There is a high risk of fragmentation within the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia according to the Armed Conflict & Location Event Data (ACLED) project, who also provided Sudan In The News with data on RSF infighting incidents. This five-part report will explore RSF infighting and the factors contributing to it, before concluding with ACLED’s analysis on the likelihood of RSF fragmentation.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Timeline

The first section will outline the 35 RSF infighting incidents in 2024, with a quarterly rise throughout the year.

2. Tribalism and racism

Examining the tensions within the RSF require an understanding of the tribal dynamics of a militia that has a broad base of western Sudanese nomadic Arab tribes known as the ‘Attawah. However, there are pre-existing conflicts between the ‘Attawah tribes that are now being reignited within the RSF. In addition, given the RSF’s reliance on foreign mercenaries, the report also explores the historical roots of the racist violence towards South Sudanese RSF fighters.

3. Poor governance

With the RSF’s poor governance and security structures a key factor in projections of fragmentation, the report will cover the militia’s struggles establishing governance structures in their stronghold - the Darfur region of western Sudan where there is a pre-existing history of intra-Attawah conflict. Furthermore, amid the prospect of ambitious RSF commanders exploiting instability and power vacuum, the report also highlights the power struggles at the top of the RSF, including among its ruling family.

4. Reliance on spoils

The RSF’s reliance on wartime spoils hints at the militia’s inability to pay salaries. This is causing competition between different units and grievances of discrimination within the RSF leading to infighting and potential defections. Competition over resources was the primary factor behind RSF infighting in the state where it is most frequent: Al-Jazira, where a recent defection played a major role in reversing of the RSF’s territorial gains.

5. Analysis

ACLED project a high-risk of fragmentation within the militia for the following four reasons: the RSF’s structure, the fragile incentives and local agenda of its fighters, poor governance and security structures, and finally, competition fuelled by the war.

1. TIMELINE OF INCIDENTS

Below is a summary of 35 RSF infighting incidents in 2024, with the data showing a quarterly increase of intra-RSF armed clashes throughout the year. 40% of the reported incidents occurred in Al-Jazira state.

Data from ACLED on RSF infighting incidents in 2024 was accessed on 13 January 2025. Other RSF infighting incidents in this report that were not attributed to ACLED came from sources not used by ACLED”.

March 2024

3 March: RSF clashed with other RSF it described as 'criminals' in Katara, Al-Hasahisa, Al-Jazirah after residents complained of RSF violations in the area. RSF claimed 23 were killed and an unspecified number were injured (Source: ACLED).

17 March: RSF clashed against each other in an unspecified location in Al-Hasahisa, Al-Jazirah for unspecified reasons (Source: ACLED).

30 March: RSF clashed with other RSF described as 'outlaws' in Tamboul, east Al-Jazirah with heavy weapons being reported (Source: ACLED).

April 2024

5 April: Four RSF were killed and an unspecified number were injured following intra-RSF clashes in Al-Hasahisa, Al Jazirah for unspecified reasons (Source: ACLED).

22 April: RSF clashed with other RSF in Al-Hudayba, Al-Jazira in a dispute over a looted vehicle. The brother of Abu ‘Agla Keikel, an RSF commander in the state, was killed (Source: ACLED).

28 April: An RSF group led by Abu Shouk clashed with RSF led by Al-Nour Gobba in Al-Borsa Al-Gadima, al-Fashir, North Darfur. A large number of RSF were killed in the clashes (Source: ACLED).

May 2024

1 May: One RSF militant was killed and an unspecified number were injured following intra-RSF clashes near Al-Gitaina locality police station in the White Nile state for unspecified reasons (Source: ACLED).

13 May: More than 30 were killed in intra-RSF clashes in Al-Hasahisa, Al-Jazirah for unspecified reasons (Source: ACLED).

June 2024

12-13 June: Two RSF groups, led by commanders Gerang and Ismail, clashed in Umm Rawaba, North Kordofan. The clashes, which lasted two days, followed disagreements on the fees imposed on sheep trucks. Several RSF fighters and civilians were killed or wounded (Source: ACLED).

23 June: Gunfire exchanged in Tamboul, Al-Jazira after an RSF force moved from Khartoum to arrest Keikel’s close associate (Source: Alnilin).

July 2024

20 July: RSF clashed with other RSF west of Sennar. Source: ACLED).

A separate source - WatanNews - reported that Rizeigat RSF were refusing to fight under Keikel in Sennar due to a lack of confidence following that killing of Abdulrahman Al-Bishi, an RSF commander in central Sudan

August 2024

2 August: Tens of RSF killed, alongside three civilians, during intra-RSF clashes in Abu ‘Ushar, Al-Hasahisa, Al-Jazirah (Source: ACLED).

16 August: Tens of RSF killed in Al-Masid, Al-Kamlin, Al-Jazirah after RSF led by Ahmed Gojja clashed with Rizeigat RSF (Source: ACLED).

26 August: 5-7 RSF militants were killed after Rizeigat RSF coming from Al-Fashir attempted to loot Mellit market in North Darfur which was being guarded by RSF from the Ziyadiyah tribe (Source: ACLED).

27 August: Tens were killed and wounded as Rizeigat and Ziyadiyah RSF clashes continued in Mellit, North Darfur (Source: ACLED).

September 2024

4 September: RSF militants from the central Sudanese Rufa’a tribe clashed with Rizeigat RSF in Al-Hisenat village near Al ‘Oseilat, Sharg Al-Nile, Khartoum due to conflict over leadership succession. Rizeigat RSF, who looted the village and killed 4-5 Rufa’a, accused the latter of collaborating with the army (Source: ACLED).

7 September: 8 civilians were killed and 12 were wounded after two RSF groups clashed in Nyala, South Darfur (Source: ACLED).

11 September: One RSF militant was killed in clashes between RSF from Menwashi and RSF stationed near an IDP camp in Nyala, South Darfur. The RSF arrested the Menwashi group, who they described as bandits, in Um Sayala (Source: ACLED).

11 September: RSF militants killed Siddig Abbas, the RSF head of media in Al-Jazirah state, in opposition to his appointment as the militia’s leader in Al-Meheiriba (Al-Managil, Al-Jazirah) (Source: ACLED).

14 September: 10 RSF were killed after RSF groups led by Ismail Hussein and Bashir Balnja clashed in Umm Ruwaba, North Kordofan in a dispute over looted cows. Three civilians were killed and five were wounded (Source: ACLED).

19 September: Intra-RSF clashes in Umm Ruwaba, North Kordofan after a group resisted the RSF’s ban on motorbikes in the city (Source: ACLED).

October 2024

17 October: 17 RSF killed in internal clashes near Dar Al-Salam, west Omdurman (Source: Facebook).

18 October: One RSF killed and three civilians wounded following clashes between RSF groups Tabit (Tawila, North Darfur) (Source: ACLED).

27 October: Clashes between Rizeigat RSF and South Sudanese RSF after the latter refused to move to the Armoured Corps, south Khartoum. Casualties unspecified (Source: X).

November 2024

4 November: Clashes between RSF units in Al-Hasaheisa, Al-Jazirah (Source: Al-Youm).

12 November: Clashes between Rizeigat RSF and South Sudanese RSF in Abu Hamama, central Khartoum led to the killing and wounding of an unspecified amount of casualties and burning of a market for stolen goods (Source: Nile News).

17 November: RSF gunfire targeted a convoy of IDPs, accompanied by RSF in combat and civilian vehicles, leaving Al ‘Oselat (Sharg Al-Nile, Khartoum) towards Wad Abu Salih. RSF detained an unspecified number of vehicles and civilians who were part of the convoy (Source: ACLED).

20 November: One RSF fighter killed and three citizens injured after clashes between RSF and allied militias in Tabit, close to Al-Fashir in North Darfur (Source: Darfur 24).

24 November: An RSF colonel attacked RSF captain Ahmed Abu Tsha in the lands office in Nyala, South Darfur, due to a renewed dispute (Source: ACLED).

26 November: Kanabi (migrant workers from Darfur) RSF clashed with RSF led by commander Gojja in Al Hasahisa, Al Jazirah. Casualties unknown (Source: ACLED).

December 2024

4 December: RSF clashed with other RSF in Wad Medani, Al-Jazirah with gunfire being reported (Source: ACLED).

19 December: Clashes using medium and heavy weapons in Wad Madani, Al-Jazirah between RSF affiliated to Jalha (Misseriya) and other RSF after the former attempted to withdraw from the city (Source: Sudan Voice).

21 December: Hundreds escape Soba prison in Khartoum after clashes between rival RSF units. Misseriya RSF affiliated to Jalha reportedly stormed the prison to release detained fighters (Sources: Al-Rakoba, Sudan Times).

22 December: Six Rizeigat RSF killed and dozens wounded in clashes with Misseriya RSF in a dispute over fuel in Dar Al-Salam, west Omdurman. The Rizeigat RSF reportedly pursued the Misseriya RSF as they withdrew towards a nearby school, leading the latter to throw a grenade (Source: Watan News).

2. TRIBALISM AND RACISM

Examining the tensions within the RSF require an understanding of the militia’s tribal dynamics. The RSF are led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Himedti) and his family, who belong to the Mahariya branch of the Rizeigat – a nomadic Arab tribe from Darfur and neighbouring Chad.

The RSF has a broad socio-ethnic base of nomadic Arab tribes from western Sudan. The militia also possesses over 18,000 ethno-mercenaries predominantly drawn from the ‘Baggara Belt’: a group of nomadic Arabic tribes extending to Chad, Niger and Nigeria. As well as using nomadic Arab mercenaries from Libya and Mali, the militia also retains foreign mercenaries outside of its ethnic base from at least eight different countries across three continents.

According to RSF discourse, the “56 state” – the Sudanese republic that was formed in 1956 after independence from Britain – is said to belong to the “Jallaba” – a term meaning northern Sudanese. As such, the stated aim of the RSF is to topple the ‘56/Jallaba state’ and replace it with the ‘Attawah state’.

The Attawah are a group of western Sudanese nomadic Arab Baggara tribes including the Rizeigat, Misseriya, Hawazma, Salamat, Bani Halba and Habbaniya. These groups claim to be descendants of Junaid bin Ahmed al-Juhaini, ensuring that the Attawah have also been described as falling under the Junaid umbrella.

A mark of the tribal nature of the RSF militia is the naming of its most important company: Al-Junaid conglomerate, which has provided at least tens of millions in financial backing for the militia. This includes Al-Gunade gold company, a key element of the RSF’s income.

Nonetheless, the RSF also extensively recruits foreign mercenaries, including from groups that have previously been in conflict with militias heavily recruiting from the Attawah. In addition, there is a history of pre-existing conflicts between the Attawah tribes that the RSF predominantly recruit from that have been reignited despite their shared participation in the RSF’s rebellion.

With this report projecting a high-risk of fragmentation within the RSF, the next section will focus on internal conflicts and grievances within the militia stemming from two Attawah tribes in particular: the Misseriya and the Salamat, alongside instances of violent racism towards the RSF’s foreign mercenaries.

2.1 MISSERIYA

While the RSF is led by Mahariya Rizeigat, the Misseriya tribe - the second-largest in Sudan – are a major constituent of RSF. Nonetheless, there has been a history of tension between the Misseriya and the RSF, alongside the Rizeigat who dominate it.

For example, there were deadly clashes between the Misseriya and Rizeigat in 2008, 2009, 2015 and 2022. The RSF’s rebellion in April 2023 re-ignited these tensions as they forced a wedge between the Misseriya community, which maintains ties to both the army and the RSF.

2.1.1 Misseriya-Rizeigat tensions within the RSF after the war

There have also been reports of conflict between RSF Rizeigat and Misseriya elements. Five months into the war, veteran journalist Kamal Al-Sharif reported that conflict erupted between Misseriya and Rizeigat in the RSF over the distribution of looted spoils.

In January 2024, tensions erupted within the Misseriya over the RSF’s plans to seize West Kordofan – a state which hosts Dar Al-Misseriya region that is considered the home of the tribe. After the RSF’s siege in West Kordofan displaced over 50,000, a high-ranking Misseriya delegation to declare their support for the army and reject the RSF’s control of their land by June 2024.

Reports then circulated of Misseriya RSF defying instructions from their Rizeigat seniors. It is alleged that around 410 Misseriya and Hawazma RSF are disobeying orders from a member of the Dagalo family to return to Sudan from Saudi Arabia. There are also allegations of corruption by the Rizeigat at the top of the militia, with RSF financial affairs officer Mustafa Ibrahim accused of stealing money allocated to wounded and killed RSF militants.

Journalist Al-Rikabi Hassan Yacoub suggested that the matter reflects “the widening gap of disagreement between the tribal components of the RSF,” with the Misseriya, Hawazma and other Attawah tribes said to accuse the militia’s Rizeigat leadership of discrimination and monopolising the spoils of war. Rizeigat RSF were accused of “pushing” the other Attawah tribes into the front lines while the Rizeigat and Dagalo family “enjoy” life far from the battlefields.

Misseriya-Rizeigat tensions within the RSF increased towards the end of 2024, resulting in three infighting incidents in December. On the 19th, intra-RSF clashes in Wad Madani, Al-Jazira were motivated by an attempt to withdraw by a unit led by a Misseriya RSF commander known as ‘General Jalha’. Two days later, Jalha loyalist Misseriya RSF stormed Soba prison in Khartoum attempting to free detainees. Then, six Rizeigat RSF were killed on 22 December in clashes with Misseriya RSF in Omdurman. These incidents were preceded by social media threats between Misseriya and Rizeigat RSF.

2.1.2 Misseriya-Rizeigat RSF social media threats

In summer 2024, there were two highly publicised spats broadcast on social media whereby Misseriya RSF fighters issued threats to their Rizeigat counterparts.

At the end of July 2024, Misseriya RSF fighters stationed in Khartoum threated to storm Al-Daein in East Darfur – known for being the home of the Rizeigat – unless a Misseriya fighter known as Captain Hamid is released. Hamid was said to be arrested and stripped of his rank after arresting a thief.

In Sennar, an RSF group consisting of members of a tribe called the ‘Arab Zaghawa Am Kamalti’ also threatened to storm Al-Daein unless Hamid is released. Another RSF group from the same tribe made the same threat. It was subsequently reported on Twitter that Hamid was executed by Rizeigat RSF.

But more publicity was generated by a matter that we covered in a documentary, whereby threats were exchanged between RSF fighters on social media during July and August 2024. The issue began after militants from the Misseriya tribe took offence to a tribesman – known as General Jalha – being undermined on a regional TV news station by an RSF advisor who said that Jalha is merely a soldier rather than a commander.

General Jalha – led a group named the ‘Braves of Greater Kordofan’ which predominantly recruited from the Misseriya tribe before fighting alongside the RSF in August 2023.

As also covered in our report, Jalha loyalists considered the comments an affront to the Misseriya tribe as a whole. RSF fighters from the Rizeigat tribe responded with patronising comments towards their Misseriya counterparts, leading the latter to issue threats.

The issue culminated with Jalha – one of the RSF’s commanders in Al-Jazira - asserting his independence from the RSF, instead claiming loyalty to a faction called ‘the Rapid Intervention’. While the RSF’s media team attempted to diffuse the issue, it nonetheless set a precedence for RSF fighters and units openly voicing their grievances and issuing threats on social media. Moreover, after Jalha was killed in January 2025, speculation was rife that it was an inside job.

2.1.2 The killing of Jalha: an inside job?

Reporting on Jalha’s death, Sudan Tribune noted that he was killed in “unclear circumstances” citing RSF sources saying he was killed in a drone strike targeting his envoy despite RSF-affiliated social media accounts claimed he was “martyred” in battle. However, as argued by Al-Jazeera journalist Abdelraouf Taha Ali: “it is a rare occurrence for the militia to announce the killing of one of its leaders [which] confirms the news of his liquidation by militia members”.

In the build-up to Jalha’s death, there were several RSF infighting incidents between the Misseriya and Rizeigat with Jalha playing a central role. On 21 December, a Misseriya unit affiliated to Jalha stormed Soba prison to release detained fighters. Two days earlier, there were intra-RSF clashes after Jalha’s fighters attempted to withdraw from Wad Madani in Al-Jazirah.

Media reports following Jalha’s death indicated that his refusal to fight in Madani and grievances over his tribesmen’s unpaid salaries triggered suspicions that he would defect to the army, eventually resulting in his executions at the hands of the RSF.

Al-Jazeera’s investigation cited a security source saying that Jalha was avoiding fighting major battles alongside the RSF, with Jalha reportedly failing to arrive to the RSF’s defence lines after the Sudanese army regained control of Wad Madani. Al-Nilin reported that the RSF’s second-in-command – Abdulrahim Hamdan Dagalo – held Jalha responsible for the fall of Madani, blaming him for withdrawal of Misseriya fighters.

Various motivating factors have been given for Jalha’s withdrawal. In comments to Al-Jazeera, journalist Mohammed Hamid Jum’a said he was planning to return to Kordofan to be close to his Misseriya people.

Shedding further light on Jalha’s killing, local Kordofani media noted that he withdrew from Al-Jazira to Kordofan in the days leading up to his death, where there were disagreements between Jalha and RSF leaders in the region over the non-payment of dollar salaries to him and his fighters. This claim was backed up by Al-Nilin.

Furthermore, retired intelligence officer Major General Mu’tasim Al-Hassan told Al-Jazeera that Jalha was at odds with the RSF’s leadership over missed salary payments and his refusal to fight in RSF operations following the army’s re-capture of Al-Jazira state.

As reported by Kordofani media, there were also suspicions that Jalha would hand himself over to the army in Al-Obeid, North Kordofan. Al-Jazeera’s security source confirmed that the Sudanese army made contacts with Jalha amid his disputes with the RSF’s leadership. Journalist Mohamed Hamed Juma’a added that the army conducted outreach to Misseriya tribal leaders, seeking to exploit Jalha’s independence from the RSF and his affiliation to a large and influential tribe.

With that in mind, multiple sources also claimed that the RSF set up a trap for Jalha ahead of his liquidation. Local media sources said that Jalha was moving between North Kordofan, but refused to participate in the Battle of Umm Ruwabah. Major General Al-Hassan told Al-Jazeera stated that Jalha was “lured” by the RSF to Sharg al-Neel in Khartoum, with Al-Nilin suggesting that he was deceived through promises to pay salaries.

Jalha’s killing also triggered analysis on the tribal cohesion within the RSF. Mohammed Hamid Jum’a questioned why his killing coincided with that of other non-Rizeigat RSF leaders amid doubts over their loyalty, arguing that the RSF is now operating in a “mafia-like” manner through eliminating rival leaders.

As noted by Abdelmajeed Abdelmajid, Jalha’s killing put an end to the three most prominent Misseriya in the RSF, citing a serious injury to Taj Al-Tijani who leads the largest RSF force in West Kordofan and the escape of Hussein Barsham.

Further credence is lent to the view that Jalha’s killing was inside job caused by Misseriya-Rizeigat tensions if taking into account the social media reactions of Misseriya RSF supporters and fighters.

For example, in a TikTok Live between RSF supporters on the day of Jalha’s death, a Misseriya man says: “my message to the honourable Misseriya [is that] if you see a Mahiri [the Rizeigat clan to which the Dagalo family belongs] - kill him”. A Mahiri Rizeigi responds: “do you want to incite [the Misseriya] against their masters?” after which he threatens to catch a Abu Jood – a Misseri Jalha loyalist.

Abu Jood’s reaction to Jalha’s death was also telling. As covered in our documentary, he issued threats on social media towards Rizeigat RSF leaders over the perceived disrespect towards Jalha which he claimed was offensive to the Misseriya tribe as a whole.

On the day of Jalha’s killing, he recorded a video that added fuel to speculation that it was an inside job. Abu Jood directly countered the official RSF narrative that Jalha was killed in battle by saying that both he and Jalha were targeted by drones while outside of military operations areas. Abu Jood then issued a threat that was not directed at the army, saying that there are thousand like General Jalha.

In another video from the same day, Abu Jood then issued a message directly to RSF commander Himedti where he complained about being insufficiently armed. He said that machine guns were not enough and demanded canons, before concluding that he will be the second Jalha if they are not delivered.

It is worth noting the complaints over salary payments and arms supplies have also been a key factor in the grievances over another ‘Attawah tribe - the Salamat – which has also led to disputes being played out on social media.

2.2 SALAMAT

The Salamat are a tribe of Arab herders with roots in Chad who settled in central Darfur around two decades ago. While the tribe provides the RSF with fighters, its conflicts with other Attawah tribes have been renewed since the war began, particularly in South Darfur.

In June 2023, two months into the RSF’s rebellion, various leaders from Darfur’s nomadic Arab Attawah tribes declared their support for the militia, including the Beni Halba and the Habbaniya. However, the Salamat did not join them, with suggestions that this division created a significant rift within the Attawah communities of South Darfur.

Nonetheless, it was reported that RSF commander Himedti sent a delegation led by his brother and second-in-command Abdelrahim to request support from the Salamat tribe, leading to the RSF receiving

5,000 fighters from the tribe in exchange for 150 billion Sudanese pounds. However, this has not stopped Salamat RSF from publicly airing grievances that may culminate in their withdrawal from the militia.

In addition, Salamat RSF fighters have been embroiled in conflict with the militants from the Bani Halba and Habaniya tribes, which ACLED said “were not related to the national-level objectives of the RSF, [but] they were rather fuelled by the local objectives of these groups to acquire more land and resources”.

2.2.1 Salamat vs Bani Halba

In August 2023, tribal conflict erupted in South Darfur between the Salamat and the Bani Halba, one of the largest tribes in South Darfur. Dozens were reportedly killed in fighting that was triggered by a dispute over cows, although there are suggestions that the conflict began over looting incident whereby a Salamat militia reportedly looted a Bani Halba leader.

With the Salamat and Bani Halba falling under the Attawah umbrella, they are both a key constituent of the RSF. Yet both tribes deployed RSF fighters from Khartoum to Darfur, thereby prioritising the tribal conflict over the RSF’s war on the Sudanese state. By October 2023, the RSF’s second-in-command Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo arrived in South Darfur aiming to mediate the tribal conflict, although Bani Halba leaders rejected his efforts. By May 2024, it was reported that clashes between the tribes spread to Central Darfur.

2.2.2 Salamat vs Habbaniya

The Salamat have also been embroiled in conflict with their Attawah cousins from the Habbaniya tribe. The latter’s tribal leaders announced their allegiance to the RSF in June 2023. But while the Salamat and Habbaniya both contribute fighters to the RSF, the tribes have a history of conflict in South Darfur. In 2011, over 100 were killed in fighting between the tribes. Salamat-Habbaniya conflict in 2017 also killed more than 100.

Fighting between the two tribes erupted again after the war. In August 2023, militants from the tribes mobilised in South Darfur. In October 2023, at least 13 were killed in Salamat-Habbaniya fighting. Then, in November 2023, at least 30 were killed in fighting between the tribes prompted by disputes over land. Militants from the Salamat tribe were wearing RSF uniform in their attacks.

2.2.3 Salamat marginalisation in the RSF

Despite the Salamat using RSF equipment in their tribal conflicts, members of the tribe still complain of their marginalisation in the RSF. Salamat RSF have taken to social media to make their grievances public.

In September 2024, Salamat RSF fighters released a video protesting that one of their leaders, Issa Al-Deif, was insufficiently armed when he died attacking the Hattab base in Khartoum Bahri.

Dissenting that Al-Deif was only provided with four combat vehicles, the Salamat RSF claimed that militia leaders from other tribes are better armed, and demanded more weapons. In a subsequent video, a Salamat RSF fighter complained that RSF mouthpieces did not offer condolences to the tribe over the loss of Al-Deif.

2.3 MERCENARIES

The RSF extensively recruits non-Sudanese ethno-mercenaries from the Baggara Belt, with estimates that the militia has around 18,000 fighters hailing from nomadic Arab tribes in Chad, Niger, Mali, northern Nigeria and southern Libya. While those groups are closer in affiliation to the Attawah, the militia also has foreign mercenaries that are not.

There have been reports of the RSF’s use of mercenaries from Ethiopia and the Central African Republic. There have also been accounts of RSF mercenaries from Yemen. More recently, an investigation conducted by Colombian news outlet La Silla Vacia revealed that over 300 former Columbian soldiers are fighting for the RSF.

But while the presence of mercenaries from at least eight countries and three different continents increases the risk of RSF infighting, the mercenaries that have been subjected to documented attacks have come from closer to home: South Sudan. These attacks are racist in nature giving the past participation of Attawah militias in conflict against South Sudanese rebels.

2.3.1 South Sudanese mercenaries

The RSF is particularly reliant on South Sudanese mercenaries in Khartoum state. As Sudan’s army regained control of the Sudan’s Radio and TV headquarters in Omdurman in March 2024, 14 South Sudanese RSF mercenaries were captured.

In June 2024, military sources would later say that the majority RSF fighters involved in attacks on the army’s Signal and Armored Corps in Khartoum North and southern Khartoum respectively are affiliated with South Sudanese militias. Indeed, a video circulated social media in July 2024 showing a large group of South Sudanese RSF mercenaries in Khartoum.

Despite the RSF’s reliance on South Sudanese mercenaries, there is nonetheless a history of conflict between South Sudanese groups and the RSF’s tribal base that predates the militia’s formation in 2013.

2.3.2 History of Attawah conflict with South Sudan

Back in the 19th century, on the modern day border of Sudan and South Sudan, the Baggara Arabs of southwestern Sudan were embroiled in conflicts over land resources with the South Sudanese Dinka which included slave raiding. Battles continued into the following century before gradually subsiding until 1983, when the second Sudanese civil war began between the central government in northern Sudan and South Sudanese rebels.

During that war, the Murahalin - Baggara militants predominantly drawn from the Rizeigat and Misseriya tribes - were used against southern rebels. In the 1980s, the Murahlin were incorporated into the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) by Misseriya defence minister Fadlallah Burma Nasir, who armed the PDF to raid South Sudan. Baggara militias would continue to attack Dinka and Nuer South Sudanese civilians into the 1990s.

At the same time, Darfur witnessed a proliferation of informal nomadic Arab militias known as Janjaweed. The decline of the PDF at the turn of the 21st century coincided with the increased mobilisation of the Janjaweed who in 2013 would eventually be formalised into the RSF. As a result, the RSF and Janjaweed before them would become the main recruiter of Attawah militants in western Sudan. Indeed, a sizeable contingent of RSF fighters previously fought in the PDF.

But, as mentioned earlier, the RSF also recruits South Sudanese mercenaries. Given the generations of conflict between the Baggara Arabs who dominate the RSF’s ranks and South Sudanese, it is therefore no surprise that past hostilities would be resurrected with the same historic racism.

2.3.3 RSF fighting with South Sudanese mercenaries

The end of 2023 saw reports of clashes between the RSF and South Sudanese (Nuer tribe) mercenaries. In the year that followed, there have also been documented instances of Attawah RSF bullying and dehumanising plain-clothed South Sudanese men who were likely fighting alongside them.

For example, a video from February 2024 shows a man who can be identified as being from a Attawah tribe from his accent slapping a South Sudanese man and ordering him to call him “my master” in reference to the forced slavery of southerners at the hands of Baggara that existed as early as the 19th century. While the men in the video are plain-clothed, the man recording the humiliation threatens to raise arms, which suggests that the scuffle was between militants rather than civilians.

Another video from August 2024 shows RSF fighters torturing three South Sudanese mercenaries from the Nuer tribe, purportedly following violent disputes after a South Sudanese mercenary was killed by the RSF. In the video, the mercenaries were forced to mimic the sounds of animals, with one of them wearing the RSF’s distinctive light beige camo. More recently, in November 2024, dozens were reportedly killed in central Khartoum in clashes between Rizeigat and South Sudanese RSF.

3. POOR GOVERNANCE

In February 2025, the RSF and allies signed a charter in Nairobi, Kenya to form a parallel government in areas under its control. However, among the factors that led ACLED to project a high-risk of RSF fragmentation are poor governance and security structures.

Almost all of the 35 RSF infighting incidents were in RSF-held areas, with eight of them in the militia’s stronghold in Darfur – a region with a long history of intra-Attawah conflict. Therefore, the next section will explore the RSF’s struggling attempts to establish governance structures in Darfur.

ACLED also raised the prospect of ambitious RSF commanders exploiting instability and power vacuums caused by ineffective governance structures. This is why we will touch upon the power struggles within the militia, where even the ruling Dagalo family reportedly contends with differences that may develop into wider chasms.

3.1 History of intra-Attawah conflict in Darfur

Earlier in this report, we covered the intermittent deadly battles between various Attawah cousins: the Rizeigat vs the Misseriya and the Salamat vs. the Bani Halba and Habbaniya. While coverage of intercommunal violence in Darfur often focuses on Arab vs. non-Arab conflicts, less attention is given to the history armed fighting between Darfur’s Arab tribes that dominate the RSF.

But “conflict between Arab tribes was nothing new” noted Sudan researcher Julie Flint in a working paper published in 2009 – four years before the RSF was formed - exploring the complex dynamics of Darfur’s Arab militias. “Until the mid-1980s, most of the wars that were fought in Darfur were mainly between Arabs,” Flint wrote.

It was further claimed that about one-third of violent fatalities in Darfur in 2008 and early 2009 occurred in intra-Arab clashes, with the rise of intra-Arab violence in Darfur attributed to Attawah groups fighting each other for control of seized land.

Back then, the Janjaweed fought on the side of the central government against non-Arab armed groups: the Sudan Liberation Movement and Justice and Equality Movement. Today, the alliances have shifted. The aforementioned armed groups are part of the Joint Forces fighting the RSF and allied Arab militia in cooperation with the state army.

However, the trend of intra-Arab militia fighting in Darfur persists despite their shared participation in the RSF’s rebellion. In the early 2000s, Sudan’s central government was unable to contain the violence except through military offensives whereby the salaries of Darfuri Arab militants would increase.

While competition over land and resources continues to be the primary motivator behind intra-Arab fighting in Darfur, the RSF faces significant challenges in preventing it amid the militia’s struggles to establish governance structures in a state where it controls four out of five state capitals, thereby increasing the risk of fragmentation.

3.2 RSF tensions in North Darfur

Al-Fashir in North Darfur remains the last state capital of Sudan’s western region to not fall to the RSF despite a siege that began in April 2024. According to Sudanese media reports, disagreements spread within the ranks of the RSF due to its struggle to take Al-Fashir with the same speed it seized control of Darfur’s other state capitals. These disputes particularly intensified after the June 2024 killing Ali Ya’coub, the RSF’s operations commander in Darfur who led the siege of Al-Fashir.

Given Ya’coub’s importance to RSF recruitment, his killing reportedly jeopardised the RSF’s internal cohesion. North Darfur is a priority area for both the Joint Forces and the RSF given its proximity to the Sudanese-Libyan-Chadian border that is a crucial supply route for RSF supplies and can decide whether the militia’s resources are depleted across Sudan. As a result, the RSF has expended considerable manpower towards Al-Fashir.

However, the mass deaths of RSF militants have reportedly caused sharp disagreements and divisions between leaders and troops, with stories of anger across Darfur due to mobilised youth being thrown into the fire while field leaders such as Al-Nour Gobba and Jedu Abu Shouk are said to have escaped.

The siege of Al-Fashir has also triggered tensions within the RSF’s leadership amid competing business interests. As previously mentioned, Janjaweed militias took to fighting each other over land in the early 2000s. These battles were primarily triggered by the war cutting off livestock migration routes.

Today, the RSF’s siege of Al-Fashir necessitated the closure of roads to the city. In October 2024, militia leaders with commercial interests rejected the decision to prevent the passage of goods in Al-Fasher, subsequently igniting internal tensions.

3.3 RSF tensions in East Darfur

In East Darfur, the RSF is also finding trouble establishing effective government structures despite its capital Al-Da’ein being the historical capital of the Rizeigat tribe from which most RSF leaders and fighters hail. While the RSF took control of Al-Daein in November 2023, the militia remains unable to guarantee security or provide effective governance.

It is worth noting the state of insecurity that Al-Da’ein already faces, including attacks by RSF mercenaries from Niger and the Central African Republic, with an RSF fighter in uniform releasing a video saying that his family home was looted. This has likely triggered differences between tribal leaders and the RSF.

In September 2024, it was reported that disagreements escalated between the native administration in East Darfur and RSF after the former dissolved RSF-affiliated committees seeking to form a civilian administration in the state. The decision was signed by the nazir (paramount chief) of the Rizeigat tribe.

Beyond the differences of the RSF’s local civilian leaders with tribal leaders, there is also a a power struggle over which civil authority governs Al-Daein on the militia’s behalf. On one hand, there is the Civil Authority led by Khalifa Bakhit, who is close to dismissed former RSF advisor Yousif Izzat. On the other hand, there is Al-Daein’s Advisory Council led by Mohamed Khater who is affiliated to the RSF advisor Izzedine al-Safi, a close associate of Abdelrahim Dagalo – the RSF’s second-in-command who was responsible for Izzat’s sacking.

Indeed, Abdelrahim is at the heart of rifts inside the RSF’s internal decision-making structures, including with other members of the Dagalo family, which heightens the risk of a potential power struggle inside the RSF.

3.4 Potential power struggle

As we reported in August 2024, Abdelrahim was behind the sacking of Yousif Izzat: a Mahariya Rizeigi like the Dagalo family. Izzat, a smooth-talking lawyer and graduate of a Canadian university, played a critical role in the RSF’s efforts to obtain domestic and international legitimacy.

Differences between Izzat and Abdelrahim reportedly stemmed from Izzat opposing Abdelrahim’s desire to create a new political incubator for the RSF rather than relying on the Taqadum coalition that Izzat is close to. The dispute was settled with Izzat being fired after accusations of aiming to position himself as capable of inheriting the RSF and transforming it into a political movement. Six months later, Taqadum has splintered, with one faction agreeing to form a parallel government in RSF-held areas.

Reporting on the Izzat-Abdelrahim rift for Al-Sudani newspaper, veteran journalist Ataf Mohamed shed light on how Abdelrahim’s attempts to maintain influence within the militia that brought him into conflict with even his own family. Citing RSF leaders, Mohamed reported that "Abdelrahim, being [RSF commander] Himedti’s older brother, wants to control the RSF. But most of his decisions are emotional, and Himedti often cancels them”.

Mohamed also highlighted Abdelrahim’s problems with key components of the RSF civilian infrastructure, including company managers, foreign consultants and politicians, which reportedly prompted Himedti to limit his influence, financial and political power within the RSF. This meant that Izzat was entrusted with the political file, whereas the youngest Dagalo brother Algoni handles the RSF’s financial management.

The sacking of Izzat now means that the RSF’s political affairs are controlled by Hassabo Abdelrahman, Sudan’s former vice-president and the most senior Islamist in the RSF’s ranks who Mohamed suggests is the “mastermind of Abdelrahim”. It is no surprise that, in November 2024, Izzat revealed that the RSF is now being dictated by the Sudanese Islamic Movement that it claims it is at war with.

With Izzat out of the way, there are now reports of Abdelrahim’s frictions with the Dagalo family that controls the militia. Journalist Azmy Abdelrazeg reported that many Dagalo family members blame Abdelrahim for the loss of investments and personal priveleges caused by the war.

Abdelrahim also reportedly faces resistance from his brothers Algoni and Adel. As Abdelrahim seeks money to fund the war effort through weapons, equipment and mercenaries, the brothers who control RSF finances are said to insist on limiting spending to media and political activities. Competition over finances and resources is the factor that binds together the rising trend of RSF infighting.

4. RELIANCE ON SPOILS

While pre-existing tribal rivalries are a major factor in RSF infighting, they are ultimately bound by competition over resources amid signs that the militia is unable to sustain its rebellion. RSF recruitment is primarily based through financial incentives, including through withholding food and medical aid to compel individuals to join their ranks as reported by CNN in March 2024.

In addition, a Reuters article from August 2024 that spoke to RSF recruits revealed how fighters are often drawn by promise of a share of the spoils. Noting the RSF’s reliance on wartime spoils, ACLED project a high risk of fragmentation within the militia due to competition and infighting between different RSF units.

Key triggers for internal tensions that occasionally turn into armed battles between rival units are financial disputes. A source familiar with the internal dynamics of the RSF confirmed families of killed RSF soldiers are in dispute with the militia’s leadership over the issues of compensation and salaries. It is also becoming clear that the RSF’s inability to pay salaries is leading to accusations of tribal discrimination within the militia and grievances that may lead to defections or more infighting.

Competition over the resources is the primary factor behind RSF infighting in the state where it is most frequent: Al-Jazira, where a recent defection has contributed to the reversal of the militia’s territorial gains from the end of 2023.

4.1 Salaries

The RSF’s reported inability to pay its fighters regular salaries is a key contributor to infighting as it fuels allegations of discrimination and competition among units for wartime spoils.

Earlier in this report, we outlined grievances held by RSF fighters from other non-‘Attawah tribes who claim that they are marginalised within the militia. Amid reported discrimination in the RSF, it is alleged that the Salamat have not received the large sum of money they were promised to send fighters to the RSF, with fighters having their salaries delayed by up to ten months.

By contrast, Rizeigat RSF fighters are said to receive their salaries on a regular basis. This has reportedly culminated in the Salamat tribe threatening to withdraw from the RSF ranks unless a 21-day deadline is met to pay their fighters. It has also been reported that the strain of unpaid salaries has forced Salamat RSF to resort to looting and car theft, with over two thousand cars collected from Salamat areas in Darfur.

Nonetheless, discontent over unpaid salaries has reportedly spread to other non-Rizeigat RSF fighters. Describing the RSF’s favouritism towards Mahariya Rizeigat fighters, journalist Azmy Abdelrazeg reported that RSF leaders had stopped paying salaries to its troops in the central Sudanese states of Al-Jazira and Sennar and was resorting to sending financial transfers through the Bankak phone application to Mahariya Rizeigat only.

It is in Al-Jazira where RSF infighting is most chronic as the militia’s reliance on spoils of war yields violent conflict over money.

4.2 Infighting in Al-Jazira

Reports on RSF infighting in Al-Jazira proliferated soon after the militia seized swathes of the state at the end of 2023. Indeed, 14 out of 35 RSF infighting incidents outlined in this report were in the central Sudanese state.

In March 2024, Mada Masr reported that battles occasionally erupt between the three RSF forces to whom Al-Jazirah state is divided: Abdelrahman Al-Bishi’s forces in the south, Abu ‘Agla Keikel’s forces in the east and Jalha’s forces in the west.

In June 2024, Mada Masr followed that up by citing military sources who said that RSF combat units under which Al-Jazira is divided led by Al-Bishi, Keikel, Jalha and Ahmed Gojja are undisciplined “as they do not follow military orders, and are primarily motivated by looting and theft”.

A Reuters article published in August 2024 spoke to RSF recruits who provided in-depth accounts of the tensions among RSF units in Al-Jazira. Key revelations included:

· Three sources with direct knowledge of RSF recruitment said fighters are often drawn by the promise of a share of the spoils.

· The RSF in Al-Jazira includes units from rival tribes and militias, which sometimes clash among themselves, residents said.

· "When you ask the soldiers about Himedti, they say, 'He gave me this gun, but we don't trust him; we don't trust his soldiers; we only trust our brothers,'" said a local who described seeing fighters cock their weapons at superiors when ordered to shut down a satellite terminal they were using to sell internet access.

Reuters also noted that forces belonging to Keikel – who is from Al-Jazira – occasionally clashed with those belonging to Ahmed Gojja – a militia leader from Darfur. These battles were attributed to Gojja’s forces, left in charge of Al-Hasaheisa in northern Al-Jazira, straying into Keikel’s territory in the east.

It is likely that Gojja’s forces were motivated by financial concerns if we consider Abdelrazeg’s account of the factors behind RSF infighting in Al-Jazira. In the city of Hasaheisa alone, there are reportedly about five RSF bases tasked with setting up checkpoints and collecting fees. Abdelrazeg added that those forces are preoccupied with selling internet access or looting everything of financial values.

4.3 Keikel’s defection

A reflection of the adverse impact of RSF infighting on the militia’s war effort was the October 2024 defection of Abu ‘Agla Keikel. As a member of the Shukriya tribe, Keikel was a major asset to an RSF militia that predominantly recruits from Attawah tribes. His familiarity with the area meant that he played a leading role in the RSF’s advances in Al-Jazira at the end of 2023. To avenge Keikel’s defection, the RSF led by Gojja embarked on a genocidal killing spree as documented by Sudan In the News.

Keikel’s defection was likely triggered by his fighting with other RSF units, with Keikel being a common denominator in at least three of the fourteen infighting incidents in Al-Jazira. In April, his brother was killed over a looted vehicle. In June, gunfire was exchanged in RSF attempts to arrest his closest associate. In September, RSF militants killed a militant he appointed to lead a territory near Gojja’s area of control.

Nonetheless, there was an atmosphere of distrust between Keikel and the RSF’s Attawah leadership even before his defection. For example, in July 2024 it was reported that Rizeigat RSF are refusing to fight under Keikel in Sennar following the killing of Abdulrahman Al-Bishi, an RSF commander from central Sudan.

As revealed by Abdelrazeg, Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo sent his uncle, Saleh Issa, to supervise Keikel. Issa took over the financial and administrative aspects of territories held by Keikel, who insisted on appointing relatives he trusted as his guards.

Keikel’s forces on the east side of the river would subsequently clash with RSF units in northern Al-Jazira localities Al-Hasaheisa and Al-Kamlin affiliated to Gojja and Ahmed Yaqoub respectively. The final straw for Keikel ahead of his defection was the September 2024 killing of Siddig Abbas, who he appointed as RSF commander in Meheiriba under Gojja’s control.

RSF infighting is already having negative repercussions for the militia’s attempts to maintain control over Al-Jazira. On 2 December 2024, little over a month after Keikel’s defection, he played a key role in the army regaining control of Um Al-Qura locality in southeast Al-Jazira. Only 40km away from Wad Madani, this advance left the army poised to regain Al-Jazira’s state capital.

By early January 2025, Sudan’s army regained Madani. Weeks later, Keikel led troops who liberated other key cities in the state: Rufa’a and Hasaheisa.

5. ANALYSIS

In analysis of RSF infighting exclusively provided to Sudan In The News, ACLED project a high-risk of fragmentation within the militia for the following four reasons: the RSF’s structure, fragile incentives of its fighters, poor governance and security and competition fuelled by the war. The sections below are full quotes provided to us by ACLED.

5.1 Decentralized and horizontal structure

The RSF’s recruitment campaigns target clans and tribes by allying with their direct community leaders, who consequently become their direct commanders in the RSF. This results in a decentralised, horizontally-organised force that builds on existing communal social networks, resulting in high loyalty between lower-ranking soldiers and their direct superiors.

This structure, however, does not necessarily guarantee a coherent chain of command, as the level of unity and coordination between mid-level tribal commanders is low. Local agendas and ethnic affiliation would likely trump national-level objectives of the RSF, and this could result in fragmentation.

This was evident in Al Jazirah on 11 September 2024, when a group of RSF of unspecified ethnic groups shot and killed the RSF head of media in Meheiriba after disputing his appointment as commander of that location. Another example is the defection of Hamar RSF members. On 15 July 2024, the Hamar native administration in al-Nuhud welcomed a group of Hamar RSF members who defected and joined the SAF allies in al-Nuhud.

This defection indicates that the Hamar native administration maintains some level of influence and has likely had a role in persuading the Hamar members of the RSF to defend their city against an imminent attack by the RSF.

5.2 Fragile incentives and local agendas

Many RSF members rely on plundering and war spoils to sustain themselves. This is feasible through the degree of autonomy offered by the RSF’s loose structure and its higher tolerance for criminal activity in areas under its control.

This reliance on wartime spoils could lead to competition and infighting between different RSF units. For instance, on 14 September 2024, RSF militias led by Ismail Hussein and Bashir Balnja clashed with each other in Umm Rawaba in North Kordofan due to a dispute over looted cows.

Five days later, more clashes continued after a group of RSF resisted the order banning motorbikes in the same city. These incidents indicate that local allied militias could easily shift their allegiances when their local interests are compromised.

5.3 Poor governance and security

The RSF's governance in areas under its control is inconsistent and often lacks functional institutions. While the RSF has attempted to establish local courts, the population often views them as arbitrary and illegitimate. This lack of effective governance structures could lead to instability and a power vacuum that ambitious RSF commanders could exploit.

5.4 Competition fueled by the conflict between the RSF and the army

The ongoing conflict between the Sudanese army and RSF has resulted in the proliferation of armed groups and a breakdown in law and order, creating opportunities for ambitious commanders to challenge existing authority.

The end of 2023 saw infighting within RSF-allied Arab groups in South Darfur, mainly the Salamat against the Beni Halba; and the Salamat against the Habbaniya.

These events were not related to the national-level objectives of the RSF, they were rather fueled by the local objectives of these groups to acquire more land and resources.