A rebellion within the rebellion? Tribal tensions in the RSF

Executive summary

·      Amid pre-existing reports of infighting between Rapid Support Forces (RSF) combat units, this briefing covers a tribal rift within the militia between the Mahariya Rizeigat who lead the militia and the Misseriya tribe – Sudan’s second-largest and a key RSF constituent.

·      The main character of this story is Rahma Mahdi - known as ‘General Jalha’ – a Misseriya armed group leader who integrated his forces into the RSF in September 2023.

·      Jalha’s loyalists and fellow Misseriya in the RSF were outraged by statements made on a regional TV news station by RSF advisor Omran Hassan that Jalha is merely a soldier rather than a commander.

·      This triggered threats from Misseriya RSF fighters towards their Rizeigat counterparts, culminating in Jalha ordering the withdrawal of his troops and asserting his independence from the RSF.

Understanding the tribal dynamics of the RSF

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Himedti) and his family, who belong to the Mahariya branch of the Rizeigat – a nomadic Arab tribe from Darfur and neighbouring Chad. Nonetheless, the RSF has a broad socio-ethnic base of nomadic Arab tribes from western Sudan.

It is common to see pro-RSF groups chanting slogans emphasising calls for the fall of the “56 state” which is said to belong to the “Jallaba” (northern Sudanese), at the expense of the “Attawah state”. The Attawa are a group of nomadic tribes of western Sudan such as the Ta’aisha, Hawazma, Rizeigat and Misseriya. These groups claim to be descendants of Junaid bin Ahmed al-Juhaini. As such, the Attawah have also been described as falling under the Junaid umbrella.  

A mark of the tribal nature of the RSF militia is the naming of its most important company: Al-Junaid conglomerate, which has provided at least tens of millions in financial backing for the militia. This includes Al-Gunade gold company, a key element of the RSF’s income and strategic relationship with their alleged UAE sponsors.

While the RSF is led by Mahariya Rizeigat, the Misseriya tribe - the second-largest in Sudan – are a major constituent of RSF. However, the Misseriya are not a monolith and there has been a history of tension between this tribe and the RSF militia, alongside the Rizeigat who dominate it.

For example, there were deadly clashed between the Misseriya and Rizeigat in 2008, 2009, 2015 and 2022. The RSF’s rebellion in April 2023 re-ignited these tensions as they forced a wedge between the Misseriya community, which maintains ties to both the army and the RSF. In January 2024, tensions erupted within the Misseriya over the RSF’s plans to seize West Kordofan – a state which hosts Dar Al-Misseriya region that is considered the home of the tribe. The RSF’s siege in West Kordofan displaced over 50,000, leading a high-ranking Misseriya delegation to declare their support for the army and reject the RSF’s control of their land by June 2024.

RSF in-fighting in Central Sudan

According to reports, infighting within the RSF militia has escalated in recent months. Back in March 2024, Mada Masr reported that battles occasionally erupt between the three RSF forces to whom Al-Jazirah state is divided: Abdelrahman Al-Bishi’s forces in the south, Abu ‘Agla Kaykel’s forces in the east and Jalha Rahma Mahdi’s forces in the West.

In June 2024, a field military source told Mada Masr subsequently that these RSF combat units are unmotivated and they do not follow military orders given that they are primarily motivated by looting and theft.  By the end of June, Kaykel played a key role in the RSF’s advances in neighbouring Sennar state. As did Al-Bishi, although he was neutralised in Sennar on July 20 2024. Al-Bishi’s killing has reportedly triggered more infighting.

While these men played a crucial role in the RSF’s seizing of Al-Jazira in December 2023, none of them are Rizeigat. Jalha, a Misseri, falls under the Juneid / Attawah umbrella. However, Kaykel hails from the Shukriya tribe in central Sudan and Al-Bishi hailed from the Rufa’a tribe of central Sudan.

Al-Watan media, a pro-army outlet, reported that Rizeigat RSF rebels are refusing to fight under Kaykel in Sennar due to a lack of confidence following Al-Bishi’s elimination. In addition, a Facebook post from Ammar Hassan Ammar, the spokesperson for the army-affiliated Popular Resistance claimed that there clashes erupted in West Sennar between RSF elements. Sudan In The News are unable to verify the credibility of these reports. However, we can confirm, with evidence, the highly publicised spat that is being fought on social media between Misseriya and Rizeigat RSF fighters.

A profile of General Jalha

The main character of this plot is Rahma Mahdi, who is known as ‘General Jalha’. He was a general in the Border Guards, a force formed in 2003 that was the main government-sponsored militia used to attack Darfur’s non-Arab communities. As noted by Africa Confidential, he was jailed in Khartoum as a renegade before escaping to Libya in 2014 where he formed his own armed group. As the leader of a group called Shujaan Kordofan, he would integrate with the RSF in September 2023.

Before this, Jalha took pride in his autonomy from the RSF despite supporting the militia as indicated in a speech from 2020.  Jalha said that he has no intention of joining the RSF, although he threatened to burn the whole of Sudan down if Himedti is killed, saying that the RSF commander represents western Sudanese and the ‘Attawah’.

Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, there have been tensions among the Attawah – particularly Himedti’s Rizeigat and Jalha’s Misseriya. The next section will cover their recent re-ignition and how they have played out within the militia’s ranks, with Jalha being a central part. 

How Jalha was belittled by an RSF advisor

At the end of June, Jalha made a speech in which he bragged about the presence of mercenaries in his forces from South Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad, Libya “and anywhere else”.  

In mid-July, the aforementioned comments were broadcast on the regional news station Al-Hadath. Omran Hassan, a UK-based RSF advisor was asked: “is [Jalha] one of your commanders or not?”. Omran responded: “he is an individual soldier, not a leader who has a say in the RSF. The RSF has advisors and spokespeople, if anybody speaks as they like then it would not be an institution”.

Considering Jalha’s experience of militancy and status within the RSF as a leader of combat units, Omran’s comments were considered to have belittled Jalha who was subsequently ridiculed on social media. For example, a new term started taking Sudanese social media by storm: Jalha Sai  (just a Jalha, meaning ‘irrelevant person’).

Several memes also circulated social media including:

·      A meme where Homer Simpson is calling Jalha a volunteer fighter and falangai from his car. A falangay is a term coined by RSF fighters meaning the person that holds the water vessel used to clean the bottom after defecating

·      A meme in which Jalha is led to believe he is playing a console game with notable RSF fighters Kaykel and Osman Operations, but Jalha’s controller is the only one not plugged in.

·      “Don’t be just a Jalha” written on the back of tuktuk/rickshaw.

 Farhaat Wad al-Omdah, an army soldier who has gained a mass following among Sudanese for streaming from the battlefield, was one of those to ridicule Jalha. “They’re saying that you’re just a falangay,” he said. Wad al-Omdah told Jalha:

“If you’re not part of the Daglo family, no matter what your rank is, you’re just a falangai. Stop calling yourself a general, we know you don’t have anything”.

Days after Omran’s comment, a video circulated where Jalha addressed his troops saying: “damn them all and damn the world, anyone that wants the truth let him come to Sudan”. The latter part of the statement was considered a dig at the UK-based Omran.  

Misseriya RSF fighters threaten their Rizeigat counterparts

A Misseriya fighter named ‘Abujood Al-Misseri’ then responded in defence of Jalha. He said:

“Jalha… is a red line. General Jalha is the leader of the Shujaan Kordofan Movement. Who are you to say that he is just a soldier?

As the Misseriya tribe, we don’t accept this. General Jalha is not a Lieutenant General, he is a Field Marshal [highest rank in the army]. I swear to God, nobody threatens us.

Nobody threatens the Misseriya tribe. Whether you like it or not. 200,000 from the Misseriya since 15 April gave men, arms, vehicles, blood and sweat for this cause…we won’t compromise our cause”.

Abujood was then addressed by an RSF leader named Ahmed Al-Mahiri – a Mahiriya Rizeigi from the Dalgo family. Al-Mahri effectively told Abujood to know his role and implied that he is ignorant. He said:

“The video does not represent the RSF. There are political affairs that you must understand. There is a difference between politics and field commanders. You are a field commander, you don’t have any relation to what happens politically. These things are far away from you. You’re only a field commander.  These are political matters, you don’t understand them”.

Then, one of the most visible RSF fighters on social media waded in. Mohamed al-Fatih, also known as Yajuj and Majuj after the demonic figures described in the texts of all three Abrahimic religions, had previously become notorious for openly saying that rape is the “right” of the militia. In comments addressed to Abujood, he said:

“The talk of these children, this gibberish, must be stopped. Abujood – you’re meant to hold your tongue and think about your words carefully”.

Abujood subsequently attacked Al-Mahri and Al-Fatih’s masculinity and effectively told them to come say what they said to his face. He said:

“Anyone who wants to say anything should come to me instead of talking in the media like a girl. If you want me, come to me straight up!”

 Then, another RSF fighter from the Misseriya tribe (name unknown) published a TikTok with a caption “Jalha is a red line”. In words that were addressed to either Al-Fatih or another RSF figure named Al-Jofani, he said:

 “Be a man. Who are you to disrespect General Jalha? If it wasn’t for General Jalha you would not have any worth in the RSF. We only knew you this year, at the start of the war. General Jalha has been a rebel how many years?”

The reason why it is unclear who the Misseriya fighter address is because he did not mention a name and his remarks apply to both Al-Faith and Al-Jofani, who only became prominent figures following the outbreak of the war. The latter was a comedy actor before the war, who has since become highly visible on social media dressed in the RSF’s distinctive fighting gear: kabdi (beige) fatigues and kadmol (turban mask). In video, Al-Jofani told Jalha to “just shut up”, saying:

“The law in the RSF does not protect the foolish. Consider your words 1,000 times and then speak. Or just shut up! In the RSF, we are all soldiers behind Himedti”

Jalha’s explosive response

Jalha then further fanned the flames of the disputes by issuing an explosive 10-minute response in which he asserted his autonomy from the RSF, ordered the withdrawal of his troops and took shots at both Al-Jofani and the advisor Omran.

Firstly, Jalha asserted his independence from the Rapid Support Forces, claiming that he leads the Rapid Intervention Forces. He said:

“Ask Himedti. I’m not Rapid Support. I’m the leader of the Rapid Intervention in Sudan and the sudden death and we can die in front of you standing!

“We are the Shuj’aan Movement of the Greater Kordofan, we came allied to the Rapid Support. We aren’t Rapid Support. I am the leader of the Rapid Intervention Forces in Sudan, and the leader of the Shuj’aan Movement of the Greater Kordofan, and the leader of the marginalised in Sudan. Whoever wants us, come find us in the battlefield. We don’t talk too much.”

Secondly, Jalha ordered his troops to withdraw from Al-Jazira and come to Khartoum.

“Assemble those in Al-Managil, Al-Rufa’a and Madani, gather within 72 hours. If you don’t come, measure will be taken up against you by the command over there.  We’re present in Khartoum and East of the Nile, they must be assembled. You know the two locations”

Finally, Jalha took aim at the advisor Omran and Al-Jofani:

“As for the advisor, they said you’re just a civilian. I don’t have a response for you. Al-Jofani - if you have a personal issue with me, come to me. I only know you as a media person, I don’t know anything else about you. You didn’t come to the battlefield with us.  You only represent yourself, Al-Jofani is an individual.”

 Attempts to diffuse by the RSF media team

The RSF media team has attempted diffuse the issue, although Jalha’s loyalist continue to launch social media attacks from their personal social media outlets. The pinned tweet on Jalha’s profile bears a new adopted slogan which says: “we are all troops behind the commander”. His Twitter page is likely managed by the RSF’s media team given that it regularly uploads posts coordinated across the accounts of other RSF fighters.

Firstly, a contradictory statement was uploaded by the association of the Misseriya which said:

“We would like to emphasize that the advisor Omran did not intend to belittle General Jalha, and his statements came in the context of his defence of the RSF as an institution, for which he is an adviser. Sometimes a person may find himself having to belittle a particular individual in order to defend a larger institution, but that in no way means an insult to that person”

Secondly, a speech by Omran was uploaded on Jalha’s page in which the advisor said: “the institution has its way of communicating with the world”.

Jalha loyalists continue to make threats

But Misseri Jalha loyalists in RSF continued to fan the flames of the dispute. A group of Jalha loyalists in the RSF  called Al-Jofani “a son of a b*tch” who is not on their level.

Another unnamed Misseri RSF fighter glorified Jalha and Abujood and issued threats to their opponents. He said:

“Jalha is a Field Marshal and Abujood is a Lieutenant General. Anyone who wants to talk, come to me. Jofani – we know what you are. Like Field Marshal Jalha said: you’re just an ass kisser. You’re just a media person. You never entered the field or knew a thing about us.  The Rapid Intervention is known. Al-Jofani and Mohamed Al-Fatih: pretend to be asleep.”

The sacking of Yousif Izzat and the power struggle inside the RSF

Video summary: Twitter link

Executive summary

·      Until 10 July 2024, Yousif Ibrahim Izzat Al-Mahri was the most visible adviser for Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Himedti).

·      The smooth-talking graduate of a Canadian university represented the militia before the global media, and played a critical role in its efforts to obtain domestic and international legitimacy.

·      Nonetheless, his eventual sacking reflects the contradicting and competing interests within a militia that is both a political entity and a family business.

·      Izzat’s growing influence became a source of tension with Himedti’s brothers: Algoney Hamdan Dagalo and Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo. Amid reports of Himedti’s declining health, the latter – who is the militia’s second-in-command – is said to have accused Izzat of aiming to position himself as capable of inheriting the RSF and transforming it into a political movement.

·      Therefore, this briefing will explore the reported tensions between Izzat and the Dagalo brothers, which eventually culminated in the former’s sacking.

A profile of Yousif Izzat

A member of the same Mahariya clan of the Rizeigat tribe as Himedti, Izzat is said to have shaped the political ideology of the RSF commander – who he labels a childhood friend.

Born in Kutum in North Darfur, Izzat is a graduate of the Faculty of Law at the Nilein University in Khartoum in 1998, where he was active among leftist circles and came to be associated with Sudanese Communist Party. He was then in a minority of Arabs involved with Darfur’s rebel movements who advocated a revolution of the marginalised peripheries against the central authority in Khartoum. After moving to Canada, where he resides as a citizen, Izzat studied conflict resolution studies and international development at the University of Winnipeg.

Izzat’s role in the RSF

Izzat then became Himedti’s advisor in 2021, eventually acting as the primary spokesperson for the RSF following its rebellion in April 2023, after which Izzat regularly represented the militia in the global media. 

Izzat’s notable media appearances include, but are not limited to, crying in defence on the RSF on Al-Jazeera and describing reports of the RSF’s use of rape as a weapon of war as army propaganda in comments to the Voice of America.

Behind the scenes, Izzat was also a pivotal part of the RSF’s attempts to gain domestic and international legitimacy.  As confirmed by an informed RSF source in comments to Mada Masr, Izzat played a crucial role in coordinating between the RSF and Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition that is being increasingly viewed as the political wing of the militia.

Before the war, images circulated of Izzat sitting in on the meetings of FFC Central Council leaders. Three months into the war, he was part of a meeting in Togo attended by FFC leaders that was described as an attempt to “whitewash” the RSF’s war crimes.

On the global stage, the smooth-talking advisor had the responsibility of helping the militia obtain legitimacy. In June 2023, Africa Intelligence reported that Izzat would play the role of RSF spokesperson in visits to European capitals London, Berlin and Paris. 

However, as argued by Abdelwahab El-Affendi, a professor of politics at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, the RSF is a “family business”. As a result, Izzat’s growing importance to, and influence on, RSF commander Himedti would become a source of friction with his brothers: the RSF’s second-in-command Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo and Algony Hamdan Dagalo – the youngest Dagalo brother.

Tension with the Dagalo brothers

Tensions have reportedly emerged between Izzat on one hand, and Algoney and Abdelrahim on the other. 

Algoney Hamdan Daglo has been described as the RSF’s chief financial officer and link with regional actors. He runs “an enormous network of shadow companies” from Dubai, including Tradive General Trading. Based in the UAE and sanctioned by the US Treasury Department, Tradive purchased vehicles which may have been retrofitted with machine guns.  

Since the war however, Algoney emerged as the RSF’s de-facto “ambassador,” as reported by Africa Intelligence in November 2023. Algoney’s growing influence was considered a threat to Izzat, who was reported to have lost the confidence of some members of Himedti’s inner circle due to his closeness to the FFC and his late arrival among the RSF’s ranks.  

Amid conflicting reports of Himedti’s deteriorating health, Abdelrahim is “increasingly taking the lead” as per an RSF source in comments to Mada Masr. As will be explored in further detail, disagreements over the RSF’s relationship with the FFC and the Taqadum coalition it dominates was a major factor in Izzat’s fall out of Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo.

Izzat’s rift with Abdelrahim Dagalo

While the RSF announced that Izzat’s assignment had been terminated, Izzat’s tweet hours before claimed that he had asked RSF commander Himedti to relieve him of his duties due to internal restructuring that transferred his responsibilities to Abdelrahim.   

“Neither experience nor convictions allow me to work under Abdelrahim’s leadership,” Izzat wrote, stating that his political assignment was linked Himedti in his capacity as the deputy head of the Sovereign Council.

“As a civilian operating outside of the RSF’s military framework, I am not subject to military orders. For other reasons that will be mentioned in the future, I requested to be excused because my assignment is linked me to brother Himedti since childhood,” Izzat added.

As reported by Sudan Tribune, the RSF in April 2024 organised a workshop in Uganda to restructure its civilian and political work. It was decided that Abdelrahim would take over the management of the RSF’s civilian coordination council.  

In comments to Al-Jazeera, Ali Mansour, an analyst specialising in Darfur affairs shed further light on the escalating tensions between Izzat and Abdelrahim. Izzat was said to be angered by Abdelrahim’s attempts to create a political incubator for the RSF rather than relying on the FFC / Taqaddum that Izzat is close to. Tensions over this matter subsequently deepened in July 2024 following a workshop held by the Promediation – a French NGO focused on conflict mediation.  

The Dagalo brothers are said to distrust the FFC due to worries the coalition might abandon them in the future and leave them without a political cover. This paranoia reportedly stems from the FFC’s “betrayal” of the currently pro-army armed movements that signed the Juba peace agreement in September 2020. Despite sharing opposition to the ousted regime, the FFC parted ways with the armed movement movements after the regime’s fall. The Dagalo brothers allegedly fear a repeat of this scenario.

Nonetheless, the disagreements between Izzat and Abdelrahim over the FFC also reflect the suspicions from the Dagalo brothers that Izzat may usurp their power within the militia. As noted earlier, Africa Intelligence reported back in November 2023 that Izzat was distrusted by some members of Himedti’s inner circle due to his closeness to the FFC.

Indeed, according to informed sources with connections to the RSF advisory office, Izzat was accused by Abdelrahim of presenting himself to external parties, including the UAE, as capable of inheriting the RSF and transforming it into political movement. As a result, Izzat’s requests to meet Himedti were rebuffed by Abdelrahim.

How Izzat embarrassed the militia

Further allegations surrounding Izzat’s fall-out with Abdelrahim were published on Facebook by Obay Izzeldin Awad, a former press advisor and spokesperson for ex-president Omar al-Bashir. Awad’s credibility as a source is strengthened by his closeness to al-Bashir’s former presidential office director Taha Osman Al-Hussain, who played a pivotal role in establishing the RSF and managing the militia’s relationship with regional actors.  Awad was part of a cohort of advisors hired to the president’s office who became known as “Taha’s sons”.

Awad claimed that the Dagalo brothers and several RSF advisors were embarrassed by Izzat’s “lie” that undermined the credibility of RSF spokespersons. On January 14 2024, Izzat was interviewed by Sa’ad Al-Kabli, the son of the late legendary Sudanese singer Abdelkarim Al-Kabli. In response to a question about his whereabouts when the war kicked off, Izzat said that he was asleep on the morning of 15 April and his mother woke him up.

However, on 6 June 2024, the army’s commander-in-chief Abdulfattah al-Burhan said the army has videos of Izzat preparing statements announcing the RSF’s takeover of Sudan. The videos were subsequently published on Sudan’s national TV station in a programme entitled ‘Threads of the conspiracy’. The footage served as evidence for those - such as a popular pro-army influencer known as Al-Insirafi - who had long been arguing that the events of 15 April 2023 were a failed RSF coup attempt.

As argued by Obey Awad, the tapes undermined the narrative pushed by the RSF that it was taken by surprise by an army initiating a war through Islamist officers and soldiers. This created “headaches” for the RSF’s command “due to the mistakes, actions and contradictions of Yousif Izzat” Awad said.   

The final straw: Izzat’s tweet

The nail in coffin for Izzat’s assignment as an RSF political advisor were his tweet on 9 July 2024 after a conference in Cairo that brought together Taqqadum and the pro-army Democratic Bloc coalition that included armed movements who signed the Juba peace agreement.

Izzat said that he does not see any justification for the absence of the Sudanese Islamic Movement from the conference. Suggesting that this was interpreted as a call to include Islamists in the political process, Mansour said Izzat’s statement “aroused the anger of regional powers supporting the RSF, so they advised Himedti to remove his advisor”. 

Awad highlighted other alienating parts of Izzat’s tweet. Firstly, Izzat used a hashtag that Islamists and members of the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP) have been using for years: #Thanks_Egypt.

Secondly, the vision that Izzat expressed for a transitional period was also divisive. Izzat called for the exclusion of political parties (such as the FFC / Taqadum) with Izzat Taqqadum’s leader, former prime minister Abdallah Hamdok argued to be “worthiest” person to lead the transitional period. According to Awad, Taqadum parties filed a verbal complaint to Hamdok, which was handed over to Himedti, who subsequently chose to relieve Izzat of his duties.

Algoney’s speculated role

Nonetheless, additional reasons for Izzat’s dismissal are under discussion. Sudanese writer and analyst Mu’tasim Agra’ highlighted speculation that Algoney pulled the plug on Izzat’s assignment in order to take over the militia’s foreign relations file for himself. A well-known livestreamer named Osman Dhu al-Nun claimed that Algoney fired Izzat in order to take over his position. Sudan In The News are not able to verify this information.

However, while an RSF source told Mada Masr that Izzat’s role was limited to liasing between the RSF and FFC, we noted earlier how Africa Intelligence reported in November 2023 that Algoney’s emergence as the RSF’s de-facto ambassador posed a threat to Izzat.

Further information to come…

It is worth noting that in his tweet announcing the end of his assignment, Izzat said that he requested to be excused “for other reasons that will be mentioned in the future,” hinting that there is more than what has already been said.

Indeed, a source close to the RSF’s advisory offices said that attempts are being made to reconcile Izzat and Abdelrahim amid Izzat’s threats to disclose Himedti’s health condition and the reasons for his removal from the foreign relations and political liaison files months ago.