Weekly Report: May 23-30 — Sudan In The News

Summary of events:

This week, Sudanese protesters enacted general strike in response to deadlocked negotiations between the military and civilians. The strike has faced the challenges of disunity, and violence from the security forces. As the dominance of Himedti, and his Rapid Support Forces, seemingly increases, clashes between security factions killed an innocent bystander. Transitional military council (TMC) leader Abdulfattah Fattah Al Burhan, made their first diplomatic visits this week: to Egypt and the UAE, with Himedti visiting Saudi Arabia.

Main points of discussion:

Amid reported divisions within the pro-democracy movement, which political actors are suspected of seeking a side agreement with the TMC?
Could escalating tensions between security factions trigger a civil war?
Is Himedti a useful ally against Islamists?
Do Sudanese democrats need US, and western, support?

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General Strike

With negotiations between the military and the opposition still in deadlock, multiple sources (24 May) reported the Declaration of Freedom and Change (DFC) called for a general strike. In a statement, the DFC said the strike was “an act of peaceful resistance with which we have been forced to proceed.”

The issue remains the composition of the military-civilian hybrid sovereign council to govern Sudan during the three-year democratic transition, with both parties vying for a majority.

The strike began on 28 May (multiple sources), with DFC representative Wagdy Saleh threatening escalation unless power is handed over to civilians. Most staff in the medical, electricity and banking sectors observed the strike. Reuters (29 May) reported that an employee of the Blue Nile Mashreg Bank in Khartoum expressed willingness to participate in civil disobedience, if the DFC requests.

Strike challenges: opposition division

As divisions within the pro-democracy movement emerge, the cohesion of the strike is challenge by disunity.

Sadig Al Mahdi, leader of the Ummah Party, which is also part of the broad DFC coalition, rejected the strike (AP, 27 May). Al Mahdi took issue with the “preparations and timing” of the strike.

In an interview with Alsharq Alawsat (May 29) a DFC leader, Ali Al Sanhouri, warned that some political powers may seek a side agreement with the TMC to act as a “fake replacement” to the deal struck with the DFC.

When asked about Al Mahdi’s refusal to join the strike, Al Sanhouri said that the lack of cohesion in the opposition negotiation team may be exploited by the TMC. Nonetheless, he stated that the strike is a mere “warning shot,” which could lead to an open-ended political strike.

Strike challenges: violence

Radio Dabanga (29 May) reported that Himedti’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) troops stormed both the Sudanese central bank and an electricity company – detaining striking employees, and forcing staff to sell electricity or hand over salaries at gunpoint.

It is telling that Himedti’s RSF gained headlines again for intimidating protesters, amid the amount of articles drawing attention to the TMC deputy’s power-seeking motives.

Himedti’s growing power in the TMC

In line with a growing feeling that Himedti is calling the shots at the TMC, there have been reports that the resignation of Mustafa Mohammed Mustafa was triggered by a divergence with Himedti (24 May, Sudan Tribune).

Mustafa was reportedly planning to open an investigation against a general working under his command at the counter-espionage department. Other reports point to a continuing dispute between the two, after Mustafa sought to protect Himedti’s rival, the tribal leader Musa Hilal.

The RSF’s growing power in Khartoum

Himedti’s RSF troops are threatening to usurp the regular Sudanese army as the most powerful armed force in Khartoum, argues Jason Patinkin (24 May, Vice News). The consequences of internal division among Sudanese armed factions turned fatal, after a gunfight killed female street vendor Mayada John by mistake (29 May, AP).

A cartoon circulated Sudanese twitter depicting Mayada John, who was 6-months pregnant. An official TMC statement blamed the incident on a drunken soldier, who opened fire with a “personal weapon” following an argument with a civilian.

Himedti’s international connections

Jason Patinkin (24 May, Vice News) also attributes Himedti’s RSF troops to the powerful international connections he has gained, citing the building up of the RSF into a “massive mercenary army,” to highlight Saudi Arabia and the UAE paying him to send troops to Yemen, and the EU reliance on the RSF to stem migrant flows.

Indeed, Simon Tisdall (25 May, Guardian) argued that the “ultra-conservative, nationalist Arab axis” of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt support for Himedti, who “claims he is not seeking power but his ambition is obvious,” are stifling Sudanese hopes for democracy.

Himedti’s popularity

However, Patinkin (24 May, Vice News) also notes Himedti’s domestic PR campaign – arguing that he is exploiting perceptions in Khartoum that he is ignorant and uncivilised, to “[appear] to be something of a working class hero for some rural folk side-lined by Khartoum’s elite.”

Himedti’s domestic popularity is further helped by his support from the anti-Islamist Saudi-Emirati-Egypt axis, notes Jason Burke (29 May, Guardian), who stated that Himedti is viewed as a counterweight to the Islamists that Sudanese protesters are seeking to uproot from the deep-state, ensuring that he is “backed by an informal coalition of diverse supporters.”

Himedti’s, and the TMC’s, positioning as a “lesser-evil” against Islamists is useful, given that Islamists are continuing to rally in Sudan (24 May, AP), although they are expressing support for the military in the face of alleged attempts by protesters to abolish Islamic rule.

TMC visit Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE

Sudan, under the TMC leader, seems firmly allied to the anti-Islamist Arab countries in the Middle East’s regional battleground, indicated Himedti and TMC leader Abdulfattah Al Burhan’s first diplomatic trips this week. After Himedti vowed to back Saudi Arabia against Iran on a visit to Riyadh (May 24, multiple sources), Al Burhan visited Egypt (May 25, Reuters), and then the UAE (May 26, Reuters).

Simon Tisdall (May 25, Guardian) argued that US disengagement from Sudan, and its strained relations with Sudanese democrats, means that the US has handed over the initiative on Sudan’s future to the Saudi-Emirati-Egypt axis. Tisdall adds that this has faded Sudanese hopes of “root-and-branch reform.”

Nonetheless, Sudan Tribune (May 27) reported that the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) foreign relations committee met for the first time with the Saudi ambassador in Khartoum. The SPA called for Saudi Arabia to support Sudanese aims for civilian rule. Sudan Tribune (May 29) also reported the US State Department has dismissed reports that Al Burhan has been invited to Washington for talks.

Do Sudanese democrats need US support?

Eli Lake (May 29, Bloomberg) called for the US to halt the momentum of Sudan’s counterrevolution, and “help show that nonviolent democratic change is possible in the Muslim world.”

Lake called for US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to meet with Sudanese opposition leaders, “to counter the pseudo-legitimacy conferred” by the Saudi-Emirati-Egypt axis, and send them a message to refrain from “thwarting” Sudan’s democratic transition.

Lake acknowledged that Sudanese democrats need international support. But do Sudanese democrats want it? We put it to a poll on @Sudan_Voices – thus far, 63% from 400 votes have voted that American supported is welcomed.