How the framework agreement has ignited a power struggle between Sudan's military rulers

Introduction

This briefing explores the tensions between the chairman and vice-chairman of Sudan’s military-led ruling Sovereign Council: Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan, who is the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Himedti, the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.

1. Developments: Alongside statements made by RSF and SAF leaders that reflect disagreements between them, the forces are now reportedly involved in a competitive recruitment drive in Darfur. In addition, a framework agreement for a civilian-led transition to elections has stalled amid disputes between RSF and SAF over military restructuring.

2. Context behind the SAF-RSF rivalry: With SAF concerned at the RSF’s growing strength and independence, SAF seeks the integration of the RSF into its ranks. However, Himedti wants this to occur on his terms. Their respective leaders have competed for influence over Sudan’s civil service.

3. The role of Islamists:  A crucial element of the Burhan-Himedti rivalry are Islamists affiliated with the ousted regime of ex-president Omar al-Bashir. Despite the mutual hostility between Himedti and the Islamists, alongside allegations that al-Burhan views the Islamists as a vanguard against Himedti’s growing influence, al-Burhan also has grounds to fear that Islamists seek to depose him. 

4. The framework agreement:  Furthermore, the framework agreement to pave the way for a two-year civilian-led transition has reignited pre-existing tensions between the generals. While al-Burhan’s army seeks to expand the agreement’s signatories to include its allies, Himedti has sided with the agreement’s civilian signatories who want to resist flooding the process with anti-democratic forces. As a result, Himedti is cultivating an image as a pro-democracy reformist, which may concern al-Burhan as they are, as one analyst suspects, potential presidential rivals.

5. Impact of the rivalry:  Nonetheless, analysts also note that the SAF-RSF rivalry presents civil war risks. In addition, the Burhan-Himedti rivalry weakens Sudan’s democratic prospects as it reinforces the country’s transactional militarised politics.

6. Solution:  Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory think-tank, provides a solution for the latter issue in the form of rejecting the “false dilemma” of picking between al-Burhan and Himedti.

1. Key developments

Framework agreement

On December 5 2022, Al-Burhan and Himedti signed a framework agreement with Sudanese civilian political parties belonging to the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC). The agreement aims to pave the way for a two-year civilian-led transition towards elections (Reuters, 5 December).

After the framework agreement flared tensions between Sudan’s military leaders, the UAE sent its state minister for foreign affairs to escalate the verbal attacks (Sudan Tribune, 7 March). Although not directly attacking al-Burhan, it is suggested that recent public statements made by Himedti are indicative of a rift between the pair.

Himedti labels al-Burhan’s coup “a mistake”

Firstly, Himedti labelled al-Burhan’s 25 October 2021 military a “mistake” that has become a gateway for affiliates of the former regime of ex-president Omar al-Bashir to regain their political foothold (Multiple sources, 20 February). Indeed, Himedti was slow to publically back the coup after it occurred, with Sudan Tribune (28 September) alleging that he outright refused to.

Himedti criticised by al-Burhan’s ally

In response to Himedti’s comments, Lt. Gen. Yassir al-Atta, a senior army general who sits on the ruling Sovereign Council reportedly criticised the business and commercial activities of Himedti - who controls gold mines and several companies in several fields. Then, a security sector reform working tackling the integration of the RSF into the army, Al-Atta went on to say said “armies care about the people and not the personal interests and aspirations of their leaders,” in comments alluding to Himedti (Sudan Tribune, 18 March).

Himedti accuses generals of clinging on to power

Himedti went on to “slam” Sudan’s ruling generals, saying they oppose stepping down to allow for a democratic transition under a civilian administration, and that his recent conflict with other military leaders is centered on the issue of handing over power to civilians. Despite playing down tensions between the RSF and the military as an institution, AP (7 March) suggested that Himedti’s comments “were apparently referring to [al-Burhan]”.

The army responds to 700 RSF being troops sent to Khartoum

The next day, it was reported that the RSF transferred 700 new recruits from Darfur to Khartoum for a training programme, in a move that coincided with the growing tensions over the framework agreement between Himedti and the army leadership. Despite an anonymous RSF senior officer telling Sudan Tribune (8 March) that the arrival of RSF troops “has nothing to do with any conflict [as] their arrival was decided months ago”, there were reports that the army responded by putting its own troops on high alert levels.

Darfur recruitment drive

Ayin Network (26 March) then reported that the SAF and RSF activated large-scale military recruitment operations in Darfur, “in what appears an open race to recruit certain tribal groups into their ranks.” SAF’s campaign “exclusively targets Arab nomadic communities”, with Ayin’s civil and military sources saying that the army seeks to weaken the RSF by recruiting youth from its core ethnic base of Arab tribes such as the Riziegat and Al-Ta’aisha.

Framework agreement signing delayed

Talks aimed at reaching a final agreement to launch a new transition towards elections hit a roadblock after disagreements surfaced over the timeline for integrating the RSF into the army. While the army prefers a two-year timeline for integration, international facilitators have suggested five years, while the RSF proposed 10 years (Reuters, 30 March).

Then, the signing of a final political agreement scheduled for 6 April 2023 was delayed for a second time due to RSF-SAF disputes over military restructuring and security sector reform. Reuters (5 April) reported that the interim leadership of the military during the post-agreement transition was an issue, with the RSF proposing that the incoming civilian head-of-state under the deal is included in a joint council of army and RSF generals. However, Sudan Tribune’s military and civilian sources (5 April) confirmed that SAF rejects this proposal “because it would mean maintaining the RSF relatively separate from the army” and believes that its commander-in-chief in chief should head the military council.  

2. The context of the rivalry between SAF and the RSF

 Despite being Sudan’s two most senior military leaders, and publically putting on a united front, there are indications that the tensions between Himedti and al-Burhan have been brewing since the pre-coup transitional period over a range of issues. The first issue this briefing will explore is why the army views the RSF as a threat.

The RSF’s growing strength is a threat to the army

Circles within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are concerned about the RSF’s growing strength making it on par with the national army (Sudan Tribune, 28 September). Alberto Fernandez, a former US diplomat in Sudan, cites SAF-connected sources complaining about the RSF acquiring heavier and more advanced weapons (MEMRI, 7 October).

The RSF’s independent foreign policy

Another sources of frustration for the army is that the RSF effectively conducts foreign policy independently. For example, Sudan Tribune (16 February) reported on the army’s frustration with the RSF’s commercial and mining activities and close cooperation with the Russian Wagner contractors deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR). In addition, following Himedti’s recent “unannounced” visit to Eritrea, political analyst Abdelmonim Abu Idris told Radio Dabanga (March 14): “The RSF has regional and international relations separately from the Sudanese government. The visit is therefore also part of the RSF weaving alliances of its own with countries in the region and international powers.”

Himedti’s resists integrating the RSF into the army

For his part, al-Burhan recently warned that he would not tolerate the RSF operating as an independent force and should instead be merged into the army (Multiple sources, 20 February). Al-Burhan further stated that the integration of the RSF into the army is the main reason for the army’s support for the framework agreement, stressing that it would not accept the agreement if this clause is not implemented (Sudan Tribune, 16 February). According to Magdi al-Gizouli of the Rift Valley Institute: “al-Burhan wants the RSF to be integrated into the army in accordance with the rules and regulations within the army” (AFP, 16 March).

Al-Burhan reportedly faces internal pressure from within the army to integrate the RSF into its rank, according to Monte Carro (19 March), a news website specialising in Sudanese military affairs. The foiled military coup of 21 September 2021 was reportedly motivated by internal army tensions over the RSF’s growing power, with al-Burhan “aware of his diminishing popularity in the army amidst accusations that his weakness and hesitation caused the expansion of the RSF at the army’s expense,” despite using the RSF as a “scarecrow” to prevent army officers overthrowing him.

Yet as recently as May 2021, Himedti advocated for the independence of his troops and his authority over them by expressing vehement opposition to integrating the RSF into the army (Sudan Tribune, 28 September). Nonetheless, Himedti’s tone vis-à-vis the integration of the RSF into the army has changed as of late, now saying that he is committed to integrating the RSF into a reformed national armed forces that is “out of politics and the economy completely” (Multiple sources, 20 February).

In addition, Magdi al-Gizouli suggested that Himedti’s stance on the integration of the RSF into the army differs from that of al-Burhan’s in that Himedti “seems to want restructuring of the top army command to take place first, so that he can be part of it before the integration” (AFP, 16 March). Indeed, Reuters’ (19 March) military sources said that Himedti’s disagreement with the army centers upon his reluctance to set a clear deadline for the RSF’s integration into the army, with clarity lacking over Himedti’s role in an enlarged army. While the army prefers a two-year timeline for integration, international facilitators have suggested five years, while the RSF proposed 10 years (Reuters, 30 March).

Furthermore, with the RSF “becoming like a political party” given its economic interests and domestic and foreign alliances, its commander Himedti allegedly seeks to ensure that integration occurs “according to his vision,” allegedly seeking to reap gains by prolonging the process “which cannot be achieved without his loyalists at the army’s helm” (Monte Carro, 19 March).  

Al-Burhan and Himedti competing for control of the civil service

The conflict between the Sudanese army and the RSF is not a conflict between military institutions - but a struggle over power and political influence, says political analyst Waleed El Nour (Radio Dabanga, 14 March). This struggle has played out in the civil service, where the chairman and vice-chairman of Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council have sought to throw their weight around.

In an analysis of the Burhan-Himedti rivalry, Alberto Fernandez suggested that both were fighting “over control of the civil service, an important source of patronage and an essential ingredient in actually running a government” (MEMRI, 7 October).

During the transitional period between ex-president Omar al-Bashir’s ousting in April 2019 and al-Burhan’s military coup in October 2021, Himedti was reportedly to use his wealth to buy influence and soft power in the civil service. According to Himedti’s advisors, al-Burhan’s concern with Himedti’s growing stock led him to seek to “set [Himedti] up for failure” by tasking him to lead an economic committee tackling an array of longstanding challenges. In addition, political analyst Mohamed Idris suggested that al-Burhan’s reintegration of Bashir-era Islamists into the civil service after the 2021 coup aimed to weaken Himedti’s leverage given Islamist’s animosity towards Himedti, thereby explaining Himedti’s initial refusal to support the coup (Sudan Tribune, 28 September).

Moreover, given the dominant position of Islamists in Sudan army, the mutual hostility between Islamists and Himedti is another contributing factor to Himedti’s rifts with al-Burhan. 

3. The role of the Islamists in the Burhan-Himedti tensions

 Although analysts suggest that the Islamists and al-Burhan have a mutual interest in stripping Himedti of his power and influence, there are also reasons to suspect that Islamists are hostile to al-Burhan too.

Islamists vs. Himedti

According to Alberto Fernandez, the Sudanese army is a “safehaven” for Sudan’s Islamists, who allegedly hate Himedti for “betraying” ex-president Omar al-Bashir and removing him from power in 2019 (MEMRI, 7 October). Nonetheless, the Sudanese army remains a “stronghold” for Islamist militants following the October 2021 coup (Africa Confidential, 19 January). Islamist groups reappeared on the political scene after coup, which reportedly triggered tensions between al-Burhan and Himedti as al-Burhan sought to use Islamists to legitimise the coup while Himedti opposed the move (Sudan Tribune, 3 December).

Indeed, Himedti himself has accused Islamists affiliated to al-Bashir’s regime of driving a wedge between the RSF and the army of (Multiple sources, 20 February), with political analyst Mohammed Abdelaziz alleging that “al-Burhan seeks to exploit supporters of the former regime to overthrow Himedti or tame him in order to monopolise power” (Radio Dabanga, 21 February).

However, it would be overly simplistic to suggest that the Islamists are united behind al-Burhan. Although the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese army must be considerate of the Islamists’ interests given their influence in the army he leads, al-Burhan accused Islamists of plotting a coup against in November 2022 (Sudan Tribune, 6 January).

Why the Islamists are hostile to al-Burhan too

Al-Burhan has considerable reason to suspect that Islamists are seeking to remove him, even if they prefer him over Himedti. While “nationalist” and “Islamist” SAF factions remain loyal to al-Burhan and are united against Himedti and pro-democracy civilians, Alberto Fernandez alleges that some observers believe that “the plan is to have SAF get rid of the civilians (and Himedti) and then an Islamicized SAF would remove Al-Burhan, who is seen as still too ambivalent toward the return of full Islamist rule” (MEMRI, 7 October).

Providing further context on the Islamists’ displeasure with al-Burhan, Africa Confidential (19 January) reported that al-Burhan is at “loggerheads with the Islamists he helped…regain their jobs in the state apparatus after the 2021 [coup]”. However, following the coup and the worsening economic crisis it triggered, al-Burhan has adopted a public anti-Islamist stance with the aim of secure the confidence of anti-Islamist regional powers Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, alongside “[winning] points with western governments who control most of the aid taps.” In addition, Al-Burhan’s post-coup support for the National Congress Party (NCP), the ruling Islamist party until the final days of al-Bashir’s regime, “led to the risk of him being overthrown by party militants in league with other Islamist factions”. With the Sudanese army remaining a “stronghold” for Islamist militants after the coup, Africa Confidential suggest that the Islamists view al-Burhan as “betraying the Islamist project”.

Indeed, a faction of the Islamist-dominated Sudanese army reportedly launched a coup against al-Burhan on 21 September 2021 which was allegedly motivated by internal army tensions over the RSF’s growing power, with al-Burhan confiding in a Gulf mediator in his tensions with Himedti that he fears losing control of the army unless he integrates the RSF into it (Monte Carro, 19 March).

Furthermore, analyst Jihad Mashamoun argues that a motivating factor for al-Burhan in signing the framework agreement was to expand his base of allies due to fears that Bashir-regime affiliated Islamists may launch a coup against him (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 November). Thus, the perception that al-Burhan has abandoned the Islamist project is seemingly reinforced by his signing of the framework agreement with the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC), a coalition of Sudanese civilian political parties and civil society organisations.

Sudan Tribune (3 December) report that People’s Call, an Islamist coalition, demonstrated in Khartoum to voice their opposition to a framework agreement between the military component and civilian forces. The group had recently held a dialogue in favour of the coup leaders, but one of its leaders, a radical Islamist named Mohamed Ali al-Jazouli, threatened to call on the army to side with them and seize power. Furthermore, according to Sudan Tribune’s military sources (6 January), retired army officers affiliated with Islamists tried to push the army to grip to power in opposition to the framework agreement.

Indeed, Himedti and al-Burhan’s converging positions vis-à-vis the framework agreement forms another reason for the reinforcement of their tensions, particularly as al-Burhan’s position is partly inspired by the pressure he faces from Islamists within his army.

4. How has the framework agreement heightened the tensions between al-Burhan and Himedti?

Amid al-Burhan and Himedti’s battle for influence, the latter has been argued to be the political benefactor of the framework agreement. With Himedti aligning with FFC-CC civilian signatories over al-Burhan on the issue of expanding the agreement’s signatories, analysts suggest that Himedti is forging an image as a reformist and champion of democracy. This is considered a concern for al-Burhan amid projections that Himedti may be his presidential rival after elections. 

Disagreement over which political forces can sign the framework agreement

Burhan-Himedti’s disagreements over the framework agreement are centered upon their lack of consensus over its signatories. On one hand, al-Burhan has called for the expansion of signatories for the framework agreement (Sudan Tribune, 5 January). Similarly, his army and sovereign council colleague, Lt. Gen Shamseldin Kabbashi, said that the army will not proceed with the framework agreement unless it is signed by a sufficient number of political parties and groups, attesting that the army “will not protect a constitution signed by 10 men” (Multiple sources, 5 February).

Indeed, a Sudan Tribune (5 January) article identifying reasons why al-Burhan has called for the expansion of signatories to the framework agreement quoted Al-Muez Hadrat, a leading FFC member, who suggested that al-Burhan was tacitly calling for the former ruling Islamist National Congress Party to not be excluded. Then, a Reuters (19 March) article citing four anonymous military sources reported that al-Burhan has sought to delay the signing of the framework agreement in a push to include pro-military armed groups and civilian factions that we supportive the coup – the Forces of Freedom and Change Democratic Block (FFC-DB). 

On the other hand, Himedti has openly disagreed with the army’s leadership over their demand to include more political forces in the framework agreement (Sudan Tribune, 6 March). Al-Burhan and senior army figures do not appreciate Himedti’s support for the framework agreement with its agreed signatories, with Himedti’s “indiscipline” allegedly foiling their flans to add more political forces supporting their vision for the transition (Sudan Tribune, 7 March).

Thus, unlike al-Burhan, Himedti has aligned with the FFC Central Council (FFC-CC) civilians who signed the agreement (Reuters, 19 March). The FFC-CC maintains that only certain parties are entitled to sign the agreement as it refuses to “flood the political process” with parties it says are not interested in democracy, such as the FFC-Democratic Block - which backed the 2021 military coup (Multiple sources, 5 February).  

Himedti’s aligning with the FFC-CC at the army’s expense

Himedti’s backing of the FFC-CC’s stance over the army’s, alongside his recent comments labelling the coup as a mistake and accusing army generals of clinging to power, could be seen as a deliberate attempt to break with the army and ally with some civilian groups (BBC, 20 February). Magdi al-Gizouli suggested that Himedti sought to use the framework agreement "to improve his competitiveness" and bill himself as "an ally to the [FFC-CC]” (AFP, 16 March).  

Sudan Tribune (6 March) noted recent rumours of an undeclared alliance between Himedti and FFC-CC leaders to press Al-Burhan to hand over power in line with the framework agreement. However, FFC-CC representatives have publically denied siding with the RSF at the army’s expense. Khalid Omar Yousif, the FFC-CC’s official spokesman for the framework agreement political process said: “this is a lie propagated by the forces associated with the former regime because they seek to incite the army to clash with the RSF in order to return to power again”.

Nonetheless, four anonymous FFC-CC leaders told Reuters (19 March) said Himedti shares their civilian government goals and opposition to al-Bashir loyalists, including in the military, although one of the FFC-CC leaders said they would return to their opposition roles if Himedti or Al-Burhan reneged on the agreement. 

Indeed, there are signs that the RSF aligning with civilians has caused a rift with SAF that has delayed the signing of final political agreement, scheduled for 6 April 2023, for the civilian-led transition to elections outlined in the framework agreement. With the agreement stipulating the formation of a military council comprising of SAF and RSF generals, the RSF has reportedly suggested that the incoming civilian head-of-state be included in it (Reuters, 5 April). However, SAF rejects this proposal “because it would mean maintaining the RSF relatively separate from the army” and believes that its commander-in-chief in chief should head the military council (Sudan Tribune, 5 April).

Himedti’s reformist image

By publicly adopting a position that sides with pro-democracy civilians at the expense of the military, Himedti’s recent actions are in keeping with a reformist image that analysts suggest he is cultivating, which may also pose a threat to al-Burhan’s power ambitions.  

Indeed, given Himedti’s nomadic camel-herding background and Sudan’s dominance by Khartoum elites, analyst Suliman Baldo suggested that the ties that Himedti has cultivated with the FFC-CC reflect his aims to become "a force to be reckoned with in the national power structure” (Reuters, 19 March).

Himedti “has in recent months sought to reinvent his public image and that of his forces” and “portrayed himself as a defender of the restoration of democratic transition” (AP, 7 March). This has included rehabilitation efforts in the form of arranging “to have himself named person of the year by Sudan’s National Human Rights Commission” (Council for Foreign Relations, 11 January), alongside “shoring up support in Darfur through the reconciliation of Arab and African tribes” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 November).

With al-Burhan and Himedti considered presidential rivals for the elections planned for 2024, Jihad Mashamoun argued that Himedti’s PR efforts are a threat for al-Burhan’s power ambitions. Mashamoun suggested that al-Burhan was “strategically” using dialogue with the FFC-CC to support his presidential ambitions, particularly amid the threat of being deposed by Islamist remnants of al-Bashir’s regime which is stated to have 500,000 supporters who control the economy and state institutions, supplying them with considerable funds and organising power to win or rig elections “as they have done in the past” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 November).

Thus, if al-Burhan is seeking to preserve his power, Himedti’s reported alliance with the FFC-CC alongside improved public image could be a source of concern, especially as the framework agreement is argued to benefit Himedti at al-Burhan’s expense.

How Himedti has “won” the framework agreement over Al-Burhan

According to Magdi al-Gizouli, the framework agreement was “a delaying tactic for al-Burhan” (AFP, 16 March). However, Himedti is the “winner” of the framework agreement, argues Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory think-tank, citing his reputational gains such as: “the launch of Phase II as campaign events, making nods toward human rights and the involvement of women, youth, and internally displaced people, and also expressing rehearsed remorse over the death of protesters in speeches that are a masterclass in empty gestural politics” (Arab Center, 23 January).

As a result, Khair adds, Egypt – al-Burhan’s “long-time patrons” - have promoted a parallel track to the framework agreement with the aim of splitting the FFC-CC, as some of the coalitions members may be pushed to the pro-Burhan camp due to their discomfort backing Himedti (Arab Center, 23 January). Indeed, Khair added that the Egyptian initiative appeared to favour al-Burhan and "catalysed renewed tensions between the generals" (AFP, 16 March). 

5. Analysis on the impact of the power struggle between Al-Burhan and Himedti

Beyond the risk of a civil war should the army and the RSF engage in armed clashes, the rivalry between Sudan’s military leaders is argued to pose a threat to Sudan’s democratic development as it presents a binary choice between armed actors which contributes to Sudan’s transactional militarised politics.

Democratic development

Military expert Amin Ismail told AFP (16 March) that the political disagreements between al-Burhan and Himedti “could push the Sudanese people to rise up and turn on all of them”.

 However, Khair argues that the heightened Burhan-Himedti rift triggered by the framework agreement has negative implications for Sudan’s democratic prospects. Writing for the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (7 March), Khair argued that the deal has created a binary choice between Himedti and al-Burhan, “while the demands of pro-democracy groups have taken a back-seat and are in danger of being relegated to the procedural abyss.” Khair added that the “false dilemma” of the Himedti-Burhan binary contributes to a heavily militarised political scene in Sudan, which is not “encouraging for prospects of a peaceful transition toward democracy”.

Security

Furthermore, Khair highlighted the heightened security risks caused by the Burhan-Himedti binary posed by the framework agreement. Khair suggested that the international community have bought into the Himedti-Burhan dilemma “over the sustainability in Sudan” which culminates in international division over which general to back toward a “stable” outcome for Sudan and the region— which is labelled “a fool’s errand, as neither general can”.

Indeed, the SAF-RSF competition for influence following the framework agreement triggering a large-scale military recruitment operations in Darfur by both of them has culminated in consequences that has further entrenched the militarisation of Sudan. Firstly, according to Ayin Network (26 March) sources, the army has sought to mitigate the growing strength of the RSF by reviving the Border Guards, a paramilitary force consisting of Darfur-based Arab tribal militias originally set up under former president Omar al-Bashir in 2003 but disbanded in 2017. Secondly, the SAF-RSF recruitment drive in Darfur has also disincentivised other armed groups from disarmament, including the Sudan Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi, a Juba peace agreement signatory.

Moreover, the prospect of a clash between the army and RSF “which could develop into an all-out civil war that may last for years and will eventually lead to the division of Sudan” was raised by political analyst Mohammed Abdelaziz raised (Radio Dabanga, 21 February). However, Amin Ismail said that the outright military confrontation that may fear is unlikely (AFP, 16 March).

6. Solution: Reject the false dilemma 

Kholood Khair calls for the international community to “reject the false dilemma” of picking between Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia commander Himedti and the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese armed forces Abdulfattah al-Burhan. Instead, Khair calls for political actors to be supported in resetting their calculations based on the Himedti-Burhan binary, with the generals pushed to commit to long-term reform and before a new transitional period. Khair concludes that a successful political process in Sudan privileges organic and considered interventions that aim to break the transactional militarised politics, which requires civilians to avoid Faustian pacts and strive for greater unity and shared civilian opportunities (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 7 March).

FFC Democratic Bloc Briefing: Is Egypt playing divide-and-rule in Sudan?

 Introduction 

Given military-led Egypt’s apprehensions about a democratic Sudan, it has promoted a parallel track to a framework agreement aiming for a two-year civilian-led transition towards elections. Egypt’s aim, analysts suggest, is to protect its interests by empowering its military allies in Sudan, alongside political groups that were favourable towards the 25 October 2021 military coup. Indeed, Egypt is suspected of playing a key role in the formation of the Democratic Bloc faction of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC-DB), a coalition of pro-coup armed groups and political party factions who reject the framework agreement. 

This analytical briefing explores why the FFC-DB rejects the framework agreement, alongside how Egypt pursues interests in Sudan that analysts deem to be anti-democratic.   

What is the FFC-DB?

The Democratic Bloc faction of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC-DB) is a coalition of armed groups and factions of political parties that were supportive of the 25 October 2021 military coup (Sudan Tribune, 3 November).

The FFC-DB coalition comprises of factions of armed movements that fought al-Bashir’s regime before allying with the military, alongside pro-military factions of Sudan’s two largest traditional sectarian parties. They include:

• Minni Minnawi – governor of Darfur and the leader of his own faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-MM).

• Jibril Ibrahim – the finance minister and leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

• Mubrak Ardol, the head of Sudan’s Mineral Resources Company and a former Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) official.

The former rebels are joined in the FFC-DB by civilians including:

• Ja’afar Mirghani, who leads a pro-coup faction of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).

• Mubarak al-Fadil, the head of a pro-coup faction of the National Umma Party (NUP) (Sudan Tribune, 30 December).

The FFC-DB was formed shortly before the military and Sudanese political parties belonging to the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC) signed a framework agreement that they said would pave the way for two-year civilian-led transition towards elections (Reuters, 5 December). The coalition is united by its rejection of the deal.

Why do the FFC-DB reject the framework agreement?

Leaders of armed movements in the FFC-DB have made strong statements against the framework agreement. Days before the deal’s signing ceremony, Jibril Ibrahim, the deputy head of the FFC-DB coalition, labelled the agreement “exclusionary…because it cannot lead to political stability, smooth transitional period or economic stability in the country” (Sudan Tribune, 2 December). Similarly, Minni Minnawi, FFC-DB political secretary, warned that the agreement would split Sudan up (Sudan Tribune, 5 December).

Then, in warnings that the agreement “will play a major role in… exacerbating the crisis in Sudan,” FFC-DB spokesperson Juma al-Wakeel said the agreement “does not include issues of identity, religion and the state, dialogue with non-signatories to the peace agreement, and wants to revise the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA)” (Sudan Tribune, 5 January).

The FFC-DB reject the framework agreement for two key reasons. Firstly, that it may alter the JPA which promises its armed movement signatories seats in a transitional government. Secondly, the armed component of the FFC-DB insists upon the inclusion of their civilian coalition allies, who the FFC-CC are adamant on excluding.  

Reason 1: Changing the Juba peace agreement

The armed movements in the FFC-DB are opposed to the framework agreement as it overrides previous agreements that guarantee their participation in government.

The armed movements who signed the JPA in September 2020, which promised an end to Sudan’s internal conflicts, oppose the framework agreement in order to “resist any attempt to dilute their hard-won gains”. In particular, they object to language in the framework agreement that suggests that the JPA, which promises its signatories 25% of seats in the civilian administration alongside other important concessions, may be renegotiated (International Crisis Group, 23 January).

JEM and the SLM-MM call for the framework agreement to be re-negotiated and amended based on their stance of preserving the 2019 constitutional declaration – which was amended as part of the JPA to guarantee their participation in the transitional government (Sudan Tribune, 16 December). Furthermore, Minnawi alleges that transitional civilian government, as promised in the framework agreement, would excluded his SLM faction from participating in the next government as it lacks civilians and technocrats (Sudan Tribune, 30 December).

In addition, the armed movements reject the framework agreement due to the political exclusion of their civilian allies in the FFC-DB.

Reason 2: The exclusion of civilian FFC-DB components

In a show of solidarity, FFC-DB seniority have criticised both military and civilian framework agreement signatories for excluding their civilian FFC-DB allies. Firstly, FFC-DB political secretary Minnawi accused the military of only dealing his SLM-MM and Jibril Ibrahim’s JEM movements while excluding other FFC-DB parties (Sudan Tribune, 2 December). Secondly, FFC-DB spokesperson Juma al-Wakeel accused the FFC-CC of “hijacking the scene” and deplored their refusal to sit with all members of the FFC-DB (Sudan Tribune, 5 January).

While the armed movements in the FFC-DB call for the involvement of the FFC-DB’s civilian forces – particularly factions of the DUP and NUP – the FFC-CC reject such requests (Sudan Tribune, 16 December). However, the armed movements in the FFC-DB hold considerable leverage, given that FFC-CC aims to bring them to the table.

Reason 3: The FFC-CC’s leadership of civilian government formation

As the framework agreement signatories come closer to a final agreement, FFC-DB deputy head Jibril Ibrahim warned the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese army Abdulfattah al-Burhan that failure to form a government without them “will not stabilise the country and their consequences are unknown”, calling on al-Burhan to “correct the course in order to avoid a disaster”.

After al-Burhan met with FFC-DB leaders to convince them to join the final political agreement, Ibrahim contested the legitimacy of the FFC-CC to lead the formation of a civilian government. While the FFC-CC, under pressure from the military, accepted including armed and civilian parts of the FFC-DB, the latter “have now made it clear that their goal is to prevent the pro-democracy coalition from leading the transition alone”. FFC-DB official Mubarak Ardol also called on al-Burhan to “not ally with specific political forces” (Sudan Tribune, 28 March).

What is the FFC-CC stance on the FFC-DB’s rejection of the framework agreement?

Despite insisting that the leaders of pro-coup civilian factions of Sudan’s two largest traditional political parties – the DUP and NUP – are not welcome to sign the framework agreement, the FFC-CC are working to bring JEM and the SLM-MM to sign the framework agreement in order to protect the JPA.

According to analyst Osman Mirghani, the rejection of the framework agreement by the SLM-MM and JEM render it “merely a symbolic move” unless “developed further to a more concrete deal”, as “it will be hard to proceed with a comprehensive deal without agreeing with armed groups” (AFP, 6 December). It is worth noting that the JPA is one of the five important issues that are under discussion during phase one of the framework agreement (Radio Dabanga, 4 January).

Indeed, FFC-CC spokesman Ja’far Hassan said that dialogue with SLM-MM leader Minnawi and JEM leader Ibrahim was “continuing because we are aware of the importance of their presence” as armed groups who signed the JPA. Nonetheless, while Minnawi and Ibrahim’s signatures are sought, the FFC-CC insists on excluding the civilian component of the FFC-DB as it refuses to “flood the political process” with parties that are not interested in democracy (Radio Dabanga, 23 December).

FFC-CC official Shihab al-Tayyib said pro-coup FFC-DB figures such as Mubarak Ardol, the Secretary-General of the pro-coup coalition called the National Consensus Forces (NCF), alongside Mubarak al-Fadil, the head of a pro-coup Umma Party faction, are unwelcome to sign the framework agreement (Sudan Tribune, 30 December).

Ja’afar Mirghani, who leads the mainstream Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), is also unwelcome to sign the agreement. After the October 2021 coup, his support for Ardol’s pro-coup NCF created a rift within the DUP (Sudan Tribune, 3 November).

As a result, the DUP, the party of the large Khatmiya Sufi sect and one of Sudan’s most significant blocs, has been embroiled in a struggle between Ja’afar and his brother al-Hassan. Ja’afar aligns with armed groups who oppose the framework agreement while al-Hassan supports the agreement. Egypt subsequently sent Ja’far and al-Hassan’s father – the veteran leader of the DUP, Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani – to Khartoum on a flight laid on by Egyptian president Abdulfattah al-Sisi to end the dispute in favour of Ja’afar and against the deal (Reuters, 22 November).

As the FFC-DB features armed movements that have leverage over the implementation of the Juba peace agreement, “the combined weight of the coalition affords them the ability to obstruct the implementation of the framework agreement especially since their positions align with [Egypt]...which has a considerable impact on the political balances in Sudan” (Fanack, 10 January).

Indeed, Egypt is suspected of playing a key role in forming the FFC-DB, with Sudan Tribune (3 January) revealing that only Egypt had diplomatic representatives during the formal launch of the coalition in November 2022 – a month before the framework agreement was signed. Although the US, UK, UAE and Saudi Arabia drove the path towards the framework agreement, Egypt has pursued an alternative track with political factions close to Sudan's military (Reuters, 31 January) – in particular the FFC-DB.

Egypt’s alternative to the framework agreement

The parallel track to the framework agreement promoted by Egypt has been received well by the FFC-DB, while the FFC-CC refuses to take part.

The FFC-CC declined Egypt’s offer to host talks on the transition in Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 3 January). However, JEM leader Jibril Ibrahim told Sudan Tribune (4 January) that the Egyptian proposal is a valid alternative to the framework agreement, before criticising the latter by arguing that “it contains fundamental flaws and resulted from secret meetings that brought together two parties under international pressure.”

Then, after Egyptian formally launched a dialogue initiative, the FFC-CC rejected the invite by describing it as a platform for the “counter-revolutionary forces” (Multiple sources, 18 January). Nonetheless, a delegation of 70 FFC-DB leaders subsequently went to Cairo to participate in a workshop organised by the Egyptian government on the political situation in Sudan. The agenda of the meeting was not released, but all participants are opposed to the framework agreement (Multiple sources, 1 February).

So, what are Egypt’s interests in Sudan, and how are the FFC-DB being used to pursue them?  

Egypt’s interests in Sudan

Broadly speaking, Egypt has two key interests in its wider preference of hindering Sudanese democratic development. Both of these interests relate to the survival of Egypt’s military regime. Firstly, Egypt fears that a democracy in Sudan on its southern border could spread north. Secondly, Egypt is believed to fear that a civilian-led government in Sudan would not take its side in its dispute with Ethiopia over its share of water from the River Nile.

To meet these aims, the ruling military generals in Egypt support their Sudanese counterparts led by Abdulfattah al-Burhan - the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese armed forces. As a result, Egypt promotes an alternative to the framework agreement in an attempt to split the FFC-CC and push its members into an alliance with al-Burhan. In addition, Egypt seeks to ensure that the post-transition government in Sudan includes the DUP, which has historically advocated for a union with Egypt.

Egypt’s fear that democracy in Sudan could spread to Egypt

Sudanese political forces “blame Egypt for supporting military regimes in Sudan” and allege that Egypt “showed its support for the [25 October 2021] military coup that removed the FFC government from power” (Sudan Tribune, 3 January). A democratic Sudan on its southern border is considered a threat for Egypt’s military leadership. Although Islamists linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s arch foe, deeply permeated Sudan’s military, Egypt reportedly view Islamists as “less of a risk” than a democratic breakthrough on its doorstep (Reuters, 31 January).  

A democratic government in Sudan may not support Egypt’s geopolitical interests

Geopolitical concerns also inform Egypt’s resistance towards democracy in Sudan. Egypt’s support for the 2021 military coup that removed the civilian government led by former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok is attributed to Egypt’s belief that Hamdok “was more favourable to Ethiopia” with regards to Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute where Egypt “sought to protect its shares of water” from the River Nile (Sudan Tribune, 3 January).

Driving a wedge between the FFC-CC

Accusing an unspecified country of working to destabilise efforts to restore civilian rule in Sudan by creating the FFC-DB, FFC-CC spokesman Ja’afar Hassan alleged that the FFC-DB impersonates the name of the FFC to give the illusion that the forces of the Sudanese revolution are divided and weak (Sudan Tribune, 25 January).

With Egypt planning a parallel track to the framework agreement signed by the FFC-CC, Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory think-tank, suggests that Egypt – the “long-time patrons” of the commander-in-chief of Sudan’s armed forces Abdulfattah al-Burhan – plans to split the FFC-CC. With the agreement said to favour Rapid Support Forces militia commander Himedti at al-Burhan’s expense, Khair argues that Egypt’s aim is to push members of the FFC-CC who are uncomfortable backing Himedti into an alliance with al-Burhan (Arab Center, 23 January).

Thus, it is argued that Egypt wants to empower Sudanese political groups that are favourable to its interests. Hence, Egypt - a “staunch supporter of the military coup” - is “not particularly enthused about a new democratic course that would distance its allies in Sudan from power” (Fanack, 10 January).

Empowering pro-Egypt Sudanese political parties 

Alongside the Sudanese armed forces under al-Burhan’s leadership, Egypt also has close ties with the DUP – which since its founding has supported maintaining unity with Egypt following Sudan's independence in 1956 (Reuters, 22 November). As a result, Egypt seeks a political settlement in Sudan in which the divided DUP is united in its pro-Egyptian stance and plays a role in Sudan’s political future.  

As previously mentioned, Egypt sent the veteran leader of the mainstream DUP, Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, to Sudan on a flight laid by President al-Sisi to throw his clout behind a faction led by his son Ja’afar – which opposes the framework agreement – at the expense of his other son al-Hassan, who favours the deal (Reuters, 22 November).

Although the signing of the framework agreement went ahead, Egypt’s promotion of an alternative to the framework agreement which includes the FFC-DB is aimed at ensuring that the divided DUP plays a role in Sudan’s post-transition government. According to Amani al-Taweel, an Egyptian expert on Sudan and Director of the African Program at the Center for Al-Ahram Political and Strategic Studies: “Egypt’s calculations may be based on the need for preserving the DUP unity in anticipation of upcoming elections. Its unity and political representation is an important issue for Egypt which has a deep relationship with this party”. Al-Taweel added that Egyptian officials believe that the DUP and NUP are the two political forces that would have significant political representation after the elections besides small political groups and Islamist forces (Sudan Tribune, 10 January).

Al-Taweel also said that Egypt’s parallel track aims to ensure Ja’afar al-Mirghani’s DUP faction, with Sudan Tribune (18 January) highlighting “rumours in Khartoum” that Egypt only trusts Ja’afar - who served as a presidential assistant to the ousted Omar al-Bashir – at the expense of his brother al-Hassan.

Will the framework agreement in Sudan lead to democracy?

Introduction

1. On 5 December 2022, a framework agreement was signed between the Sudanese military and civilian political parties. The deal aims to end the political crisis triggered by the 25 October 2021 military coup by paving the way for a two-year civilian-led transition towards elections.

2. However, the agreement is rejected across Sudan’s political spectrum from both anti-coup and pro-coup forces.

3. Section three synthesises analysis that has highlighted the positive potential of the framework agreement (3.1), followed by the negatives (3.2).

4. Section four explores the public distrust towards the military and civilian signatories of the framework agreement. The military’s commitment towards democracy has been questioned (4.1). On the other hand, various analysts deem the civilian signatories of the framework agreement inept at leading Sudan’s path towards democratic governance (4.2).

5. Finally, section five summarises proposed solutions for the framework agreement to be implemented effectively and deliver democratic governance. Solutions have been directed towards the civilian signatories of the agreement (5.1), and the international community (5.2). 

1. Developments

The first section gives a brief overview of the framework agreement and what it promises. 

1.1 What is the framework agreement?

Following weeks of US-brokered negotiations that saw the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia hold direct talks with the political parties belonging to the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC), the framework agreement was signed by the aforementioned parties (Bloomberg, 5 December).

1.2 What does the framework agreement entail?

According to the signatories, the deal provides would pave the way for two-year civilian-led transition towards elections, which would start with the appointment of a prime minister chosen by the FFC-CC (Sudan Tribune, 5 December). Aspects of the deal include:

• The military agreeing it would only be represented on a security and defence council headed by a prime minister (Reuters, 5 December).

• The establishment of a single professional army, with the RSF integrated into it and an Interior Minister controlling all security forces.

• The military would only be allowed to conduct commercial business in its industry.

• The commander-in-chief of the army would be the civilian head of state, who also picks the head of the General Intelligence Service (Sudan Tribune, 5 December).

1.3 What are the next steps of the framework agreement?

Phase 1 of the negotiations that aim to implement the framework agreement cover five key policy areas: transitional justice, security sector reform, dismantling the remnants of the ex-president Omar al-Bashir regime, the Juba Peace Agreement and the crisis in eastern Sudan (Radio Dabanga, 4 January).

Mohamed Abdelhakam, a leading member of Sudan’s Federal Association and the FFC-CC, said he believes that the prime minister should be chosen from a pool of technocrats who are not involved in partisan work. He also stressed the necessity of forming “a government of independent voices without partisan quotas, provided that the parties devote themselves to preparing for the elections” (Radio Dabanga, 15 March).

 Khalid Omar Yousif, the spokesperson for the signatories to the framework agreement, said there was an agreement to form a new transitional government on 11 April 2023, with a constitutional declaration to be signed on 6 April 2023 (Multiple sources, 19 March).

However, the deal faces various obstacles, starting with its rejection by political groups that both rejected and supported the 25 October 2021 military coup.

2. Who has rejected the framework agreement?

The framework agreement has been rejected across Sudan’s political spectrum – with both anti-coup and pro-coup groups opposing the deal.

2.1 Resistance committees

Despite some acceptance by resistance committees in Sudan’s marginalised peripheries, the framework agreement has been mostly rejected by Sudanese resistance committees – particularly those in Khartoum state.

In reaction to the signing of the framework agreement, the Resistance Committees - “the largest of the popular gatherings opposed to military rule” (Fanack, 10 January) - announced protests in line with the slogan they adopted in response to the political crisis the followed the 25 October 2021 military coup: “no negotiation, no partnership, no legitimacy” (Radio Dabanga, 5 December). As a result, the deal is yet to gain buy-in from the resistance committees who “formed the core of the protests against ex-president Omar al-Bashir’s regime but have since sparred with the FFC” (International Crisis Group, 23 January).

Two days before the signing ceremony of the framework agreement, the coordination of Khartoum Resistance Committees (3 December) published a statement entitled ‘Let the traitors fall’ which stated that: “Transforming the project of the great Sudanese revolution into a project for a political settlement” that recognizes the coup regime is not only a matter of “high treason” but also breaks from the revolution.

 However, the resistance committees are not a monolith and there have been contrasting perceptions according to geographic location.

Reporting on the mixed reactions by different resistance committees, Radio Dabanga (7 December) quoted resistance committee members in al-Jazira state and Kassala who rejected the framework agreement. However, Ismail Kenek from the resistance committees of the Blue Nile region was quoted to welcome the signing of the framework agreement, saying that “it fulfils the demands for a radical solution gradually and works to solve crises, especially for the Blue Nile Nuba Mountains region.” Similarly, his colleague Osman Ghaboush agreed said: it is “an acceptable solution that presents a roadmap to get out of the current stalemate,” before calling for “credibility in its implementation.”

2.2 Left-wing political parties

The Communist Party of Sudan and the mainstream Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party vehemently reject the framework agreement and have rallied public opposition towards it.

Calling on its members to join the marches organised by the resistance committees against the agreement, the Communists labelled it “a domestic and foreign conspiracy to block the path of the revolution” (Radio Dabanga, 5 December).

Like the coordination of Khartoum resistance committees, the Alliance of Forces for Radical Change (AFRC), a coalition led by the Communist Party, also published a statement two days before the framework agreement was signed which labelled it a “legitimisation of the authority of the 25 October 2021 coup”. The Communist-led AFRC further stated that “the interests of politicians seeking to inherit the former regime are integrated with the ambition of the military to continue their political and economic control, and justice for the martyrs is a ‘minimal’ price for the continuation of this alliance” (3 December).

The mainstream Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party later announced its departure from the FFC coalition, stating that the agreement is “devoted to legitimising the October 25 coup” as both the Communist Party and Resistance Committees suggested (Radio Dabanga, 15 December). Nonetheless, the agreement is also rejected by pro-coup forces.

2.3 Islamists

Islamist groups reappeared on Sudan’s political scene after the 25 October 2021 coup, with the army’s commander-in-chief Abdulfattah al-Burhan seeking to use them to gain civilian backing for his coup. Yet, despite holding a dialogue in favour of the coup leaders shortly before the framework agreement was signed, People’s Call, an Islamist coalition, demonstrated in Khartoum in opposition to the deal. Mohamed Ali al-Jizouli, the leader of a radical Islamist group, warned: “we will resist the leadership of the military component and are ready to close the East and North and transfer the protests to the Army General Command” which Sudan Tribune (3 December) stated meant “they would call on the army to side with them and seize power.”

2.4 FFC-DB

The framework agreement is rejected by a pro-coup faction of the Forces of Freedom and Change entitled the Democratic Bloc (FFC-DB) (Sudan Tribune, 2 December).

The FFC-DB coalition comprises of factions of armed movements that fought al-Bashir’s regime before allying with the military, alongside pro-military factions of Sudan’s two largest traditional sectarian parties (Sudan Tribune, 3 November). They include:

• The Sudan Liberation Movement faction of governor of Darfur Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM)

• The Islamist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by finance minister Jibril Ibrahim.

• Mubrak Ardol, the head of Sudan’s Mineral Resources Company and a former Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) official.

• Ja’afar Mirghani, who leads a pro-coup faction of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).

• Mubarak al-Fadil, the head of a pro-coup faction of the National Umma Party (NUP) (Sudan Tribune, 30 December).

With the armed movements – JEM and the SLM-MM – commanding “widespread support” across Sudan’s peripheries, Fanack (10 January) suggest that “the combined weight of [FFC-DB] affords them the ability to obstruct the implementation of the framework agreement especially since their positions align with [Egypt]...which has a considerable impact on the political balances in Sudan.

The International Crisis Group (23 January) attribute JEM and the SLM-MM’s rejection of the agreement to their signing of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) which promised its signatories 25% of seats in the civilian administration alongside other important concessions. Thus, the rebel movements will “resist any attempt to dilute their hard-won gains” due to their objection to language in the framework agreement which suggests that the JPA may be renegotiated.

For more information on the FFC-DB and their position on the framework agreement, please read our analytical briefing: Is Egypt playing divide-and-rule in Sudan?

3. Analysis

The first analysis section of the framework agreement reports starts by synthesising analysis that has highlighted sources of optimism and positivity around the framework agreement (3.1). However, this will be immediately followed by negatives about the agreement itself (3.2).   

3.1 Positives

3.1.1 Resolving the economic crisis

If successfully implemented and civilian-led government returns, the deal could: restore billions of dollars of Western financial help, speed large-scale investment from Gulf Arab nations including in ports and agriculture, alongside reviving plans for Sudan to receive debt relief under an International Monetary Fund initiative (Bloomberg, 5 December).

3.1.2 Resolving security crisis

Amid protests in Khartoum against the framework agreement, Radio Dabanga (5 December) report on positive perceptions in the peripheries. The Darfuri Civil Society Platform signed the framework agreement, describing it as “a new and excellent opportunity to address and discuss Sudanese problems that have existed for decades, pave the way for future generations, and end the sharp polarisation.” In addition, Awatef Abdelrahman, head of the Sudanese Displaced Women Network, called on “all forces to sign the framework agreement in order to implement the Juba Peace Agreement, which will allow the displaced to return home.”

3.1.3 Optimism about the FFC’s leadership

Marina Ottaway, a Middle East Fellow at the Wilson Center (5 January), identified two sources of “guarded optimism” that a democratic process can emerge from Sudan’s Framework Agreement. Ottaway argues that the FFC is better equipped to lead Sudan’s democratic transition in comparison to other civilian forces that have been historically powerful.

Ottaway noted how Sudan’s previous three experiences with civilian rule (1956-58, 1964-68, 1985-89) saw the government controlled by coalitions in which power was shared by the traditional sectarian parties – the NUP and DUP – that were deemed incapable of cooperating or governing effectively. However, she noted that the traditional parties “are no longer controlled by dynasties, and their importance has faded compared to that of newer organisations”. Ottaway further noted the decline of the Islamic Movement.

However, Ottaway adds, the “Forces of Freedom and Change represent a broader section of the population; they are younger, more mobilized and better led”.

3.1.4 Compromise from the military

The second source of optimism highlighted by Ottaway is that “most of the military leadership seems to realise that they cannot rule alone,” which is conducive towards compromise.

3. 2. Negatives

3. 2.1 Lack of details

The framework agreement has been criticised on the grounds that it does not set out a specific path for the reforms it promises.  Firstly, the outline pact of the framework agreement has set no date for a final agreement or the appointment of the prime minister who is meant to lead a two-year transition towards elections (Reuters, 5 December). Secondly, although the deal envisions Sudan’s military stepping back from politics by forming part of a new ”security and defense council” under the appointed prime minister, “it does not address how to reform the armed forces, saying only they should be unified and controls should be imposed on military-owned companies” (AP, 5 December).

3. 2. 2. Unrealistic time frame

The framework agreement has also been criticised for setting unrealistic deadlines for complex reforms.  Kholood Khair, founding director of Confluence Advisory think-tank, said: “realistically none of these complex processes can be dealt with within a transitional time frame of two years” (AP, 5 December). Similarly, human rights lawyer Najlaa Ahmed identified an “ambitious list of reforms that is unrealistic for a two-year transition,” citing the lack of time frame for a final agreement that is meant to contain detailed provisions on the military, security sector, judiciary and law reform (Rights for Peace, 26 February). Ahmed also raised concerns about the number of issues “deferred” for further discussion, which has also been a common theme of criticism.

3. 2. 3. Defers important issues

With AP (5 December) noting that the deal “appears to leave many thorny issues unresolved,” Reuters (5 December) add that it has left sensitive issues including transitional justice and security sector reform for further talks. As a result, Cameron Hudson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said: “it is massive embarrassment for the international community… which celebrated Sudan’s civilian transition three years ago…[who] believe that any deficiencies in this agreement can be made up for in subsequent rounds of negotiations” (Voice of America, 6 December). Among the crucial issues deferred for further discussion is transitional justice.

3.2.4 Transitional justice

Rights for Peace (26 February) questioned how the framework agreement would build on previous agreements regarding transitional justice, accountability and reparation for those who suffered gross human rights violations such as torture, conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and mass atrocity crimes. This includes the implementation of a law establishing the Transitional Justice Commission that was adopted by former prime minister Abdallah Hamdok’s government in June 2021.The organisation also raised concerns that CRSV is not mentioned at all in the agreement.  

4. Why are the framework agreement signatories distrusted?

 A key hindrance towards the implementation of the framework agreement is public distrust towards both its military and civilian signatories. Rift Valley Institute fellow Magdi al-Gizouli noted that the signatories “have quite limited public trust in them” (Reuters, 15 December), while Kholood Khair said the deal “does not inspire confidence that it will lead to the reforms that people want to see,” and it is “contingent on public trust in the protagonists [which] does not exist” (AFP, 6 December). As a result, part four will focus on why there is a lack of trust in the military and civilians. Whereas analysts predominantly question the democratic commitment of the military, they also criticise the political aptitude of civilian political parties given their exclusionary tendencies and ineffective policymaking. 

4.1 The Sudanese military’s questionable democratic commitment

4.1.1 Can the military be trusted?

With observers questioning whether the military would be willing to give up economic interests and wider powers that it views as its privileged domain (AFP, 5 December), recent military actions and statements have raised doubts about the military’s commitment to the democratic reforms promised in the framework agreement.

Firstly, there is the issue of civilian-led security sector reform – a major demand of Sudan’s pro-democracy movement. Yet, in a speech shortly after the agreement was signed, the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese army, Abdulfattah al-Burhan, told his troops: “do not listen to what politicians say about military reform. Nobody will interfere in the affairs of the army at all” (Sudan Tribune, 14 December).

Secondly, there is the issue of which civilian entities can participate in the political process following the framework agreement. The FFC-CC seeks to exclude “non-revolutionary and pro-coup forces” who they say would “flood the process of democratic transition” (Sudan Tribune, 5 January). This includes parties that it says are not interested in democracy, such as the FFC-DB - which backed the 2021 military coup (Multiple sources, 5 February).

Yet, al-Burhan called for an expansion of signatories to the Framework Agreement, which leading FFC-CC member al-Muez Hadrat alleged was a tacit call for the return of the National Congress Party (NCP) – the Islamist ruling party of al-Bashir’s regime (Sudan Tribune, 5 January). Then, al-Burhan’s army and ruling Sovereign Council colleague, Lt Gen Shamseldin Kabbashi, claimed that the Sudanese army will not protect a [framework agreement] signed by 10 men,” in comments labelled by Siddig Tawir, a civilian member of the pre-coup Sovereign Council, as “an expression of his anti-democratic behaviour” (Multiple sources, 5 February).

The military’s actions before and after the framework agreement have also raised doubts about their commitment to the framework agreement. Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory think-tank, noted that the framework agreement hinges upon the word of military actors “who staged a violent coup in 2021” and have not curbed violence against protestors since the agreement was signed (Arab Center DC, 23 January). 

As such, doubts about the military’s intentions and democratic commitment has informed analysis that its signing of the framework agreement is merely a strategic retreat.

4.1.2 The deal is considered a strategic retreat for the military

Given the internal and external pressures facing the military following a worsening economic crisis triggered by the 2021 coup, various analysts suggest that the framework agreement offers the military a lifeline that can pave the way for further power grabs.

With Kholood Khair suggesting that phase one of the deal "is a very low level commitment on al-Burhan's part... allowing him to survive" politically (AFP, 5 December), Cameron Hudson said he is skeptical that Sudan’s framework agreement “is anything more than a tactical maneuver by the military to buy more time and space” as it “essentially returns Sudan to the position it was in originally in 2019 after the fall of al-Bashir” (Al-Monitor, 5 December).

The military’s withdrawal from power can be attributed to its inability to institutionalise and consolidate its rule following the 2021 military coup, argues Hager Ali, a doctoral researcher at the German Institute for Global Area Studies. As the dissolution of the NCP left al-Burhan “without any prefabricated structures for effective governance”, Ali argued that “Sudan’s economic crisis requires a much faster consolidation of government to avert state collapse,” as the loss of foreign aid in response to the coup triggered worsening crises that aggravated citizen backlash and can turn army factions against al-Burhan. However, Ali identifies “high conflict risks” if “al-Burhan’s institutionally weaker new regime” tries to generate state revenues to fund direct military rule by exploiting important natural resources located in Sudan’s peripheries, as doing so would “fuel the same grievances that mobilised the Sudanese people against al-Bashir” (Political Violence At A Glance, 10 January).

Nonetheless, the framework agreement will likely maintain the military’s upper hand over pro-democracy civilians, notes Hudson (Voice of America, 6 December). With the agreement keeping military leaders in their roles, Rift Valley Institute fellow Magdi al-Gizouli said the door is open for military intervention in civilian affairs and “a door closed to civilian intervention in military affairs” (Reuters, 15 December).

Furthermore, Council for Foreign Relations (11 January) warn that extended “transitional” periods – as promised in the framework agreement - that empower the military and “give them ample opportunities to engineer the kind of instability that they can later argue requires their continued control”.

Alternatively, at the end of the transitional period, the military may consolidate and institutionalise their control via elections, with Hudson questioning whether any future elections in Sudan, if they occur, will be free and fair or “lead to the fundamental transformation of the Sudanese state” adding that “the leopard has not changed its spots and there is nothing in evidence to suggest that it intends to going forward” (Al-Monitor, 5 December).

4.1.3 Elections to consolidate military rule

Although Sudan’s weak electoral infrastructure has the double-edged risk of both empowering the military before elections, and facilitated legitimised autocratic military rule via the ballot box.

With credible elections requiring broadly accepted parameters that ensure that losers respect the legitimacy of elected institutions and winners do not “push victory to extremes [and act with] no limits in power”, Sami Abdelhalim Saeed, the head of the Sudan programme at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, wrote that the lack of scope of elected institutions under Sudan’s 2019 Constitutional Charter are “an invitation to instability”. Saeed argued that  the requirement that elections in Sudan happen at the end of a transition “place a huge burden” on the country’s unelected transitional institutions to develop a permanent constitution. Thus, Saeed raised the prospect of either: a rushed constitution that compromises on quality and checks and balances on electoral winners, or delayed elections that increase the risk of extra-constitutional military intervention (Atlantic Council, 30 January).

Nonetheless, there is also the argument that the military is using the framework agreement as a tool to consolidate is power electorally. When the framework agreement was still under negotiation, analyst Jihad Mashamoun wrote an article for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (15 November) which suggested that, with elections planned for 2024, al-Burhan was serving his presidential ambitions by “strategically” using dialogue with the FFC.

Mashmoun suggested that al-Burhan fears that factions of al-Bashir’s regime may launch a coup against him. Ibrahim Ghandour, Ali Karti and Amin Hassan Omar were identified as al-Burhan’s presidential rivals, with the former regime stated to have 500,000 supporters who control the economy and state institutions, supplying them with considerable funds and organising power to win or rig elections “as they have done in the past”. In addition, Mashamoun highlighted competition al-Burhan faced from within his own coalition: finance minister and JEM leader Jibril Ibrahim was “working to unite the former regime and [Islamist] Popular Congress Party” and Rapid Support Forces commander Himedti was “shoring up support in Darfur through the reconciliation of Arab and African tribes.”

4.2 The weakness of Sudan’s civilians

While the framework agreement offers the military a strategic retreat, it "works out less well for the civilians who will have to do the hard work and sell it to the public,” notes Kholood Khair (AFP, 6 December). This section explores criticisms and challenges confronting the civilian component of the framework agreement. An obstacle to the implementation to the agreement are Sudan’s “weak” civilian political parties, with those who dominate the FFC-CC deemed inept at leading Sudan’s path towards democratic governance.

4.2.1 Weak political parties

Hala Al-Karib, the Regional Director of SIHA (the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa), identified obstacles preventing Sudan’s pro-democracy movement from transforming into an effective vehicle for democratic governance. Al-Karib wrote that the women and youth who were “truly responsible” for toppling Omar al-Bashir’s regime “had to yield to the leadership of weak and isolated political parties”. Al-Karib added that Sudanese political parties’ attempts to lead the political transition after the revolution “were doomed to failure” as they had long lost any connection they had with the people, were solely interested in self-preservation and “failed to engage with and accommodate in their policy plans the new waves of activism led by women, youths and minorities” (Sudan Tribune, 12 January).

4.2.2 The exclusion of influential civic groups

The failure to include, and forge consensus with, influential civic groups in the process leading up to the framework agreement is argued to increase the risk of another military coup, particularly as both the negotiations that preceded and succeeded the framework agreement have been deemed exclusionary.

The International Crisis Group (ICG, 23 January) suggest that the “biggest and most legitimate concerns” regard the process. ICG cited the FFC-CC’s direct negotiation with the military rather than forging consensus with the resistance committees. ICG also alleged the FFC-CC alienated “other important actors” including ex-rebel leaders and tribal groups with constituencies far away from Khartoum, as well as Islamists who lost power when al-Bashir fell.

As a result, ICG (31 January) note – the deal is yet to gain buy-in from the aforementioned groups – particularly the resistance committees who “formed the core of the protests against al-Bashir’s regime but have since sparred with the FFC”. Thus, ICG warn that unless the FFC leaders make genuine efforts to forge a broader coalition with civilian groups that are critical of the framework agreement, their exclusion will affect the credibility of any final agreement and the legitimacy of the civilian government that will take power. Without broader support, Sudan’s next government risks falling again, possibly to another coup, ICG add.

Thus, the framework agreement “re-entrenches Sudan’s cardinal weakness” - that political settlements only create winners and losers and thus do not result in a government for all, but rather, in a minority government of elite interests,” with Kholood Khair drawing attention to “opaque and exclusive methods” under which post-agreement negotiations have commenced (Arab Center DC, 23 January). It is no surprise then that the negotiations that have followed the framework agreement have been deemed “elitist” and Khartoum-centric.

4.2.3 Khartoum-centric

Radio Dabanga (9 January) reported that Darfur’s displaced have labelled “elitist” the series of workshops held by the signatories of Sudan’s framework agreement. Lawyer al-Moez Hazrat said that conferences on transitional justice held in “air-conditioned ivory towers” will not be able to achieve justice. He called for holding one of the planned workshops on transitional justice in a camp for the displaced in Darfur emphasising how holding grassroots conferences with the participation of stakeholders is “especially important [as] we would benefit from the views of native administration leaders in this transitional justice process.”

Similarly, Sheikh Abdelrazeq, a leader of Darfur’s displaced, said the “elitist” workshops will not achieve justice as “they are confined to Khartoum without any coordination with the victims.” He called on the signatories to reach out to people in Darfur.

Therefore, the exclusionary nature of the negotiations that preceded and followed the framework agreement, alongside the pre-existing representation and policymaking weaknesses of Sudan’s political parties, combine to culminate in weak civilian institutions that may struggle to tackle the complex policy challenges that the framework agreement intends to solve.

4.2.4 Can civilians implement the framework agreement?

Amid the pre-existing criticisms of the exclusionary tendencies of Sudan’s political parties, political analyst Bakri al-Jak warned that the agreement may bring about “a lame government” instead of political stability (Radio Dabanga, 4 January). With the agreement aiming to tackle issues that fuelled civilian-military tensions before the October 2021 coup - reform of the security forces, justice for civilians killed during protests, dismantling al-Bashir’s regime and resolving internal conflicts

Khaled al-Tijani, editor of Elaph newspaper, said the aforementioned policy areas “could be the future cause of the agreement's collapse” (Reuters, 15 December). Similarly, Kholood Khair said the signatories will likely face "a real political crisis as they start talking in earnest about security sector reforms, transitional justice (and) financial accountability” (AFP, 5 December).

Political analysts have particularly questioned the capacity of the framework agreement, and its signatories, to resolve Sudan’s internal conflicts. Analyst Osman Mirghani said the agreement is “merely a symbolic move” unless “developed further to a more concrete deal”, adding that “it will be hard to proceed with a comprehensive deal without agreeing with armed groups” amid its rejection by the SLM-MM led by Darfur governor Minni Minnawi and the JEM led by finance minister Jibril Ibrahim (AFP, 6 December). Bakri al-Jak also ruled out the implementation of the security arrangements stipulated in the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement. “This agreement is not enforceable for reasons related to financial capabilities for demobilisation and the lack of an integrated political vision of the security arrangements,” he told Radio Dabanga (4 January).

Therefore, Hafiz Mohammed, the director of Justice Africa Sudan, said the framework agreement “is not optimal” as “the problem with Sudan is not agreements, it is honouring those agreements”. He explained that Sudan has “civilian institutions which are not able to enforce and implement the constitutions and deals,” instead opting to “fold them on the junta” (Radio Dabanga, 5 December).

5. Solutions 

Solutions provided for the implementation of the framework agreement have included policy suggestions for the pro-democracy movement inside Sudan (5.1), alongside western states who aim to support democratic development in Sudan (5.2).

 5.1 Domestic solutions for the FFC-CC

5.1.1 FFC ceasefire with RCs

To win over resistance committees (RC), ICG (23 January) suggest the FFC can find common ground on the RC’s political charter and negotiate a “ceasefire” whereby RCs “stop campaigning against the accord, redirecting their energies toward holding signatories to account for what they have agreed to”.

5.1.2 FFC to make Khartoum-centric deal more inclusive

To make the “Khartoum-centric” deal more inclusive, ICG (23 January) call for engagement with local power brokers such as peripheral armed movement leaders and tribal chiefs. With the credibility of the civilian government hinging on the extent of its acceptability to a wide range of political actors, ICG (31 January) suggests that the FFC is encouraged to expand groups included in its ongoing negotiations with the military, and appeal to their interests by including their agenda items. ICG also warn that excluding Islamists not affiliated with ex-president Omar al-Bashir’s regime will “nurture ready-made and well-connected opposition that retains plenty of support among conservative Sudanese.”

5.1.3 Phase II negotiations focus on state-building

ICG (23 January) suggest that Phase II negotiations focus on core areas of state-building including: economic reforms, establishing an independent electoral commission, credible government administration, overseeing peace processes and pursuing a national constitutional dialogue.

5.1.4 Justice for Sudanese victims of atrocities

To help the Framework Agreement provide justice for victims of atrocities in Sudan, Rights for Peace (26 February), a charity that seeks to prevent genocide using human rights approaches, call for the:

• Transitional Justice Coalition of over 30 Sudanese NGOs to enable the sensitive participation of conflict-related sexual violence survivors in regional workshops to ensure this category of victims is not excluded from the transitional justice discussions;

• Political parties, mediators and other signatories to ensure participation of victims of human rights violations and their families, as well as pro-democracy activists, including women; 

• The Law Reform Commission and Constitutional Court to be established without delay to ensure reform of the justice sector and oversee the appointment of newly qualified judges to improve access to justice.

5.2 International solutions for Sudan’s pro-democracy movement

International support for Sudanese civil society

Hala Al-Karib, the Regional Director of SIHA (the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa), calls for the international community to support Sudanese civil society achieve a truly democratic leadership beyond the Framework Agreement. Al-Karib argued that Sudan’s “weak and isolated” political parties’ attempts to lead the political transition after the revolution “were doomed to failure” as they had long lost any connection they had with the people, were solely interested in self-preservation and “failed to engage with and accommodate in their policy plans the new waves of activism led by women, youths and minorities” who were “truly responsible” for toppling Omar al-Bashir’s regime” (Sudan Tribune, 12 January).

International support for elections

Sami Abdelhalim Saeed of International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance calls for the international community to provide substantial support for elections in Sudan planned for the end of the transitional period. Saeed warns that the requirement in Sudan that elections happen at the end of a transition “places a huge burden” on Sudan’s unelected transitional institutions to develop a permanent constitution, to which the three “non-attractive” solutions are: amending the constitutional documents in contradiction of the Juba peace agreement, rush constitution-building and compromise on quality and inclusivity or delay elections and increase the risk of extra-constitutional military intervention (Atlantic Council, 30 January).

Financial support for civilian government

To prevent another military coup and the potential comeback of the former ruling Islamist National Congress Party, ICG (31 January) call for the EU to financially support the civilian government so that it does not lose popular support should it fail to adequately improve the livelihoods of ordinary citizens and undermine public trust in the political transition. ICG also propose that humanitarian relief focuses on health, food and education to provide stability.