SUDAN INSIGHT ALERT: Arab Center DC - Sudan’s Political Process and Hopes for a Civilian Government

23/1/2023: Arab Center DC - Sudan’s Political Process and Hopes for a Civilian Government, by Kholood Khair

Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory think-tank, argued that the framework agreement (FA) hinges upon the word of military actors “who staged a violent coup in 2021” and have not curbed violence against protestors. Khair also drew attention to “opaque and exclusive methods” under which negotiations have commenced.

Khair suggests that the FA favours Rapid Support Forces commander Himedti over army chief Abdulfattah al-Burhan, before stating that a parallel track planned by Egypt – al-Burhan’s “long-time patrons” – plans to split the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council as some of its members may be pushed to the pro-Burhan camp due to their discomfort backing Himedti.

Thus, Khair concludes, the FA has increased Himedti-Burhan tensions and “re-entrenches Sudan’s cardinal weakness” - that political settlements only create winners and losers and thus do not result in a government for all, but rather in a minority government of elite interests.”

SUDAN INSIGHT ALERT: International Crisis Group - A Critical Window to Bolster Sudan’s Next Government

23/1/2023: International Crisis Group - A Critical Window to Bolster Sudan’s Next Government

ANALYSIS

The International Crisis Group (ICG) identified criticisms surrounding Sudan’s framework agreement.

ICG note that the rebel groups who signed Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) will “resist any attempt to dilute their hard-won gains” and thereby oppose the framework agreement as they object to language that suggests that the JPA, which promises its signatories 25% of seats in the civilian administration alongside other important concession, may be renegotiated.

Alongside worries that the framework agreement “will do little to weaken” military power or prevent another coup, ICG suggest that the “biggest and most legitimate concerns” regard the process, with the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition negotiating directly with military rather than forging consensus with the resistance committees and alienating “other important actors” including ex-rebel leaders and tribal groups with constituencies far away from Khartoum, as well as Islamists who lost power when ex-president Omar al-Bashir fell.

SOLUTIONS

The International Crisis Group (ICG) suggest ways for the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) to build support for the framework agreement.

To win over resistance committees (RC), ICG suggest the FFC can find common ground on the RC’s political charter and negotiate a “ceasefire” whereby RCs “stop campaigning against the accord, redirecting their energies toward holding signatories to account for what they have agreed to”.

To make the “Khartoum-centric” deal more inclusive, ICG call for engagement with local power brokers such as peripheral armed movement leaders and tribal chiefs. ICG also warn that excluding Islamists not affiliated with ex-president Omar al-Bashir’s regime will “nurture ready-made and well-connected opposition that retains plenty of support among conservative Sudanese.”

Finally, ICG suggest that Phase II negotiations focus on core areas of state-building including: economic reforms, establishing an independent electoral commission, credible government administration, overseeing peace processes and pursuing a national constitutional dialogue.

SUDAN INSIGHT ALERT: Africa Report - Sudan: The hijacking of the people’s revolution continues on

23/1/2021: Africa Report - Sudan: The hijacking of the people’s revolution continues on, by Dimah Mahmoud and Jihad Mashamoun

 Arguing Sudan’s military are undermining the democratic transition analysts Dimah Mahmoud and Jihad Mashamoun suggest three ways for civilian ministers to “rebuild their wavering domestic credibility”.

 Calling for “complete transparency,” the authors suggest that the civilian government “outline to the people through forums and social media what they have achieved since their appointment and what are the remaining challenges.”

 The authors also call for the handover of perpetrators of the “Darfur genocide” to the ICC until “a functional judicial system with civilian ministers is established.” Finally, the authors call for the incorporation of the Local Resistance Committees and active civil society groups working towards the pillars of the revolution through sizable representation in the Legislative Council.

SUDAN NEWS ALERT: Sudan Tribune - Sudanese army, Red Cross renew deal to teach humanitarian law

23/1/2020: Sudan Tribune - Sudanese army, Red Cross renew deal to teach humanitarian law  

Sudan Tribune reports that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) renewed an agreement to teach International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to SAF troops.

Several international conventions stipulate that governments have the obligation to teach their armies the rules of IHL.

Pascal Cuttat, ICRC Head of Delegation in Sudan, said that the agreement coincides with the democratic transition in Sudan and the efforts of the transitional authority to achieve change.

SUDAN INSIGHT ALERT: Africa Report - Sudan’s deep state still poses a threat to the democratic process

23/1/2020: Africa Report - Sudan’s deep state still poses a threat to the democratic process, by Andrew Edward Tchie and Jihad Salih Mashamoun

Andrew Edward Tchie, Research Fellow for Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London, and Jihad Salih Mashamoun, a PhD Candidate at the University of Exeter, call for the transitional government to put in place a strategy that ensures that the Islamist deep-state does not mobilise to hinder the democratic process.

To do so, Tchie and Mashamoun call for the government to “deal carefully” with the “fractured” military, security and intelligence apparatus and isolated Islamists, suggesting that the unification of these under one leadership could prevent the mobilization of disenfranchised Islamist conservatives and isolated security personnel.

This would entail a vision of governance that addresses structural marginalization of Sudanese peripheral regionals, through “innovative, sustainable, inclusive and law-abiding”, including polices, including the devolution of powers to “create and embed real change.”