Introduction

Given military-led Egypt’s apprehensions about a democratic Sudan, it has promoted a parallel track to a framework agreement aiming for a two-year civilian-led transition towards elections. Egypt’s aim, analysts suggest, is to protect its interests by empowering its military allies in Sudan, alongside political groups that were favourable towards the 25 October 2021 military coup. Indeed, Egypt is suspected of playing a key role in the formation of the Democratic Bloc faction of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC-DB), a coalition of pro-coup armed groups and political party factions who reject the framework agreement.

This analytical briefing explores why the FFC-DB rejects the framework agreement, alongside how Egypt pursues interests in Sudan that analysts deem to be anti-democratic.

What is the FFC-DB?

The Democratic Bloc faction of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC-DB) is a coalition of armed groups and factions of political parties that were supportive of the 25 October 2021 military coup (Sudan Tribune, 3 November).

The FFC-DB coalition comprises of factions of armed movements that fought al-Bashir’s regime before allying with the military, alongside pro-military factions of Sudan’s two largest traditional sectarian parties. They include:

Minni Minnawi – governor of Darfur and the leader of his own faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-MM).
Jibril Ibrahim – the finance minister and leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).
Mubrak Ardol, the head of Sudan’s Mineral Resources Company and a former Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) official.

The former rebels are joined in the FFC-DB by civilians including:

Ja’afar Mirghani, who leads a pro-coup faction of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).
Mubarak al-Fadil, the head of a pro-coup faction of the National Umma Party (NUP) (Sudan Tribune, 30 December).

The FFC-DB was formed shortly before the military and Sudanese political parties belonging to the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC) signed a framework agreement that they said would pave the way for two-year civilian-led transition towards elections (Reuters, 5 December). The coalition is united by its rejection of the deal.

Why do the FFC-DB reject the framework agreement?

Leaders of armed movements in the FFC-DB have made strong statements against the framework agreement. Days before the deal’s signing ceremony, Jibril Ibrahim, the deputy head of the FFC-DB coalition, labelled the agreement “exclusionary…because it cannot lead to political stability, smooth transitional period or economic stability in the country” (Sudan Tribune, 2 December). Similarly, Minni Minnawi, FFC-DB political secretary, warned that the agreement would split Sudan up (Sudan Tribune, 5 December).

Then, in warnings that the agreement “will play a major role in… exacerbating the crisis in Sudan,” FFC-DB spokesperson Juma al-Wakeel said the agreement “does not include issues of identity, religion and the state, dialogue with non-signatories to the peace agreement, and wants to revise the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA)” (Sudan Tribune, 5 January).

The FFC-DB reject the framework agreement for two key reasons. Firstly, that it may alter the JPA which promises its armed movement signatories seats in a transitional government. Secondly, the armed component of the FFC-DB insists upon the inclusion of their civilian coalition allies, who the FFC-CC are adamant on excluding.

Reason 1: Changing the Juba peace agreement

The armed movements in the FFC-DB are opposed to the framework agreement as it overrides previous agreements that guarantee their participation in government.

The armed movements who signed the JPA in September 2020, which promised an end to Sudan’s internal conflicts, oppose the framework agreement in order to “resist any attempt to dilute their hard-won gains”. In particular, they object to language in the framework agreement that suggests that the JPA, which promises its signatories 25% of seats in the civilian administration alongside other important concessions, may be renegotiated (International Crisis Group, 23 January).

JEM and the SLM-MM call for the framework agreement to be re-negotiated and amended based on their stance of preserving the 2019 constitutional declaration – which was amended as part of the JPA to guarantee their participation in the transitional government (Sudan Tribune, 16 December). Furthermore, Minnawi alleges that transitional civilian government, as promised in the framework agreement, would excluded his SLM faction from participating in the next government as it lacks civilians and technocrats (Sudan Tribune, 30 December).

In addition, the armed movements reject the framework agreement due to the political exclusion of their civilian allies in the FFC-DB.

Reason 2: The exclusion of civilian FFC-DB components

In a show of solidarity, FFC-DB seniority have criticised both military and civilian framework agreement signatories for excluding their civilian FFC-DB allies. Firstly, FFC-DB political secretary Minnawi accused the military of only dealing his SLM-MM and Jibril Ibrahim’s JEM movements while excluding other FFC-DB parties (Sudan Tribune, 2 December). Secondly, FFC-DB spokesperson Juma al-Wakeel accused the FFC-CC of “hijacking the scene” and deplored their refusal to sit with all members of the FFC-DB (Sudan Tribune, 5 January).

While the armed movements in the FFC-DB call for the involvement of the FFC-DB’s civilian forces – particularly factions of the DUP and NUP – the FFC-CC reject such requests (Sudan Tribune, 16 December). However, the armed movements in the FFC-DB hold considerable leverage, given that FFC-CC aims to bring them to the table.

Reason 3: The FFC-CC’s leadership of civilian government formation

As the framework agreement signatories come closer to a final agreement, FFC-DB deputy head Jibril Ibrahim warned the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese army Abdulfattah al-Burhan that failure to form a government without them “will not stabilise the country and their consequences are unknown”, calling on al-Burhan to “correct the course in order to avoid a disaster”.

After al-Burhan met with FFC-DB leaders to convince them to join the final political agreement, Ibrahim contested the legitimacy of the FFC-CC to lead the formation of a civilian government. While the FFC-CC, under pressure from the military, accepted including armed and civilian parts of the FFC-DB, the latter “have now made it clear that their goal is to prevent the pro-democracy coalition from leading the transition alone”. FFC-DB official Mubarak Ardol also called on al-Burhan to “not ally with specific political forces” (Sudan Tribune, 28 March).

What is the FFC-CC stance on the FFC-DB’s rejection of the framework agreement?

Despite insisting that the leaders of pro-coup civilian factions of Sudan’s two largest traditional political parties – the DUP and NUP – are not welcome to sign the framework agreement, the FFC-CC are working to bring JEM and the SLM-MM to sign the framework agreement in order to protect the JPA.

According to analyst Osman Mirghani, the rejection of the framework agreement by the SLM-MM and JEM render it “merely a symbolic move” unless “developed further to a more concrete deal”, as “it will be hard to proceed with a comprehensive deal without agreeing with armed groups” (AFP, 6 December). It is worth noting that the JPA is one of the five important issues that are under discussion during phase one of the framework agreement (Radio Dabanga, 4 January).

Indeed, FFC-CC spokesman Ja’far Hassan said that dialogue with SLM-MM leader Minnawi and JEM leader Ibrahim was “continuing because we are aware of the importance of their presence” as armed groups who signed the JPA. Nonetheless, while Minnawi and Ibrahim’s signatures are sought, the FFC-CC insists on excluding the civilian component of the FFC-DB as it refuses to “flood the political process” with parties that are not interested in democracy (Radio Dabanga, 23 December).

FFC-CC official Shihab al-Tayyib said pro-coup FFC-DB figures such as Mubarak Ardol, the Secretary-General of the pro-coup coalition called the National Consensus Forces (NCF), alongside Mubarak al-Fadil, the head of a pro-coup Umma Party faction, are unwelcome to sign the framework agreement (Sudan Tribune, 30 December).

Ja’afar Mirghani, who leads the mainstream Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), is also unwelcome to sign the agreement. After the October 2021 coup, his support for Ardol’s pro-coup NCF created a rift within the DUP (Sudan Tribune, 3 November).

As a result, the DUP, the party of the large Khatmiya Sufi sect and one of Sudan’s most significant blocs, has been embroiled in a struggle between Ja’afar and his brother al-Hassan. Ja’afar aligns with armed groups who oppose the framework agreement while al-Hassan supports the agreement. Egypt subsequently sent Ja’far and al-Hassan’s father – the veteran leader of the DUP, Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani – to Khartoum on a flight laid on by Egyptian president Abdulfattah al-Sisi to end the dispute in favour of Ja’afar and against the deal (Reuters, 22 November).

As the FFC-DB features armed movements that have leverage over the implementation of the Juba peace agreement, “the combined weight of the coalition affords them the ability to obstruct the implementation of the framework agreement especially since their positions align with [Egypt]...which has a considerable impact on the political balances in Sudan” (Fanack, 10 January).

Indeed, Egypt is suspected of playing a key role in forming the FFC-DB, with Sudan Tribune (3 January) revealing that only Egypt had diplomatic representatives during the formal launch of the coalition in November 2022 – a month before the framework agreement was signed. Although the US, UK, UAE and Saudi Arabia drove the path towards the framework agreement, Egypt has pursued an alternative track with political factions close to Sudan's military (Reuters, 31 January) – in particular the FFC-DB.

Egypt’s alternative to the framework agreement

The parallel track to the framework agreement promoted by Egypt has been received well by the FFC-DB, while the FFC-CC refuses to take part.

The FFC-CC declined Egypt’s offer to host talks on the transition in Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 3 January). However, JEM leader Jibril Ibrahim told Sudan Tribune (4 January) that the Egyptian proposal is a valid alternative to the framework agreement, before criticising the latter by arguing that “it contains fundamental flaws and resulted from secret meetings that brought together two parties under international pressure.”

Then, after Egyptian formally launched a dialogue initiative, the FFC-CC rejected the invite by describing it as a platform for the “counter-revolutionary forces” (Multiple sources, 18 January). Nonetheless, a delegation of 70 FFC-DB leaders subsequently went to Cairo to participate in a workshop organised by the Egyptian government on the political situation in Sudan. The agenda of the meeting was not released, but all participants are opposed to the framework agreement (Multiple sources, 1 February).

So, what are Egypt’s interests in Sudan, and how are the FFC-DB being used to pursue them?

Egypt’s interests in Sudan

Broadly speaking, Egypt has two key interests in its wider preference of hindering Sudanese democratic development. Both of these interests relate to the survival of Egypt’s military regime. Firstly, Egypt fears that a democracy in Sudan on its southern border could spread north. Secondly, Egypt is believed to fear that a civilian-led government in Sudan would not take its side in its dispute with Ethiopia over its share of water from the River Nile.

To meet these aims, the ruling military generals in Egypt support their Sudanese counterparts led by Abdulfattah al-Burhan - the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese armed forces. As a result, Egypt promotes an alternative to the framework agreement in an attempt to split the FFC-CC and push its members into an alliance with al-Burhan. In addition, Egypt seeks to ensure that the post-transition government in Sudan includes the DUP, which has historically advocated for a union with Egypt.

Egypt’s fear that democracy in Sudan could spread to Egypt

Sudanese political forces “blame Egypt for supporting military regimes in Sudan” and allege that Egypt “showed its support for the [25 October 2021] military coup that removed the FFC government from power” (Sudan Tribune, 3 January). A democratic Sudan on its southern border is considered a threat for Egypt’s military leadership. Although Islamists linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s arch foe, deeply permeated Sudan’s military, Egypt reportedly view Islamists as “less of a risk” than a democratic breakthrough on its doorstep (Reuters, 31 January).

A democratic government in Sudan may not support Egypt’s geopolitical interests

Geopolitical concerns also inform Egypt’s resistance towards democracy in Sudan. Egypt’s support for the 2021 military coup that removed the civilian government led by former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok is attributed to Egypt’s belief that Hamdok “was more favourable to Ethiopia” with regards to Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute where Egypt “sought to protect its shares of water” from the River Nile (Sudan Tribune, 3 January).

Driving a wedge between the FFC-CC

Accusing an unspecified country of working to destabilise efforts to restore civilian rule in Sudan by creating the FFC-DB, FFC-CC spokesman Ja’afar Hassan alleged that the FFC-DB impersonates the name of the FFC to give the illusion that the forces of the Sudanese revolution are divided and weak (Sudan Tribune, 25 January).

With Egypt planning a parallel track to the framework agreement signed by the FFC-CC, Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory think-tank, suggests that Egypt – the “long-time patrons” of the commander-in-chief of Sudan’s armed forces Abdulfattah al-Burhan – plans to split the FFC-CC. With the agreement said to favour Rapid Support Forces militia commander Himedti at al-Burhan’s expense, Khair argues that Egypt’s aim is to push members of the FFC-CC who are uncomfortable backing Himedti into an alliance with al-Burhan (Arab Center, 23 January).

Thus, it is argued that Egypt wants to empower Sudanese political groups that are favourable to its interests. Hence, Egypt - a “staunch supporter of the military coup” - is “not particularly enthused about a new democratic course that would distance its allies in Sudan from power” (Fanack, 10 January).

Empowering pro-Egypt Sudanese political parties

Alongside the Sudanese armed forces under al-Burhan’s leadership, Egypt also has close ties with the DUP – which since its founding has supported maintaining unity with Egypt following Sudan's independence in 1956 (Reuters, 22 November). As a result, Egypt seeks a political settlement in Sudan in which the divided DUP is united in its pro-Egyptian stance and plays a role in Sudan’s political future.

As previously mentioned, Egypt sent the veteran leader of the mainstream DUP, Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, to Sudan on a flight laid by President al-Sisi to throw his clout behind a faction led by his son Ja’afar – which opposes the framework agreement – at the expense of his other son al-Hassan, who favours the deal (Reuters, 22 November).

Although the signing of the framework agreement went ahead, Egypt’s promotion of an alternative to the framework agreement which includes the FFC-DB is aimed at ensuring that the divided DUP plays a role in Sudan’s post-transition government. According to Amani al-Taweel, an Egyptian expert on Sudan and Director of the African Program at the Center for Al-Ahram Political and Strategic Studies: “Egypt’s calculations may be based on the need for preserving the DUP unity in anticipation of upcoming elections. Its unity and political representation is an important issue for Egypt which has a deep relationship with this party”. Al-Taweel added that Egyptian officials believe that the DUP and NUP are the two political forces that would have significant political representation after the elections besides small political groups and Islamist forces (Sudan Tribune, 10 January).

Al-Taweel also said that Egypt’s parallel track aims to ensure Ja’afar al-Mirghani’s DUP faction, with Sudan Tribune (18 January) highlighting “rumours in Khartoum” that Egypt only trusts Ja’afar - who served as a presidential assistant to the ousted Omar al-Bashir – at the expense of his brother al-Hassan.