Will Ross, an independent mediator in the negotiations said the military agreed to two councils:

  • A Supreme Council with a civilian majority

    AND

  • A Security council with a military majority.

However, Sudan Tribune (May 8) reported that the military rejected this proposal – as they felt that its role would be limited to defence policy only.

 On May 7, multiple sources reported that the military threatened to call early elections within 6 months if the deadlock is not broken. On the same day, multiple sources reported that while the military agreed on the structure for an interim government proposed by the DFC, they rejected its omission of the Sharia.

 With the deadlock still continuing, the DFC coalition called for a civil disobedience campaign, in response to the military’s “disappointing” response to their proposals (Multiple sources, May 8).

 In an interview with Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat (May 9), Mohammed Nagi Al Asam, a prominent Sudanese Professionals Association figure, justified the campaign by accusing the military of seeking to extend the transitionary phase in order to increase its own power and influence.

 Economic crisis

According to Ibrahim Elbadawi, a Sudanese economist and former World Bank employee, without political and economic progress, the crisis of Sudan’s baking system will continue and the economic collapse may worsen (Reuters, May 7).

 Confidence in Sudan’s banking system has eroded (Guardian, May 9), with Reuters (May 4) reporting that the fuel and cash crisis was so severe that soldiers had to man petrol stations to ensure order, and that there were up-to 88 customers in one ATM queue.

 Patrick Werr (Reuters, May 7) attributed the root of the banking crisis to Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism by the US, leaving Sudan unable to tap the IMF or World Bank for support, and Sudanese banks struggling to build trust among foreign banks. The US is also unwilling to change Sudan’s terror designation while the military holds power.

 Economic reliance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE

Therefore, Sudan is reliant on financial backing from the Gulf. Despite this, the Independent (May 2) reported that Sudan’s global diaspora planned protests at the Saudi and Emirati embassies in the West, in resentment of Gulf support for the military council.  

 Yet the financial situation is so dire, that even Omar Al Digair (Asharq Al-Awsat, May 9), a leader of Declaration of Freedom and Change coalition, accepted the financial aid from the Gulf is necessary.

 Even so, Saudi-Emirati aid has only offered scant reprieve for Sudan’s economy (Reuters, May 7). A banker in Khartoum stated that of the $3bn pledged by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, only $250m has been deposited into the Sudanese central bank, adding that this amount would only cover the basics for 1-2 months.

 As a result, Ibrahim Elbadawi called for more Gulf aid. But of course, this would give the Saudis and Emiratis leverage over Sudan’s future, and potential democratic transition. Which once again puts into question whether economic considerations may put to bed the prospect of an independent Sudan, free from foreign influence.

 Saudi-Emirati influence on Sudan’s future

Nesrine Malik (Guardian, May 5) argued that Saudi Arabia is seeking to prevent civilian rule in Sudan under the guise of seeking stability. Malik stated Saudi Arabia’s propaganda and financial campaign in support of Sudan’s military council reflects the Kingdom’s own heightened insecurity about its own future.

 AP’s report on May 8 that Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia worked to shape the fate of Sudan’s uprising, adds fuel to fears that Sudan’s economic vulnerability may be exploited by the aforementioned Arab powers. During the April 6 sit-in, after which it became clear that Al Bashir’s days in power were numbered, it was reported that Sudanese military and intelligence officials arrived in Cairo to ask their Egyptian counterparts whether the Saudis and Emiratis would provide financial aid should they remove Al Bashir from power.

 Sudan is a regional battleground for Middle-East rivals, argues BBC Diplomatic Correspondent Jonathan Marcus (May 2) – who stated that the Saudi-Emirati-Egyptian competition against Turkey and Qatar reflects “two brands of authoritarianism…attempting to push their supporters into positions where they can influence the future in Khartoum.”

 Other international influences: US, AU, UN

Marcus also wrote that the UN, African Union and the US have been “bit players” amid Sudan’s political crisis, although this has somewhat changed. The AU and UN have publically issued support for a civilian-led transitional government in Sudan (AP, May 6), with the US following on May 8 (AP).

 While US President Trump himself has been silent on Sudan, a US Senate Resolution on May 3 expressed solidarity with Sudanese people and urged the US government to materially support a peaceful power transfer to a civilian-led political authority.

 It remains unclear whether the US Senate resolution can have an impact on Sudan’s democratic future. US Senate has failed to overturn Trump’s use of the presidential veto of a resolution calling for the end of US support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. In any regard, Jonathan Marcus (BBC, May 2) notes that it is unlikely that a Trump Sudan policy will go against Saudi interests.

 Moreover, from the perspective of women’s role in the Sudanese revolution, it is also unclear whether US influence is welcome, particularly if it fuels a civil war by arming militias.

 Women

Zahra Langhi, the co-founder and CEO of the Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace, warned that Sudanese women may suffer the fate of Libyan women should civil war break out (Guardian, May 3).

 Noting that Libyan women – like Sudanese women - were also leading figures in the revolution, Langhi attributed NATO’s military intervention to a militarization of the Libyan uprising, that saw arms flowing into militias who violently erased women’s influential role from the revolution.

 And as the famous broadcast Zeinab Bedawi wrote in the Financial Times (May 5), “if the revolution fails the women of Sudan, it has failed the whole country.”

 The future of the revolution

It is a tense moment for the Sudanese revolution. The military is turning increasingly aggressive. The deadlock in negotiations continues. The economic situation is worsening, leaving Sudan vulnerable to reliance on Gulf powers who are suspected to be hostile to democracy.

 Zachariah Mampilly (Foreign Affairs, May 2) argued that the current Sudanese protest movement’s inability to advance a national vision, leaves it prone to receiving the fate of previous failed uprisings: the military exploiting ethnic and religious divisions to secure their rule.

 The solution that Mampilly called for is a truth and reconciliation process, arguing that a long-repressed conversation about the damage Al Bashir’s regime inflicted on Sudanese society would facilitate a national identity that transcends the Islamist and Arabist supremacy - “[which] has long been the source of [Sudan’s] many problems.”

 This process, Mampilly argues, would create the inclusive democratic identity that Sudan has eluded for so long.