Introduction

This briefing explores the tensions between the chairman and vice-chairman of Sudan’s military-led ruling Sovereign Council: Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan, who is the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Himedti, the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.

1. Developments: Alongside statements made by RSF and SAF leaders that reflect disagreements between them, the forces are now reportedly involved in a competitive recruitment drive in Darfur. In addition, a framework agreement for a civilian-led transition to elections has stalled amid disputes between RSF and SAF over military restructuring.

2. Context behind the SAF-RSF rivalry: With SAF concerned at the RSF’s growing strength and independence, SAF seeks the integration of the RSF into its ranks. However, Himedti wants this to occur on his terms. Their respective leaders have competed for influence over Sudan’s civil service.

3. The role of Islamists: A crucial element of the Burhan-Himedti rivalry are Islamists affiliated with the ousted regime of ex-president Omar al-Bashir. Despite the mutual hostility between Himedti and the Islamists, alongside allegations that al-Burhan views the Islamists as a vanguard against Himedti’s growing influence, al-Burhan also has grounds to fear that Islamists seek to depose him.

4. The framework agreement: Furthermore, the framework agreement to pave the way for a two-year civilian-led transition has reignited pre-existing tensions between the generals. While al-Burhan’s army seeks to expand the agreement’s signatories to include its allies, Himedti has sided with the agreement’s civilian signatories who want to resist flooding the process with anti-democratic forces. As a result, Himedti is cultivating an image as a pro-democracy reformist, which may concern al-Burhan as they are, as one analyst suspects, potential presidential rivals.

5. Impact of the rivalry: Nonetheless, analysts also note that the SAF-RSF rivalry presents civil war risks. In addition, the Burhan-Himedti rivalry weakens Sudan’s democratic prospects as it reinforces the country’s transactional militarised politics.

6. Solution: Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory think-tank, provides a solution for the latter issue in the form of rejecting the “false dilemma” of picking between al-Burhan and Himedti.

1. Key developments

Framework agreement

On December 5 2022, Al-Burhan and Himedti signed a framework agreement with Sudanese civilian political parties belonging to the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC). The agreement aims to pave the way for a two-year civilian-led transition towards elections (Reuters, 5 December).

After the framework agreement flared tensions between Sudan’s military leaders, the UAE sent its state minister for foreign affairs to escalate the verbal attacks (Sudan Tribune, 7 March). Although not directly attacking al-Burhan, it is suggested that recent public statements made by Himedti are indicative of a rift between the pair.

Himedti labels al-Burhan’s coup “a mistake”

Firstly, Himedti labelled al-Burhan’s 25 October 2021 military a “mistake” that has become a gateway for affiliates of the former regime of ex-president Omar al-Bashir to regain their political foothold (Multiple sources, 20 February). Indeed, Himedti was slow to publically back the coup after it occurred, with Sudan Tribune (28 September) alleging that he outright refused to.

Himedti criticised by al-Burhan’s ally

In response to Himedti’s comments, Lt. Gen. Yassir al-Atta, a senior army general who sits on the ruling Sovereign Council reportedly criticised the business and commercial activities of Himedti - who controls gold mines and several companies in several fields. Then, a security sector reform working tackling the integration of the RSF into the army, Al-Atta went on to say said “armies care about the people and not the personal interests and aspirations of their leaders,” in comments alluding to Himedti (Sudan Tribune, 18 March).

Himedti accuses generals of clinging on to power

Himedti went on to “slam” Sudan’s ruling generals, saying they oppose stepping down to allow for a democratic transition under a civilian administration, and that his recent conflict with other military leaders is centered on the issue of handing over power to civilians. Despite playing down tensions between the RSF and the military as an institution, AP (7 March) suggested that Himedti’s comments “were apparently referring to [al-Burhan]”.

The army responds to 700 RSF being troops sent to Khartoum

The next day, it was reported that the RSF transferred 700 new recruits from Darfur to Khartoum for a training programme, in a move that coincided with the growing tensions over the framework agreement between Himedti and the army leadership. Despite an anonymous RSF senior officer telling Sudan Tribune (8 March) that the arrival of RSF troops “has nothing to do with any conflict [as] their arrival was decided months ago”, there were reports that the army responded by putting its own troops on high alert levels.

Darfur recruitment drive

Ayin Network (26 March) then reported that the SAF and RSF activated large-scale military recruitment operations in Darfur, “in what appears an open race to recruit certain tribal groups into their ranks.” SAF’s campaign “exclusively targets Arab nomadic communities”, with Ayin’s civil and military sources saying that the army seeks to weaken the RSF by recruiting youth from its core ethnic base of Arab tribes such as the Riziegat and Al-Ta’aisha.

Framework agreement signing delayed

Talks aimed at reaching a final agreement to launch a new transition towards elections hit a roadblock after disagreements surfaced over the timeline for integrating the RSF into the army. While the army prefers a two-year timeline for integration, international facilitators have suggested five years, while the RSF proposed 10 years (Reuters, 30 March).

Then, the signing of a final political agreement scheduled for 6 April 2023 was delayed for a second time due to RSF-SAF disputes over military restructuring and security sector reform. Reuters (5 April) reported that the interim leadership of the military during the post-agreement transition was an issue, with the RSF proposing that the incoming civilian head-of-state under the deal is included in a joint council of army and RSF generals. However, Sudan Tribune’s military and civilian sources (5 April) confirmed that SAF rejects this proposal “because it would mean maintaining the RSF relatively separate from the army” and believes that its commander-in-chief in chief should head the military council.

2. The context of the rivalry between SAF and the RSF

Despite being Sudan’s two most senior military leaders, and publically putting on a united front, there are indications that the tensions between Himedti and al-Burhan have been brewing since the pre-coup transitional period over a range of issues. The first issue this briefing will explore is why the army views the RSF as a threat.

The RSF’s growing strength is a threat to the army

Circles within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are concerned about the RSF’s growing strength making it on par with the national army (Sudan Tribune, 28 September). Alberto Fernandez, a former US diplomat in Sudan, cites SAF-connected sources complaining about the RSF acquiring heavier and more advanced weapons (MEMRI, 7 October).

The RSF’s independent foreign policy

Another sources of frustration for the army is that the RSF effectively conducts foreign policy independently. For example, Sudan Tribune (16 February) reported on the army’s frustration with the RSF’s commercial and mining activities and close cooperation with the Russian Wagner contractors deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR). In addition, following Himedti’s recent “unannounced” visit to Eritrea, political analyst Abdelmonim Abu Idris told Radio Dabanga (March 14): “The RSF has regional and international relations separately from the Sudanese government. The visit is therefore also part of the RSF weaving alliances of its own with countries in the region and international powers.”

Himedti’s resists integrating the RSF into the army

For his part, al-Burhan recently warned that he would not tolerate the RSF operating as an independent force and should instead be merged into the army (Multiple sources, 20 February). Al-Burhan further stated that the integration of the RSF into the army is the main reason for the army’s support for the framework agreement, stressing that it would not accept the agreement if this clause is not implemented (Sudan Tribune, 16 February). According to Magdi al-Gizouli of the Rift Valley Institute: “al-Burhan wants the RSF to be integrated into the army in accordance with the rules and regulations within the army” (AFP, 16 March).

Al-Burhan reportedly faces internal pressure from within the army to integrate the RSF into its rank, according to Monte Carro (19 March), a news website specialising in Sudanese military affairs. The foiled military coup of 21 September 2021 was reportedly motivated by internal army tensions over the RSF’s growing power, with al-Burhan “aware of his diminishing popularity in the army amidst accusations that his weakness and hesitation caused the expansion of the RSF at the army’s expense,” despite using the RSF as a “scarecrow” to prevent army officers overthrowing him.

Yet as recently as May 2021, Himedti advocated for the independence of his troops and his authority over them by expressing vehement opposition to integrating the RSF into the army (Sudan Tribune, 28 September). Nonetheless, Himedti’s tone vis-à-vis the integration of the RSF into the army has changed as of late, now saying that he is committed to integrating the RSF into a reformed national armed forces that is “out of politics and the economy completely” (Multiple sources, 20 February).

In addition, Magdi al-Gizouli suggested that Himedti’s stance on the integration of the RSF into the army differs from that of al-Burhan’s in that Himedti “seems to want restructuring of the top army command to take place first, so that he can be part of it before the integration” (AFP, 16 March). Indeed, Reuters’ (19 March) military sources said that Himedti’s disagreement with the army centers upon his reluctance to set a clear deadline for the RSF’s integration into the army, with clarity lacking over Himedti’s role in an enlarged army. While the army prefers a two-year timeline for integration, international facilitators have suggested five years, while the RSF proposed 10 years (Reuters, 30 March).

Furthermore, with the RSF “becoming like a political party” given its economic interests and domestic and foreign alliances, its commander Himedti allegedly seeks to ensure that integration occurs “according to his vision,” allegedly seeking to reap gains by prolonging the process “which cannot be achieved without his loyalists at the army’s helm” (Monte Carro, 19 March).

Al-Burhan and Himedti competing for control of the civil service

The conflict between the Sudanese army and the RSF is not a conflict between military institutions - but a struggle over power and political influence, says political analyst Waleed El Nour (Radio Dabanga, 14 March). This struggle has played out in the civil service, where the chairman and vice-chairman of Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council have sought to throw their weight around.

In an analysis of the Burhan-Himedti rivalry, Alberto Fernandez suggested that both were fighting “over control of the civil service, an important source of patronage and an essential ingredient in actually running a government” (MEMRI, 7 October).

During the transitional period between ex-president Omar al-Bashir’s ousting in April 2019 and al-Burhan’s military coup in October 2021, Himedti was reportedly to use his wealth to buy influence and soft power in the civil service. According to Himedti’s advisors, al-Burhan’s concern with Himedti’s growing stock led him to seek to “set [Himedti] up for failure” by tasking him to lead an economic committee tackling an array of longstanding challenges. In addition, political analyst Mohamed Idris suggested that al-Burhan’s reintegration of Bashir-era Islamists into the civil service after the 2021 coup aimed to weaken Himedti’s leverage given Islamist’s animosity towards Himedti, thereby explaining Himedti’s initial refusal to support the coup (Sudan Tribune, 28 September).

Moreover, given the dominant position of Islamists in Sudan army, the mutual hostility between Islamists and Himedti is another contributing factor to Himedti’s rifts with al-Burhan.

3. The role of the Islamists in the Burhan-Himedti tensions

Although analysts suggest that the Islamists and al-Burhan have a mutual interest in stripping Himedti of his power and influence, there are also reasons to suspect that Islamists are hostile to al-Burhan too.

Islamists vs. Himedti

According to Alberto Fernandez, the Sudanese army is a “safehaven” for Sudan’s Islamists, who allegedly hate Himedti for “betraying” ex-president Omar al-Bashir and removing him from power in 2019 (MEMRI, 7 October). Nonetheless, the Sudanese army remains a “stronghold” for Islamist militants following the October 2021 coup (Africa Confidential, 19 January). Islamist groups reappeared on the political scene after coup, which reportedly triggered tensions between al-Burhan and Himedti as al-Burhan sought to use Islamists to legitimise the coup while Himedti opposed the move (Sudan Tribune, 3 December).

Indeed, Himedti himself has accused Islamists affiliated to al-Bashir’s regime of driving a wedge between the RSF and the army of (Multiple sources, 20 February), with political analyst Mohammed Abdelaziz alleging that “al-Burhan seeks to exploit supporters of the former regime to overthrow Himedti or tame him in order to monopolise power” (Radio Dabanga, 21 February).

However, it would be overly simplistic to suggest that the Islamists are united behind al-Burhan. Although the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese army must be considerate of the Islamists’ interests given their influence in the army he leads, al-Burhan accused Islamists of plotting a coup against in November 2022 (Sudan Tribune, 6 January).

Why the Islamists are hostile to al-Burhan too

Al-Burhan has considerable reason to suspect that Islamists are seeking to remove him, even if they prefer him over Himedti. While “nationalist” and “Islamist” SAF factions remain loyal to al-Burhan and are united against Himedti and pro-democracy civilians, Alberto Fernandez alleges that some observers believe that “the plan is to have SAF get rid of the civilians (and Himedti) and then an Islamicized SAF would remove Al-Burhan, who is seen as still too ambivalent toward the return of full Islamist rule” (MEMRI, 7 October).

Providing further context on the Islamists’ displeasure with al-Burhan, Africa Confidential (19 January) reported that al-Burhan is at “loggerheads with the Islamists he helped…regain their jobs in the state apparatus after the 2021 [coup]”. However, following the coup and the worsening economic crisis it triggered, al-Burhan has adopted a public anti-Islamist stance with the aim of secure the confidence of anti-Islamist regional powers Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, alongside “[winning] points with western governments who control most of the aid taps.” In addition, Al-Burhan’s post-coup support for the National Congress Party (NCP), the ruling Islamist party until the final days of al-Bashir’s regime, “led to the risk of him being overthrown by party militants in league with other Islamist factions”. With the Sudanese army remaining a “stronghold” for Islamist militants after the coup, Africa Confidential suggest that the Islamists view al-Burhan as “betraying the Islamist project”.

Indeed, a faction of the Islamist-dominated Sudanese army reportedly launched a coup against al-Burhan on 21 September 2021 which was allegedly motivated by internal army tensions over the RSF’s growing power, with al-Burhan confiding in a Gulf mediator in his tensions with Himedti that he fears losing control of the army unless he integrates the RSF into it (Monte Carro, 19 March).

Furthermore, analyst Jihad Mashamoun argues that a motivating factor for al-Burhan in signing the framework agreement was to expand his base of allies due to fears that Bashir-regime affiliated Islamists may launch a coup against him (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 November). Thus, the perception that al-Burhan has abandoned the Islamist project is seemingly reinforced by his signing of the framework agreement with the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC), a coalition of Sudanese civilian political parties and civil society organisations.

Sudan Tribune (3 December) report that People’s Call, an Islamist coalition, demonstrated in Khartoum to voice their opposition to a framework agreement between the military component and civilian forces. The group had recently held a dialogue in favour of the coup leaders, but one of its leaders, a radical Islamist named Mohamed Ali al-Jazouli, threatened to call on the army to side with them and seize power. Furthermore, according to Sudan Tribune’s military sources (6 January), retired army officers affiliated with Islamists tried to push the army to grip to power in opposition to the framework agreement.

Indeed, Himedti and al-Burhan’s converging positions vis-à-vis the framework agreement forms another reason for the reinforcement of their tensions, particularly as al-Burhan’s position is partly inspired by the pressure he faces from Islamists within his army.

4. How has the framework agreement heightened the tensions between al-Burhan and Himedti?

Amid al-Burhan and Himedti’s battle for influence, the latter has been argued to be the political benefactor of the framework agreement. With Himedti aligning with FFC-CC civilian signatories over al-Burhan on the issue of expanding the agreement’s signatories, analysts suggest that Himedti is forging an image as a reformist and champion of democracy. This is considered a concern for al-Burhan amid projections that Himedti may be his presidential rival after elections.

Disagreement over which political forces can sign the framework agreement

Burhan-Himedti’s disagreements over the framework agreement are centered upon their lack of consensus over its signatories. On one hand, al-Burhan has called for the expansion of signatories for the framework agreement (Sudan Tribune, 5 January). Similarly, his army and sovereign council colleague, Lt. Gen Shamseldin Kabbashi, said that the army will not proceed with the framework agreement unless it is signed by a sufficient number of political parties and groups, attesting that the army “will not protect a constitution signed by 10 men” (Multiple sources, 5 February).

Indeed, a Sudan Tribune (5 January) article identifying reasons why al-Burhan has called for the expansion of signatories to the framework agreement quoted Al-Muez Hadrat, a leading FFC member, who suggested that al-Burhan was tacitly calling for the former ruling Islamist National Congress Party to not be excluded. Then, a Reuters (19 March) article citing four anonymous military sources reported that al-Burhan has sought to delay the signing of the framework agreement in a push to include pro-military armed groups and civilian factions that we supportive the coup – the Forces of Freedom and Change Democratic Block (FFC-DB).

On the other hand, Himedti has openly disagreed with the army’s leadership over their demand to include more political forces in the framework agreement (Sudan Tribune, 6 March). Al-Burhan and senior army figures do not appreciate Himedti’s support for the framework agreement with its agreed signatories, with Himedti’s “indiscipline” allegedly foiling their flans to add more political forces supporting their vision for the transition (Sudan Tribune, 7 March).

Thus, unlike al-Burhan, Himedti has aligned with the FFC Central Council (FFC-CC) civilians who signed the agreement (Reuters, 19 March). The FFC-CC maintains that only certain parties are entitled to sign the agreement as it refuses to “flood the political process” with parties it says are not interested in democracy, such as the FFC-Democratic Block - which backed the 2021 military coup (Multiple sources, 5 February).

Himedti’s aligning with the FFC-CC at the army’s expense

Himedti’s backing of the FFC-CC’s stance over the army’s, alongside his recent comments labelling the coup as a mistake and accusing army generals of clinging to power, could be seen as a deliberate attempt to break with the army and ally with some civilian groups (BBC, 20 February). Magdi al-Gizouli suggested that Himedti sought to use the framework agreement "to improve his competitiveness" and bill himself as "an ally to the [FFC-CC]” (AFP, 16 March).

Sudan Tribune (6 March) noted recent rumours of an undeclared alliance between Himedti and FFC-CC leaders to press Al-Burhan to hand over power in line with the framework agreement. However, FFC-CC representatives have publically denied siding with the RSF at the army’s expense. Khalid Omar Yousif, the FFC-CC’s official spokesman for the framework agreement political process said: “this is a lie propagated by the forces associated with the former regime because they seek to incite the army to clash with the RSF in order to return to power again”.

Nonetheless, four anonymous FFC-CC leaders told Reuters (19 March) said Himedti shares their civilian government goals and opposition to al-Bashir loyalists, including in the military, although one of the FFC-CC leaders said they would return to their opposition roles if Himedti or Al-Burhan reneged on the agreement.

Indeed, there are signs that the RSF aligning with civilians has caused a rift with SAF that has delayed the signing of final political agreement, scheduled for 6 April 2023, for the civilian-led transition to elections outlined in the framework agreement. With the agreement stipulating the formation of a military council comprising of SAF and RSF generals, the RSF has reportedly suggested that the incoming civilian head-of-state be included in it (Reuters, 5 April). However, SAF rejects this proposal “because it would mean maintaining the RSF relatively separate from the army” and believes that its commander-in-chief in chief should head the military council (Sudan Tribune, 5 April).

Himedti’s reformist image

By publicly adopting a position that sides with pro-democracy civilians at the expense of the military, Himedti’s recent actions are in keeping with a reformist image that analysts suggest he is cultivating, which may also pose a threat to al-Burhan’s power ambitions.

Indeed, given Himedti’s nomadic camel-herding background and Sudan’s dominance by Khartoum elites, analyst Suliman Baldo suggested that the ties that Himedti has cultivated with the FFC-CC reflect his aims to become "a force to be reckoned with in the national power structure” (Reuters, 19 March).

Himedti “has in recent months sought to reinvent his public image and that of his forces” and “portrayed himself as a defender of the restoration of democratic transition” (AP, 7 March). This has included rehabilitation efforts in the form of arranging “to have himself named person of the year by Sudan’s National Human Rights Commission” (Council for Foreign Relations, 11 January), alongside “shoring up support in Darfur through the reconciliation of Arab and African tribes” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 November).

With al-Burhan and Himedti considered presidential rivals for the elections planned for 2024, Jihad Mashamoun argued that Himedti’s PR efforts are a threat for al-Burhan’s power ambitions. Mashamoun suggested that al-Burhan was “strategically” using dialogue with the FFC-CC to support his presidential ambitions, particularly amid the threat of being deposed by Islamist remnants of al-Bashir’s regime which is stated to have 500,000 supporters who control the economy and state institutions, supplying them with considerable funds and organising power to win or rig elections “as they have done in the past” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 November).

Thus, if al-Burhan is seeking to preserve his power, Himedti’s reported alliance with the FFC-CC alongside improved public image could be a source of concern, especially as the framework agreement is argued to benefit Himedti at al-Burhan’s expense.

How Himedti has “won” the framework agreement over Al-Burhan

According to Magdi al-Gizouli, the framework agreement was “a delaying tactic for al-Burhan” (AFP, 16 March). However, Himedti is the “winner” of the framework agreement, argues Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory think-tank, citing his reputational gains such as: “the launch of Phase II as campaign events, making nods toward human rights and the involvement of women, youth, and internally displaced people, and also expressing rehearsed remorse over the death of protesters in speeches that are a masterclass in empty gestural politics” (Arab Center, 23 January).

As a result, Khair adds, Egypt – al-Burhan’s “long-time patrons” - have promoted a parallel track to the framework agreement with the aim of splitting the FFC-CC, as some of the coalitions members may be pushed to the pro-Burhan camp due to their discomfort backing Himedti (Arab Center, 23 January). Indeed, Khair added that the Egyptian initiative appeared to favour al-Burhan and "catalysed renewed tensions between the generals" (AFP, 16 March).

5. Analysis on the impact of the power struggle between Al-Burhan and Himedti

Beyond the risk of a civil war should the army and the RSF engage in armed clashes, the rivalry between Sudan’s military leaders is argued to pose a threat to Sudan’s democratic development as it presents a binary choice between armed actors which contributes to Sudan’s transactional militarised politics.

Democratic development

Military expert Amin Ismail told AFP (16 March) that the political disagreements between al-Burhan and Himedti “could push the Sudanese people to rise up and turn on all of them”.

However, Khair argues that the heightened Burhan-Himedti rift triggered by the framework agreement has negative implications for Sudan’s democratic prospects. Writing for the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (7 March), Khair argued that the deal has created a binary choice between Himedti and al-Burhan, “while the demands of pro-democracy groups have taken a back-seat and are in danger of being relegated to the procedural abyss.” Khair added that the “false dilemma” of the Himedti-Burhan binary contributes to a heavily militarised political scene in Sudan, which is not “encouraging for prospects of a peaceful transition toward democracy”.

Security

Furthermore, Khair highlighted the heightened security risks caused by the Burhan-Himedti binary posed by the framework agreement. Khair suggested that the international community have bought into the Himedti-Burhan dilemma “over the sustainability in Sudan” which culminates in international division over which general to back toward a “stable” outcome for Sudan and the region— which is labelled “a fool’s errand, as neither general can”.

Indeed, the SAF-RSF competition for influence following the framework agreement triggering a large-scale military recruitment operations in Darfur by both of them has culminated in consequences that has further entrenched the militarisation of Sudan. Firstly, according to Ayin Network (26 March) sources, the army has sought to mitigate the growing strength of the RSF by reviving the Border Guards, a paramilitary force consisting of Darfur-based Arab tribal militias originally set up under former president Omar al-Bashir in 2003 but disbanded in 2017. Secondly, the SAF-RSF recruitment drive in Darfur has also disincentivised other armed groups from disarmament, including the Sudan Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi, a Juba peace agreement signatory.

Moreover, the prospect of a clash between the army and RSF “which could develop into an all-out civil war that may last for years and will eventually lead to the division of Sudan” was raised by political analyst Mohammed Abdelaziz raised (Radio Dabanga, 21 February). However, Amin Ismail said that the outright military confrontation that may fear is unlikely (AFP, 16 March).

6. Solution: Reject the false dilemma

Kholood Khair calls for the international community to “reject the false dilemma” of picking between Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia commander Himedti and the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese armed forces Abdulfattah al-Burhan. Instead, Khair calls for political actors to be supported in resetting their calculations based on the Himedti-Burhan binary, with the generals pushed to commit to long-term reform and before a new transitional period. Khair concludes that a successful political process in Sudan privileges organic and considered interventions that aim to break the transactional militarised politics, which requires civilians to avoid Faustian pacts and strive for greater unity and shared civilian opportunities (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 7 March).