#SudanUprising report: 3 major challenges facing the post-coup uprising in Sudan

After the coup: the uprising continues

Sudan’s situation is “very chaotic, because for the first time in Sudan’s history, we have both a coup and a revolution restarting,” with the current government being “a reflection of [former dictator Omar] al-Bashir’s regime”, says Kholood Khair, the managing partner at Insight Strategy Partners, a Khartoum-based think-tank. “The pro-democracy movement has a lot to fight for,” Khair added (East African, 16 April).

Although the pro-democracy movement continues fighting – the post-coup Sudan Uprising is fraught with challenges.

The first challenge that this report explores are the human rights infringements conducted by the coup regime led by Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan – the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Since taking power in a military coup on 25 October 2021, the regime has led a suppression of freedom of expression and press via brutal crackdowns on peaceful protesters and controlling and intimidating the media.

The second challenge the report examines are issues facing the pro-democracy movement. Firstly, the mistrust between the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition of political parties that formed the civilian component of the pre-coup transitional government and the Resistance Committees who are the centre of revolutionary mobilisation help enable a military that exploits civilian divisions to justify their rule. Secondly, despite circumventing their exclusion from the state media by publishing charters on social media, analysts debate whether the Resistance Committees can implement a roadmap to democracy.

As Resistance Committees are attempt to shape the post-coup political environment, the third challenge is al-Burhan’s re-empowerment of the Islamists that the 2018 uprising sought to remove in his attempts to form a civilian base to legitimise the coup the regime. The re-empowerment of Islamists has enabled them to regroup and retake state institutions, alongside obstructing Sudan’s anti-corruption progress. Consequently, Islamists have a competitive advantage ahead of elections that are likely to be controlled by the military, which poses security risks.

The report concludes with solutions proposed in the Atlantic Council think-tank, US Institute of Peace and Human Rights Watch.

Issue 1: The coup regimes infringement on human rights

In protests that have followed the 25 October military coup, Sudanese security forces have unlawfully detained, disappeared and killed hundreds, with sexual assault being a tool of brutal suppression. In addition, media freedoms are being infringed upon, with journalists covering anti-coup protests being targeted for abuses and the director of Sudan’s national broadcaster being fired for platforming revolutionary voices. 

The coup regime’s brutal suppression of the protest movement

In a broad clampdown on opposition to the October 25 military coup, Sudan’s security forces have unlawfully detained hundreds of protesters and forcibly disappeared scores (HRW, 28 April), with Reuters (7 June) reporting that reported that at least 100 Sudanese protesters have died in anti-coup protests. Furthermore, the coup regime is alleged to use sexual assault as a tool of suppression.

The Guardian (16 March) reported that protests took place across in Sudan following the alleged gang-rape of an 18-year-old by up to nine uniformed men belonging to the security forces tasked with dispersing the anti-coup protests. Sulaima Ishaq, the head of the violence against women unit at Sudan’s social development ministry, was quoted to say that security forces are increasingly using sexual assault as a “tactic” to suppress protests, with the security apparatus “using rape as part of their work”. Ishaq added that “it is a well-known oppressive policy in our country … it is not the first time that they have been doing this and it will not be the last time. We have a history of using women’s bodies, whether it is in Darfur or at the dispersal of the sit-in in 2019 or at the protests.”

The coup regime’s crackdown on the media

Furthermore, the coup regime has been infringing on media freedoms in Sudan, with the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor (31 March) recording 55 attacks on journalists by the coup regime from 25 Oct 2021 to 8 March 2022. Security forces violations against journalists and media including: breaking into and closing press offices and institutions, harassment and arbitrary detention and physical and psychological attacks. Euro-Med Monitor identified obstacles to independent journalism in Sudan, including emergency laws and articles of the Penal Code that censor the media and intimidate journalists and activists, with coverage of events that followed the coup and the human rights violations against protesters “considered red lines”.

Indeed, Brig. Gen. al-Tahir Abu Haja, the media advisor to Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan, the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the chairman of the military-led ruling Sovereign Council, confirmed that the military activated a series of measures to censure and control the media (Sudan Tribune, 15 April). This has included the replacement of state-media directors.

The director of Sudan’s Radio and TV Corporation Luqman Ahmed was fired, with Sudan Tribune (11 April) sources alleging that Luqman’s sacking was triggered by his rejection of attempts by the Military Media Department to intervene in the management of the corporation and its programmes. This was confirmed by al-Burhan’s media advisor Abu Haja, who said that Luqman was dismissed as he “ignored” the news of al-Burhan and the army and broadcast it at the end of the news bulletin (Sudan Tribune, 12 April). Furthermore, Sudan Tribune (11 April) sources also allege that Luqman was sacked due to his invitation of representatives of the Resistance Committees in a talk show he presents, which suggests the ruling military junta has a particular disregard for Resistance Committees being given a platform.

Issue 2: Obstacles facing the pro-democracy movement

The silencing of the Resistance Committees by the coup authorities and the media it dominates has been indicated in the banned broadcast of a talk show discussing the prospects for solutions to the current political strife entitled “From The Revolution Onwards”. Nonetheless, the Resistance Committees - who have become the centre of revolutionary mobilisation - circumvent their exclusion from the state media by issuing charters directly on social media. However, their decentralised nature has led to debate on whether they can implement a transitional roadmap. In addition, the mistrust between the Resistance Committees and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition of civilian political parties reflect divisions within the pro-democracy movement that enable the military.

Exclusion from the state-media

Samah Mubarak Khater, the presenter of “From The Revolution Onwards” said that decision to ban the show was taken after a complaint by an unnamed army brigadier general – possibly Abu Haja himself - about statements made by a member of the Resistance Committees rejecting the participation of the military in any future transitional government. Khater said the general condemned previous episodes, despite the invitation of army spokesman and a strategic expert to discuss the army’s visions and plans in the next stage (Sudan Tribune, 15 April).

Nonetheless, despite being excluded from the state media, the Resistance Committees are continuing to shape the post-coup political landscape, and assuming leadership of the revolution, through political charters published on social media platforms.

Debates on whether the resistance committees can implement a transitional roadmap

The resistance committees have become the centre of revolutionary mobilisation amid the divisions within the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and Sudan Professionals Association (SPA), note Marija Marovic, senior advisor to Gisa Group and Zahra Hayder, a Sudanese political activist (USIP, 3 May). However, despite “sustaining the revolution’s energies and combating political apathy,” Marovic and Hayder argue that the decentralised nature of the committees prevents them from participation in national-level political negotiations and coordinating or implementing a transitional roadmap.

On the other hand, Muzan Alneel, cofounder of the ISTiNAD think-tank, reviewed two Resistance Committee (RC) charters that offer a roadmap - the Revolutionary Charter for People’s Power (RCPP) and the Charter for the Establishment of the People’s Authority (CEPA). RCPP analysed Sudan’s historic underdevelopment and proposed that grassroots-led government comprising of local councils focuses on national development projects that transform Sudan from rentier economy to industrialised. CEPA is similar but favours a centralised approach to governance, thereby reflecting revolutionary debate among Sudanese (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 26 April).

Furthermore, the centralised approach proposed by CEPA address doubts that the decentralised nature of the committees will prevent them from coordinating and implementing a transitional roadmap. Nonetheless, Islamists attempts to shape the post-coup political landscape face a key challenge – the re-empowerment of the Islamists that came to power in 1989 coup and governed Sudan for 30 yeas.

Civilian divisions enable the military

Nonetheless, according to Kholood Khair, managing partner at Insight Strategy Partners think-tank, the mistrust between the committees and the FFC is argued to enable Sudan’s military, which has historically exploited civilian divisions in order to justify coup staged under the guise of stability. However, Khair argues, while the resistance committees and FFC differ on how to achieve civilian rule, they are united in opposition to a power-sharing arrangement with the military, with political parties that have “historically [agreed]” to sharing power with the military now viewing such a move “as tantamount to political suicide” (Arab Center DC, 22 February).

With the FFC unwilling to provide al-Burhan with a civilian base, the coup regime has instead turned to re-empowering the Islamists that the revolution sought to depose.

Issue 3: the return of the Islamists

After failing to create a civilian base to legitimise the coup regime, al-Burhan is rehabilitating the Islamists ousted in the 2018 uprising. After freeing from prison key leaders of the Islamist National Congress Party (NCP) that governed Sudan before al-Bashir was ousted in a palace coup, Islamists have re-group and formed a coalition. The re-empowerment of the Islamists has been aided by the reversal of a court decision to dissolve the financing arm of al-Bashir’s regime. Moreover, NCP Islamists are being reintegrated into key state institutions, enabling them to conduct a politically motivated campaign against an anti-corruption committee that aimed to retrieve their illicitly gained assets during the pre-coup transitional period. The re-empowerment of the Islamists poses the risk of their victory in controlled elections, alongside the exacerbation of Sudan’s security situation.

How Islamists solve al-Burhan’s problems

According to political analyst Jihad Mashamoun, al-Burhan aimed to compensate for the loss of international legitimacy caused by the resignation of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in order to satisfy western warnings against unilateral military appointments of a civilian government (FFC) (Responsible Statecraft, 31 January).

However, al-Burhan’s inability to create a civilian base to form a government indicates that the October 2021 coup leaders have “no political plan other than survival”, argues World Peace Foundation executive director Alex de Waal (Responsible Statecraft, 4 May).

Indeed, after al-Burhan proved to be unable to woo the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) or build a front of non-Communist resistance committees, his failure to appoint a civilian prime minister or build a civilian base forced the Sudanese coup regime to “fall back on Islamists of all stripes” to shore up the regime (Africa Confidential, 12 May). Consequently, the coup regime is “unofficially” rehabilitating the former ruling Islamist National Congress Party (NCP), despite the party remaining formally outlawed, as Burhan’s seeks to “assemble a civilian political base in an attempt to build a case for badly-needed foreign financial support suspended after the coup” (Reuters, 22 April).

NCP leaders freed from prison

Ibrahim Ghandour, the jailed head of the NCP was freed from prison, becoming the most senior figure from the deposed regime of Omar al-Bashir to have charges of crimes against the state dropped since the October 2021 coup. Ex-foreign minister Ghandour was found innocent of undermining the constitution, financing terrorism, and plotting the assassination of former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok along with other attacks. Two other NCP leaders, Anas Omer and Kamaleldin Ibrahim, were among 12 others cleared of the same charges (Reuters, 7 April).

Radio Dabanga (8 April) added that Ghandour and his co-conspirators were accused of planning to assassinate leaders in the transitional government, bombing the Legislative Council and other government headquarters, as well as planning a military coup, with the charges dropped after the witness retracted his statement under intimidation.

Ghandour then voiced his support for the October 25 coup, saying that it was not a coup, and that it was a “step in the corrective path”, although he argued that al-Burhan “made a mistake” when he signed an agreement on transitional arrangements excluding the NCP, which he stressed, will challenge by all legal means the decision that dissolved and prohibited it. “No one can block our freedom of association,” Ghandour said (Sudan Tribune, 9 April). Nonetheless, the legal status of the NCP has not prevented the formation of an Islamist coalition.

The Islamists regroup

While the NCP remains formally banned, 10 Islamist political groups announced the formation of a new political coalition under the name of “The Broad Islamic Current”.

Among the signatories are the Islamic Movement, a “façade” of the NCP, and the State of Law and Development Party of Mohamed Ali al-Jizouli, “an ISIS supporter released recently from prison”. The coalition aims to coordinate the efforts of the Islamist groups elections, with Islamists seeking to take advantage of the post-coup political environment (Sudan Tribune, 19 April).

Then, a Sudanese high court took “a further step towards the rehabilitation of allies of the former regime” by reversing a decision dissolving the Islamic Call Organization, an organising and financing arm for the regime that has helped to finance Islamist groups (Reuters, 29 April). To further aid the re-empowerment of the Islamists, they are beginning to regain their control over Sudanese state institutions.

The re-empowerment of the Islamists in state institutions

Scores of NCP Islamists have been reinstated into institutions including: the central bank, judiciary, public prosecutor, prime minister's office, foreign ministry and state media (Reuters, 22 April), alongside Sudan’s intelligence agency (Al-Monitor, 19 April). 102 diplomats, including 48 ambassadors, 35 junior diplomats, and 19 administrative staff who are part of the NCP, have also been reinstated (Africa Confidential, 12 May).

In addition, Islamists are using the justice system to free their allies and reverse the seizures of bank accounts and other assets by the Empowerment Removal Committee (ERC) (Reuters, 29 April).

The politically motivated Islamist campaign against anti-corruption efforts

The ERC is a now-suspended anti-corruption body that aimed to dismantle al-Bashir’s deep state (Radio Dabanga, 10 February). ERC was named such as such because the term ‘empowerment’ was used by al-Bashir’s regime to support its affiliates by granting them far-going privileges, including government functions, the setting-up of various companies, and tax exemptions (Radio Dabanga, 28 April).

With Islamists intimidating the ERC’s members (Africa Confidential, 12 May), Sidgi Kaballo, a leader in Sudan's Communist Party, noted that the appointment of Islamists into state institutions, banks and the judiciary is the effective “re-empowerment” that the ERC sought to dismantle (Radio Dabanga, 11 February).

According to Orwa al-Sadig, a member of the suspended ERC who fled Sudan, the committee had revealed operations through Port Sudan airport linked to the Russian Wagner group, fought the drug mafia, stopped land grabbing, and corruption in the sale of the state-owned companies,” and compiled corruption cases threatening the interests of powerful senior officials linked to al-Bashir including ministers and bank directors  “who allied to overthrow the [civilian] government” (Sudan Tribune, 21 March).

As a result, the coup regime has been leading a campaign of arrests of ERC members, which the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) condemned, alleging that they were an effort by the coup authorities to defame the committee’s actions with criminal cases, cancel the committee’s progress in recouping assets and conceal the return of al-Bashir’s Islamist regime (Radio Dabanga, 10 February).

Sudanese lawyers questioned the legal validity of the ‘breach of trust’ cases against the leaders of the now-suspended ERC were launched by the Ministry of Finance, after the ERC instructed the removal of dozens of employees alleged to hold ties to al-Bashir’s regime (Radio Dabanga, 11 February). Committee members were also accused of embezzling public funds, charges they deny as the properties and companies they confiscated are managed by security and ministry of finance officials (Sudan Tribune, 21 March).

While the coup authorities eventually released the arrested ERC leaders on bail (Radio Dabanga, 28 April), exiled ex-member Orwa al-Sadig alleged that the military aimed to use the detained ERC members hostage as a bargaining chip to force them to accept a political settlement (Sudan Tribune, 21 March).

The risk of Islamists winning controlled elections

With Atlantic Council senior fellow Cameron Hudson warning that Sudan’s military leaders are aiming to establish a Security and Defence Council that paves the way for quick elections that provide surface-level legitimacy for the military (Atlantic Council, 11 April), policy analyst Hamid Khalafallah told Al-Monitor (19 April) that, while the NCP remains formally outlawed, the military will “find a way” to allow it to participate in elections if “not with the original name. This risk is emphasised given the formation of an Islamist coalition to prepare them for elections (Sudan Tribune, 19 April).

Security risks of Islamist re-empowerment

The rehabilitation of the Islamists also poses various security risks. Firstly, Suliman Baldo, the director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, warned that “bringing back the Islamists could stoke political tension and has already contributed to bureaucratic paralysis” (Reuters, 22 April).

Secondly, Yasir Arman, a leading member of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the armed Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) warned that the NCP is seeking to exploit the isolation experienced by the coup leaders to control the army again, with the return of the NCP “meaning the return of wars, repression and looting of resources” (Sudan Tribune, 10 April).

In addition, the intimidation of a witness in a trial in which NCP were charged with terrorism indicate that the Islamists in Sudan continue to use violence as a political tool (Radio Dabanga, 8 April).

Finally, the rehabilitation of Islamists and influence over the army may also fuel friction within the security apparatus, amid tensions between Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia and Islamists who are hostile towards the RSF and feed discontents into the army over the RSF’s growing influence (Sudan Tribune, 6 May).  

Solutions

Solutions for Sudan’s post-coup crisis have been directed at the international community and the Resistance Committees.

Recognition that a new transition is being sought

To soften Sudan’s political impasse, Kholood Khair, managing partner at Insight Strategy Partners think-tank, calls for recognition that the transition that started in August 2019 is over, and that a new transition toward a fresh civilian political dispensation is sought. Amid Sudan’s economic crisis, Khair calls for recognition that pro-democracy forces can far outlast the military “who rely so heavily” on economic control. Although divisions within the pro-democracy movement enable the military, Khair adds that key divisions about governance modalities can be negotiated and managed, given that political contestations and ideological differences are “part and parcel of the democratic prerogative that underpins healthy democracies” (Arab Center, 22 February).

Improved public messaging

Atlantic Council (11 April) senior fellow Cameron Hudson calls for the international community adapt its public messaging according to Sudanese public demands and sentiments. This would entail ending calls for the military to enact “confidence-building measures” as this “only plays into the existing discriminatory power dynamics in the country and elevate the security services as an equal, if not legitimate, part of Sudan’s political future”, with calls for “return to civilian-led transitional government…reflecting deafness to popular calls for a new way forward”. Instead, Hudson suggests that the military is reminded that “a return to the pre-revolution status quo is both impossible and unacceptable.”

Unified post-coup leadership body

Marija Marovic, senior advisor to Gisa Group and Zahra Hayder, a Sudanese political activist, argue that the resistance committees (RC) could evolve into forming a unified leadership body for post-coup transitional negotiations as “mass mobilisation against the coup is necessary but insufficient in the absence of unified leadership with clear political demands” (USIP, 3 May).

Addressing deteriorating human rights

Human Rights Watch (28 April) call on Sudan’s international and regional partners and the UN to:

• Press the military to lift the state of emergency, allow access for independent monitors to all detention facilities, and stop abusing protesters;

• Adopt targeted measures against leaders and commanders of security forces involved in unlawful detentions and enforced disappearances, including those in leadership positions of the Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID) and General Intelligence Service (GIS);

• Provide ongoing support to the mandate of the UN independent expert on Sudan and call for invitations for relevant UN and ACHPR experts to visit Sudan; and

• Support local groups in their human rights documentation work.

#SudanUprising Report: Build-up to the military coup of 25 October

Summary

In the previous Sudan Uprising report, we covered how various analysts viewed the foiled coup of 21 September as a precursor for an eventual coup, particularly how Sudan’s military leaders blamed it on the performance of the civilian government, in keeping with the history of Sudanese military coups that heralded the end of democratic attempts.

 This Sudan Uprising report looks at the events and issues raised in the build-up to the eventual military coup of 25 October 2021. As Sudan’s democratic struggle continues, the proposed solutions may serve as inspiration.

Key Events

•    The start of October 2021 saw the formation of a breakaway faction of the Forces of Freedom Change (FFC), the coalition that selected the civilian component of the government, by the leaders of Darfuri-based armed movements who defected their allegiance away from civilian revolutionaries, towards the military.

• The leaders of the military and armed movements escalated their calls for the civilian government to step down, culminating in their organisation of demonstrations that demanded military rule.

• In response, the largest protests since the start of the transitional period were held, as hundreds of thousands took to the streets to demand a civilian-led democratic transition. The protests were to no avail as the coup eventually happened

Key Issues

• Public statements made by civilian members of the government in the month of October suggested that they knew it was coming, as they, alongside analysts, questioned the military’s democratic commitment.

• The formation of the breakaway FFC faction, the National Accord (FFC-NA), is viewed as a way to split and polarise the pro-democracy movement and pave the way for the return to power of the former regime, particularly given the political ambitions of the FFC-NA’s leaders, and their prior relations with the ousted regime.

• The pro-military protests were artificially inflated as people were paid to participate. Anti-democratic forces were also revealed to use their financial resources to win the battle for public opinion online via fake grassroots campaigns.

• Nonetheless, there are grievances about the exclusionary tendencies of the mainstream FFC, with democracy advocates criticising civilian political elites were being pre-occupied with pursuing personal career and political ambitions at the expense of the national interest.

 Solutions

• Proposed solutions included: for civilian politicians to adopt a more confrontation stance towards the military, to attempt to gain public legitimacy and focus on creating transitional institutions. Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok was called upon to form a more inclusive executive government, while the US were called upon to apply pressure on the military.  

Events 

A breakaway faction of the Forces of Freedom Change (FFC) echoed the military’s calls to dissolve the civilian government, and organised pro-military protests. A travel ban was allegedly imposed upon senior civilian politicians, before the largest pro-democracy demonstration since the transitional began was held.

 1. FFC split

The Sudanese political crisis escalated, and the path was paved for the eventual coup after a split in the Forces of Freedom Change, the political coalition comprised of civilian political parties, civil society organisations and armed movements that revolted against Omar al-Bashir’s ousted regime, played a leading role in the Sudan uprising and selected the civilian government.

Sudan Tribune (3 October) reported that 16 political and armed groups signed "the National Consensus Charter for the Unity of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)", thereby forming a new faction of the FFC.

The new alliance – known as the FFC National Accord Group (FFC-NA) - gathers armed movements including: The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Darfur governor Minni Minnawi, and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) of Finance Minister Dr. Gibril Ibrahim. In their speeches, Minnawi and Ibrahim denounced the monopoly of power by four components of the FFC saying they have excluded the other groups that participated with them in the struggle against the former regime (Sudan Tribune, 3 October).

Similarly, the head of the ruling Sovereign Council and the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese army, Abdelfattah al-Burhan, echoed the FFC-NA allegations that the FFC monopolises power via four groups that control the Cabinet and impose their partisan agenda. Indeed, the FFC controlled 18 out of Sudan’s 26 government ministries (Sudan Tribune, 3 October).

The FFC-NA then called for the boycott of the mainstream FFC, also known as the FFC Central Council (FFC-CC), until it is reorganised and an agreement is reached on membership representation. Indeed, JEM Political Secretary, Suleiman Sandal, disclosed a request to the Sovereign Council and the Council of Ministers “to stop any political or executive dealings with the FFC-CC, which hijacked the government, until they return to the founding platform” (Sudan Tribune, 8 October).

According to Bloomberg (11 October), the formation of the FFC-NA splinter group “removes a key pillar of support from embattled civilians in the interim government who are increasingly at odds with the military officials they share power with,” a feud that “risks derailing Sudan’s path to democracy”.

Al-Tom Hajo, an FFC-NA member who is the deputy chair of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) coalition of armed movements, said that the FFC-NA leadership demands a government of technocrats, and rejects allegations from the FFC-CC that the FFC-NA breakaway was instigated by the military in an attempt to discredit the government and sow chaos.

Days later, Minnawi demanded the partial dissolution of Sudan’s transitional government and refused to meet with Sudan’s civilian government leaders (Sudan Tribune, 14 October).

The FFC-NA’s boycott of the FFC-CC conforms to the stance of al-Burhan and Himedti, the Sovereign Council deputy chair and the commander-in-chief of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group. Al-Burhan and Himedti had refused to meet with their civilian sovereign council counterpart Mohamed al-Faki, after the latter’s vocal criticisms of the military component of the government’s threats towards the democratic transition (Sudan Tribune, 4 October).

Al-Burhan would then back up the FFC-NA’s demands for the dissolution of the civilian government.

2. Al-Burhan demands government dissolution

Addressing his soldiers, Radio Dabanga (12 October) reported that Al-Burhan called for the dissolution of the transitional government. "Civilians’ attempts to continue the partnership in its previous form are rejected. There is no solution to the current situation without dissolving the government," he stressed.

Al-Burhan accused civilian political forces of fabricating troubles with the army to distract the public opinion and called for a new "broad-based" cabinet, thereby echoing calls made by the FFC-NA. In response to the calls, Mutaz Saleh of the FFC-CC said that, under Sudan’s constitution, only the FFC has the authority to dissolve the Cabinet (Sudan Tribune, 12 October).

Three days later, Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok rejected al-Burhan and Himedti’s request to dissolve the FFC-majority Cabinet, and form a replacement government involving political groups that form the splinter FFC-NA (Sudan Tribune, 15 October). Instead, Hamdok proposed an alternative solution to the political crisis.  

3. Hamdok’s solution

To solve what he labelled as “the worst and most dangerous crisis that not only threatens the transition, but threatens our whole country” (Multiple sources, 16 October), Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok announced a 10-point plan to move past the political crisis that has split the FFC’s civilian and armed components, and escalated tensions between the civilian and military components of the government.

 Hamdok said: “the essence of this crisis is the inability to agree on a national project… the conflict is not between civilians and the military, but rather between [revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries],” calling for a de-escalation of tensions and serious dialogue on issues dividing the FFC coalition. To end the frictions that split the FFC, Hamdok proposed broadening the base of the transitional government with more components (Sudan Tribune, 16 October).

4. Travel ban

The crisis between the military and civilian components of Sudan’s transitional government escalated after multiple sources (13 October) reported that the General Intelligence Service (GIS) issued a travel ban for 11 leading civilian members of the Empowerment Removal Committee (ERC)*. Sources reported that the ban issued by the GIS includes member of the Sovereign Council Mohamed al-Faki and Minister of Cabinet Affairs Khaled Omar, who have recently been vocally critical of military threats to the democratic transition.

5. Pro-military protests

In protests organised by the FFC-NA, the political crisis in Sudan’s democratic transition reached a new low after thousands of Sudanese took to the streets of Khartoum to demand the dissolution of the civilian government (Multiple sources, 18 October). Pro-military slogans were chanted including: “one people, one army”, as demonstrators announced they would stage a sit-in until the dissolution of the civilian government (Sudan Tribune, 17 October). Other chants included: “the army will bring us bread” (AFP, 17 October).

 In response to the protests, the mainstream FFC-CC said: “the current crisis is not related to dissolution of the government… it is engineered by some parties to overthrow the revolutionary forces ... paving the way for the return of remnants of the previous regime” (AFP, 17 October).

 6. Pro-democracy protests

Days later, across Sudan, hundreds of thousands participated in a ‘March of the Millions’ in favour of a civilian-led democratic transition, in what Reuters estimate is the largest protest of Sudan’s democratic transition. Protests took place from Darfur in the West, to Atbara in the White Nile state, and around Khartoum, as well as among the Sudanese diaspora in London, Washington DC, and other western cities (Multiple sources, 21 October).

Issues

The key issues raised include: that the prospect of a coup was increasingly raised by civilian members of the government which indicates the level to which tensions among the military-civilian government were escalating, alongside the military’s aversion to democracy. The formation of the FFC-NA, and its alliance to the military, reflects a threat to the democratic transition that was projected as far back as the time that the transition began, as it polarised the pro-democracy movement and paved the way for the return of the ousted regime. While anti-democratic forces are artificially inflating their support on the street and online, the infighting and mismanagement of the civilian government has also been blamed for inviting the military coup.

1. The coup was predicted

While the military coup eventually came on 25 October, public statements made by civilian members of the government in the month of October suggested that they knew it was coming.

 Madani Abbas Madani, an FFC member and former Trade minister, spoke about a planned coup by the military and allies: “[Al-Burhan and his deputy Himedti] are circumventing the Constitutional Document…they do not want to reform the military and security sector and establish a unified army," Madani stressed, adding that civilians should focus on achieving democratic reforms rather than being distracted by internal disputes (Sudan Tribune, 3 October).

Five days later, Madani told Reuters (8 October) that the military attacks on civilians in the wake of the “foiled” coup of 21 September reflected that: the “military component is not keen on democratic transition…they aim, by weakening the civilian authority through economic sabotage and encouraging ethnic protests ... to create a reality that allows them ... to take control of Sudan”.

Siddiq Tawer, a civilian member of the Sovereign Council, also hinted at the possibility of a coup following the reactions of the military leaders to the 21 September foiled coup, including the refusal of Al-Burhan and Himedti, the chair and deputy chairs of the Sovereign Council respectively, to have any meetings with civilian Sovereign Council member Mohammed al-Faki. Tawer slammed military leaders al-Burhan and Himedti for suspending the council’s meetings, as well as arguing that al-Burhan’s comments that the military are the “guardians of the revolution” come from “those with a putschist mentality", adding that the military leaders must be convinced to abide by what is stipulated in the Constitutional Document” (Sudan Tribune, 4 October).

Indeed, al-Faki himself alleged that al-Burhan aims to “create a new civilian government that he can control”, by installing allies inside the civilian government under the guise of expanding political representation. Al-Faki added that al-Burhan believes now is the time to strike because of the fatigue and apathy of the Sudanese people over the tough economic situation and political infighting (Axios, 20 October). The military coup was staged only five days later.

But, before that, were the pro-military protests. Following the demonstrations against the civilian government organised by the FFC-NA, Ja’far Hassan, a spokesperson for the FFC-CC, called the pro-military sit-in “an episode in the scenario of a coup d’etat”. Hassan said the protests aimed “to block the road to democracy because the participants in this sit-in are supporters of the former regime and foreign parties whose interests have been affected by the revolution” (AFP, 17 October).

Suspicions that the coup was coming only amplified pre-existing scepticism around the military’s democratic commitment.

2. Military aversion to democracy

The military worries about democratic transition as it may be subject to justice for abuses committed, and may lose their dominant and privileged place in the Sudanese economy, argues the International Crisis Group’s Jonas Horner (Independent, 19 October).

Indeed, al-Burhan alone allegedly controls the security services and economic military companies, including "10 billion-dollar companies…around the world that manage slaughterhouses and export meat,” according to Ibrahim al-Sheikh, the Minister of Industry and a leading FFC-CC member, who responded to al-Burhan’s claims that the FFC-CC monopolises power via four groups that control the Cabinet and impose their partisan agenda (Sudan Tribune, 3 October).

Furthermore, al-Faki accused al-Burhan and the military of forestalling reforms of state institutions — including the civil service, judiciary and security sector — which, he said, were essential for dismantling the "old state" and transitioning to democracy (Axios, 20 October).

3. The formation of the FFC-NA

 The leaders of Darfur-based armed movements forming an allegiance with the military forms a threat to the democratic transition that was projected as far back as the time that the transition began. Thus, the formation of the FFC-NA was viewed as a way to polarise the pro-democracy movement and pave the way for the return to power of the former regime.

Back in 9 July 2019 (Foreign Policy), analyst Jerome Tubiana raised the prospect of Darfuri rebel movements forming a strategic alliance with Himedti, a fellow Darfuri, in an alliance of Sudan’s marginalised peripheries against the civilian democrat movement dominated by the “riverine elite”, the Arabs of central Sudan.

Then, after the Juba peace agreement that co-opted armed movement leaders into the transitional government, researcher Jean-Baptiste Gallopin warned that Sudan’s democratic prospects will fade if the deal becomes an “instrument for the ambitions of [the armed movements],” also raising the prospect of a coalition of peripheral leaders including Himedti and the Darfur-based armed movements, which would weaken the civilian component of the government comprising of elites from the Centre (War On The Rocks, 22 September).

These projections came true after the breakaway FFC-NA was formed by Minni Minnawi, the leader of the Darfur-based armed Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Dr. Jibril Ibrahim, the leader of the Darfur-based Islamist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a move that is viewed beneficial to the former regime, which Minnawi and Ibrahim both have a history of intermittently allying with and rebelling against. Indeed, Asmaa Jum’ah, the editor-in-chief of al-Democrati (19 October), argued that Minnawi and Ibrahim’s current alliance with the same military they fought against and blamed for the marginalisation of Darfur, indicates that they are untrustworthy.

Minnawi’s history: Journalist Sabah Mohamed al-Hassan suggested that Minnawi’s move benefits the remnants of Omar al-Bashir’s ousted regime.  Al-Hassan wrote that Minnawi is “accustomed to creating rifts and splinter groups wherever he went,” noting that he ceded from his own SLM to become an assistant to former president Omar al-Bashir, who’s forces he led a rebellion against. Thus, for al-Hassan, Islamist remnants hinge their hopes of returning to power on Minnawi “because of his unprincipled, slippery personality and visible intention to destroy the FFC”. Al-Hassan also wrote that the Islamists were happy to hear Minnawi criticise the FFC’s movements against the former regime and its remnants (Al-Jareeda, 3 October).

 Asmaa Jum’ah, the editor-in-chief of al-Democrati (19 October), suggests that Minnawi exploited the uprising opportunistically as a platform to support the military’s seizure of power in order to prolong his political relevance

Ibrahim’s history: Writer Buthaina Teriws also labelled the formation of the FFC-NA as a reflection of Islamist attempts to retain power, labelling the Islamist Dr. Jibril Ibrahim “the Muslim Brotherhood’s minister” (al-Rakoba, 18 October). Asmaa Jum’ah suggested that – Ibrahim – an Islamist allied to the former regime until rebelling against it “because he was not given positions” – is allegedly trying to revive the Islamists’ dominance of Sudan, under his leadership (al-Democrati, 19 October).

The FFC-NA under Minnawi and Ibrahim’s leadership would then go on to organise protests against the civilian government, although reports suggest that the participant figures were artificially inflated with cash incentives.

4. Fake pro-military protests

 Evidence circulated social media that members of the public were paid to participate in the protests calling for the military to take power. 

In videos posted by activists, young demonstrators spoke about receiving money for their participation in the pro-military protests. Heads of Islamic schools are accused of being paid to send students to participate in demonstrations, in a violation of international treaties (Sudan Tribune, 17 October).

Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of al-Tayyar newspaper, said the pro-military demonstration is reminiscent of the practices of the former regime, which bribed people to participate in pro—regime protests (Sudan Tribune, 17 October). Buthaina Terwis expressed similar sentiments in al-Rakoba (18 October), alleging that the military component of the government “generously pays money for demonstrations and political crowds to support its plans”.

Furthermore, having noted that children were paid to participate in the FFC-NA’s protests at a time when the Sudanese school day has been reduced to four hours due to bread shortages, Terwis argues that it is the “proven habit of Islamists to exploit the needs of the poor and violating the rights of children [who have] been used as cheap ends in political machinations”.

5. The information war

The military components and the opponents of democracy have also used their financial resources to artificially inflate their support online, through the usage of astroturfing campaigns (fake grassroots efforts that primarily focus on influencing public opinion).

With much of the Sudanese battle for public opinion occurring online, Reuters (19 October) note that the 30% of Sudanese with internet access “depend heavily on social media for news, in a report that Facebook closed two large networks targeting Sudanese users linked to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and supporters of the former regime agitating for a military takeover.

In both networks, posts mimicked news media but offered skewed coverage of political events. The Sudanese Information ministry said former regime loyalists were “working systematically to undermine the transition and tarnish the image of the government”. Representatives of Valent Projects, a firm contracted by the ministry to find the networks, said the networks were “agitating for a military takeover [amid pro-military protests], and in the aftermath of the coup attempt,” as they try to give the impression of grassroots support for anti-civilian protests.

Nonetheless, despite the artificial inflation of anti-democratic or anti-civilian sentiments, they still exist in the form of grievances against the civilian government. 

6. Grievances against the civilian government

Participants in the pro-military protests expressed several grievances with the civilian component of the government, namely: their exclusionary tendencies and neglect of the marginalised peripheries.

Some protesters complained that that the government overlooked other states beyond Khartoum (AFP, 17 October). Meanwhile, protester Ibrahim Ishaaq said the government is dominated by only four political parties, and Sudan will never have stable government if a small group makes decisions. Similarly, protester Muhiddeen Adam, a member of Minnawi’s SLM faction, said: “few political forces want to drive [Sudanese] policy by the same policies of the previous administration… and these policies will never take us anywhere" (Voice of America, 18 October).  

Thus, as BBC Africa analyst Magdi Abdelhadi noted, the demonstrations were not solely pro-army, but also featured those accusing the [FFC-CC] excluding other groups from the transition (BBC, 20 October). Indeed, grievances towards the performance of the civilian government were also head by democratic advocates, who warned that the civilian political parties are repeating the same historic mistakes that caused the failure of Sudan’s previous democratic transitions.

7. The same historical mistakes / The performance of civilian government

 Sudan’s previous democratic attempts, which followed the civilian uprisings of 1964 and 1985, both lasted less than five years, after they failed for the same reasons: a broad-based coalition of civilian political parties failed to develop solutions for Sudan’s complex problems, as they were pre-occupied with infighting, thereby inviting the military to take power under the guise of restoring order (Sudan In The News, 12 August).

Indeed, Abdelhadi argues that a fundamental flaw of Sudan’s political class since independence in 1956 is: “the tendency to fragment and splinter…failure to compromise and build consensus paved the way for the military to step in, to mount coups under the pretext of rescuing the country from the chaos inflicted upon it by politicians” (BBC, 20 October).

The repeat of history is happening today. Yezid Sayigh of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted that the military shifted to more assertive approach to dealing with civilian political parties after the latter proved disunited (Independent, 19 October), with Reuters’ (8 October) military source blaming the political crisis on civilian politicking and mismanagement, saying: “the root of the problem is the divergence of the parties that are controlling the FFC from the transitional constitution by monopolizing power”.

Wael Mahjoub, a pro-democracy writer, also blamed the crisis facing Sudan’s democratic transition on the FFC-CC, suggesting that it has become a club for the career advancement opportunities and party quotas. Mahjoub blames the FFC-CC for the military’s growing threats to the democratic transition, citing its: weakness, inaction, poor choice of officials, concessions, gasping for positions and infighting (al-Rakoba, 14 October).

Similarly, Sabah Mohammed al-Hassan argued that the civilian government’s weakness, silence, concessions and “turning a blind eye” to their legitimate and guaranteed rights encourage the military to threaten the democratic transition (al-Rakoba, 14 October).

Solutions 

Proposed solutions directed at civilian politicians included: a more confrontation stance towards the military, attempts to mend their relationships with the street, and to create transitional institutions, with Hamdok called upon to reshuffle his Cabinet. The US were called upon to apply pressure on the military to support the democratic transition. 

1. Confrontational stance

Sabah Mohamed al-Hassan called for the civilian government to adopt a more confrontational approach towards the military component of the government, by making strong decisions that deter the military component, thereby restoring its revolutionary standing. Arguing that “passive silence will achieve nothing but humiliation,” she credits civilian sovereign council member Mohammed al-Faki’s confrontational stance for igniting anger in army commander-in-chief, and Sovereign Council chairman, Lt. Gen al-Burhan - “until he reached a point of bankruptcy” (al-Jareeda, 14 October).

 2. Hamdok cabinet re-shuffle

On the day that pro-military protesters held demonstrations against a civilian government “facing a growing crisis that could topple its rule”, analyst Hassan Ali called for Prime Minister Hamdok to deal with the grievances by partly reshuffling his Cabinet or expand the number of ministers, alongside setting a timetable for the composition of the legislative assembly and taking steps toward organising a general election (Voice of America, 18 October).

 3. Reforms of institutions

Political analyst Dr. al-Shafee’ Khidr argued that the political and social polarisation may lead Sudan to a situation of civil war as in Syria, Yemen and Libya. Thus, Dr. Khidr proposed solutions including: reducing the Sovereign Council to five or six members, reviewing the performance of all council members, forming a Cabinet of professional competencies rather than partisan or regional quotas, reforming the justice system and civil service appointments, the investigation of accusations against the anti-corruption committee retrieving the assets of the former regime, the immediate formation of independent national commissions, with priority given to the commissions of constitution-making, the constitutional conference, and elections.

The national commissions, in addition to fulfilling their well-known tasks, will also achieve widening participation in the transitional and state administration bodies, Dr. Khidr suggested (al-Quds,18 October).

 4. Mending civilian politicians’ relationship with the street

Arguing that the crisis facing Sudan’s democratic transition is the inevitable result of the inaction of the Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FFC-CC), Wael Mahjoub calls for the FFC-CC to “solve their problems with the neglected streets,” through transparency, practising the virtue of self-criticism and holding accountable its cadres who caused the “political collapse”. To resist military coup attempts, Mahjoub concludes with calls for the mass movement to reorganise itself through a new alliance of revolutionary forces that is not led by “the same forces whose political and executive practices led to the disappearance of the slogans and goals of the revolution” (al-Rakoba, 14 October).

5. US pressure on the military

Yezid Sayigh of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said that civilians’ “only possible hope” is “an unambiguous public stance from the US warning against any form of a military takeover and hinting at the possibility of Sudan losing access to the IMF and World Bank etc., could have a huge effect on the Sudanese military’s behaviour” (Independent, 19 October).

#SudanUprising Military coup attempt report: Sudan's democratic transition threatened by growing tensions between military and civilian components of government

Summary

1. Events

A failed coup attempt has triggered a crisis in relations between the military and civilian components of Sudan’s government. After Sudan’s military leaders blamed the coup attempt on the performance of the civilian government, they also withdrew security from civilian government figures and key buildings. In response to the escalation, an estimated 20,000 civilians protested in support of a civilian-led democratic transition.

 2. Analysis

The words and actions of Sudan’s military leaders have been considered a threat to the democratic transition, culminating in analysts raising the prospect of military utilising the coup to justify its prolonged hold on power ahead of its required transfer of the leadership of Sudan’s highest political authority to civilians. Furthermore, the events of the failed coup led to a proliferation of articles in the Sudanese media which reflected public scepticism over the military’s version of events.

  3. Solutions

Thus, among the solutions proposed, to both the Sudanese and international policymakers, are more transparency over the coup, alongside helping the civilian government to avert further coup attempts by achieving the political and economic goals demanded by the Sudanese public.

1. Events

In developments that are considered dangerous to Sudan’s democratic transition, tensions are escalating between transitional ruling partners amid a crisis between the civilian and military components of the government.

• 1.1 The hostilities were triggered by a failed coup attempt.

•  1.2 The coup was reportedly masterminded by Major General al-Bakrawi, who the Sudanese media have profiled as an Islamist.

• 1.3 Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok blamed remnants of Omar al-Bashir’s ousted Islamist regime.

• 1.4 However, the civilian government’s political and economic mismanagement was blamed for triggering the coup attempt by Sudan’s military leaders - the chairman of the ruling Transition Sovereign Council Chairman, Sudan’s highest authority, and commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces - Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan – and his deputy in the Sovereign Council, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia – Himedti.

• 1.5 Senior civilian government figureheads responded that al-Burhan and Himedti’s comments were a threat to the democratic transition.

•    1.6 Sudan’s military leadership then withdrew their protection of civilian government personnel and the nationwide offices of Sudan’s anti-corruption committee. 

•   1.7 An estimated 20,000 Sudanese protests what they view as a threat to the democratic transition.

•   1.8 The UN offers to mediate between the civilians and military, with western states emphasising their support for Sudanese democracy. A US official said that anti-democratic actions in Sudan put US support at risk.

1.1 How the coup unfolded

 Multiple sources (21 September) reported that Islamist troops loyal to Sudan’s ousted dictator Omar al-Bashir launched an attempt at a military coup. 21 officers and a number of soldiers were detained in connection the coup attempt, and a search continued for others (Reuters, 21 September).

Following “intense” military activity in Khartoum and nearby Omdorman, the main bridge across the River Nile was shut. In the early hours of the morning, shooting was heard near a military base housing a tank division in Omdurman. Shortly after that, a news flash on state TV said that a coup attempt had been thwarted. The coup plotters had tried but failed to take over a building housing the state media (BBC, 21 September). According to Defence Minister Lt. Gen. Yassin Ibrahim, the leader of the coup was the commander of the Armored Corps based in al-Shajara camp in South Khartoum, Major General Abdalbagi Alhassan Othman Bakrawi (Reuters, 21 September).

A “well-informed” military source provided al-Taghyeer (22 September) with further information on how the coup plot unravelled. Al-Bakrawi and his group launched the coup at three in the morning by preventing the commander of the Armored Corps from entering his office. However, they were unable to seize control of any institution or road. “After learning of the failure of their attempt, they allowed him to enter his office”, the source added. Al-Bakrawi and his group were then locked in another office until they were handed over to Military Intelligence. Al-Taghyeer’s military source denied that negotiations occurred, stating the plotters surrendered on their own, and that they will be charged with undermining the constitutional order, although their whereabouts were not revealed.

1.2 The reported mastermind – Who is Al-Bakrawi?

The Sudanese media provided details on the reported mastermind of the coup attempt, Major General al-Bakrawi. Al-Jareeda (22 September) profiled the alleged coup leader, in a headline that described him as a Koz (Sudanese dialect for a supporter/member of al-Bashir’s regime) from Kosti, a city on North Kordofan. Al-Bakwari was recruited to the Islamist party, the National Islamic Front (the NIF – the predecessor to the dissolved former ruling National Congress Party), in his second year of secondary school. After working for the NIF during the 1986 elections, he obtained a master's degree in military sciences from Sudan and Malaysia, and a fellowship from the Sudan Academy of Administrative Sciences.

In comments made to al-Taghyeer (22 September), a “high-ranking military source” said that al-Bakrawi served a six-month military suspension following the ouster of Omar al-Bashir, following his arrest after an audio recording went viral where he pledged to “eliminate the Rapid Support Forces with a single tank”. He was also accused of insulting Rapid Support Forces commander-in-chief, Sudan’s currently deputy chairman of the ruling Sovereign Council, Himedti (al-Jareeda, 22 September).

Al-Bakrawi’s military detention caused health issues which forced him to travel to Cairo where diabetes-induced gangrene led to an amputation, before he returned Khartoum a week before the coup attempt (al-Taghyeer, 22 September).

According to Sudan Tribune (21 September), when al-Bakrawi was in Cairo, he is suspect to have planned the coup attempt with other Sudanese Islamists in Egypt.  Al-Taghyeer’s (22 September) military sources also said the second-in-command of the foiled coup was deputy major at the armored forces who had a very faithful following.

1.3 Hamdok reacts

Following the coup attempt, in a speech which emphasised need for security sector and army reforms, Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok said the coup was orchestrated “by parties inside and outside the armed forces,” and that it was “another attempt of the remnants of the former regime to abort the civil democratic transition [which was] prepared extensively, as witnessed by the lawlessness”, citing unrest in eastern Sudan which saw highways blocked, ports closed, oil production disrupted and continuous incitement against the civilian government (Radio Dabanga, 21 September).

1.4 Al-Burhan and Himedti’s comments

 The civilian government selected by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition were blamed for the coup attempt by Sudan’s military leaders – the chairman of the ruling Transition Sovereign Council Chairman, Sudan’s highest authority, and commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces - Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan – alongside his deputy in the Sovereign Council, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia – Himedti.

Immediately after the coup was foiled, al-Burhan visited army corps at al-Shajara camp in south Khartoum, where the attempt reportedly originated, where he said: “the armed forces are leading the change and take it wherever they want” (Radio Dabanga, 22 September). Al-Burhan also went on to say that the military are “the guardians of Sudan’s future, despite anyone's objection” (Radio Dabanga, 23 September). Controversially, al-Burhan said: “[the military] are protecting [the revolution] from the [civilians who want to steal it]” (Reuters, 22 September).

Indeed, both al-Burhan and Himedti accused civilian politicians of opening the door to the coup attempt by neglecting public welfare while they were consumed by internal squabbles. Both said that civilians were pre-occupied with fighting over power positions, with al-Burhan saying that “no political party [seeks to] address citizen’s problems” and Himedti accusing civilian politicians of creating opportunities for repeated coups because they failed to address public concerns. “The military is met with humiliation and insults day and night, so how can there not be coups?”, Himedti asked (Reuters, 22 September).

1.5 Civilian government responds to al-Burhan and Himedti’s comments

Civilian leaders in the transitional government reacted vociferously to the comments made by Sudan’s military leaders which expressed anti-civilian sentiments. Al-Burhan’s statement of the military’s guardianship over the transition was described as a "direct threat to the transitional period" by Cabinet Affairs Minister Khalid Yousif, who stressed that any setback or violation of the transitional Constitutional Document will be faced by the Sudanese street, and that the military component has to pick between implementing the constitutional document or confronting Sudanese people (Sudan Tribune, 23 September).

Similarly, Mohamed al-Faki, the civilian spokesman of the Sovereign Council, also rejected al-Burhan’s statement that the military are the guardians of the democratic transition. adding that al-Burhan’s comments about divisions in the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) aim to give the military the control of the transition in Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 25 September).

The FFC coalition which occupies civilian government positions also responded to al-Burhan and Himedti’s statements blaming civilians for the coup attempt, labelling them: “a setback to the agenda of the revolution and the democratic transformation”, which contained “a load of fallacies and baseless accusations against the FFC”, which constitute “a direct threat to the democratic transition as they attempt to create a rift between the forces of the civil revolution and the armed forces of the people, and undermine the foundations on which the revolution was based” (Radio Dabanga, 24 September).

Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok disputed al-Burhan’s allegations that civilians seek to exclude the military from the transition, stating that he discussed his initiative "The Way Forward" with al-Burhan and Himedti. (Sudan Tribune, 23 September).

1.6 Military withdraws security from civilians

 The war of words between the military and civilian components of the transitional government escalated after relations worsened following the withdrawal of security forces charged with protecting the headquarters and 22 properties of the Empowerment Removal Committee, upon the request of al-Burhan. The committee - whose purpose is to dismantle the political and financial apparatus of [former dictator Omar al-Bashir’s] regime… has been criticised by the military generals participating in the transition, who served under al-Bashir” (Reuters, 26 September).

Upon the request of the Committee, hundreds of activists turned up at its Khartoum offices declaring their readiness to fill the security vacuum. Addressing the crowd Mohamed Al-Faki said his official protection had also been withdrawn, and that the building may turn into a centre of confrontation and resistance if necessary (Multiple sources, 27 September). Al-Faki also said: “if there is any threat to the democratic transition we will fill the streets” (Reuters, 26 September), with Cabinet Affairs minister Khaled Omar labelling the withdrawal of guards “a part of a series of developments aimed at undermining the transitional period (Multiple sources, 27 September).

Meanwhile, protests erupted across Sudan - in Khartoum, al-Gadarif, North Kordofan, Darfur, the Red Sea, Northern and White Nile states – in solidarity with the Empowerment Removal Committee after the removing of its military guards, although the committees’ office in Central Darfur was plundered in the absence of security provisions (Radio Dabanga, 28 September).

In efforts to mediate the escalating tensions between the military and civilian components, head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)

said the UN was ready to hold comprehensive dialogue between the partners of the transitional period, calling on Sudan’s ruling partners to reduce escalation and media exchanges and focus on dialogue and cooperation instead (Radio Dabanga, 28 September).

However, in a “confrontational” tone, Himedti said: “the international community cannot threaten us…it was civilians that blocked the streets…the armed forces are not responsible for the insecurity” (Radio Dabanga, 27 September).

1.7 Protests supporting civilian rule

 Sudanese security forces fired tear gas to break up a demonstration in Khartoum by an estimated 20,000 people in support of a civilian-led transition to democracy. Protesters chanted “the army is Sudan's army, not Burhan's army". A statement issued by the Sudanese Professionals Association said: “The objective of these marches is to protect Sudan’s democratic transition and there is no way to achieve that without ending any partnership with the military council” (Multiple sources, 30 September).

1.8 International reactions

 As noted by Jonas Horner, senior Sudan analyst at the International Crisis Group a successful coup may have meant the end of international aid dollars that the new government has been increasingly successful at getting (Washington Post, 21 September).

Indeed, the coup was condemned, and support for Sudan’s democratic transition was emphasised by the UN Security Council (Sudan Tribune, 23 September), alongside the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the Sudan Troika (the US, UK and Norway) and African Union (Radio Dabanga, 22 September), alongside the EU and the Friends of Sudan group (the aforementioned states and intergovernmental bodies, and France, Germany, KSA and the UAE). The spokesperson for the US Department of State, Ned Price, said that US mobilisation of substantial assistance to Sudan will be advanced as Sudan makes “continued progress in its ongoing transition” (Radio Dabanga, 23 September).

Furthermore, the U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Jeffrey Feltman, warned that actions against the civilian-led government in Sudan will put US support at risk. In a meeting with Prime Minister Abdallah, Feltman condemned the failed coup attempt, underscoring that such attempts might lead "the Congress to stop supporting Sudan," said Hamdok’s office. In December 2020, the US Congress passed the "Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020", which aims to tighten oversight of the Sudanese security and intelligence forces, including an assessment of the security sector reforms which should lead to militias’ merging with the regular army and strengthening civilian control of the military sector (Multiple sources, 30 September).  

2. Analysis/issues:

•   2.1 Contradictions: The military and civilian components of the government initially gave conflicting accounts as to who was behind the coup attempts. Senior army officers contradicted the Minister of Information and the Prime Minister, who blamed Islamist loyalists of the former regime.

• 2.2 The previous regime: While the coup attempt is argued to reflect the ongoing influence of the former regime, civilians accused al-Burhan of facilitating the attempt by not sacking Islamists from the army, while al-Burhan blames coup attempts for the poor performance of civilian government.

•   2.3 Coup risks: Indeed, given public dissatisfaction with the performance of the civilian government, analysts have argued that coup risks remain.  

• 2.4 Anti-democratic comments:  Nonetheless, al-Burhan and Himedti’s anti-civilian comments in the immediate aftermath of the coup have labelled as threat to the democratic transition, or a precursor to a coup.

• 2.5 Military power-grab: As we edge closer to the date in which the leadership of Sudan’s highest authority, the ruling Sovereign Council, must be handed over from the military to civilians, civil society voices suspect that the military leadership played a role in the coup attempt, as foiling it would enable them to justify their prolonged leadership on security grounds.

• 2.6 Was it a real coup?: Indeed, the proliferation of articles in the Sudanese media that were sceptical about the official version of events surrounding the coup suggests that credence is given to the suspicions of coup being used as a military power-grab. Numerous articles analysed the logistical operations of the coup attempt to question whether it was real.  

2.1 Contrasting accounts of Islamist involvement in the coup

As mentioned earlier, in his speech which immediately followed the coup attempt, Hamdok said it was orchestrated “by parties inside and outside the armed forces,” and that it was “another attempt of the remnants of the former regime to abort the civil democratic transition (Radio Dabanga, 21 September).  

Indeed, Hamdok’s statements were backed up by Minister of Information, Hamza Balol, who affirmed that civilians were involved in the planning of the attempted coup. Balol accused remnants of Omar al-Bashir’s deposed regime of being complicit in the failed coup in an attempt to regain power in the country, adding that efforts are ongoing in pursuing remaining members of the dissolved regime who aided in the attempt to overthrow the government (al-Taghyeer, 22 September).

However, the Prime Minister and Minister of Information were contradicted by senior officers in the Sudanese army, including spokesman Brig-Gen Tahir Abu Haja, who said that no civilian politicians were arrested in connection with the failed coup attempt. Commander of the Ground Forces, Lt-Gen Issam-al-Din Karrar said the coup plotters comprised of one retired general, with the others are still in service (Sudan Tribune, 22 September).

To further add to the confusion, head of the Sudanese army, Abdulfattah al-Burhan, pointed to the involvement of civilians in the failed coup attempt, “but stopped short of admitting they were Islamists”. Al-Burhan said that the political affiliation of the coup plotters will be disclosed at the end of the investigation (Sudan Tribune, 24 September).

Despite contrasting accounts of whether civilian Islamists were behind the coup attempt, the event has nonetheless triggered analysis that the remnants of al-Bashir’s ousted Islamist regime are working to spoil Sudan’s democratic transition.

2.2 The remnants

According to Brian D’Silva, an analyst on Sudan, the coup reinforces the fragility of Sudan’s democratic transition and indicates the “persistent influence of remnants of Bashir’s regime”. In addition, Yasir Arman, an adviser to Prime Minister Hamdok, called the events “a wake-up call" about support among Islamist forces loyal to al-Bashir and the extent to which they oppose the transitional government (Washington Post, 21 September).

Indeed, Sudanese transition underwent “more than 3 coups during three years” and “the conspiracies against the transitional period will not stop,” according to FFC spokesman Jaafar Hassan (al-Taghyeer, 22 September). Thus, the coup attempt “indicates persistence of opposition to Sudan's new, more inclusive direction", according to Jonas Horner, the senior Sudan analyst at the International Crisis Group (AFP, 22 September).

Potential motivations for the Islamist coup have been provided by Mohanad Hashim, a journalist for government-run Sudan TV in Khartoum, who said that loyalists to former dictator Omar al-Bashir who were blamed for the coup say they are disgruntled with Sudan's tough economic situation (BBC, 21 September). In blaming the Islamist remnants of al-Bashir’s regime, with Salah Halima, former assistant foreign minister, told Al-Monitor (28 September) that “the Sudanese army has become ideological given the large-scale incorporation of Muslim Brotherhood members in the military institutions just like the rest of the state’s institutions”.

While al-Burhan says Islamists would not have the opportunity to seize power if civilian forces stopped quarrelling, Hamdok and the leaders of the FFC attribute Islamist attempts to seize power to al-Burhan delaying the sacking of Islamists from the army (Sudan Tribune, 24 September), with Sudan Tribune (22 September) outright accusing al-Burhan of refusing to sack Islamists from the army.

2.3 Coup risks remain

Despite the failure of the coup attempt, various analysts suggest that the risks of a military coup remain, with some pointing to the failure of civilians in government to achieve transitional goals, both political and economic, as a triggering factor. Indeed, Joseph Tucker, the US Institute of Peace (USIP, 22 September) Senior Horn of Africa expert, warns that Sudanese public frustrations towards a civilian government that has failed to achieve its political goals, and is not sufficiently inclusive of the wider public, “could chip away at popular support for a civilian-led government”.

Arguing that Sudan’s transition “has entered its most difficult period”, Bloomberg (23 September) columnist Bobby Ghosh suggests that Hamdok is at his most vulnerable, amid economic issues triggering public frustration. Although the coup plotters “misread the national mood”, Ghosh warns that there may be other bids to overthrow the government before the elections expected in early 2024.

Similarly, senior Sudanese journalists also warn of future coup attempts. Firstly, Khaled al-Tijani, head of Sudan’s Elaph newspaper, warned that the deteriorating economic and social conditions of Sudan will lead to “more coup attempts, even more violent than this one” (al-Monitor, 28 September). Secondly, Osman Mirghani, the editor-in-chief of al-Tayyar newspaper, warns that a successful coup may still occur amid “the failure of Sudan’s ruling partners to build vital institutions without which the strength of the state will not be upright” (al-Taghyeer, 22 September).  

Mirghani criticises the “frequent” statements of civilian and military officials that they do not expect a coup by highlighting Sudan’s political and economic environments which culminate in the “slackening of citizen reactions to the idea of the coup”. Alongside citing the “corrosive” economy, Mirghani also states that the “political situation cannot get any worse”, amid divided ruling forces that are unable to establish institutions of governance such as Legislative, Supreme Prosecution, and High Judicial Councils and the Constitutional Court (al-Taghyeer, 22 September).

Mirghani adds that these failures are compounded by “the complete absence of any vision and strategic plan that inspires the path of development and renaissance” (al-Taghyeer, 22 September). Waleed Madibo, founder of Sudan Policy Forum, also cited the failure of civilian politicians to form a legislative body to state that there is a “lack of leadership and vision that can lead Sudan out of this quagmire” (Radio Dabanga, 23 September). 

Columnist Shamael Al-Nour also highlights the flaws of the civilians in government. With  the latest events reflecting a :”transitional crisis,” whereby the military and civilians are apprehensive about each-other, she adds that “some civilian circles are not fully prepared for the transfer of the presidency, and “they do not have a clear vision for this process” (al-Yom al-Tali, 22 September).  

2.4 Military leader’s comments threat to the transition

 Al-Burhan and Himedti’s expression of anti-civilian sentiments immediately after the coup attempt triggered a blowback from Sudanese civil society, and suspicions over the democratic commitment of Sudan’s military leaders.

Writing in al-Jareeda (23 September), Sabah Mohammed al-Hassan raised the prospect of the military leaders being connected to the coup attempt in how they spoke about it “with frustration rather than the pride [of successfully thwarting coup attempts]”, and that they attacked civilians rather than the remnants of the former regime, which, according to al-Hassan, “confirms that the remnants have nothing to do with the coup, or the military partnered with them in it”.

The Sudanese Journalist Network (SJN, 23 September) also consider al-Burhan and Himedti’s anti-civilian comments an “advanced step towards the seizure of power”. The SJN further stated that the al-Burhan and Himedti’s comments proved the correctness of its position rejecting the power-sharing agreement with military forces, which put the revolutionaries in “an imbalanced partnership dominated by the military of the former regime, with civilians marginalised”.

Furthermore, Taha Osman Ishag, member of the Anti-Corruption Committee for the Sudanese Professionals Association, said that the statements of the military leaders “are more dangerous than the coup itself”, with “this rhetoric of accusations and threats” hindering a national solution (Radio Dabanga, 23 September).

The timing of the coup attempt culminated in suspicions that Sudan’s military leaders are keen to prolong their hold on power ahead of their requirement to handover the chairing of Sudan’s highest authority to civilians.

2.5 Military prolonging power

Reactions to the coup in the Sudanese and western media highlighted the prominence of a narrative that the coup was motivated by the military’s attempt to prolong its presidency of Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council before it is required, in Sudan’s transitional constitution, to handover presidency to civilians.

However, the date of the transfer of the leadership of the Sovereign Council from military to civilians remains unclear, according to Mohammed al-Faki, the civilian spokesman for the council. Sudan’s 2019 constitutional declaration signed in 2019 set the power transfer to civilians for May 2021, but the Juba Peace agreement of October 2020 reset the clock on the transition without specifying a new date for handover. A simple reset of the clock would set a handover of July 2022. Al-Faki said that the transfer requires discussion and a new legal decree from the Justice Ministry, and that he favours a proposal to conduct the handover in November 2021 (AP, 24 September).

Bloomberg (23 September) state that the Sudanese army is required to surrender its chairmanship of the Sovereignty Council by mid-2022, a step that “would theoretically curtail a monopoly the [army] has had on decision-making for at least a generation [which] could usher in transparency that is rare in the broader Middle East and Horn of Africa regions”. Various analysts have raised the prospect of the military using the coup to justify their prolonged power under the guise of maintaining security.

In his questioning of the army’s account of the coup attempt, Jonas Horner told Bloomberg (23 September) that “the coup presented the military with an avenue to show national and international audiences that they remain integral to the security of Sudan’s transition…they’re saying ‘we’re the only ones that can keep this place together.’”

Similarly, with AFP (22 September) noting that the coup attempt could help in the military's push to prolong their leadership of the sovereign council, analyst Magdi el-Gizouli of the Rift Valley Institute added “the argument will simply be that the country is facing a security crisis that requires that they remain in power…. it’s likely we will continue to hear of similar coups," which reflects the transition's "fragility".  Similar narratives were also present in the Sudanese media.

In Mu’tasim al-Qadhi’s suspicions of ulterior motives behind the coup attempt, it was noted noted that that the military denied reports of a coup ten days before it occurred, before blaming the attempt on civilian incompetence ahead of the transfer of the Sovereign Council presidency to civilians, at a time when the military is accused of failing to maintain security (al-Rakoba, 23 September). Al-Burhan’s comments also lend credence to suspicions that the military could use the foiled coup to justify their power on security grounds, with the chairman of the Sovereign Council saying that the army had intelligence on the coup attempt but waited “to arrest [putschists] in the act so that the coup attempt will be easy to prove” (Sudan Tribune, 24 September). 

Analysts have also inferred that the failed coup is the precursor to a successful one, with Horner telling the Washington Post (21 September) that: “this coup attempt may have been a test…to see how the street reacts”. The Sudanese media has also been rife with analytical inferences that the foiling of the coup attempt merely disguises the military’s intent to prolong power.

Columnist Shamael al-Nour argues “something is being covered up” by the coup attempt, as it is not far away from the date by which the presidency of the Sovereign Council will be transferred from the military to civilians (al-Yom al-Tali, 22 September). Writing in al-Rakoba (23 September), Dr. Mu’tasim Bukhari noted that, with the end of military’s presidency of the Sovereign Council looming, “something is being woven in complete darkness, and there is an intent to do something,” as the military are “in fear and apprehension of the consequences of leaving power in the hands of civilians”.  

Moreover, the proliferation of articles in the Sudanese media that cast doubts about the coup and its motives also tended to question the events of the coup itself, thereby reflecting skepticism around the authenticity of the reports of the coup.

2.6 Scepticism: was it real coup? 

Writing in al-Jareeda (23 September), journalist Haider al-Mikashfi states that: “people did not witness events that indicated coup attempts,” citing the lack of military deployments in strategic locations, and that passengers moved on the streets regularly.

Dr. Mu’tasim Bukhari (al-Rakoba, 23 September) went into granular details in his disputation of the authenticity of the coup attempt, by asking several questions:

Why did the coup leaders not first arrest all political and military leaders? Why was General Command of the Armed Forces was not taken over, nor vital facilities such as the airport, television and communication facilities, and bridges across the capital? Why were the two officers who attempted to get the coup statement broadcasted unarmed, and why were they turned away “like delivery workers who got the address wrong” from the national media centre?

Consequently, Shamael al-Nour (al-Yom al-Tali, 22 September), explained public skepticism towards the authenticity of the coup attempt by questioning whether it was just “restlessness in the army employed to serve a party”, citing “the lack of signs indicating that the country is experience a military coup” and that commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, Abdulfattah al-Burhan, “spoke with friendliness during his visit to the Armored Corps that attempted the coup”. 

With the latest coup attempt being the fifth since the start of the transitional period, al-Mikashfy (Al-Jareeda, 23 September) suggests that the “excess” of reports of coup attempts – and the lack of official information about them - raises public skepticism, whereby the authenticity of the news of the coup attempts is questioned, especially as “not a single one of the masterminds of these coup was brought to trial despite the declaration of their arrest and investigation”, with leaks the perpetrators were released for a lack of evidence.

Furthermore, the Sudanese Communist Party argue that the failure to prosecute those involved in previous coup attempts tempted others to try to take power too (Radio Dabanga, 22 September).  

3. Solutions

 Solutions proposed in the wake of the coup attempt have been directed at both Sudanese and international policymakers.  

3.1 Sudanese policymakers

Transparency over the coup

With the latest coup attempt being the fifth since the start of the transitional period, columnist Haider al-Mikashfy calls for transparency from the military, arguing that the public must be informed of the full facts and details of the coup attempts through a public trial that is broadcasted publicly, “otherwise the latest coup attempt will only be another episode of a continuous series”. Al-Mikashfi suggests that the “excess” of coups, and the lack of information about them, raises public skepticism, whereby the authenticity of the news of the coup attempts is questioned (al-Jareeda, 23 September).  

Islamist purge

Wajdi Saleh, a member of the Empowerment Removal Committee, repeated calls to purge the military and security agencies from the Islamists in order to mitigate the risk of coups d’état and to protect the transition (Sudan Tribune, 21 September).

 Unified armed forces

Noting that differences within both the civilian and military camps “serve as fertile ground for coup attempts”, alongside the Islamist coup risks that are exacerbated by divides within Sudan’s armed forces, Salah Halima, former assistant foreign minister called for a single structure that would bring Sudan’s military and security components under one umbrella” (al-Monitor, 28 September).

Creating governance institutions 

Joseph Tucker of USIP (22 September) calls for the creation of governance institutions, including “the long-delayed” legislative council, the constitutional court and judicial bodies. Tucker particularly emphasises the legislative council, which is “needed to give popular legitimacy and political direction to the transitional government’s decisions and provide space for other political and civic stakeholders to participate”, with the absence of such institutions argued to leave the government vulnerable to coup attempts.

Security sector reform

Tucker also suggests that security sector reform, which would include civilian oversight over the security apparatus, builds consensus around policy that shifts the military’s role from one of regime protection to citizen protection.

Addressing the demands of Sudan’s diverse population

Noting that Sudan’s “long-neglected constituencies” are impatient with the government, Michelle Gavin, Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (27 September) warns that their “frustration is ripe for manipulation by those interested in impeding a transition to genuine democracy”. Thus, Gavin calls upon Sudan’s leaders to address the demands of Sudan’s “complex and diverse population impatient for change that brings about relief from economic hardship and political marginalisation.” 

3.2 International community

 International support for Sudan’s economic recovery

Bloomberg (23 September) columnist Bobby Ghosh calls for the international community to speed up debt-forgiveness and aid for Sudan, as well as encouraging private investment in order to help Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok get the economy on track, and thereby “keep the population on his side”. Ghosh adds that Sudan has been “a shining exception to the trend of democratic retrenchment across much of Africa and a beacon of hope amid the gathering gloom of autocratic populism worldwide,” concluding that “this bright spark of democracy in Africa deserves special consideration.”

 Neutralising military weapons with international help

Questioning the fate of the military-civilian transitional partnership after the failed coup attempt, Mu’tasim al-Qadhi calls for military weapons to neutralised, with the help of the international community, to prevent it from using its weapons to abort the transition to full-fledged democratic civilian rule, which can be helped by the Sudanese diaspora and their relations with international institutions and human rights associations, and their abilities to file cases before international courts (al-Rakoba, 23 September).

US support for Sudanese reformers

Michelle Gavin of the Council on Foreign Relations (27 September) notes that that a democratic and stable Sudan could “play an important bridging role between Africa and the Middle East,” before warning that if the US “neglects to do what it can to support Sudan’s reformers, other states with quite different agendas will surely fill the gap. “

Using the US Congress’ Sudan 2020 Act as a blueprint

USIP’s Joseph Tucker calls on the international community to use US Congress’ 2020 Sudan Democratic Transition Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act as blueprint for support for Sudan’s democratic transition. The act is said to encompass possibilities that include civilian-led security sector oversight and reform (22 September).

#SudanUprising Human Rights: Events in August 2021 reflect further set-backs for women's rights and free media

Summary

Controversial incidents relating to Sudan’s path towards human rights reflect steps backwards. Firstly, famous singer Marwa al-Dawliyah was allegedly attacked and sexually harassed by policemen at a wedding in Bahri (Khartoum North). The attack led the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) to issue a statement that the much-maligned Public Order Law – which has been described as a “law used by policemen to harass women” – is still intact. Secondly, military personnel allegedly attacked journalist Ali al-Dali, leading to an outcry in the media community. 

Key issues identified are: violations against journalists remaining as frequent as they are under the former regime, “half-baked” justifications for the “worrying” increase of security forces’ attacks on unarmed civilians, and the lack of political will from the government to fight sexual and gender-based violence (S/GBV).

The solutions proposed for: justice and support for victims of S/GBV, human rights training for security forces and for the government to abide by international human rights obligations.

Events

Marwa al-Dawliya attacked

Popular singer Marwa al-Dawliyah said she was assaulted and sexually harassed by 13 policemen from the “Community Security division”, which was known as the “Public Order division” during the former regime (SIHA, 15 August). During a police raid on a wedding ceremony in Khartoum North – Sharg Al Nile area, Marwa was assaulted alongside another 8 women and 21 men.

Journalist attacked: Ali Al-Dali

Sudanese journalist Ali al-Dali, a contributor to al-Jareeda newspaper who was “frequently harassed and detained by the former regime”, was in hospital after being beaten senseless, allegedly by military personnel in uniform, after an incident in Khartoum. The Sudanese Journalists Network (SJN) condemned the attack on a journalist who “owned no weapons others than his pen and words”, and called on the journalistic community across the spectrum “to take a strong stand against bullying, which is reminiscent of the practices of Al-Bashir’s military gangs” (Multiple sources, 24 August).

Demonstrations

Radio Dabanga (25 August) report that Sudanese journalists demonstrated against an alleged military assault that hospitalised Ali al-Dali, announcing a three-day boycott of all activities, particularly regarding news on the armed forces. The Ministry of Information and Culture also said the attack was “reminiscent of the former regime” and the ministry said it is working on preparing a law to protect journalists to prevent such practices. 

 Other journalists attacked

The SJN also publicly condemned “the brutal attack on journalist Mohamed El Mustafa by regular armed forces”. The SJN also condemned the “persistent” ill-treatment of journalist Tarig Osman by the reception staff of the Committee for Dismantling the June 30 System and Recovering Stolen Funds, explaining that Osman was subjected to investigation and harassment by the anti-corruption committee’s employees and was denied entry, which means he was denied the right to obtain information (Radio Dabanga, 31 August).

Issues

Harassment of journalists

The SJN state that the violations and harassment practised towards journalists “have unfortunately become as frequent as the violations and harassment practised by the ousted al-Bashir regime” (Radio Dabanga, 31 August).

Half-baked excuses for violence

Following the beating of journalist Ali al-Dali, his colleague Haider al-Mikhashfi writes that all Sudanese security forces offer “half-baked” justifications for violations committed by their adherents against unarmed civilians on the basis they are, and he quotes, "isolated, individual behaviour that has nothing to do with our unit”, with the offenders going unpunished. Furthermore, al-Mikhashfi notes that security elements assaults on unarmed civilian citizens “have increased in a worrying manner,” despite the enactment of legal provisions to prevent the unjustified use of force (al-Jareeda, 26 August).

 Lack of government will against sexual and gender-based violence

Noting the failure from numerous transitional government bodies to condemn the assault of Marwa al-Dawliya, SIHA (15 August) accused the government of lacking political will to address violence against women and girls beyond tokenism, emphasising that “women and girls will still be exposed to such human rights violations perpetrated by state representatives” unless the government commits to “repealing oppressive and discriminatory laws and avail the necessary instruments and resources to end sexual and gender-based crimes in Sudan”.

Solutions

 

Support and justice for sexual and gender and based violence victims

SIHA (15 August) call upon the government to repeal laws that hinder violence victims from accessing justice, enact laws to protect women and girls against sexual and gender-based violence (S/GBV), especially during detention, interrogation, and imprisonment, alongside providing access to medical and psychosocial support for S/GBV survivors by supporting and establishing licensed mental health institutions and building strong and effective referral systems.

Human rights training

Haider al-Mikhashfi calls on the security forces to check the conduct of their personnel by holding “intensive courses on human rights for their staff,” whereby soldiers learn to protect citizens and not take the law into their own hands. He concludes that the assault of al-Dali can be “the last of such misconduct, or else calls for judges to be assigned to investigate before the civilian judiciary will be logical” (al-Jareeda, 26 August).

Government abiding by international human rights obligations

In demonstrations led by the SJN, protestors demanded that the transitional government reform military institutions and the statutory agencies, alongside abiding by the international treaties and covenants signed by Sudan relating to human rights and the protection of individuals. The Sudanese Human Rights Commission stressed the need to take serious legislative and administrative measures, procedures and public policies that are compatible with Sudan’s human rights obligations (Radio Dabanga, 25 August).

Marwa al-Dawliya attacked

Popular singer Marwa al-Dawliyah said she was assaulted and sexually harassed by 13 policemen from the “Community Security division”, which was known as the “Public Order division” during the former regime (SIHA, 15 August). During a police raid on a wedding ceremony in Khartoum North – Sharg Al Nile area, Marwa was assaulted alongside another 8 women and 21 men.

Journalist attacked: Ali Al-Dali

Sudanese journalist Ali al-Dali, a contributor to al-Jareeda newspaper who was “frequently harassed and detained by the former regime”, was in hospital after being beaten senseless, allegedly by military personnel in uniform, after an incident in Khartoum. The Sudanese Journalists Network (SJN) condemned the attack on a journalist who “owned no weapons others than his pen and words”, and called on the journalistic community across the spectrum “to take a strong stand against bullying, which is reminiscent of the practices of Al-Bashir’s military gangs” (Multiple sources, 24 August).

Demonstrations

Radio Dabanga (25 August) report that Sudanese journalists demonstrated against an alleged military assault that hospitalised Ali al-Dali, announcing a three-day boycott of all activities, particularly regarding news on the armed forces. The Ministry of Information and Culture also said the attack was “reminiscent of the former regime” and the ministry said it is working on preparing a law to protect journalists to prevent such practices. 

 Other journalists attacked

The SJN also publicly condemned “the brutal attack on journalist Mohamed El Mustafa by regular armed forces”. The SJN also condemned the “persistent” ill-treatment of journalist Tarig Osman by the reception staff of the Committee for Dismantling the June 30 System and Recovering Stolen Funds, explaining that Osman was subjected to investigation and harassment by the anti-corruption committee’s employees and was denied entry, which means he was denied the right to obtain information (Radio Dabanga, 31 August).

Issues

Harassment of journalists

The SJN state that the violations and harassment practised towards journalists “have unfortunately become as frequent as the violations and harassment practised by the ousted al-Bashir regime” (Radio Dabanga, 31 August).

Half-baked excuses for violence

Following the beating of journalist Ali al-Dali, his colleague Haider al-Mikhashfi writes that all Sudanese security forces offer “half-baked” justifications for violations committed by their adherents against unarmed civilians on the basis they are, and he quotes, "isolated, individual behaviour that has nothing to do with our unit”, with the offenders going unpunished. Furthermore, al-Mikhashfi notes that security elements assaults on unarmed civilian citizens “have increased in a worrying manner,” despite the enactment of legal provisions to prevent the unjustified use of force (al-Jareeda, 26 August).

 Lack of government will against sexual and gender-based violence

Noting the failure from numerous transitional government bodies to condemn the assault of Marwa al-Dawliya, SIHA (15 August) accused the government of lacking political will to address violence against women and girls beyond tokenism, emphasising that “women and girls will still be exposed to such human rights violations perpetrated by state representatives” unless the government commits to “repealing oppressive and discriminatory laws and avail the necessary instruments and resources to end sexual and gender-based crimes in Sudan”.

Solutions

 

Support and justice for sexual and gender and based violence victims

SIHA (15 August) call upon the government to repeal laws that hinder violence victims from accessing justice, enact laws to protect women and girls against sexual and gender-based violence (S/GBV), especially during detention, interrogation, and imprisonment, alongside providing access to medical and psychosocial support for S/GBV survivors by supporting and establishing licensed mental health institutions and building strong and effective referral systems.

Human rights training

Haider al-Mikhashfi calls on the security forces to check the conduct of their personnel by holding “intensive courses on human rights for their staff,” whereby soldiers learn to protect citizens and not take the law into their own hands. He concludes that the assault of al-Dali can be “the last of such misconduct, or else calls for judges to be assigned to investigate before the civilian judiciary will be logical” (al-Jareeda, 26 August).

Government abiding by international human rights obligations

In demonstrations led by the SJN, protestors demanded that the transitional government reform military institutions and the statutory agencies, alongside abiding by the international treaties and covenants signed by Sudan relating to human rights and the protection of individuals. The Sudanese Human Rights Commission stressed the need to take serious legislative and administrative measures, procedures and public policies that are compatible with Sudan’s human rights obligations (Radio Dabanga, 25 August).

#SudanUprising: Hamdok initiative rejected and parties told to prepare for elections as FFC unity remains questionable

Summary

After Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok launched his ‘Road Forward Initiative’ as an attempt to create a national project that solves Sudan’s democratic transition issues, the governing civilian Forces for Freedom and Change (FCC) signed a declaration confirming its unity. However, Hamdok’s ‘Road Forward’ has already faced four resignations, with criticisms of its membership – particularly the inclusion of remnants of the former regime, and the absence of women and the youth. In addition, the FFC’s unity declaration was not signed by two rebel groups that are currently in government – the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Movement, alongside one of Sudan’s largest political parties – the Communists. Indeed, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) maintains its grievances towards the civilian government, and continues to refuse to re-join the FFC.

Meanwhile, Hamdok froze appointments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs following reports that employment was not being granted on the basis of competency, after which the Communist Party alleged that the military component of the Sovereign Council are blocking the employment of communists into the civil service, with the 100-200 communists in the civil service allegedly facing restrictions. Furthermore, political parties have been told to plan for elections, despite their attempts to extend the transitional period.

The solutions proposed have been: greater youth involvement in the democratic transition, for Hamdok to stop “wasting time” on his Road Forward initiative and to focus on his ministerial duties, and for a population census ahead of elections.

Key events

Hamdok – The Road Forward Initiative

Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok announced the initiative ‘National Crisis and Transition Issues - The Road Forward’, “to find a way out of the national crisis and issues of democratic transition” in Sudan. The initiative contains proposals to implement the goals of the Sudanese revolution, solve the economic and political crises in the country, develop a clear a national programme to unify the transitional bloc, and achieve a comprehensive peace by expanding its base. “The decision-making centres in Sudan should work according to a common vision” on “a civil, democratic system of government based on equal citizenship and free and fair democratic elections,” he stated (Radio Dabanga, 23 June).

Hamdok then announced the formation of a mechanism “to create a broad consensus” for the implementation of his ‘Road Forward’ initiative to protect Sudan’s democratic transition. Hamdok explained that his initiative attempts to compensate for failures to create a national project, adding that all responses from the international community were positive (Radio Dabanga, 16 August).

Political Declaration of the Unity of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC)

43 members of the governing Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) signed the Political Declaration of the Unity of the FFC (FFC), which reiterated their unity and determination to achieve the foundation for democratic reforms and to hold general elections at the end of the transitional period. The signed text also stated that the need to build a unified and professional army that reflects diversity and is based on a new military doctrine, which "requires a serious dialogue between civilians and the military to determine the nature of reforms" (Multiple sources, 9 September).

The charter also promised to work together with the military component of the transitional authority to establish support the Empowerment Removal Committee to dismantle the former regime, build the state of law, justice and democracy, alongside pledges to remove the obstacles preventing the formation of the Transitional Legislative Council, the Constitutional Court, the High Judicial Council and the Public Prosecution Council

Civil service employments frozen

Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok announced that a special committee was formed to look into the Foreign Affairs’ ministry’s latest round of appointments, following his review of extensive reports provided by both Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Labour’s civil service selection committee. Foreign Minister Dr. Maryam al-Mahdi also formed her own committee to investigate complaints about the ministry’s recently appointed personnel (al-Taghyeer, 16 August).

Elections

Sudan will start consultations on the preparations for the first free general elections after the collapse of the former regime in April 2019. Sovereign Council member and spokesman Mohamed al-Faki said the council tasked some of its members to launch discussions on the formation of the Electoral and the Constitution-Making Commissions, stressing that preparing for the elections requires discussions on defining constituencies, statistics, the preparation of the civil registry and workshops. Cabinet affairs minister Khalid Omar Yousif said elections could be held in January 2024, although the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) has not set an official date (Sudan Tribune, 20 August).

Issues 

Road Forward initiative rejected

Despite Hamdok’s emphasis that his Road Forward initiative aims to unite all revolutionary forces, it has faced several resignations, including Darfur governor Minni Minawi and eastern Sudanese native administration leaders (Radio Dabanga, 26 August).

 In addition, Radio Dabanga (26 August) also reported on civilian resignations and criticisms. Firstly, professor Hadia Hasaballah announced her resignation from the initiative, stating that the committee’s composition cannot achieve its central goals due to the lack of representation of women and youth. Secondly, Shahinaz Jamal, a member of the Resistance Committees, also submitted her resignation from the initiative, saying that the mechanism contained people who are “part of the crisis”, such as remnants of the former regime and opportunists. She also criticised the fact that the members were not able to choose the composition and structure of the initiative's membership.

Moreover, Hamdok has also been criticised for the initiative. Writer Salah Shu’aib suggests that Hamdok is “wasting time” with his “very generalised” initiative mechanism which culminates in a proliferation of committees that have unclear objectives, and distract him from his ministerial duties. Shu’aib also noted that Hamdok’s initiative is 95% male, before questioning whether it will solve key issues pertaining to Islamists, the former regime, the re-integration of the Sudanese Communist Party and the Professionals Association into the government, alongside economic and security concerns (al-Rakoba, 16 August).  

Non-signatories to declaration

The Political Declaration of the Unity of the FFC was not signed by numerous parties, including the Communist Party (al-Taghyeer, 9 September). They were joined by the Technical Committee for Freedom and Change, which includes a number of parties and movements, including the Sudan Liberation Movement faction under the leadership of Darfur governor Minni Minnawi – who labelled the FFC coalition “liars who are not to be believed” and accused of “clinging on to seats of power”. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which is represented by Finance Minister Dr. Jibril Ibrahim, also said it is not part of the political declaration, explaining that “meetings did not take the comments of the movement seriously”, calling the declaration an “incomplete vision in a way that does not achieve comprehensive unity” (Radio Dabanga, 9 September).

FFC divisions

Despite Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s calls upon the leaders of the FFC to exert more effort to integrate holdout groups into the governing coalition, the latter groups told Hamdok that they request a delay of the appointment of governors, the formation of the legislative council and the prioritisation of FFC coalition structure reforms. Indeed, as noted by Sudan Tribune (2 August), divisions within the FFC factions hampered the formation of the legislative council and delayed reforms to be enforced by the transitional government, alongside weakening Hamdok’s government.

One of Sudan’s largest opposition parties, the Sudanese Communist Party, rejected calls to re-join the FFC, due to its opposition to the transitional government’s economic reforms, among other issues. 

Communist party refusal to rejoin FFC

The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) withdrew from the FFC in November 2020 and called to bring down Hamdok’s government in April 2021, as it “did not want to bear the responsibility of the unpopular economic reforms” (Sudan Tribune, 29 August), with SCP spokesman Fathi Fadl telling Sudan Tribune (16 August) that the party did not abandon the slogan of overthrowing the transitional government, as the government "failed to implement the demands of the revolutionaries”, and that the Communists reject “foreign dictates”, in reference to the government’s implementation of IMF-monitored economic recommendations.

The SCP also criticises the slow pace of government efforts to achieve peace and justice, particularly targeting the approach adopted in negotiations with the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebel coalition ahead of the Juba peace agreement of 3 October 2020 (Sudan Tribune, 16 August). The Communists voiced their opposition to the Juba peace process as it excluded FFC forces at the expense of armed components. “The government did not develop a plan to address the roots of the problem”, said Siddiq Youssif, a leading SCP figure, "rather, it focused on reaching an agreement with the armed groups based on the power and wealth sharing” (Sudan Tribune, 29 August).

Allegations of military interference in the civil service

Although Khalid Omar Yousif, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, declared that reform to the civil service sector in Sudan is one of the transitional government’s top priorities (al-Taghyeer, 19 August), the foreign ministry is facing allegations that it is not hiring based on competence, following reports that applicants are being rejected despite passing exams, at the expense of those who failed (al-Taghyeer, 16 August).

Indeed, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) alleged political interference in civil service employment, accusing the military component of the Sovereign Council of seeking to prohibit the employment of its members, “particularly in the ministries of finance and foreign affairs,” SCP Spokesman Fathi Fadl told the Sudan Tribune (31 August).

Fadl alleged that 100-200 SCP members in the ministries of foreign affairs, finance, health and education are subjected to restrictions because of their political affiliation. "Attempting to politicize the civil service and attacking the communist workers can turn into a sword directed at any unwanted servant who by the influential parties in power," he added.

Fadl said that the applicants for the foreign ministry were surprised that the civil service interviews included a direct question: "Are you a communist or not?"

Parties not prepared for elections

Sudan Tribune (20 August) note that some non-FFC groups call for early elections as “the transitional government failed to achieve revolutionary goals,” although the Communist Party says a new constitution must be adopted beforehand, with numerous political forces keen to delay the elections in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of previous failed transitions.

However, columnist Zahir Bakhit al-Faki, accused Sudan’s transitional authorities of “enjoying power”, in article thanking the US for reminding the government of the elections. Al-Faki argues that Sudanese politicians are keen to extend the duration of the transitional period as their “current squabbling for government offices and their benefits” suggests that they preserve power “because of their conviction that they will not win in the elections due to their lack of popular bases.” Al-Faki adds that the voter, “in this time of enlightenment,” is difficult for politicians to win over as “this requires instruments these politicians do not have” (al-Jareeda, 4 August).

Solutions

Youth involvement in the transition

US NGO the Carter Centre (5 August) call for Sudan’s government to prioritise youth involvement in government   decision-making   by   identifying   and developing regular channels for them  to  express  their  views, and implementing a youth-focused  outreach strategy  with  the  aim  of  sharing  information and engaging youth participation.

Civilian Sudanese democrats are called upon to establish coalitions around employment, health care, and the rising cost of living—the top priorities of youth across Sudan. The international community were called on to seek youth input on initiatives and encouraging Sudanese stakeholders to do the same, alongside supporting training for youth on discerning the accuracy of information, within the overall goal of fostering a transparent social media environment.

Hamdok requested to stop “wasting time”

Salah Shu’aib (al-Rakoba, 16 August) calls for Prime Minister Hamdok to “save time and energy” by allowing the transitional partners’ council, the alternative to the proposed legislative council, to handle Hamdok’s democratic transition mechanism and Road Forward initiative. With elections due in two years, Shu’aib suggests that Hamdok should prioritise improving his executive performance, particularly fixing economic, social, information, diplomatic and cultural shortcomings, which is “the meaning of the revolutionary authority he was given”, instead of “wasting time”.  

Population census

Ahead of the elections, the Sudanese Communist Party stress that a population census should take place, in order to take into account the demographic changes that have occurred in Sudan due to internal conflicts (Sudan Tribune, 29 August).

EXCLUSIVE REPORT: The next Sudanese general election is scheduled for 2022, but are the political parties ready?

Sudan In The News is a youth-led organisation currently developing a project to enhance Sudan’s democratic culture and enhance the political participation of Sudanese youth. For further information on our project and potential partnership opportunities, please contact sudaninthenews@gmail.com

Introduction

Representatives of Sudan’s Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a broad coalition that includes political parties currently sharing civilian government positions, want the transitional period to be extended as they claim that the political parties are not ready for elections. This exclusive report finds out why this is the case - with strong signs that more work needs to be done to develop Sudan’s democratic culture by building bridges of understanding between the political parties and a public that does not trust them.

With Sudan’s elections scheduled for 2022 set to herald the end of the transitional period, various well-informed analysts project that military rule in Sudan will be restored, thereby putting the nail on the coffin containing Sudan’s democratic dreams. The foundation of such projections lies on the premise that Sudan’s current uprising is destined to follow the same trajectory of the previous civilian uprisings of 1964 and 1985 – whereby a broad coalition of civilian political parties was unable to govern effectively. Deficient of strategies, visions and solutions to solving Sudan’s problems, on top of an inability to gain legitimacy among the public, the uprisings of 1964 and 1985 eventually saw the military step into the gap created by the civilian politicians within less than five years of the initial uprising.

Sudan In The News’ report set out to conduct research on whether the FFC face the same issues as their counterparts of yesteryear. This report synthesises key events, alongside a range of insights from political experts  - particularly within Sudan – which indicate that the FFC’s relationship with the public is strained. In addition, we exclusive spoke to four people – two of whom are formally involved in the FFC, and two politically informed members of the electorate who the FFC parties seek the support of.

Summary

• The parties need an extended transitional period: 30 years of Omar al-Bashir’s totalitarian regime prevented the parties from engaging with the public. FFC representatives believe that the transitional period of three years is too short for Sudan to build the democratic culture needed for elections.

•   The parties are viewed as lacking ideas and solutions: While this has been attributed to the legacy of dictatorship which forced them to prioritise short-term survival rather than long-term policy development, alongside Sudan’s brain drain, sentiments that the parties lack strategies, visions, ideas and solutions are contributing to perceptions that they seek to hold onto power for the sake of it, culminating in distrust towards the parties.

• Public distrust towards the parties: Another factor causing distrust towards the parties is Sudan’s limited experience with democracy, and by extension, lack of interpersonal trust on a societal level.

•    Communication is the main obstacle preventing the parties and the public from understanding each-other: Furthermore, the public and the parties are unable to understand each-other and communicate in a productive matter due to logistical communication issues such as: Sudan’s scarcity of independent media free from government control, alongside the parties’ lack of mass communications expertise and resources, and their continuation of “old-fashioned” communication techniques. In addition, the FFC’s discursive tendency to blame the ousted regime for Sudan’s low standards of living is said to be a “currency of short validity”. All factors contribute to gaps of understanding between the parties and the general public.

• Lack of appeal to the youth: Despite Sudan’s youthful demographics, the political parties are not attractive to the youth, who are said to prefer engaging with civil society organisations and Resistance Committees. A young Sudanese respondent noted that many youth feel “betrayed” by the parties.

•   Political participation excludes women: Sudanese political institutions are said to be patriarchal, sexist and uninviting of women through exclusionary practises that hinder the political participation of women. This is reflected in poor representation for women and the lack of pro-women’s policy production.

• The “traditional” sectarian parties are most likely to have electoral success: There is also the belief that the main benefactors of elections in 2022 will be the traditional sectarian parties such as the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionists, who are able to utilise their past experience of mobilising clan and tribal networks. Three respondents noted that such parties and their “religious following” do not build support on the basis of their programmes and visions for solving Sudan’s issues, with one saying that the victory of the traditional parties on the basis of “exchanging favours” contradicts their vision of a democratic Sudan where politics is a battle of “ideas and visions”.

• Projections: With all of these factors resulting in the FFC parties’ inability to develop or articulate solutions for Sudan’s problems and thus gain public legitimacy through popularity, analysts project that military rule will be restored – as previously occurred in Sudan’s history.

History of Sudan’s democratic transitions

To help us identify the issues that need to be solved to consolidate democracy during the current democratic transition, it is important to know the history of Sudan’s previous civilian uprisings, the brief democracies that followed them, and the circumstances that triggered military restoration.

1964-1969: From the October Revolution to Ja’afar al-Nimeiry’s military coup

The key transitional issues that followed the 1964 revolution bear similarity to the 2019 uprising: conflict exacerbated by the inability to agree on a constitution that satisfies Sudan’s diversity, as well as chronic economic difficulties. However, unlike in the 2019 uprising, elections were held only a year after the military dictatorship was toppled, after an “unholy alliance” of the sectarian Umma and Unionist parties, alongside the Islamist National Islamic Front, sought early elections. Indeed, G.R Warburg declared that “the transitional period was too short”, as it did not give sufficient time to allow the fragmented coalition of political parties to form policies (Northeast African Studies, 1986).

Out of 173 parliamentary seats, the sectarian Umma and Unionist parties gained 76 and 54 respectively. Despite representing rival movements of Sufi Islamic interpretations, neither could rule without the support of the other. Meanwhile, the “ideological” parties - the Islamists and the Communists - had a limited following primarily confined to intelligentsia in urban centres, culminating in them sharing 16 parliamentary seats and unable to influence policy.

Although the “traditional” sectarian parties were the only parties able to enjoy broad support in Sudan, particularly through mobilising support networks on religious grounds, a consistent criticism of their governance has been a lack of political or economic programmes, which “creates absolute confusion”.

With no solution in sight for Sudan’s economic and security woes, Ja’afar al-Nimeiry staged a military coup in 1969, announcing “we tried liberal democracy in Sudan, it failed, and we will never go back to it”, with an analyst of the time, George W. Shepherd, writing that al-Nimeiry was “certainly correct about the failure of the political parties to deal with the basic problems of Sudan” (Africa Today, 1969).

Nonetheless, al-Nimeiry initially enjoyed the support of the Islamists and Communists, with Warburg attributing their “unholy alliance with military bedfellows” to their weak performance in the 1965 elections that indicated the unlikelihood of their ability to gain power via elections (Northeast African Studies, 1986).

1985-1989: From the April Intifada to Omar al-Bashir’s military coup

After the April 1985 civilian uprising ousted al-Nimeiry, Sudan’s political parties failed to learn from their past experiences and repeated the same mistakes that led to their 1969 overthrow, argues Kamal Osman Salih (Journal of Modern African Studies, 1990).

Again, an election was held after just a year-long transitional period, which culminated in three fragmented and unstable coalition government led by the sectarian Umma party, also featuring the Unionists, and later joined by the National Islamic Front. The first coalition government lasted less than a year. The second was brought down in August 1987 by the Unionists. Sudan was then technically without a government until May 1988, before the third and final coalition government of Umma party leader Sadig al-Mahdi’s premiership was dissolved in March 1989 after the Unionists and Islamists differed on solving the civil war. Three months later, general Omar al-Bashir would take power in an Islamist-backed military coup.

A common trend in all three democratic civilian coalitions was a paralysis of decision-making and policy development on key security and economic issues amid fierce disputes among coalition partners.

Thus, Dr. Willow Berridge, in Civil Uprisings in Modern Sudan (2015) writes: “there was a horrible feeling of ‘history repeating itself’… Sudanese politics seemed to reproduce an apparently inevitable cycle of events, whereby… a period of liberal democracy dominated by political parties relying on patrimonialism more than policy; the cynicism this experience generated then made it possible for the military to seize power once more, as it had done in 1969”.

2019-present: Will history repeat itself?

Worryingly, given the previous experiences of Sudan’s democratic transitions, Institute of Security Studies (June 3 2021) researcher Shewit Woldemichael identifies similarities between the trajectory of Sudan’s current democratic transition and its failing predecessors. In particular, Woldemichael highlights the rifts among the governing coalition of political parties and how they are impediment to policy development on key issues.

1. The key events

In September 2019, Sudan Tribune reported that a high-profile visit to Darfur by political heavyweights from the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition was met by hostile protesters who chanted “no to marginalisation” and threw stones at the politicians. The FFC delegation included Umma Party secretary-general and political veteran Sara Nugdallah, as well as Mohamed Nagy al-Assam, a leader in the Sudanese Professionals Association who is viewed as a poster boy for the uprising against al-Bashir’s regime, and Khalid Omar Yousif, the former secretary-general of the Sudanese Congress Party and currently the Minister of Cabinet Affairs in the transitional government.

Just over a year later, in November 2020, the political parties were met with public displays of hostility in Khartoum. Radio Dabanga reported that Khartoum’s Resistance Committees, grassroots neighbourhood activist networks, stormed out of talks with representatives of FFC parties on Sudan’s yet-established parliament. Clips of Resistance Committee members chanting ‘ya ahzab, kifaya azab’ (you parties, the suffering is enough) consequently circulated social media, with a spokesperson for the committees accusing the parties of “seeking to abort what is left of the revolution:”.

Recently, in a further reflection of public anger towards the civilian side of the government and the FFC parties that comprise it, Sudanese took to the streets to demand the resignation of the government following the lifting of fuel and bread subsides (AFP, 1 July 2021­­)  

2. Why are the parties unpopular?

When the uprising was in its infancy, analytical observers had already identified a weakness in the FFC’s claimed leadership of the revolution and democratic transition – that there was no clear plan for solving Sudan’s problems after protests toppled the dictator Omar al-Bashir. As criticism of the FFC’s strategic planning continues now that they are in government, other issues highlighted include exclusionary tendencies towards non-FFC civilians, a lack of legitimacy beyond the central areas of Sudan where power historically lies, alongside a lack of popularity among the youth – a crucial demographic ahead of scheduled elections.

Less than a month after protests toppled Omar al-Bashir, Zachariah Mampilly, a Professor of Political Science at Vassar College, identified the Sudanese protest movement’s “struggle to advance a national vision beyond replacing the military with a civilian-led transition” as an obstacle to the democratic transition (Foreign Affairs, 2 May 2019). Indeed, two years later, veteran journalist Osman Mirghani, the editor-in-chief of al-Tayyar newspaper, told Radio France Internationale (23 April 2021) that “when the FFC signed their declaration, they were looking to remove the dictatorship. What will happen the day after was not considered”.

With the FFC sharing civilian government positions among its representatives, Clingendael, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, in a lengthy report entitled “Consolidating Sudan’s transition” (February 2020), highlighted numerous issues facing the FFC parties during the transitional period, namely: the FFC’s “exclusionary tendencies” towards civilians who are not affiliated or representing its coalition of parties, the lack of legitimacy in the marginalised peripheral regions which will play a pivotal role in deciding the election, and difficulties in meeting public expectations and addressing the fundamental grievances which sparked the flames of revolution.

“Alienating” Sudanese youth

Moreover, the FFC also have trouble connecting with Sudan’s youth, who will be important in the election process, according to Dr. Azza Mustafa, a specialist on democracy and political parties, and until recently, a professor of political science at Alzaiem Alazhari University in Khartoum. Dr. Azza noted that Sudanese youth are not active in “traditional” Sudanese political parties, as they do not find “the old political programmes” attractive and are “alienated” by political parties that do not accommodate them. Thus, Dr. Azza adds, “most of the active young people join civil society organisations [rather than] political parties that still do what they did 50 years ago” (Radio Dabanga, 12 October 2020)

Indeed, upon invitation by the Sudanese Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Carter Center (August 2021), an NGO that aims to advance peace and health worldwide, surveyed 1,023 resistance committees and youth-led organisations across Sudan that formed the basis of a report on the political participation of Sudanese youth which found that:

• A majority of youth are not engaged in national policymaking.

•   Nearly 80% of youth representatives reported that they had not been involved in any government-supported activities since the start of the transition.

• Over 42% said youth had little or no voice in the transitional government, including 14% who said youth lacked any input at all.

Furthermore, in an exclusive interview with Sudan In The News, political analyst and academic at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, Dr.  Ali Abdulrahim Ali, also emphasised the pragmatic importance of the parties connecting with youth. “Sudan has a median age of under 19 and 90% of the population is under 55, [making the Sudan of today] very different from the Sudan that had a freely elected parliament in 1986.” Therefore, adds Dr. Ali, “the political message to address this population must not just be revised, it must be reimagined.”

Given the view that the FFC lacks a vision and strategy to solve Sudan’s issues, alongside public legitimacy issues, it is no surprise that analysts and experts project that Sudan’s democratic transition will end in a return to military rule, in a repeat of Sudan’s previous failed democratic experiments.

3. The risk of military rule

As it stands, Sudan’s current democratic transition is following the same trajectory as the as the 1964 and 1985 uprisings, whereby “civilian governments lost popular support and were ousted in military coups within less than four years”, argues Shewit Woldemichael of the Institute for Security Studies (18 December 2020). Woldemichael adds that the FFC “needs to develop the democratic culture required to form inclusive institutions and processes.”

Indeed, the prospect of  a military coup triggered by the FFC’s lack of public legitimacy was also raised by  Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, a former Visiting Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (18 March 2020), who warned that military rule may be restored if the FFC fail to organise beyond their “narrow” social base in Sudan’s central Arab regions. Projections that the flaws of Sudan’s political parties will culminate in a return to military dictatorship at the end of the transitional period have also been advanced by influential political journalists inside Sudan.

 Firstly, Osman Mirghani, the editor-in-chief of al-Tayyar, one of Sudan’s few independent media outlets, said that the democratic transition is threatened by the mistakes of civilian politicians who lack “a true vision of what needs to be done… a strategic approach and a plan” which will “enable the military to step into the gap they are creating” (Radio France Internationale, 23 April 2021).

Secondly, Asma Juma’a, the editor-in-chief of al-Democrati (17 December 2020), went a step further and warned that the political parties are the primary threat to the democratic transition. Juma’a echoed Mirghani’s point, arguing that the absence of solutions provided from the parties encourage the military to maintain state control. Furthermore, she added that while parties in countries that have entrenched democracies possess a base of supporters that they gained through their principles, vision and targeted national programmes - Sudanese parties pursue their “own narrow interests rather than offering visions and solutions.”

In summary, various analysts project that Sudan’s democratic transition will end in military rule due to the inability of the parties comprising the FFC coalition to either produce visions and solutions to solve Sudan’s issues, or articulate them and gain public support. In further exploration of the gaps of understanding between the parties and the public, Sudan In The News spoke to four people: two men and two women, of whom one of each was a representative of an FFC party and a young politically informed member of the electorate.   

4. The four people we spoke to

Out of the party representatives Sudan In The News spoke to, firstly, Saif al-Dawla Ahmed, a senior leader in the Sudanese Congress Party, a liberal centre-left party that was formed in 1986.

Secondly, we spoke to a woman who is a member of the New Forces Democratic Movement, also known as the Haq party – a secular party formed in the 1995 by disgruntled leaders in the Sudanese Communist Party. Unfortunately, the woman was unable to speak on-the-record due to professional commitments that do not allow political statements in public, so for the purposes of clarity, her alias in this article is ‘Rofaida’.

Of the politically informed citizens we spoke to, firstly, we spoke to civil society leader Mayada Abdelazim. An economist specialising in development, Mayada Abdelazim is also the co-founder of SheLearns – an organisation that supports women’s education in Sudan. Secondly, we spoke to Dr. Ali Abdulrahim Ali, a political analyst and academic at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies.

5. Are the parties ready for elections?

All four respondents agreed that Sudanese political parties are not ready for elections. Notably, the politicians gave separate reasons in comparison to the electorate.  

Civilian parties lack experience in politics

Both Dr. Ali and Mayada emphasised the inexperience of Sudanese political parties in stating that they are not ready for elections, given that the thirty years of the dictatorship led by Omar al-Bashir leaves the parties with no experience of working within a democratic environment.

Dr. Ali noted that the parties “have been either working underground or accepting political ‘handouts’ of power from the regime,” with Mayada adding that “the way that the political parties have been using to practising politics has never been through elections and gaining real and true acceptance,” citing their reliance on participation through power-sharing deals, coups, supporting dictators or playing a specific role in opposing them.

In addition, Dr. Ali argues that “no experience of proper political practice can come from working under any form of tyranny, and the regime in Sudan now, while not a totalitarian state as the ousted regime, still remains a great deal under the dictates of the military junta.” He concluded that: the bottom line is, the political parties in Sudan, despite decades of experience in political struggle, are in their infancy as rulers.”

Thus, it is no surprise that the politicians we spoke to suggest that parties require an extended transitional period ahead of elections.  

The parties need more time before elections, and the transitional period extended

In calling for an extended transitional period ahead of elections, Saif al-Dawla Ahmed of the Sudanese Congress Party cited factors the following factors that the parties are “suffering: from: “structural organisational problems, on top of the length of interruption between them and the masses (during the 30-year dictatorship regime), which culminates in the emergence of generations that do not know these parties as they should.”  

Similarly, Rofaida of the Haq party said the transitional period must be extended, not because “[the parties] want to hold on to power, [but rather that they are] trying to build a democratic culture in Sudan” in order to avoid repeated the mistakes of previous premature elections.

Most importantly, Rofaida made the distinction between the “younger, modern” parties like her own Haq party and the Sudanese Congress Party, and the traditional sectarian conservative parties such as the Umma Party (NUP) and Democratic Unionists, who she suggests, would be the main benefactors from early elections.

Sectarian parties have a head-start ahead of the elections

According to Rofaida, the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionists, which were formed before Sudan’s independence and have experience of governing, have structural advantages ahead of elections in comparison to their younger modern counterparts, such as financial resources and networks of support, especially in the rural areas.  However, Rofaida alleges the support of the sectarian traditional parties is due to clan networks and strategic alliances with tribal leaders, which is “what we [the modern parties] are trying to change”.

Expanding on the prospect of the traditional parties performing better in the elections, and what it means for Sudan’s democratic culture, she said: “we want Sudanese politics to be a battle of ideas and visions. Not ‘I will vote for this person because this person told everyone in my family to do so’. If the election is decided on the grounds of mobilising sectarian and clan networks then the outcome would be that Sudanese politics will still be decided on the basis of exchanging favours, rather than ideas. This is not a productive environment to consolidate democracy and solve Sudan’s issues.”

Nonetheless, Ali argues that while the traditional parties may win seats in any future parliament and form a coalition government, “[they] are now lead by second or third generation politicians with very limited experience in parliamentary politics or even preparing for elections.”

Perceptions that the parties do not have strategies

The lack of readiness for elections among Sudan’s political parties is also a matter of strategies and priorities, according to Mayada. She said that “in terms of their intentions, it seems like the political parties do not really care about anything. They don’t look like people who want to build manifestos, explain them and market them.”

6. What challenges do the parties face in terms of connecting with the public?

All four respondents said that communication was the key barrier preventing the parties from connecting with the public. 3 of the 4 respondents highlighted logistical issues such as: the absence of independent media and communication expertise. Dr. Ali, however, identified the FFC’s discursive practices as a hindrance to their ability to closely connect with the public .

Communication

3 out of 4 respondents identified communication as a logistical barrier prevent the parties from connecting with the public. On top of noting the pre-existing hindrance to the parties public engagement capabilities caused by 30 years of dictatorship, Saif al-Dawla Ahmed also cited the financial inability of the parties and the “absence of a practicing and trained cadre on communication and mass communication processes.”

The Haq Party’s Rofaida also identified these obstacles, stating that the parties “lack resources and expertise in communicating with the masses”. However, Rofaida highlighted specific aspects that entrench the communication gap between the parties and the public, stating that: “many of the parties are reliant on old-fashioned methods of communicating such as rallies and public meetings, but the new generation are not interested in this.” Furthermore, she adds that the matter is compounded by anti-democratic forces that were affiliated to the ousted regime possessing “the most advanced mastering of social media and mass communications practices”.

In addition, Mayada also suggests that communication is one of the most important barriers between the public and the parties, particularly the absence of independent media. She states that during al-Bashir’s regime “there was no media outlet that was trustworthy and reliable that was reporting from the ground. There were no unbiased media channels. All the big ones that people would follow were monitored by the government.” Mayada added that “the political parties had to opt for alternative methods, primarily social media, which became linked to fake news and rumours”.

FFC Discourse: “a currency of very short validity”

Meanwhile, Dr. Ali identified two challenges facing the FFC’s ability to connect with the public, with both falling into the category of the coalition’s discursive practices. “Their first challenge is to withdraw the discourse of ‘opposition’ and adopt the position and attitude of government.” Dr. Ali adds that the second challenge for the FFC is to manage the expectations of Sudanese people with regards to standards of living, with “the discourse of blaming the former regime [being a] currency of very short validity, and soon these parties will have to take responsibility and answer to the Sudanese people accordingly.”

7. Do the parties have visions and solutions for Sudan’s problems?

Then, we asked our politicians to respond to the accusations that parties lack a vision and strategy for solving Sudanese issues, alongside asking the citizens if they feel that the parties have a vision and strategy. Saif al-Dawla Ahmed of the Sudanese Congress Party agrees that the parties were unable or interested in developing political strategies, although he differentiates between the traditional and modern parties as to why. However, Rofaida says that her party does have visions and solutions for Sudan’s issues, but attributes accusations the accusations to the lack of a platform that allows the parties to articulate their visions before the masses.  

Meanwhile, Dr. Ali and Mayada highlight specific obstacles preventing the parties from developing visions and strategies: namely, how Sudan’s brain drain limits the depth of political participation from those capable of providing the necessary “new and inventive” visions to solve the “chronic economic situation,  alongside the parties’ focus on short-term priorities such as survival. 

“Sectarian parties are not interested in strategies”

Saif al-Dawla argues that the traditional sectarian parties, the Umma Party and Democratic Unionists, are not interested in strategies “as they are electoral parties that depend on their masses, so the course of their competition is to create the largest amount of sectarian, tribal and clan bases and networks, as opposed to building support on the basis of strategies and programs.” Similarly, Mayada notes that many do not trust the sectarian parties, who despite possessing the “biggest base of supporters”, have a predominantly religious following that trusts their leaders as “icons and religious symbols” rather than political figures.

Short-term priorities like survival take precedence over the production of long-term visions and solutions

Nonetheless, Saif al-Dawla attributes the absence of strategy from “modern parties such as the Communist Party, the Sudanese Congress Party and the Baath Party [who] try to base their political competitiveness on the basis of programmes and strategies” to the lack of continued democracy and totalitarian rule.

To supplement Saif al-Dawla’s argument, Mayada provided more granular analysis, telling us that: “in the last 30 years, most parties were in survival mode and did not have enough space to develop well-thought out strategy. Everyone was too busy trying to not get caught, or free their friends who were caught”.

Even now that the FFC are in government, short-term survival continues to take precedence over the long-term development of strategy, notes Ali, who attributes the parties inability to develop strategies and visions to most parties “thinking their chances of political success in a free and fair elections are small,” leaving their priority to “prolong the transitional period, perhaps indefinitely, if they can conspire with the military junta.” Ali adds that this “falls in direct opposition to the Sudanese goal of transforming Sudan into a democracy.”

The lack of platforms to present visions and strategies

However, Rofaida claims that her party, Haq, does have strategies and visions to solve Sudan’s issues, but asks “where can we present it?”. Rofaida states that much of the media in Sudan is subject to the control or influence of the former regime, and that attendants of party rallies tend to be people who already support a party rather than interested observers who need to be won over. Thus, she claims, “the issue for Sudan’s political parties is that many in the public do not know what we stand for.”

Brain drain: talented Sudanese have “little incentive to be part of the political mess”

Dr. Ali identifies Sudan’s brain drain, whereby Sudanese professionals leave the country for economic or social reasons, contributes to situation that culminates in citizens of high potential to contribute to solving Sudan’s issues, are not doing so.  While Sudan’s “chronic economic situation makes a new and inventive vision necessary,” Ali notes that “the talents that can bring about the right visions and ideas are not part of the political parties now. They are mostly a diaspora with little incentive to be part of the political mess in Sudan.”

8. Is there distrust between the public and the parties?

Dr. Ali and Mayada, as citizens with no affiliation to any political party, both confirmed that public views the political parties with suspicion. Both identified Sudan’s lack of democratic tradition as a contributing factor. In part 9, all four respondents explain why youth are not participating politically through the FFC parties, and the importance of the youth ahead of the elections.

Inexperience with democracy

Dr. Ali states that Sudan’s minimal experience with democracy – with Sudan a democratic state state for less than ten years of 65 since independence – means that “there is much distrust towards the political parties from the public.” Dr. Ali adds that democracy in Sudan has “had very little chance to show its merits and all the Sudanese could see in it is the political bickering, weakness, and ineptitude of the political strata,” although he further notes that “this is normal for any nascent democracy”.

Similarly, Mayada told us, “if we are using the approach of comparing Sudanese political practice to the politics practised in mature western liberal democracies, then we are failing. The way the Sudanese state was built does not accommodate liberal democratic political practice, and the evidence of this lies in our experience of coups and civil wars.”

Anti-politician sentiments

Also confirming the public hostility towards the political parties, Mayada said: “there is is a strong sentiment among the public that the parties just want to rule and do not care about the people. The anti-politician sentiment is large and strong. I’m not sure of its origins, but it definitely exists and it makes the job of politicians harder.“

9. Parties relationship with youth

With Sudan’s young population making the youth a crucial demographic target in any pursuit of electoral success, a disconnect between the youth and the parties has been acknowledged. However, while the Sudanese Congress Party’s Saif al-Dawla identifies the former regime as a contributing factor to this disconnect, Mayada notes that many youth felt betrayed by the parties after the horrific incidents of the June 3 massacre. Interestingly, Rofaida says that the parties are competing with the Resistance Committees for the contributions and support of politically active young people.  

Youth do not know the parties

Saif al-Dawla says it is “natural” that the youth do not trust the parties, as “they do not know them and they have been influenced by the media of the previous regime, which has demonised the parties for a period of three decades.”

Youth feel betrayed

However, Mayada, herself a young Sudanese civilian who the parties aim to win over, says the youth do not feel connected to the parties because “a lot of youth lost hope in the parties and felt like they were betrayed,” in the aftermath of the FFC entering a power-sharing government with the military after the June 3 massacre.

Political parties must compete with resistance committees and civil society organisations for youth participation

According to Rofaida, a consequence of the youth’s distrust of the parties is that they are competing with the Resistance Committees for young talent and support. She told us: “many of the visionary Sudanese youth, who have ideas, leadership qualities and the charisma to engage well with the wider public, opt to remain independent of any parties and instead chose to serve or support the Resistance Committees.”

As well as emphasising the need to integrate such youth into the parties, she also said the parties “could do better to engage with the youth on their preferred methods of communication, like social media.”

It is worth noting that, as mentioned earlier in the report, Dr. Azza Mustafa, a specialist on democracy and political parties, and until recently, a professor of political science at Alzaiem Alazhari University in Khartoum, pointed out that “most of the [politically] active young people join civil society organisations [rather than] political parties that still do what they did 50 years ago.” 

Youth are important in the election

Ahead of the elections, there is also strategic importance for the parties in establishing close relationships and gaining the support of Sudanese youth. According to Dr. Ali, Sudan – “with a median age of under 19 and 90% under 55 is very different from the Sudan that last had a freely elected parliament in 1986.” Thus, Dr. Ali suggests that “the political message to address this [young] population must not just be revised, it must be reimagined.”

10. Women’s representation

Finally, the parties have also been accused of excluding women. Mayada blames the wider patriarchal nature of Sudanese politics, while Rofaida alleges a reluctance to adopt radical policies for women’s empowerment.

“Political practice in Sudan excludes women”

 “Women’s representation in Sudanese politics is generally not good” as “Sudanese political institutions are very patriarchal, sexist and not very inviting to women”, explains Mayada, who further notes that “political practice in Sudan is also done in a way that excludes women”. She provided example of political meetings being held late into the evening, “even though many women in Sudan cannot just be outside in public places during these hours of the night.” In addition, Rofaida notes that: “condescending attitudes towards women in politics still prevail. There is this belief that politics is “men’s talk”.

Reluctance to empower women

However, Rofaida also argues that the inclusion of women is more than “just a matter of representation,” citing how the ousted regime had quotas for women’s representation in parliament despite overseeing repression and infringements of women’s liberty. In particular, she points to a “reluctance” among parties to adopt radical visions and solutions for women’s empowerment that are being proposed by women’s rights groups.

Sudan In The News is a youth-led organisation currently developing a project to enhance Sudan’s democratic culture and enhance the political participation of Sudanese youth. For further information on our project and potential partnership opportunities, please contact sudaninthenews@gmail.com

#SudanUprising Human Rights report May 2021: developments, issues and solutions

Protesters killed, activists silenced by Cybercrime laws and civil society rejects a controversial new security law

Summary

In developments that reflected Sudan’s limited freedom of expression, two young protesters were killed during a commemoration of the June 3 2019 massacre. Furthermore, the Cybercrime Act is allegedly being used to stifle dissent, with a proposed Security Bill also viewed as attempt to legally restrict freedom of expression. Another legal development saw major judicial changes whereby the chief justice was sacked and the attorney general resigned.

 The five issues identified in this briefing include: legal and institutional limits on press freedom and freedom of association, with the Cybercrime Act and draft Security Bill identified as causes for concern. In addition, analysts and legal insiders suggest that Sudan’s judicial system lacks the resources and political will to find justice for protest crackdown victims. Indeed, in an exclusive interview with Newlines Magazine, Nabil Adib, the human rights lawyer who leads the committee to investigate the June 3 2019 massacre, said that Sudan will be “destabilised” if he publishes the committee’s finding.

The five proposed solutions for human rights in Sudan include: the adoption of international standards on freedom of expression and use of force, providing for a transparent justice process, rejecting the security bill and reforming the justice system completely.

1. Developments

Deadly protest dispersal

Two young men were shot dead and 37 were wounded after army forces dispersed – with live bullets -  a group of people commemorating the June 3 2019 Khartoum Massacre (Multiple sources, 12 May). The young men were named as Osman Ahmed and Muddathir al-Mukhtar (Sudan Tribune, 13 May).

Attorney general Tajelsir al-Hibr said the injuries of the two killed protesters “may indicate that the shooting was intentional” (Human Rights Watch, 19 May). However, in a statement, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) said that “no instructions were issued to the forces protecting the army command to use live ammunition against the people” (Radio Dabanga, 12 May).

Major judicial changes

Musa resignation was preceded by major judicial changes which saw the sacking of chief justice, Niemat Mohamed Abdallah and the resignation of attorney general Tajelsir al-Hibr. Although is unclear why Abdallah was sacked, Sudan Tribune (18 May) note that the decision has been criticised for delaying importing reforms.

Meanwhile, al-Hibr submitted his resignation several times and had recently protested to the Sovereign Council about decisions made by the Empowerment Removal (Tamkeen) Committee that aims to retrieve the assets of the former regime. Al-Hibr was reportedly unhappy that several prosecutors accused of being close to the former regime were removed without his prior consultation,

Draft security bill

An internal security agency bill has been drafted, providing a new security apparatus powers of arrest for 48 hours without a court order or warrant from the Public Prosecution office (Sudan Tribune, 25 April).  According to Radio Dabanga (26 April), the bill was proposed by Justice Minister Nasreddin Abdelbari, who said the bill was prepared by a limited-membership committee and will be presented to a group of experts on the rule of law, security and democracy, before embarking on the establishment of broad consultative workshops as part of preparations for presentations to the Cabinet.  

Activists charged for “false news”

Activists are being charged in Sudanese courts for spreading “false news” under the Cybercrime Act of 2018. Firstly, human rights activist Khadeeja al-Deweihi was charged under Articles 24 and 25 of the act for a May 13 2020 Facebook post discussing the health situation in Sudan. Al-Deweihi was summoned to appear at the Office of the Prosecutor on December 14 2020, where she was asked about her political affiliation and her engagement with the Communist Party of Sudan (Radio Dabanga, 27 March).

In addition, Orwa al-Sadig, a member of the Tamkeen committee was sued by Sudan’s head of state, Lt. Gen. Abdulfatah al-Burhan and charged with “publishing lies and fake news and committing insults of disrepute” under the Cybercrime Act (Global Voices, 4 March).

Alsadig is under investigation for a solidarity speech he made on behalf of his colleague, Salah Manna, on 6 February 2021. 

 2. Five human rights issues

Press freedom limits (Radio Dabanga, 4 May)

To mark World Press Freedom Day, the Sudanese Journalists Union (SJU) made a statement against the “repression” of journalists in Sudan. The SJU criticised the ongoing operations of the National Press and Publications Council, labelling it “a repressive institution established by the defunct regime”. Radio Dabanga note that the press council oversees the grant of licenses for newspapers, can impose huge fines on publishing houses, and “often hinders the establishment of new newspapers or restricts media outlets’ ability to ‘open up’ since the revolution.” 

According to the SJU, Sudanese newspapers still operate under the “repressive” 2009 law that “the former regime put in place to protect itself, silence mouths and deny press freedom”, which the SJU labels “an obstacle to revolutionary journalism”, enables strict state control over the press and journalism with licensing and approval powers, heavy fines, and criminal sanctions for media outlets and journalists.

Finally, the SJU allege that newspapers affiliated to the former regime continue to obtain the largest share of government advertisements.

 The Cybercrime Act further limits freedom of expression

Indeed, freedom of expression in Sudan is also legally restricted by the Cybercrime Act of 2018, which the African Centre of Justice and Peace Studies (26 March) state was “designed by al-Bashir’s regime to limit the freedom of activists, bloggers, and media professionals, and was amended in 2020 to increase terms of imprisonment for various penalties including the online publication of false news”.

Furthermore, Khattab Hamad (Global Voices, 4 March) dissected the text of the act, in an exploration as to how it can be abused to limit freedom of expression. Hamad argues that government institutions may violate fundamental freedoms and the privacy of opposition and activist voices through terms that “lack clarity and definition,” such as: national security, prestige of the state, sensitive information and designated authority. Similarly, Ahmed Elsanousi, a lawyer specialising in criminal code and administrative law, suggests that the act “contains vague and unclear terms,” making it easily exploitable

Security bill rejected by civilians

Several civilian stakeholders have strongly condemned the draft internal security bill under the grounds that it may be used to limit freedom. Yasir Arman, the deputy head of Malik Agar’s faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, said the bill was “as if Omar al-Bashir wrote it from his prison,” referring the former regimes suppression of opposition groups (Sudan Tribune, 25 April).

Similarly, if the law is approved, columnist Yousif al-Sondy questions what the difference would be between Sudan’s civilian leadership - “most of whom suffered the horrors of detention in al-Bashir’s security cells” - and the ousted regime, should the civilians enable the “human rights violations” they accuse the former regime of (al-Tahreer, 24 April).

Sudanese political parties and civil society groups also criticised the internal security bill. Firstly, the Democratic Unionist Alliance, having accused the Ministry of Justice for failing to consult political groups ahead of drafting the bill, criticised its broad immunities, special courts, and the power given to the new security apparatus to withdraw cases from regular courts (Sudan Tribune, 25 April).

In addition, the Sudanese Communist Party said the the law poses a threat to public freedoms and represents a step towards dictatorship, accusing the military component of the Sovereignty Council and the Cabinet of seeking to undermine the revolution (Radio Dabanga, 26 May).  The Communists also labelled the law "a new episode of the conspiracy against the forces of the revolution, aiming to circumvent its objectives(Sudan Tribune, 25 April).

Furthermore, the Darfur Bar Association said the law violates the Constitutional Document that stipulates the need to limit the powers of the authorities as it provides security forces a judicial authority to arrest and detain in private guards (Radio Dabanga, 26 May).

The legal system hinders justice for victims of protest crackdowns

Beyond the political limitations preventing justice for those massacred on June 3 2019, Mohamed Osman, Human Rights Watch (12 April) assistant researcher for Africa, cites institutional issues within Sudan’s legal system - a lack of resources and political will - as obstacles to justice.

Osman quotes Mahmoud al-Sheikh, a member of the attorney-general’s committee to investigate abuses, to say: “we are struggling to get the security forces to cooperate including by providing us with access to crucial evidence or accept requests of lifting immunities of suspects”. Furthermore, Osman notes that Sudanese criminal law does not recognise command responsibility as a mode of liability, “which could hinder the possibility of holding mid-to-top level commanders accountable.” This particularly poses a problem for the committee investigating the June 3 2019 massacre.

The risks of finding justice for the June 3 2019 massacre victims

 In an interview with Mat Nashed (Newlines Magazine, 5 May), Nabil Adib, the human rights lawyer who leads the committee to investigate the June 3 2019 massacre in Khartoum, said “whatever we decide will destabilise the country”. Although Adib’s committee was meant to deliver its findings by the end of 2019, Nashed raises the prospect of senior security officers in the Military Council trying to overthrow the civilian half of the government and consolidate power if Adib finds them guilty of ordering the massacre. Nonetheless, notes Nashed, “many fear that Adib will reinforce a climate of impunity if he absolves senior military officers from blame”.

3. Five solutions

International law enforcement standards on the use of force

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS, 14 May) call for Sudanese authorities to ensure law enforcement agencies comply with international standards on the use of force, “[making it clear] that arbitrary or abusive use of force by security forces will be punished.”

ACJPS specifically suggest that police and other security services policing demonstrations or performing other law enforcement duties receive adequate training and caution on the use of force in line with the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Furthermore, ACJPS call on Sudanese authorities to refrain from deploying armed forces and government-sponsored militias including Rapid Support Forces to disperse peaceful gatherings 

Transparent justice process

To find justice for Sudanese victims of crackdowns on protests, Mohammed Osman, Human Rights Watch (12 April) assistant researcher for Africa calls for a “meaningful” transparent justice process, with the Sudanese government providing “regular public updates on the progress in investigations of public interest and guaranteeing victims and their families effective participation.” Osman argues that while “justice efforts required in Sudan are ambitious and long-term,” the government, with international support, should take “effective, prompt actions to bolster current efforts”.  

Committing to international standards on freedom of expression

ACJPS (26 March) call for Sudanese authorities to “respect and guarantee the right to freedom of expression as provided for in article 56 of the Constitutional Declaration and international and regional human rights treaties that Sudan is a state party to,” with law enforcement agencies to be instructed to cease harassing and intimidating individuals exercising their rights legitimately. ACJPS specifically call for the decriminalisation of “false news” and proposes reforms adhering to regional and international standards to which Sudan has committed: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

Similarly, Orwa Alsadig, the activist and member of the Tamkeen committee sued by Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan calls for legal and legislative reform in line with the international bill that guarantees freedom of expression, alongside laws that control media work and combat publishing that incites hate speech (Global Voices, 4 March).

Reformed justice system (Radio Dabanga, 23 May)

In the letter explaining her resignation from the ruling Sovereign Council, Aisha Musa called for a reformed justice system, which is “unattainable by replacing persons only”.

 Musa emphasised the need for practical steps around setting laws that guarantee the flow of justice and forming a professional constitutional court capable of preventing transgressions on the constitution, alongside “working strongly towards a constitutional congress that guarantees laying of a permanent democratic constitution”.

In addition, to support a “just” democratic transition, she said that a probe into the delayed publishing of the results of the investigation into the sit-in dispersal massacre (June 3 2019) must be within the priorities of a comprehensive governmental programme for which the yet unestablished justice commission shall be assigned.

Rejecting the security bill (al-Tahreer, 24 April)

Columnist Yousif al-Sondy calls for the civilian government to reject a draft security bill suggesting that the government confines the authorisation to arrest solely to the police and limits the authority of security forces to “the collection and analysis of information and passing it to concerned bodies.” Arguing that revolutionary Sudanese should not tolerate a security that arrests, tortures and kills, al-Sondy concludes that the bill is “wrong” and “its backers should know that it is unlawful at the age of this revolution”.

#SudanUprising briefing May 2021: developments, issues and solutions

The killing of two protesters leads to the resignation of a civilian from the ruling Sovereign Council

Summary

Two young men - Osman Ahmed and Muddathir al-Mukhtar – were shot dead and 37 were wounded after army forces dispersed protesters in Khartoum. The death triggered the resignation of ruling Sovereign Council member Aisha Musa. In her resignation speech, Musa tearfully accused the military-dominated government of ignoring civilians, alongside highlighting other institutional issues within Sudan’s executive bodies.

Other key issues highlighted in this briefing include the view that Sudan’s civilian politicians are weak and allegations that the Tamkeen (Empowerment Removal Committee) set up to claw back assets from former President Omar al-Bashir and his associates applies selective justice.

The solutions proposed include inclusive political participation supported by domestic and international actors, an independent Tamkeen committee, alongside the demands from Aisha Musa’s resignation letter.  

1. Developments

Deadly protest dispersal

Two young men were shot dead and 37 were wounded after army forces dispersed – with live bullets -  a group of people commemorating the June 3 2019 Khartoum Massacre (Multiple sources, 12 May). The young men were named as Osman Ahmed and Muddathir al-Mukhtar (Sudan Tribune, 13 May).

Attorney general Tajelsir al-Hibr said the injuries of the two killed protesters “may indicate that the shooting was intentional” (Human Rights Watch, 19 May). However, in a statement, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) said that “no instructions were issued to the forces protecting the army command to use live ammunition against the people” (Radio Dabanga, 12 May).

Witness report (Human Rights Watch, 19 May)

HRW reported from nine witnesses who alleged the military’s “heavy-handed response” in using “excessive and lethal force against peaceful protesters”. Soldiers reportedly formed “cordons” around the crowd, “which hindered their dispersal, allowing for only a narrow exit”, before allegedly encircled the protesters, making it hard for them to leave, then “apparently unprovoked and without warning” starting to beat them. One protester said they saw a soldier shooting indiscriminately “at a direct level toward people, not in the air…like he did not care where the bullet would hit”.

Suspects arrested

Attorney general Tajelsir al-Hibr consequently confirmed that the Public Prosecution Office opened two lawsuits against the military members involved (Sudan Tribune, 13 May). Minister of Defence Lt Gen Yassin Ibrahim expressed the military’s regret for what happened and delivered condolences from the army’s leadership for the nation’s martyrs. SAF also announced that a committee was formed to investigate who ordered the shooting, expressing full cooperation with judicial authorities (Radio Dabanga, 13 May).

Then, Al-Hibr announced the arrest of seven Sudanese military personnel accused, alongside 92 other suspects, after the Chairman of the Sovereign Council Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the SAF, handed over the Military Investigation Committee’s report on the dispersal to al-Hibr (Sudan Tribune, 16 May).

Civil society condemns the killings

Several Sudanese political parties and organisations condemned the killing of the two young protestors. The president of the Sudanese Businessmen and Employers Federation, Hashem Matar, announced that he will boycott the Paris Conference. The Democratic Unionist Party and Sudanese Congress Party both announced the withdrawal of their leaders from the Transitional Partners Council (TPC), with the latter withdrawing two ministers from the government (Radio Dabanga, 13 May).

The National Umma Party said: “the security forces still do not comprehend the requirements of the democratic transformation. They need to be restructured in a way so that they contribute to the glorious revolution, preserve public rights and freedoms, and apply the law to the fullest”. The Communist Party of Sudan demanded the resignation of the government, calling for a “fully civilian government representing the forces of the revolution” (Radio Dabanga, 13 May).

Furthermore, the Alliance of Civil Society Forces called for the resignation of all the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) members from the Sovereign Council, alongside requesting that Prime Minister Hamdok dismisses the heads of the relevant security and executive agencies, amend the existing legislation and adopt a new law for the security apparatus that protects public freedoms (Sudan Tribune, 16 May).

Aisha Musa resigns and explains why

Consequently, Sovereign Council member Aisha Musa resigned in protest against the killings. Her decision was praised by the Alliance of Civil Society Forces (ACSF) in Sudan, who considered it to be an expression of the rejection of "all forms of killing and oppression that our people are facing by the transitional power structures” (Multiple sources, 16 May).

 In a tearful speech explaining her resignation, Musa, one of only two women in the ruling Sovereign Council, accused the military-dominated transitional government of ignoring civilian voices. "The civilian component in the sovereign (council) and at all levels of government has become just a logistical executive body that does not participate in decision-making," Aisha Musa said. "Rather it only stamps the approval of pre-prepared decisions," she added (Multiple sources, 23 May).

2. Key issues

1. Incompetent civilian politicians

According to veteran journalist Osman Mirghani, the editor-in-chief of al-Tayar newspaper, Sudan’s democratic transition is threatened by the mistakes of “weak” civilian politicians with “limited personal capacity”, which will “enable the military to step into the gap they are creating” (Radio France Internationale, 23 April).

Mirghani alleges the politicians are “ruling as employees, not leaders”, and lack “a true vision of what needs to be done…a strategic approach and plan, and [are incapable] of ruling,” adding that “when the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance signed their declaration, they were looking to remove the dictatorship. What will happen the day after was not considered.”

2. Institutional issues within executive bodies

In the speech explaining her resignation from the ruling Sovereign Council, Aisha Musa highlighted several institutional issues within Sudanese executive bodies, claiming that her viewpoints were ignored as the military component of the government exceeded its constitutional powers. Musa said: “the weakness of state institutions led to the extension of insecurity and the inability to regulate and monitor the military forces” (Sudan Tribune, 23 May).

Alongside accusing transitional authorities of delaying the formation of the Legislative Council, the third body constituted in the power-sharing agreement alongside the Sovereignty Council and the Cabinet (Multiple sources, 23 May), Musa also criticised the Transitional Partners Council, saying it “diminished the joint meetings of the cabinet and Sovereign Council and the ruling coalition,” leading to the “concealment of efforts to form the transitional parliament,” which “breached the Constitutional Document without logical justifications” (Sudan Tribune, 23 May).

3. Does the Tamkeen committee apply selective justice?

Reuters (6 April) reported on criticism that the Tamkeen (Empowerment Removal Committee), “the group set up to claw back assets from ousted President Omar al-Bashir and his associates” and “aims to purge public bodies of al-Bashir loyalists,” applies “selective justice”, citing a protest triggered by the sacking of 7,000 from the civil service “without proper explanation or appeal process.”

Some critics reportedly view the committee as a means for easy political point scoring by a government struggling to manage an economic crisis, while others are concerned about what they see as a shaky legal framework, add Reuters. Such criticisms highlighted may shed light on the resignation of attorney general Tajelsir al-Hibr over the decisions of the committee (Multiple sources, 18 May), and a member of the committee Orwa Alsadig has been sued by the head of the committee (and state), Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan (Global Voices, 4 March).

3. Solutions

Inclusive participation (International Politics and Society, 9 April)

Philipp Jahn of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Gerrit Kurtz of the German Council on Foreign Relations call for Sudan’s “extremely volatile political transition” to be supported via an inclusive political process whereby “participation, dialogue and political organisation cannot be limited to negotiating access to institutions within elites.”

Arguing that the emergence of stable and legitimate elected government requires properly functioning competition among political parties, the authors propose the government establishes a state-funded independently controlled mechanism to strengthen political party development, potentially funded from the profits of enterprises that the Finance Ministry takes from security forces or Sudan’s established business families, which the elected government may transform into a permanent form of democratically secured party funding.

The authors also suggest international actors support training courses and projects for self-organisation and participation down to the constituency level, with incentives for participation, dialogue and debate “needing to be essential components of international cooperation with Sudan”.

Independent Tamkeen committee

Warning of a lack of due process and the shaky legal framework of the Tamkeen committee, Mohamed Abdelsalam, dean of the University of Khartoum law school, said “a better approach would be to establish a group of independent commissioners, rather than politicians, able to apply the law equally to every individual..[as] the current practice can be labelled as selective justice” (Reuters, 6 April).

Demands from Aisha Musa’s resignation letter (Radio Dabanga, 23 May)

In the letter explaining her resignation from the ruling Sovereign Council, Aisha Musa called for arms controls, restructuring the security apparatus, establishing a parliament “as a basic necessity” and the transfer of power to civilians “as mandated by the Constitutional Document”.

#SudanUprising: A new government which may re-integrate Islamists into the political scene

Summary

In widespread changes to Sudan’s government, rebel groups were integrated into the government, in accordance with the Juba peace agreement. Most notably, the cabinet reshuffle saw the post of finance minister go to Jibril Ibrahim, leader of the Islamist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), with National Umma Party deputy leader Maryam al-Mahdi, the daughter of the late Sadig al-Mahdi, being given the foreign ministry. Sudan is continuing its anti-Islamist campaign through the Empowerment Removal Committee and the arrest of members of the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP), despite calls for Islamists to be re-integrated into the political scene. The solutions provided for Sudan’s democratic transition have ranged from calls for Hamdok to be more assertive in managing rifts within the government, as well as for the Cabinet to gain credibility through transparency and inclusivity.

New government

In a considerable shake-up of Sudan’s government following the Juba peace agreement, rebel groups were integrated into the Sudanese government’s executive bodies – the Sovereign Council and the Council of Ministers (Cabinet). 

Three representatives of the armed movements were appointed to the ruling Sovereign Council - Alhadi Idris, a leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement, Malik Agar, head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North faction in the Blue Nile state, and Al-Taher Abu Bakr Hagar, president of Sudan Liberation Forces (AP, 4 February).  

In Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s Cabinet reshuffle, rebel groups were given the mining, livestock, social development, education, infrastructure and federal government ministries as part of the Juba peace agreement. The post of foreign minister went to Mariam Sadiq al-Mahdi, a leader of the Umma Party and daughter of former prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. Most notably, the newly appointed finance minister was announced as veteran Darfur rebel group the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader and Islamist Jibril Ibrahim. Formerly an economic advisor to JEM, Jibril’s appointment generated controversy as he was formerly an ally of former dictator Omar al-Bashir (Reuters, 8 February).

AP (8 February) raised the prospect of the appointments of Jibril and al-Mahdi to the finance and foreign ministries creating “some anxiety within the international community, given their Islamist-leaning background” as the transitional government seeks better ties with the US, Israel and the West. Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, said the two appointments are a “very risky and somewhat perplexing move,” because they occupy the two most important Cabinet positions that donors must have faith in.

Nonetheless, Ibrahim said he was he was committed to working with all of Sudan’s people and international partners to rejuvenate the economy, pledging to resolve current shortages of fuel, bread and affordable medicine (Bloomberg, 9 February).

The Empowerment Removal Committee

The government has continued its campaign against the remnants of Omar al-Bashir’s ousted regime. Sudanese authorities ordered the arrest of al-Bashir supporters accused of fuelling a wave of unrest and looting that struck at least five states (Bloomberg, 11 February). The committee responsible for dismantling the remnants of al-Bashir’s regime – the Empowerment Elimination, Anti-Corruption, and Funds Recovery Committee – issued a directive to its state branches to take criminal procedures via the Counter-Terrorism and Money Laundering 2014 Act, among other acts (Radio Dabanga, 12 February). Indeed, the authorities arrested several members of the dissolved National Congress Party (NCP) – including former Vice-President Hassabo Abdel-Rahman, and journalist Hussein Khojali, the owner of Omdurman TV satellite channel (Sudan Tribune, 13 February).

Nonetheless, the Empowerment Removal Committee still faces obstacles in its work. Chairman Lt Gen Yasir al-Atta, a member of the Sovereign Council, submitted his resignation after repeated criticism directed towards the committee. The Empowerment Removal Committee spokesperson Salah Manna accused the General Attorney Taj Elsir al-Hebir of obstructing their action, as well as accusing Sovereign Council chairman Lt Gen Abdulfattah al-Burhan and deputy chairman Himedti of ordering the release of al-Bashir’s wife Widad Babiker (Sudan Tribune, 5 February).

National Reconciliation with Islamists?

To further complicate Sudan’s anti-Islamist campaign, Minni Minnawi, leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-MM), called for a ‘National Reconciliation; including the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Minnawi said that the NCP is “part of the Sudanese,” and that a reconciliation should discuss Sudan’s future (Sudan Tribune, 7 February). However, write Haider Ibrahim Ali was critical of the National Reconciliation, arguing that the Islamists is a “call for justice” that “provides lessons to deter a repeat of [al-Bashir’s 1989 coup]”. Ali further criticised the re-integration of Islamists under the guise of nationalism, arguing that the Islamists did not believe in nationalism when they were in power, citing the Sudanese citizenship granted to Tunisian Islamist Rached Ghannouchi, whereas this “right was denied to some honourable Sudanese who were rendered homeless around the globe”, and Sudanese youth were “deprived from the bounties of their country which were readily given to the members of terrorist groups” (al-Democratic, 16 February).  

Solutions

Transparency and inclusivity:

Analysts Dimah Mahmoud and Jihad Mashamoun suggest ways for civilian ministers to “rebuild their wavering domestic credibility”. Calling for “complete transparency,” the authors suggest that the civilian government “outline to the people through forums and social media what they have achieved since their appointment and what are the remaining challenges.” The authors call for the incorporation of the Local Resistance Committees and active civil society groups working towards the pillars of the revolution through sizable representation in the Legislative Council (Africa Report, 23 January).

Cabinet credibility:

For Sudan’s new cabinet to gain credibility, Horn of Africa expert Joseph Tucker proposes that “effective coordination across ministries—perhaps via a more proactive Ministry of Cabinet Affairs—and transparent decision-making” would help ministers conduct reforms and “create a more stable environment for elections.” Tucker also calls for ministers to “push for the creation of outstanding government commissions, as well as institutions like the long-delayed Transitional Legislative Council,” which would “improve avenues for government oversight and public trust in both institutions” (United States Institute of Peace, 8 February).  

New ways of political participation

Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper al-Democrati (28 January), Asma’a Juma’ah, calls for new ways of protesting. Juma’ah suggests that the government is pressured to put forward new youthful politicians, and that the government is helped in finding solutions. Examples suggested by Jum’ah include forming social and political working groups to supplement the resistance committees in pressing for the delivery and promotion of services. Jum’ah also suggests pressure for the formation of the government and a popular parliament selected from all the Sudanese territories, whereby popular parliamentarians can stage a sit-in at the gates of the parliament premises on behalf of the public.

Assertive Hamdok

Ashraf Abdulaziz, the editor of al-Jareeda (10 February), calls for Prime Minister Hamdok to be more assertive and transparent in resolving controversial matters his new government faces. Abdulaziz suggests that Hamdok should hold his ministers responsible for what they do and that she should not allow a repeat of the “chaos” of the previous government, which was argued to “waste time on the discussion of policies and controversies, causing the government to look inharmonious, thus impeding the mechanisms of implementation and drowns the Sudanese people in harmful differences.”

#SudanUprising Report: End of 2020

#SudanUprising Report: End of 2020

Transitional Partners Council, civilian-military tensions, economic developments and protests .

Summary

1.     TPC: A controversial decree by the chairman of Sudan's Sovereign Council, Lt Gen Abdelfattah al-Burhan, to form a Transitional Partners Council (TPC) sparked opposition from influential civilian stakeholders in Sudan’s transition, including: Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition. Analysts say that the TPC, in its original form, hindered democracy and weakened the civilian government due to the power it gave to the military and some armed movements who are openly hostile to political parties.

2.     Civilian-military tensions: There have also been civilian and military tensions over a US Congress bill which challenges the military’s role in Sudan’s economic affairs. While Hamdok said the involvement of Sudan’s military in the private sector is “unacceptable,” a senior member of the Sudanese Armed Forces expressed resentment towards “foreign laws and legislation”.

3.     Economic developments: Nonetheless, Sudan’s 2021 Economic Budget suggests that military spending will be increased at the expense of health and education. In addition, the government’s decision to increased electricity tariffs by 500% has been declared “illegal” by the FFC Economic Committee.  

4.     Protests: Meanwhile, Millioniyah protests highlighted the contrasting radical and gradualist approaches to reform in Sudan among political parties. Finally, the murder of activist Bahaeldin Nouri has triggered calls for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia to be disbanded, and led to the acceleration of anti-torture laws being ratified in Sudan.

5.     Solutions: Among the solutions for Sudan’s democratic transition include calls for political parties and FFC to maintain unity, for transitional justice, and for mode of governance that is more attentive to community needs.

1.     The controversial TPC

Tensions have grown between civilian and military stakeholders in Sudan’s transitional period following a decision by the chairman of Sudan's Sovereign Council, Lt Gen Abdelfattah al-Burhan, has issued a decision to form a Transitional Partners Council (TPC) of 29 members.

Consisting of six military members, the prime minister, 13 members from the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), and nine rebel group members who were signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement, the aim of the TPC is to direct the transitional period in a way that serves the supreme interests of Sudan, to resolve differences in viewpoints between the various parties, and to mobilise the necessary support for the success of the transitional period” (Radio Dabanga, 4 December). The decree said that the TPC directs the transitional period and can interfere in the government attributions, including obstructing the transitional parliament (Sudan Tribune, 6 December).

According to analyst Hafiz Ismail (Radio Dabanga, 16 December), the TPC has its roots in the Juba peace talks, “consolidates the power of the military and some rebel signatories” and thereby hinders “any genuine process of democratisation” because it “weakens the civilian government.” Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok was reportedly “unhappy” about the TPC’s power to veto the executive government.

I.               Civilian opposition to the TPC

The TPC’s formation raised suspicions about attempts by al-Burhan and his military faction to circumvent the civilian government and its divided coalition with the support of some former rebels (Sudan Tribune, 9 December). Consequently, al-Burhan has been accused by political parties and civil society organisations who accused him of abusing his authority to transfer political power away from the country's constitutional institutions to the TPC (Radio Dabanga, 10 December).

However, Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok immediately distanced himself from the TPC, saying that the TPC’s role should exclusively be coordinative and consultative and that it should not interfere in the activities of the executive, legislative organs nor the sovereign council. He warned that he would boycott the TPC unless substantial changes are made (Sudan Tribune, 4 December).

The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) also criticised the TPC, labelling it unconstitutional and arguing that it paves the way for conflicts of power with other institutions of transitional authority. The SPA’s statement added that the TPC “has been imposed by a few dominating the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance and tampering with the goals of the revolution, to serve narrow personal and partisan interests by identifying with the military” (Radio Dabanga, 5 December).

Sudanese political parties that are part of the FFC also joined the criticism. The Sudanese Congress Party said the TPC is “unacceptable and does not comply with what has been agreed upon before”. The National Umma Party accused “some parties to have a hidden agenda to try to disrupt the march towards democracy”. Civil society organisations, including the No to Women’s Oppression Initiative in Khartoum, as well as a large number of Resistance Committees also rejected the TPC. (Radio Dabanga, 7 December).

II.              Rebel positions towards the TPC

The TPC was also divisive among Sudan’s Revolutionary Front (SRF) factions. Sudan Liberation Movement factional leader Minni Minnawi and his ally Eltom Hajo defended the decree and calling for its implementation, although SRF leader Hadi idris called for a review of the TPC (Sudan Tribune, 9 December). The vice president of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North Agar faction (SPLM-N Agar), Yasser Arman, echoed calls for more discussions between government parties to resolve differences, saying that the TPC “will reproduce the same problems,” and it should be a “council of wisdom… with the purpose of resolving the disputes facing the transitional period, in addition to forging a unified political will” (Sudan Tribune, 7 December).

III.            Al-Burhan’s defence of the TPC

Nonetheless, al-Burhan defended the TPC twice. First, he denied that the TPC is unconstitutional and that it aims to enable state agencies to focus on solving people's problems (Radio Dabanga, 8 December). Then, having criticised the Sovereign Council and Cabinet for their “inability to achieve the goals of the revolution,” al-Burhan stressed that the TPC does not aim to confiscate the powers of executive or sovereign bodies, nor eliminate the role of the Legislative Council, but rather aims to address the differences between the organs of government (Radio Dabanga, 10 December).

IV.            Al-Burhan’s concession

Al-Burhan eventually reversed his decision on the mandate of the TPC (Sudan Tribune, 9 December), after which the FFC, military component of the Sovereign Council and the SRF armed movements agreed on limited powers for the TPC – that it cannot interfere in the powers of the Council of Ministers or the Sovereign Council, and that it is strictly limited to coordinating between transitional partners and resolving disputes. Nonetheless, there was no settlement on the position of the Prime Minister in the TPC, with differences over whether they will be an alternate chair of the council or a regular member (Sudan Tribune, 14 December) 

2.     Civilian-military tensions

Another contributor to tensions between the civilian and military components of the transitional government are disputes over the military’s role in economic affairs following a law passed by the US Congress requiring financial transparency and civilian control over Sudan’s state-owned enterprises as a condition for US assistance to Sudan. Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok said the involvement of Sudan’s military in the private sector is “unacceptable,” and such enterprises should be turned into public companies, adding that resources belonging to the Sudanese people without transparency or accountability cannot be managed without transparency and accountability (Reuters, 14 December).

The Congressional bill, called the Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020, advocates tightened monitoring of the Sudanese army, security forces, and intelligence services. It has caused controversy within the ruling Sovereign Council as it challenges the role of the army in Sudan’s economic affairs. Indeed, Chief-of-Staff Lt Gen Mohamed al-Hussein accused some Sudanese of trying to “bring in foreign laws and legislation,” adding that the army “is not a politicised group and does not seek power” (Radio Dabanga, 17 December).

3.     Economic affairs

I.               Increased military spending in 2021 Budget

Sudan’s leaked 2021 Economic Budget has sparked controversy. Radio Dabanga (4 January) reported that the budget demonstrates Sudanese government plans to increase the budget for the military and security forces, while decreasing healthcare and education. Thus, Dr Hasan Bashir, Economics Professor at al-Nilein University said he expects Sudanese to continue living in dire conditions in 2021. 

Bashir told Radio Dabanga that the budget shows “an imbalance in the expenditure”, citing increased expenses for the ministries of Defence and Interior Affairs, and the Rapid Support Forces,” and that he considers it “a major problem” that revenues from companies owned by military forces are not mentioned in the budget.  

The budget was eventually improved by the Council of Ministers, with Finance Minister Hiba Mohammed Ali announcing that education spending will take up 12.5% of the budget,

24% of the budget will go towards social protection, with subsidies for wheat, medicine, gas and electricity will also be retained. However, leaked contents of the Budget suggests that 1/3rd of public revenues will go towards the security and defence sector (Radio Dabanga, 8 January).

II.              Controversy over “illegal” electricity tariff increases

Furthermore, the government’s decision to raise electricity tariffs by 500% has been condemned as both unjustified and illegal by the FFC’s Economic Committee. The “inflated power fees will lead to an increase in the prices of many goods and services, and negatively affect agricultural and industrial production and exports,” the FFC warns, adding that “this large increase in the electricity fees is implemented illegally, as it is not included in the 2021 National Budget, that has not been passed yet”.  

The committee further the increase in the power tariffs a violation of the September 2020 National Economic Conference – which called for delaying lifting subsidies until necessary economic reforms including direct cash support are conducted – and that the increased prices are a precursor to electricity subsidies being lifted altogether (Radio Dabanga, 4 January).

However, Sudan’s Minister of Energy and Mining Khairy Abdelrahman defended the 500% increase on the basis of the state’s need to cover the deficit in finances concerning electricity provision, citing soaring annual inflation and the “enormous” government employee salaries in 2020 (Radio Dabanga, 7 January). 

4.     Millioniyah protests

In a new wave of Millioniyah protests, thousands of Sudanese took to the streets to mark the second anniversary of the 2018 December revolution and to demand the correction of the course of the revolution. However, there were contrasting slogans and public demands, ranging from calls for the transitional government to be overthrown, to calls for gradual reform. 

I.               Radical demands for change

Sudan Tribune (19 December) reported that a leftist camp including the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), the Sudanese Professionals Association (New Secretariat faction) and some Khartoum Resistance Committees called for the cancellation of the Transitional Partners Council and “to stop plots of the military component and its allies from the armed movements".

II.              Gradual demands for change

While the Sudanese Communist Party launched campaigns for the removal of the military from power and for the transitional government to be overthrown, the Congress Party, Unionist Gathering, the National Umma Party, and the Arab Socialist Baath Party announced their opposition to calls to bring down the transitional government, despite criticising its “weak” economic performance (Radio Dabanga, 19 December).

Similar reformist calls came from the historical leadership of the SPA, who requested that Prime Minister Hamdok replace the “weak” cabinet, with the Sudanese Congress Party calling for the end of the economic crisis and the formation of the Legislative Council (Sudan Tribune, 19 December).

III.            Violence against protesters

Ahead of the protests, Attorney General, Tajelsir El Hibir, prohibiting police forces from using bullets, tear gas, or excessive force against demonstrators. However, two people were injured and several were suffocated after security forces dispersed a sit-in in front of the Republican Palace and the Sudanese Parliament. The Central Committee of Doctors said that a young man had his hand completely lacerated, while another young man was injured by a gunshot wound to the head (Radio Dabanga, 21 December).

Moreover, it was the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) killing of activist Bahaeldin Nouri which sent shockwaves across Sudan, leading to renewed questioning of the RSF’s role in Sudan.

5.     The RSF’s murder of Bahaeldin Nouri

The RSF’s killing of activist Bahaeldin Nouri has sparked controversy around the scope of the paramilitary force. Nouri’s family said he was stopped by pick-up truck in al-Kalakla, after which two men abducted him and took him to an unknown destination where he was tortured and killed (Radio Dabanga, 26 December). Sudan’s public prosecution charged RSF members with Nouri’s torture and murder, and the militia said the perpetrators of the crime will be handed over to justice (Sudan Tribune, 29 December).

Brig. Gen. Gamal Goma, the RSF spokesman, said the head of the RSF’s intelligence unit as well as officers involved in Nouri’s detention and interrogation have been suspended or detained, pending an investigation into his death (AP, 27 December). Public Prosecutor Moulana al-Habr later confirmed that the RSF lifted the immunity of the officers who killed Nouri (Radio Dabanga, 31 December). Activist Shamael el-Noor said Nouri’s murder could happen to anyone, adding “this is a serious indication of the state institutions’ inaction towards security issues” (AP, 27 December). 

I.               SPA demand that the RSF is disbanded

Consequently, Nouri’s murder triggered calls for legal reforms and the dissolution of the RSF. The SPA (Multiple sources, 5 January) called for the RSF to be disbanded and integrated into the national army as part of campaign entitled ‘Know Your Right’, which protests against the RSF’s violence towards “ordinary citizens”.

 In a memorandum submitted to Justice Minister Nasreldin Abdelbari and Attorney General Tajelsir al-Hibr, the SPA demanded urgent steps “to criminalise the abduction and detention of citizens by the RSF”, and “to clearly restrict the right to arrest people to the police”. The SPA further urged Sudanese authorities to t form a committee to “review all detention centres of the RSF and other forces, transfer the detainees who have been charged to police stations,” and for the closure of all “illegal detention centres” and “ghost houses of the security apparatus”, with the attorney general requested to form “a permanent commission to investigate allegations of RSF violations”.

On the theme of security sector reform, the SPA also say that serious steps must be taken to restructure security and military institutions in Sudan, calling on transitional authorities, in particular the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and those which signed the Juba Peace Agreement, to push for restructuring, including the rehabilitation and training of security and military members (Radio Dabanga, 2 January).  

II.              Hamdok says government approved law against torture

In addition, Prime Minister Hamdok announced that his government approved the ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. "Targeting civilians with extrajudicial killing, torture, or enforced disappearance, regardless of the reasons for, is totally unacceptable by all Sudanese,” Hamdok said (Sudan Tribune, 2 January).

Solutions

Proposed solutions for Sudan’s democratic transition have come from civil society leaders, journalists and independent political analysts. The solutions have been directed towards the international community, Sudanese political parties and the government.

Delayed parliamentary formation

Columnist Abdellatif al-Booni (al-Sudani, 7 December) argues that the TPC will culminate in a polarised legislative council in which representation quotas will be shared by four components within the transitional government; namely, Al-Burhan block, Hamdok block, armed movements block and FFC block. Thus, al-Booni calls for a delay to discussions on forming a legislative council, warning that Sudan’s polarised political situation may replicate the Libyan experience whereby the forming of a post-revolution parliament led to the eruption of civil war.

Transitional justice

Albaqir Mukhtar, the director of Al Khatim Adlan Center for Enlightenment (KACE), calls for a transitional justice process that takes into account the impact of crimes against individuals, while addressing the victimisation of entire communities. Mukhtar emphasises the importance ensuring that crucial stakeholders such as survivors, victims’ families, civil society and human rights organisations gain ownership of and inform regional initiatives, “as they can best speak to community-specific abuses and aspirations for the future” (Brookings Institute, 24 November).

Compromise between FFC parties

Shewit Woldemichael, researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS, 18 December), notes that Sudan’s current transition bears similarity to the 1964-65 and 1985-86 transitional periods which culminated in military dictatorships, attributing the previous failures to the “lack of a common vision for Sudan among political elites,” which resulted in alliances “mired in rivalry [which] undermines the unity and strength of civilian actors.”

Thus, Woldemichael calls for the transitional government to manage public expectations and regain public confidence through transparency and regular engagement, and for the FFC to reach compromise on major issues to bridge divisions based on politics and identity, and to maintain civilian unity to ensure the military hands over power in the second half of the transition period.

Political parties to focus on offering visions and solutions

Asmaa Juma’a, the editor-in-chief of al-Democrati (17 December), calls for Sudanese political parties to end their conflicts between the each other, so as to not threaten Sudan’s democratic prospects, “as they have done [since independence]”. Juma’a argues that while parties in most countries that have entrenched democracies have a base that they gained through their principles, vision and targeted national programmes, Sudanese parties pursue their own narrow interests rather than offering visions and solutions.

A community service strategy from the government

Columnist Yousif al-Sondy calls for the transitional government to adopt a changed mindset and paradigm in which it embarks upon a community service strategy aimed at serving common interests. Al-Sondy argues that post-independence Sudanese governments have prioritised taxing the poverty-stricken population to cover running expenses rather than setting citizen service as a priority. Thus, he suggests that a clearly defined public service programme is a bottom-line requirement for any political party that seeks to garner popular support (al-Tahreer, 11 December).

#SudanUprising October 2020 briefing: Protests, FFC disputes and economic disagreements

Summary

October saw a fresh round of protests in Sudan, as citizens marked the 56th anniversary of the October 1964 Revolution, as well as launching demonstrations against fuel and bread shortages. With Sudanese political parties already stated to lack support from the youth, the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition were dealt a fresh blow after public criticism from influential civil society groups over their management of Sudan’s long-expected parliamentary formation. The Communist Party has also left the coalition. Despite promising signs of economic recovering from Sudan’s delisting by the US as a terrorism sponsor, the controversial decision to lift fuel subsidies has triggered opposition from leftists close to the government.

 Protests

The 21st of October saw another Millioniyah, this time to commemorate the 56th anniversary of the October 1964 Revolution (Radio Dabanga). However, two protesters - Hussein Abdelgader, 14, and Mohammed Abdulmajeed, “a man in his 20s”, both from Bahri – were killed by security forces who used live munition to disperse crowds. Several others were also wounded and taken to hospitals (Radio Dabanga, 26 October).

Security forces also allegedly intimidated journalists covering the protests. A Sky News Arabia camera crew was allegedly arrested, beaten, and forced to erase their footage. Al Hadath’s camera crew were also stopped from filming by armed men, with journalists complaining that they were prevented from their duties (Radio Dabanga, 22 October).

In response, sit-ins and protests in Khartoum continued, as demonstrators demanded justice for protestors killed, and the release of nine detained activists (Radio Dabanga, 29 October).

FFC disputes with civil society

Difference between civil society groups and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition are complicating Sudan’s path to a legislative council (parliament).

Radio Dabanga (5 November) reported that Resistance Committee representatives withdrew from a Khartoum meeting with the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) regarding the formation of parliament, citing disagreements with the agenda, and accusing political parties of inflicting “suffering.” The Khartoum Resistance Committees accuse the FFC of “seeking to abort what is left of the revolution by deliberately excluding the Resistance Committees from meetings on the parliament,” further describing the government's handling of “important issues” such as the economic conference and the peace issue as “superficial and condescending of the voice of the street”.

Then, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) criticised the new parliamentary structure agreed by the Juba peace agreement, which exclusively comprises of peace negotiation participants. The SPA said that the new parliament will lead to “the formation of an ineffective and quarrelsome legislative council” and “complications regarding representation of rebel movements not included in the peace agreement”. The SPA also said the FFC is not qualified to lead the formation of the Legislative Council, and criticised the “individual approach followed by the FFC Central Council by inviting revolutionary groups separately for formal consultations while imposing de facto directions” (Radio Dabanga, 6 November).

 Attempts by the political parties to gain legitimacy among the public are further hindered by reports that young Sudanese are not active in ‘traditional’ Sudanese political parties, according to Dr Azza Mustafa, a former professor of political science at Alzaiem Alazhari University in Khartoum and specialist on democracy and political parties. Dr Mustafa said young Sudanese do not find “the old political programmes” attractive, that the youth are being “alienated” by political parties that do not accommodate them, and “still do what they did 50 years ago” (Radio Dabanga, 12 October).

Communist Party withdraws from FFC (Sudan Tribune, 8 November)

The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) announced its withdrawal from the FFC, accusing FFC leaders of plotting against the revolution and concluding “secret and suspicious deals” inside and outside the country, adding that they are leading the "coalition towards a coup against the revolution and endorsing policies that contravene the agreed charters and declarations”.

The SCP recently failed to dissuade the government from implementing economic reforms including the removal of fuel subsidies, alongside rejecting the Juba peace agreement which it said empowered rebels “who are perceived as potential allies of the military component of the Sovereign Council.” Nonetheless, the FFC reportedly suspects the SCP of seeking to control the Sudanese Professionals Association.

Economic developments

SST delisting - Despite the lifting of Sudan’s State Sponsors of Terrorism designation, Minister of Finance Hiba Mohammed Ali said a quick improvement of the economic situation is unexpected. Among the benefits of Sudan’s delisting noted by Ali are: access to grants from international institutions to finance development projects without US objections, that Sudan may now cooperate directly with various institutions to purchase basic commodities that Sudan was purchasing at a high price through intermediaries, alongside the ease of banking and cash transfers (Sudan Tribune, 21 October).

Fuel subsidies lifted - The government then liberalised fuel prices, culminating in a 400% increase of previous prices, leading to opposition from leftist groups, including the Sudanese Communist Party who vowed to organise popular protests (Sudan Tribune, 28 October). FFC Economic Committee member al-Tijani Hussein said the decision to lift fuel subsidies upon the International Monetary Fund’s directive reflects “obedience to external dictation and the application of the neoliberal approach [which is] imposed by the US and its counterparts on developing nations and constitutes…capitalism…at the expense of the poor” (Sudan Tribune, 28 October).  Indeed, protests against fuel and bread shortages continued across Sudan – with protests erupting in Atbara in the River Nile state, al-Fasher in Darfur and ed-Damazin in the Blue Nile state (Radio Dabanga, 2 November).  

Solutions

Parliament - The SPA called for the inclusion of Resistance Committees, the Families of the December Revolution Victims, and all minority groups in Sudan in the proposed transitional parliament (Radio Dabanga, 6 November).

Youth inclusion - Dr Azza Mustafa called on “all political parties to reformulate their programmes, so that they will address the issues of all segments of society, especially youth and women “otherwise they will lose the support of young people, who will be important in the election process.” Faki Mohamed, leading member of the Kassala Resistance Committees, Asaad El Taher, a youth leader in Darfur, both said youth should be better represented in policy-making given their “leading role” in overthrowing al-Bashir (Radio Dabanga, 12 October).

Adjusted exchange rate - Finance Minister Hiba Ali cited the existence of five exchange rates in Sudan to stress adjustments needed to incentivise expatriates to send remittances through official channels (Sudan Tribune, 21 October).

#SudanUprising July 2020 Briefing: The Aftermath of the March of The Millions

Sudan Uprising: July 2020

 Summary

1.     What happened? - Sudan’s civilian government responded to a wave of major protests across Sudan with progress on the institutional agenda of Sudan’s democratic transition and a major cabinet reshuffle.

2.     Key issues - However, Sudan’s finance ministry is impeded in solving the economic crisis due to difficulties taxing dominant military and security sector businesses. “Tough” economic reforms initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are a source of divide within the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition. Internal FFC power contestations and in-fighting over “narrow privileges” are viewed as a risk to the democratic transition.

3.     Solutions – The civilian government has been called on to be more assertive in raising government revenue through taxation, with support from the western states in doing so. Civil society groups also seek permanent dialogue mechanisms to strengthen political participation.

1.     What happened?

• Following the symbolic June 30 ‘March of the Millions’, sit-ins and protests proliferated across Sudan.

• The civilian government responded to protesters demands by finally appointing civilian governors, demonstrating progress towards the establishment of a parliament, and implementing a major cabinet reshuffle.

• The most notable ministerial departure was former finance minister Ibrahim Elbadawi, who revealed differences with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok over Sudan’s economic direction.

I.               March of the Millions and a new wave of protests

On June 30, Sudan witnessed the ‘Millioniyah’ or the ‘March of the Millions’. Across Sudan, hundreds of thousands protested, united in their calls for civilian rule, peace, retribution for the protestors killed during demonstrations, better living conditions, and dismantling the remnants of Omar al-Bashir’s regime (Radio Dabanga, 1 July). Few observed the social distancing requirements to avoid contracting coronavirus, emphasising the importance of street protests in Sudanese civilian political participation (AP, 30 June).

 As noted by Reuters, 30 June symbolically marks the anniversary of former president Omar al-Bashir’s ascent to power. The Millioniyah of 2019 saw thousands marching to pressure the then-ruling transitional military council to resume negotiations over a peaceful power-sharing deal with civilian opposition.

 The protests were organised by the Sudanese Professionals’ Association and the Resistance Committees, who called for the implementation of key parts of the aforementioned deal which remained incomplete, including: the appointment of civilian governors for Sudan’s provinces, the establishment of a parliament, peace with Sudan’s rebels, and swift public trials for former president Omar al-Bashir and his top officials (AP, 30 June).

 Radio Dabanga (1 July) identified state specific grievances from Millioniyah participants across Sudan, including:

• In West Sudan, protesters in the capitals of the five Darfur states demanded just peace and disarmament of militias.

• In East Sudan, protesters in Gadarif, Kassala and Port Sudan called for the end of water shortages, whereas in the Northern State protesters demanded improved living conditions

• In the Northern State and River Nile State, protesters demanded the appointment of civilian governors and the formation of the Legislative Council.

• Central Sudanese protesters in Sennar, Wad Madani and Kosti stressed that the goal of the marches is to correct the course of the revolution, and not to topple the government.

 Although the government responded with a vast Cabinet reshuffle and demonstrable progress towards the establishment of a parliament and the appointment of civilian governors, protests across Sudan did not seize. Radio Dabanga (13 July) reported that sit-ins spread across Sudan, with protesters from Darfur in the West to Kassala in the East demanding security, rights, freedoms, justice, better living conditions. Protesters also expressed displeasure at difficult agricultural conditions, the absence of roads, and the continued presence of officials affiliated to Omar al-Bashir’s ousted regime.

 In addition, Resistance Committee said they are planning announced a comprehensive revolutionary escalation to press for the implementation of Sudanese public demands during the June 30 Millioniya (Radio Dabanga, 22 July).

II.              Progress on local governance issues 

 With a week of the Millioniyah, progress was made towards establishing a parliament. Sudan’s transitional government, Freedom and Change Forces (FFC) and armed groups agreed to allocate 75 parliamentary seats to the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and Sudan Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi. The deal followed ten days of talks, in which the armed groups initially requested 140 out of the 300 available seats (Sudan Tribune, 8 July).

 However, the “long-awaited” appointment of civilian governors in Sudan has witnessed protests against some selected state rulers, particularly in Kassala, al-Obeid (North Kordofan) and El Daein (East Darfur), with protesters in the latter two localities displeased that the appoints were not nominated by the FFC. Feminist groups in Khartoum and Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) also denounced women’s underrepresentation (Radio Dabanga, July 24).

 III.            The Cabinet Reshuffle – the motivations?

 Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok announced a major Cabinet reshuffle in hopes to defuse public discontent over economic collapse and other crises following the June 30 rallies (AP, July 9). Hamdok said the reshuffle intends to “advance the performance and execution of the transitional period’s missions and respond to accelerated economic and social changes” (Reuters, 9 July).

 However, according to Sudanese newspaper editor Osman Mirghani, the reshuffle seems unlikely to satisfy demonstrators. Mirghani cites the continuing employment of key officials such as commerce minister [Madani Abbas Madani] despite calls for his removal. Mirghani added that “Hamdok was forced” and “the government [lacks] any real road map for how to create deeper change” (AP, July 9).

 Nonetheless, both Reuters and AP note that the reshuffle could be a precursor to the government appointing several ministers from the Sudan Revolutionary Front, as a condition of peace negotiations.

IV.            The Cabinet Reshuffle – which ministers went?

 Acting replacements were appointed in the following seven ministries (Sudan Tribune, 9 July).

• Foreign Affairs: Omer Gamer Eldin replaced Asma Abdallah

• Energy: Khairy Abdel-Rahman replaced Adel Ali Ibrahim

• Agriculture: Abdel Gadir Turkawi replaced Issa Osman Sharif

• Infrastructure and Transport: Hashim Abu Naouf replaced Hashim Tahir Sheikh Taha

• Animal Resources: Adel Farah Idris replaced Allam Eddin Abdallah Absher

• Health: Sarah Abdelazim Hassanein replaced Akram Eltom

• Finance: Heba Ahmed Ali replaced Ibrahim al-Badawi.

 It was the replacements of the latter two ministers which generated the most attention, with Sudan facing both the coronavirus and economic crisis.

 Former health minister Akram Eltom was the only minister sacked, having refused to resign as all his ministerial colleagues were requested to (Reuters, July 9). According to Sudan Tribune (July 11) Sudanese leftists claim that the “popular” Eltom was sacked due to his plans to implement free universal healthcare. However, footage circulated of Eltom being protected from a beating by an angry crowd during a Millioniyah rally, amid allegations that he mismanaged Sudan’s response to coronavirus.

 Meanwhile, Elbadawi was dismissed despite “spearheading ambitious economic reform plans sought by foreign donors and the International Monetary Fund, which included painful steps like [subsidy cuts]” (AP, July 9).Suggested reasons for his departure include opposition to the IMF-backed subsidy cuts, conflict with Hamdok and the Finance Ministry’s inability tax the military and security apparatus’ lucrative companies.

 V.             Ibrahim Elbadawi’s resignation

In a five-page statement addressed to the public, Elbadawi attributed his resignation to a dispute with Hamdok over the implementation of the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) he negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Elbadawi said he requested “a full delegation of powers” over specific areas to avoid "conflicts of authority,” in light of differences with Hamdok over important issues whereby “the specialised technical opinion was not respected.” Nonetheless, it was also reported that FFC leftist groups opposed Elbadawi’s IMF-backed subsidy cuts  (Sudan Tribune, 19 July).

 However, National Umma Party (NUP) leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi said that Elbadawi’s dismissal will not prevent the reforms initiated with the IMF (Sudan Tribune, 11 July). According to Sudan Tribune (19 July), the NUP is demanding authority over Sudan’s finance ministry to ensure that the IMF-supported reforms are fully implemented.

2.     Key Issues

• Elbadawi attributed the finance ministry’s inability meet the needs of Sudan’s economy to difficulties controlling tax-exempt military and security sector businesses.

• “Tough” economic reforms initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), including subsidy cuts, are a source of divide within the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition of parties.

• ·While senior Communist Party members say that the FFC is not consulted on the cabinet reshuffle nor economic strategy, the Sudanese Congress Party has stated its intention to join the government, and the National Umma Party is allegedly seeking authority over the Finance Ministry.

• The FFC’s internal competition over “narrow privileges” is argued to be a threat to the democratic transition, with the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) citing this as a reason for their departure from the coalition.

I.               Finance Ministry unable to meet Sudan’s economic needs

In his statement, Elbadawi attributed the finance ministry’s inability to manage its liquidity and meet the needs of Sudan’s economy to difficulties controlling tax-exempt military businesses (Sudan Tribune, 19 July).

 Indeed, Dr John-Baptiste Gallopin, a visiting fellow at the European Council of Foreign Relations (9 June), published a lengthy article explaining the threat posed to Sudan’s democratic transition by the civilian wing of the government’s reluctance to confront its financial dependence on the economically dominant military and security sectors.

 In addition, leading NUP members allegedly claimed that Elbadawi expressed frustrations to Hamdok about his lack of support for attempts to hand over military firms to the Finance Ministry (Sudan Tribune, 11 July).

II.              “Tough” IMF-initiated economic reforms are divisive

NUP leader al-Mahdi differentiated between the two competing economic positions within the FFC: “the dreamers and the [pragmatists].” Claiming the former camp will “destroy the economy,” Al-Mahdi said he belongs to the latter camp, who intend to implement the “tough” IMF reforms which Elbadawi pursued (Sudan Tribune, 11 July).

 This divide re-appeared on July 24 (Sudan Tribune), after the FFC Economic Committee announced its rejection of the government’s budget amendment. The FFC Economic Committee said the new budget “ignores the demands of the June 30 demonstrations” by continuing IMF policies that “destroyed the national economy and impoverished the masses.”

 The FFC Economic Committee stated that the increases in commercial fuel, dollar prices and salaries without “real resources” contradict budgetary laws. The committee also likened the budget to the one approved by Omar al-Bashir’s regime in December 2019, which eventually “collapsed the currency exchange rate and raised inflation to over %130.”

III.            Power contestations within the FFC

 Recent reports suggest that the Communist Party’s political influence over the civilian government is waning, at the expense of the Sudanese Congress Party and the National Umma Party.

 FFC Economic Committee member and senior Communist Party member Sidgi Kaballo said the government does not consult the committee on economic policies, reflecting the power dynamics within the civilian component of the government (Sudan Tribune, 24 July). Under a fortnight earlier, leading FFC member and Communist Party political bureau member Siddiq Youssef alleged that Hamdok is yet to consult the FFC on the cabinet reshuffle, despite the Constitutional Document governing the transitional period stipulating their consultation (Sudan Tribune, 12 July).

 Nonetheless, it seems that the cabinet reshuffle could stimulate Sudan’s move away from a technocratic cabinet, with the Sudanese Congress Party (SCoP) announcing its intention to “contribute positively” by joining Hamdok’s second government, which is said to include the FFC and armed groups (Sudan Tribune, 12 July). In addition, Sudan Tribune (19 July) sources claim that the NUP demands authority over the finance ministry to ensure that IMF-backed reforms are fully implemented.

 IV.            Risk posed to democratic transition by FFC in-fighting

Hussein Arko Minnawi, a member of the political bureau of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), warns that Sudan’s transitional period is at risk as political parties in Khartoum “still see politics within conflict over their vested interests.” Minnawi cites the FFC’s intensified “competition over narrow privileges,” which reflects “feverish political competition over power privilege and social class interests” (Sudan Tribune, 26 June).

 As a result, Minnawi argues that Sudanese parties are “stuck” in the [failed] uprisings of 1964 and 1985, whereby “political elites were unable to address the roots of the Sudanese crisis.” Thus, Minnawi concludes that Sudanese politics remains “static” and “stuck on old practices…failing to respond to changes while continuing to revolve within the orbit of the same old ideas.”

 Indeed, the internal competition within the broad FFC coalition led to the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) announcing its departure from the FFC (July 25). In a statement, the SPA said that FFC’s performance since al-Bashir’s fall has been “confused”, with narrow interests and tactical considerations prevailing over major strategic interests such as seeking accountability for the former regime’s crimes. The SPA added that the FFC’s internal chaos produced an “incompetent” government amid deteriorating economic conditions and "a lack of resolve" in the peace talks.

3. Solutions

1.     Firmer civilian government

 Assertive civilian government - In a letter to the Financial Times (14 July), Mohamed El Mustafa Hammad noted that Sudan’s finance ministry is unable to set economic policy respectively. Hammad called for Sudan’s civilian administration to demand to take on the “real role of government,” requiring “a more assertive stance on assuming powers, as the public has demanded.”

 Practical ways for the government to mobilise revenue - Jean-Baptiste Gallopin (European Council on Foreign Relations, 9 June) provided practical strategies for the civilian government to implement. Gallopin called for Hamdok to “become visibly involved” in confronting the civilian government’s financial dependence on the economically dominant military and security sectors. To raise awareness of the importance of raising government revenue and ensuring transparency in public finances, Gallopin suggested that Hamdok establishes a committee comprising of civil society and independent retired military officers, as well as explicitly supporting civilian management of non-defence businesses.

2.     Economic solutions

 Clarity regarding authority over economic policy - Expressing hope that the statement explaining his departure will be viewed as "one of the lessons learned" during the transitional period, former finance minister Ibrahim Elbadawi called for future “clarity” in ascertaining authority over Sudan’s economic strategy, adding that the upcoming period “will witness difficult decisions to enforce profound economic transformations” (Sudan Tribune, 19 July).

 Mobilising resources - The FFC Economic Committee said that it presents an alternative national programme based on “the mobilisation of resources inherent in the national economy” (Sudan Tribune, 24 July).

 Directing state capabilities towards crisis management - In criticising the FFC’s perceived neglect of peace issues and marginalisation of Sudan’s peripheries, Hussein Arko Minnawi called for state capabilities to be directed towards crisis management and addressing key issues related to peace and security ((Sudan Tribune, 26 June).

3.     International support

 Gallopin calls for EU members, the US, UK and Norway to support Hamdok by publicly stating their support for his efforts to mobilise revenue streams currently controlled by the military and security sector. Gallopin also calls for European countries to “considerably increase” funding for projects that facilitate Hamdok’s increased popular legitimacy, as well as convincing the UAE and Saudi Arabia that their economic interests in Sudan are best served by competent civilians rather than generals (European Council on Foreign Relations, 9 June).

4.     Civil society solutions

 A national conference - Dr Mudawi Ibrahim, head of the peace axis at the University of Khartoum Forum for Development and Democratic Transformation, stressed the importance of rebuilding the Sudanese state and ensuring the participation of all Sudanese in the process. Ibrahim added that a national conference will host a societal dialogue discussing issues including: citizenship, the relationship between religion and the state and forms of governance (Radio Dabanga, 22 July).

 Permanent dialogue mechanisms -  The Darfur Bar Association (DBA) said that peaceful sit-ins can be further developed through conferences, workshops, focus groups, interviews, and employing media to display issues. Thus, the DBA called for permanent dialogue mechanisms, engagement with the authorities in Khartoum and the states, and the development of medium to long-term strategic plans which outline proposals for solutions, that are to be implemented by the authorities and those responsible for organising the sit-ins (Radio Dabanga, 13 July).

#SudanUprising: Despite progress in the anti-Islamist campaign, the institutional agenda of Sudan's democratic transition continues to stall

Introduction

 Sudanese authorities continue to make progress against the ousted Omar al-Bashir regime, arresting their supporters and seizing assets gained through corruption. However, the former regime’s considerable resources mean it is able to defend its interests through traditional and social media, despite the transitional government’s intentions to exert more efforts in achieving press freedom. In addition, it seems unlikely that companies linked to the security apparatus will be transferred to the civilian Ministry of Finance.

 Meanwhile, infighting within the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition continues to stall the institutional agenda of the democratic transition. The May 9 deadline for the establishment of a transitional parliament and appointments of civilian governors has passed, with the FFC yet to reach an agreement on the distribution of positions. The National Umma Party (NUP) has suspended its FFC activities, with the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebel groups seeking independence within the coalition.

 Sudan has made women’s rights progress by outlawing Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), although enforcing the law poses challenges. To read about this in more detail, read our briefing: How can Sudan enforce the FGM ban and do more for women’s rights?

1. Campaign against the former regime

The transitional government has  arrested Islamists and seized assets gained through corruption. However, the former regime continues to defend its interests on traditional and social media, and it is seems unlikely that security apparatus companies will be transferred to the Ministry of Finance.

Anti-Islamist Campaign

Sudan Tribune (April 25) report that the head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, Lt. Gen. Abdelfattah al-Burhan, alleged that the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP) is seeking to sow discord between the military and civilian components of the transitional authority. Al-Burhan said that every time there is a rapprochement between the armed forces and the political "forces of the revolution", rumours emerge about a coup d’etat to destabilise security and stability. Nonetheless, al-Burhan asserted that a meeting was held with Sudan’s Attorney General to discuss ways to speed up the arrests of Islamists, following criticisms that the authorities are not moving fast enough to do so.

 Consequently, Sudanese police arrested 23 who protested in demands that members of al-Bashir’s regime are released from prison. With their third protest in eight days, the protesters had ignored directives to ban public gatherings as a precaution against the spread of coronavirus (Radio Dabanga, 1 May).  The government has also made progress in recovering the corrupt proceeds of organisations and people affiliated to the ousted regime. 

 Nonetheless, the former regime is still able to defend its interests through traditional and social media. Hassan Ahmed Berkia, a member of the Sudanese Journalists Network (SJN), said: “most of the 18 daily newspapers that cover politics continue to be affiliated or close to supporters of the former regime and economic conditions prevent the arrival of new actors.” The former regime also possesses a “Cyber Jihadist Unit,” a troll army created by the intelligence services to spy on the opposition and journalists (Reporters Without Borders, April 10).

 Anti-Corruption Progress

Sudan’s Anti-Corruption Committee confiscated 79 real estate properties that were illegally acquired by leading members of the ousted regime, confiscating properties amounting to 36,411,114 square metres and seized funds estimated at $1.20 billion. Leading Islamist Abdelbasit Hamza came top of the list – losing swathes of land and shares and ownership of key companies (Radio Dabanga, 24 April).

 For a more detailed account of the corrupt activities of Abdelbasit Hamza, and other associates and organisations of the ousted regime, please read our investigation:  A Mafia With a State.

 In addition, El Gezira University anti-corruption efforts saw the dissolution of the Institute for Islamic Knowledge endowment (Imam) foundation, and the seizure of its assets and properties. The Institute granted al-Bashir and “many” leaders of his regime honorary degrees while receiving funding from organisations that “fell short of transparent financial and accounting procedures” (Radio Dabanga, 5 May).

 No discussion of transferring military companies to the civilian Ministry of Finance

Sudan Tribune (24 April) reported on a meeting featuring Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander and Sovereign Council deputy head Himedti, which discussed progress in converting non-military companies belonging to Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation (MIC) into public joint-stock companies to be regulated under civil codes and in observance of transparency and oversight rules.

 However, Sudan Tribune’s sources say that the companies will continue to belong to the army and the prospect of their transfer to the Ministry of Finance was not discussed. The source added that the meeting stressed the importance of the MIC in utilising its technical and professional capabilities to solve Sudan’s economic crisis.

2. The Institutional Agenda

The institutional agenda of Sudan’s democratic transition continues to stall due to infighting within the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). Consequently, the transitional parliament and appointment of civilian governors originally planned for November 2019, has been delayed again. The FFC’s internal divides leave the broad coalition at risk of a break-up.

FFC divides

The National Umma Party (NUP) has suspended its activities on all levels for the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). The NUP called for “a new social contract” to rebuild Sudan, calling on its FFC partners to meet within two weeks to discuss ways to achieve democratic transition’s goals (Multiple sources, 23 April). However, leading FFC member, Gaafar Hassan Osman ruled out the NUP’s proposed conference due to coronavirus precautions limiting public gatherings (Sudan Tribune, 3 May).

 Highlighting its displeasure with the FFC’s management of the transitional period, the NUP noted “urgent” tasks including: the formation of national commissions as provided in the transitional constitution, and the need to schedule elections - starting locally, followed by state legislative assemblies and state governors elections, ending with the general elections at the end of the transitional period. The NUP also called for an immediate videoconference on economic issues, and criticised the “lack of clear strategy in the Juba peace talks” which “pave the way for blackmail and exaggerated demands by the armed groups” (Multiple sources, 23 April).

 However, Sudan’s armed groups, through the the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) also express displeasure with the FFC. In a letter to Hamdok, al-Burhan and Himedti – the SRF said it seeks independence within the FFC, exiting the Sudan Call alliance with civilian political parties the NUP and the Sudanese Congress Party (Sudan Tribune, 5 May).

 Indeed, a key SRF and FFC leader, Malik Agar, a factional leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), called for reforms that would enable the SRF to play an “effective” role in Sudan’s democratic transition. The SRF accuses FFC political forces of excluding them from consultations on Sudan’s future, although FFC civilian entities justify SRF exclusion on the basis that the armed movements demanded peace negotiations to address the issues of their regions (Sudan Tribune, 25 April).

 The internal divides within the FFC are resulting in the stagnant progress of the institutional agenda of Sudan’s democratic transition. FFC in-fighting mean that Sudan still lacks democratic institutions, with the establishment of a transitional parliament and the appointment of civilian governors being a major point of dispute.

Transitional parliament and the appointment of civilian governors delayed - again.

An international delegation featuring the UK, Norway, USA, EU and Germany proposed the formation of a transitional legislative council, should a peace agreement be signed by the government and SRF by May 9. In the absence of an agreement, the international delegation suggested that armed movements are reserved one third of third of transitional legislative council seats (Radio Dabanga, April 28).

 However, FFC coordination council member Gaafar Hassan Osman told Sudan Tribune (3 May) that the formation of the transitional parliament will be postponed until after May 9th, due to the FFC’s failure to reach an agreement on the distribution of the seats. Osman attributed the failure to the absence of appropriate mechanisms in ensuring that the selection process of parliamentarians represents women, youth, resistance committees and political forces, in addition to taking into account geographical variation.

 Moreover, Osman said the FFC is unwilling to amend its nominees for state governors, despite opposition from influential civil society groups and the SRF. In response, the FFC wrote to Hamdok, al-Burhan and Himedti to propose that “selected governors should have sufficient administrative experience, acceptance from local residents, especially in the conflict-affected states [and] must be chosen from apolitical and qualified cadre who represent Sudan’s diversity, with fair representation of women” (Sudan Tribune, 5 May).

3. Human Rights

Sudan has outlawed female genital mutilation (FGM), although more progress needs to be made with regards to women’s rights. To read about this in more detail, read our briefing: How can Sudan enforce the FGM ban and do more for women’s rights?. The government also intends to exert more efforts in improving press freedom.  

Women’s Rights - FGM briefing summarised:

Enforcement of Sudan’s criminalisation of FGM remains an obstacle due to: Sudan’s socio-economic norms and the fears of sparking a backlash among influential Islamist groups. The solutions proposed have revolved around raising awareness of the FGM ban and facilitating a communal effort against the practice. However, Sudan’s criminalisation of FGM “might seem well-intended” but “[fails to] address the root causes of women’s subordination in Sudan which are deeply ingrained in misogynistic attitudes,” argue Strategic Initiative for the Horn of Africa (SIHA), an influential local civil society organisation.

 Press Freedom

Although Reporters Without Borders (April 10) note that systematic media harassment has declined since the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime. Sudan is no longer at the “absolute bottom” of Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index, which the Ministry of Information says “constitutes a motivation to further improve press freedom in Sudan” However, Prime Minister Hamdok said that press freedom in Sudan is “still below the standards set by the transitional government” (Radio Dabanga, 4 May).  

 A key issue noted by Reporters Without Borders (RWB, April 10) is that news control is being exercised “more insidiously.” RWB cite the case of Lubna Abdella, dismissed by al-Sudan al-Dawlia after an investigative story about corruption within the human rights commission. Hassan Ahmed Berkia, a member of the Sudanese Journalists Network (SJN), said: “most of the 18 daily newspapers that cover politics continue to be affiliated or close to supporters of the former regime and economic conditions prevent the arrival of new actors.”

 The SJN also claim that the vast majority of the press institutions still lack health insurance for their journalists and other employees, with publishers violating labour laws and illegally depriving journalists of money. (Radio Dabanga, 4 May).  

 In addition, RWB note that the former regime’s interests are defended online by a “Cyber Jihadist Unit,” a troll army created by the intelligence services to spy on the opposition and journalists.

For the transitional government to solve press freedom issues, RWB suggest that media outlets and the journalists’ organisations that were most critical of the former regime are consulted in the drafting of press freedom legislation.

#SudanUprising: One year into the democratic transition, key issues remain

 #SudanUprising: Ongoing Issues in Sudan’s Democratic Transition

A year from the fall of Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s democratic transition still faces considerable obstacles. This briefing explores the following issues:

• ·      Al-Bashir loyalists pose a security threat to Sudan’s Anti-Corruption committee. In April 2020, Islamist groups staged three protests against the transitional government.

• ·      Analysts argue that the civilian government’s perceived inability to manage Sudan’s economic crisis and the coronavirus pandemic serve as pretexts for military restoration.

• ·      The Rapid Support Forces militia (RSF) continue to be viewed as a threat to democratisation and economic recovery. 

• ·      Sudan’s economic woes and the coronavirus pandemic are also argued to stall justice and conflict resolution efforts.

• ·      The appointment of civilian governors continues to divide political groups in Sudan.

 Nonetheless, solutions have been presented to Sudan in its attempts to solve issues of:  governance, democratic development, justice, economic recovery, and reducing corruption and the influence of the deep-state.

1. Anti-Corruption Efforts

Sudan’s Empowerment Elimination, Anti-Corruption, and Funds Recovery Committee – a committee tasked with dismantling the remnants of Omar al-Bashir’s deep-state – has made progress in confiscating deep-state assets, despite the security threat it faces.

Sudan’s Anti-Corruption Committee transferred to the Ministry of Finance 390 properties in prestigious neighbourhoods of Khartoum that were registered under the names of officials, families, and affiliates of the deposed al-Bashir regime. (Radio Dabanga, 19 April).

 However, the Anti-Corruption Committee faces security threats. Committee member Wajdi Saleh announced that he received anonymous death threats, hours after retrieving 157 plots of land from three prominent leaders of the ousted regime (Radio Dabanga, 13 April). Radio Dabanga (10 April) also reported that armed men attempted to shoot two members of the anti-corruption committee in West Kordofan - Hussein Bakkar, secretary of the Arab Socialist Baath Party in West Kordofan, and lawyer Ibrahim El-Ahmar.

The Ba’ath Party labelled the attack “a political assassination, aiming to eliminate West Kordofan state leaders as part of a plan to launch a counter-revolution against change” in Sudan. The Ba’ath Party blamed Sudan’s General Intelligence Service (GIS) for the attack. 

2. Al-Bashir supporters protest

Despite the ban on gatherings, supporters of Omar al-Bashir’s regime have staged three demonstrations against the transitional government in a week. Hundreds belonging to a group called the Unified Popular Movement (UPM) - staged a demonstration in central Khartoum (Radio Dabanga, 10 April). Sudanese police responded to second UPM protest by firing tear gas and arresting 30 demonstrators (Multiple sources, April 13). Islamist groups then held a third demonstration on April 16 (Sudan Tribune).

The demonstrators denounced the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and called for the resignation of the transitional government, chanting slogans including: “down with neo-colonialism” in reference to western support for the civilian government, “one army, one people” in calls for a military takeover, and “no to government of hunger” in reference to the ongoing economic crisis (Multiple sources, April 13).

The Sudanese Cabinet subsequently ordered strict measures against al-Bashir supporters who continue to demonstrate. Madani Abbas Madani, Minister of Industry and Trade, said his Cabinet colleagues agreed that al-Bashir’s supporters “should not be allowed to occupy the spaces of freedom that the Sudanese people have extracted from the former regime.” (Radio Dabanga, 17 April).

 Sudan Tribune (April 16) note that various Islamic currents in Sudan believe they can incite the army to take power after the government’s failure to convince international financial institutions to support its economic plans. Indeed, Sudan’s economic crisis has been argued to raise the risks of military rule being restored. 

3. Economic crisis

Sudan’s economic crisis has deepened, argues Atlantic Council senior fellow Cameron Hudson – who notes that an ambitious reform plan to generate revenues to fund basic social services and revive “crumbling” government ministries has “gone unimplemented by the new crop of civilian technocrats. Hudson notes that Sudan’s civilian technocrats “are accused of lacking both the acumen to enlist broad political support for painful reforms and the courage to upset the military’s entrenched financial interests” (Radio Dabanga, April 13).

 As a result, Jonas Horner, a Sudan analyst at the International Crisis Group, identifies concerns that military leaders could use Sudan’s worsening economy as a “pretext to take a much firmer hold on the transition,” as the “civilian component of the government is made to look weak” (New Humanitarian, April 16).

 However, Sudan’s Information Minister, Faisal Mohamed Salih dismissed suggestions that the military was plotting a coup (Bloomberg, April 18). The Sudanese Cabinet has also emphasised the need for Sudan’s security forces “to deal firmly” with demonstrating supporters of al-Bashir’s regime (Radio Dabanga, 17 April).

 For his part, General Command of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the chairman of the Sovereign Council, Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan, said the entire military “will keep its covenant with the Sudanese people to protect change and the gains of the revolution.” El Burhan stressed that the leaders of the armed forces “with all their factions, including the Rapid Support Forces”, work in complete harmony and that “their sole goal is to protect the country and the revolution” (Radio Dabanga, 20 April).

 4. Coronavirus

The coronavirus is argued to have a negative impact on Sudan’s democratic transition – with factors cited including: the inability to protest, disputes between civilian and military leaders, and a civilian government that is unable to meet Sudanese demands for leadership in dealing with the pandemic.

Foreign policy specialist Stephen Zunes told the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (April 14) that protests reflect how “people in Sudan have acknowledged the power of nonviolent actions to obtain human and minorities rights, accountability and more.” However, civilian officials told the New York Times (April 17) that the coronavirus has put them at a disadvantage since they now could not mobilise supporters lest they risk spreading the virus.

Declan Walsh (New York Times, April 17) also argues that Sudan’s management of the coronavirus underscores the “fragility” of Sudan’s democratic transition, citing a dispute between Prime Minister Hamdok and Khartoum’s ex-military governor Lt. Gen Ahmed Abdoun Hamad, after the latter defied orders to cancel Friday prayers to counter the spread of coronavirus in Khartoum. Walsh also reports that senior Sudanese officials contacted western officials and local journalists to warn that they feared the military would use the coronavirus lockdown to seize power, although a senior US official said Sudan’s “jittery” civilian leaders had “so frequently warned of a possible coup in Khartoum that they had become akin to the boy who cried wolf.”

 Nonetheless, the coronavirus “is particularly dangerous for Hamdok as the military - and particularly the RSF - may move to demonstrate their ability to deliver in the absence of broader government action,” argues Jonas Horner (Bloomberg, April 14).

 In particular, the RSF is reportedly aiming to win Sudanese hearts and minds by “spearheading” Sudan’s coronavirus fight, in what Cameron Hudson labels as the RSF’s latest push “to reinvent themselves as defenders of the poor and downtrodden. Hudson notes that “unlike Hamdok’s government” the RSF is able to draw on its discipline, organisation and resources (Bloomberg, April 14).

5. RSF

Bloomberg (April 14) quoted political cartoonist Khalid Albaih to say that “the RSF has become one of the main obstacles to [Sudan’s] democratisation.” Although the RSF-linked Al-Junaid company has handed over gold mines in North Darfur to the Sudanese government (Sudan Tribune, 19 March), anti-corruption protesters in South Darfur’s El Radoom have occupied government offices to demand that al-Junaid returns a percentage of profits to the local community (OCCRP, April 14).

 Sudan analyst Jihad Mashamoun also accuses RSF commander Himedti of worsening Sudan’s economic crisis through his links with al-Fakher company, “which has been buying gold at uneconomic prices thereby pushing down the value of the Sudanese pound.” Himedti’s emerging political role is also viewed as an obstacle to the democratic transition.

Mashamoun suggests that Himedti’s “intervention” in Sudan’s peace talks “as a means of forming alliances with groups across [Sudan] and controlling the transition to free elections” is in “disregard of the Constitutional Declaration” (Africa Report, 31 March).

 Hudson also suggests that Himedti’s emerging role has had a dampening effect on US support for the transitional government - fearing that sanctions relief could deprive the US of “critical leverage down the road” should civilian efforts fail or the military retake absolute control (Radio Dabanga, April 13).

6. Reforming state institutions

Sudan Tribune (April 6) report that Sudan’s ruling partners formed a joint committee in order to reform state institutions, after the Sovereign Council, the government and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) held a meeting to assess the performances of Hamdok’s government. The FFC noted the slow pace of reforms and continued presence of al-Bashir’s regime in state institutions. The ruling partners agreed to form a joint committee to reform security services, implement economic and diplomatic solutions, resolve conflict, secure justice and remove the former regime.  

 However, the coronavirus pandemic and economic crisis pose obstacles in Sudan’s reform attempts. Sudan must wait until the coronavirus lockdown is over before proceeded to try Omar al-Bashir on charges related to the 1989 coup that brought him to power as well as a crackdown on the protests that eventually led to his ouster (Bloomberg, 7 April). Moreover,

Human Rights Watch (9 April) state that Sudanese prosecutors lack the resources and technical capacity to investigate violations on protesters, relying on victims’ families to collect evidence.

 The economic crisis is also impeding the prospects of conflict resolution, amid uncertainty around funding for the proposed security sector reforms, investment into marginalised areas and the demobilisation and reintegration of rebels. In addition, Sudanese writer Ahmed Hussein Adam argues that the peace talks have failed to look at “the root cause of the failure of the Sudanese state” -  given their focus on securing armed group representation in various transitional bodies (New Humanitarian, April 16).

 Indeed, the peace talks are also stalling the institutional agenda of Sudan’s democratic transition – as the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) - a coalition of rebel groups – continue to oppose the appointment of civilian governors and a legislative parliament before the signing of a peace agreement (Sudan Tribune, 14 April).

7. Governors

The Sovereign Council, Cabinet and the FFC agreed to appoint civilian governors and the legislative parliament before mid-May 2020 (Sudan Tribune, 12 April). Sudan’s Information Minister, Faisal Mohamed Salih, confirmed that Khartoum’s military governor was replaced by a civilian, and the 17 other provincial heads will be replaced by temporary governors until a final peace deal is made between Sudan’s government and a patchwork of rebel groups (Bloomberg, 18 April).

 However, the SRF accuses the FFC of seeking to exclude them from the nomination process, saying that “the FFC’s Khartoum faction seeks to exclude [the peripheral regions] and is bypassing the street and the resistance committees by striking a deal to share the state governor positions in a shameful way, and are seeking to appoint unqualified people” (Sudan Tribune, 14 April).

 The SRF’s position is supported by the National Umma Party (NUP), who described the FFC civilian governor nominations as “an abyss of quotas, turning a blind eye to the weight of political names, and their presence in the states,” and that they “do not take into account the views of stakeholders in the states, but rather represent the opinion of the political elites in Khartoum.” The NUP also warn that the FFC nominations will impede conflict resolution and “will make stability in [conflict zones] impossible” (Multiple Sources, April 20).

 Nonetheless, the SRF said it is willing to back the appointment of state governors and the Transitional Legislative Council in Sudan before peace, provided that the process is based on agreed criteria and that it can take part in the nomination process, threatening to suspend peace negotiations unless its demands are met (Sudan Tribune, 18 April).

 The SRF’s position does not represent all rebel groups. The Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North  – which is not part of the SRF – accused the SRF of seeking to share power, with the SRF position stated to be “inconsistent with the spirit of the revolution” and a “disruption of the civil democratic transformation process." (Sudan Tribune, April 20).

 In addition, key civil society groups – the Darfur Bar Association (DBA) and the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) – also endorse the appointment of civilian governors, with the DBA stating that the appointments will help ongoing efforts to dismantle the ‘deep state’. Nonetheless, the SPA note that consensus has not been reached in the states of: Khartoum, the Northern State, North Darfur and Central Darfur (Radio Dabanga, April 21).

Solutions

 Analysts, civil society and political groups have proposed solutions to solve Sudanese issues in the areas of: governance, democratic development, justice, economic recovery, reducing corruption and the influence of the deep-state.

 1. Appointing independent and diverse provisional parliamentarians

 Sudan analyst Jihad Mashamoun, and Andrew Tchie, a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think-tank, call for Sudan to appoint independent provisional parliamentarians who reflect Sudan’s diversity and hold the Sovereign Council, FFC and Cabinet to account (Africa Report, April 7).

 2. Dictating the appointment of governors through local public opinion

The NUP emphasised the importance of local public opinion in determining governors. The NUP announced that it was seeking consultations to develop a mechanism to “determine the weight of political forces,” in order to achieve “the goals of decentralisation” (Multiple Sources, April 20).

 3.Establishing a set of standards for the appointment of governors

The SRF demand that the appointment of governors is conducted according to transparent standards that ensure competence, experience, ethnic diversity, women’s participation, non-partisanship, and popular acceptance. The SRF also voiced rejection of any appointment based on "party loyalty or quotas based on narrow organizational selfishness.” (Sudan Tribune, 18 April). The Darfur Bar Association calls for 30 percent of the civilian state governors to be women, with standards for selecting governors including: experience in administration, connection to the state represented and the values of the revolution (Radio Dabanga, April 21).

4. Building political unity

With the leaders of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) stated to be “inexperienced and fragmented,” Mashamoun and Tchie (Africa Report, April 7) call for diverse Sudanese civic groups to build political consensus with a “robust road map that clearly outlines practical steps towards democracy,” including electoral support to prevent electoral manipulation or violence.

 5. Civilian leadership

Jonas Horner called for Hamdok to spend his political capital on meeting Sudanese demands for leadership from the transitional government (Bloomberg, April 14).

 6. Conflict resolution

SPLM-N al-Hilu faction maintains its position that peace can only be achieved by addressing the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts (Sudan Tribune, April 20). To consolidate peace, Mashamoun and Tchie for Sudan’s leadership to “contend with the influence of Islamic groups and elites that make up Sudan’s deep state” (Africa Report, April 7).

 7. Justice

Human Rights Watch (9 April) call for the government to form a special entity “such as an investigation committee or special court,” to investigate cases, with the international community, including donors, seeking to provide technical and financial support.

 8. Fighting corruption and the deep-state

Mashamoun calls for the government to accelerate the transfer of businesses run by the security officials linked to al-Bashir’s regime to the Ministry of Finance. Mashamoun also calls for the government and the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition to challenge the deep-state’s social media campaign by “working together in public forums to communicate more clearly what is happening in Sudan” (Africa Report, 31 March).

 9. Economic reform

To solve the economic crisis, Mashamoun and Tchie calls for Sudan to focus investment in infrastructure, education, health and agriculture, tackle corruption and strengthen regional trade links (Africa Report, April 7).

"The Revolution Was Stolen": Can the transitional government bring justice for killed protesters?

“The Revolution Was Stolen”: Can the transitional government bring justice for killed protesters?

 Despite international advocacy organisations concluding that Sudanese security forces were responsible for the June 3 2019 massacre in Khartoum, Sudanese civilians remain critical of the transitional government’s incapacity in prosecuting the alleged perpetrators. Some civilians are withdrawing their support for the government due to its inability to deliver justice for the dead protesters.

 However, the government faces structural obstacles in hold perpetrators of the massacre to account. The government’s inquiry into the massacre is flawed by an inability to quantify death toll figures or protect witnesses. The Sudanese legal system is also believed to lack independence, which poses a concern as the RSF – who are accused of conducting the massacre – launch legal action against their critics.

 Proposed solutions include: an independent investigation, international sanctions, constitutional reforms and for Sudanese security forces to adopt a “new culture.”

Sudanese security forces accused of responsibility for the June 3 2019 massacre

 An inquiry by New York-based advocacy organisation Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) concluded that Sudanese security forces systematically planned and coordinated the June 3 2019 massacre which killed up to 241 pro-democracy protesters and injured hundreds more (Guardian, March 5).

 Citing interviews with 30 survivors, eyewitness accounts, and analysis of thousands of still and video images among other sources of information, PHR found that Sudanese authorities “purposefully pre-positioned” state security forces armed with tear gas, whips and assault rifles in the month before the protests began, and “intentionally targeted” medical personnel and facilities during and after the protests.

 Amnesty International (March 10) blamed the “shadowy” armed operational units of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and the Rapid Support Forces militia (RSF) for the June 3 2019 massacre.

 However, Sudanese civilians continue to criticise the transitional government for failing to bring the alleged perpetrators of the massacre to account, with support for the transitional government being withdrawn.

Transitional government criticised for its inability to deliver justice

AP (9 March) highlighted the growing youth disillusion at the transitional government, with growing frustrations at the lack of justice for killed protesters.

 30-year-old Al-amin Ali said the transitional government “is far from meeting the basic demands of the uprising — justice for previous crimes.” 19-year-old Youssef al-Sewahly said his support for the transitional government hinges on whether those responsible for violence on demonstrators are prosecuted, adding that “our trust in the military is zero, we do not expect anything from them.”

A video circulating Sudanese social media was a speech by the mother of Abdulsalam Kisha – a protester who was killed during the June 3 massacre. Kisha’s mother was responding to a request for a three-month extension made by Nabil Adib, the rights lawyer who is leading the government investigation into the June 3 massacre.

 Kisha’s mother said: “Nabil Adib is the dirtiest human created by Allah. He is a dirty, unclean man. Today, he was supposed to give a statement, but he delayed it for three months. Why does he want a three month extension?” Kisha’s mother also labelled the chairman and deputy chairman of Sudan’s ruling sovereign council – Abdelfattah al-Burhan and Himedti respectively – “the dirtiest creations of Allah.”

Kisha’s mother then extended her criticisms to the civilian groups who organised the Sudan Uprising, and share power with the military in the transition government. “The Kezan [al-Bashir’s regime] are still in power,” she said. “The revolution got stolen. The revolutionaries need to be united,” she said.

“The Forces of Freedom and Change are dirtier than the Kezan. The Sudanese Professionals Association are dirtier than the Kezan. Hamdok is cold, because he has a foreign passport. He has not lived our life. They do not feel the pain of the revolutionaries who died” Kisha’s mother added.

 Kisha’s mother concluded by saying: “all the martrys who died were young. I have to bring them justice – for my son and his friends. And I have to be on the streets, with the revolutionaries.” The crowd chanted: “Kisha’s mother, we are all Kisha.”

However, structural obstacles impede the prospects of justice for the killed protesters.

Obstacles to justice

 The government’s inquiry into the June 3 massacre is flawed by an inability to quantify death toll figures or protect witnesses. The Sudanese legal system is also believed to lack independence, which poses a concern, as the RSF government militia – who are accused of conducting the massacre – launch legal action against their critics.

 Inability to quantify the death toll – Amnesty International (March 10) said it is “flabbergasted” by the “widely divergent” protester death toll data provided by different Sudanese government agencies, calling for Sudanese authorities to “spare no effort” in verifying the “true extent of atrocities committed.

 Witness protection not guaranteed – While Nabil Adib, the lawyer who leads the government investigation into the June 3 2019 massacre, has been labelled “the dirtiest creation of God” by the mother of a killed protester, structural obstacles impede Adib in his attempts to provide justice.  Adib has conceded that his commission lacks the resources and capabilities to guarantee witness protection (AP, 9 March).

 Sudanese legal limitations – Musad Mohamed Ali, the Executive Director of the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, told Radio Dabanga (March 4) that Sudan has not had an independent, impartial and transparent judiciary for the past 30 years, with the judiciary lacking “practical” experience in international humanitarian law and human rights violations.

 While Ali was speaking within the context of Sudanese legal limitations which render “out of the question” a trial in Sudanese courts for those wanted by the ICC for crimes committed in Darfur, the same criticisms can be applied to the practicality of Sudanese courts in bringing perpetrators of the June 3 massacre to justice.

 RSF legal action –  With the RSF widely blamed for the June 3 massacre, public pressure on the militia can be silenced by the possibility of legal action taken against those who accuse the RSF, who having filed four official complaints against its critics. Radio Dabanga (March 2) reported that the RSF is taking legal action against journalists of the independent El Jareeda newspaper after it published criticisms from senior figures in the Sudanese Communist Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North.

 Mohammed el-Khateeb, the Communist Party Secretary-General, said the RSF is a militia that should not be allowed to join the Sudanese army. El Jareeda is also being sued after quoting Dr Mohamed Hashim, the deputy head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, who reportedly told a symposium that the RSF “poses a danger to the revolution.”

 To find justice for killed protesters, the solutions presented have included calls for an independent investigation, international sanctions, constitutional reforms and for Sudanese security forces to adopt a “new culture.”

Solutions

 Independent investigation - Deprose Muchena, Amnesty International’s Director for East Africa, called on Sudan’s transitional authorities to hold “thorough, effective and independent investigations into all protester killings and other human rights violations.” Muchena called for all those found responsible, “including through command responsibility,” to be brought to justice through fair trials, “but without resorting to the death penalty” (Amnesty International, March 10).

 International sanctions and constitutional reform - PHR called on on UN member states to sanction the Sudanese officials responsible for the human rights abuses and for Sudan’s civilian-military government to include human rights, rule of law and accountability protections in the nation’s new constitution (Guardian, March 5). Indeed, Taj Elsir Alhibr, Sudan’s Attorney General, called for relevant authorities to confirm constitutional rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression (Sudan Tribune, March 6).

 New culture for security forces – Alhibr also called for Sudanese security forces to adopt a “new culture” to prevent the “brutal” crackdown against peaceful protesters. Alhibr suggested that the police depart from conventional methods of dealing with demonstrations under al-Bashir’s regime, as “peaceful demonstrations “are now a legitimate right” (Sudan Tribune, March 6).

 However, just four days after the statements were reported, Sudanese police used tear gas to disperse demonstrations in the Blue Nile state (Radio Dabanga, March 10). On the same day that citizens across Sudan took to the streets in solidarity with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok following a failed assassination attempt, protests in Ed Damazin faced violence as they protested frequent power cuts and water shortages. Six houses were torched in the process.

#SudanUprising: After an assassination attempt on Hamdok, can the democratic transition be saved from the deep-state?

After an assassination attempt on Hamdok, how can #SudanUprising be saved from the deep-state?

 An attempt to assassinate Sudan’s civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is believed to been orchestrated by loyalists of former president Omar al-Bashir, in an attempt to derail Sudan’s democratic transition. While the transitional government has made progress in its attempts to dismantle the remnants of al-Bashir’s regime, the deep-state affiliated to al-Bashir continues to pose structural obstacles for Sudan’s democratic prospects. Therefore, the solutions presented involve vigorous institutional reforms and international support.

Hamdok survives assassination attempt

 Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok survived an assassination attempt after a motorcade carrying the armoured vehicle he was in was struck by an explosion and sustained gunfire. In its claim of responsibility, the Sudanese Islamic Youth Movement, which sometimes refers to itself as the “Sudanese Taliban”, called Hamdok “an American agent” (Multiple sources, March 9). The Sudanese Information Minister Faisal Mohammed Salih labelled the attempt “a terrorist attack” (Reuters, March 9).

 Sudanese police revealed that the explosive used in the attempt was locally manufactured (Sudan Tribune, March 11). The Sudanese government has since arrested several people, including foreigners, with security forces stating that six months ago, a militant Islamist group arrived in Sudan with forged Syrian travel documents. The group allegedly planned to conduct explosive attacks to kill Sudanese officials tasked with dismantling the former regime (Sudan Tribune, March 12).

 Moves by the transitional government further suggest a belief that loyalists of former president Omar al-Bashir organised the attack. The spokesman for Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council, Mohamed al-Faki, said the General Intelligence Service (GIS) will be brought under control of the government’s interior ministry (Reuters, March 10).

 It is worth noting that GIS is a rebrand of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) - a branch of Sudan’s security services that was closely linked to al-Bashir. Alongside the Ministry of Defence, the Interior Ministry is one of the only two cabinet ministries controlled by the military. Al-Faki added that the ‘Empowerment Committee’ tasked with “dismantling” the old regime will also be given additional powers, having already disbanded the former ruling National Congress Party and dismissed officials at banks and embassies.

Reactions to the assassination attempt

 The attempt on Hamdok’s life has been condemned by both the civilian and security elements of Sudan’s transitional government.

 A statement by Sudan’s security council said it would seek help from friendly countries to identify those involved and bring them to justice (Reuters, March 9). Indeed, Sudanese Information Minister Faisal Mohammed Salih subsequently announced that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will help Sudan investigate the attempt on Hamdok’s life (Multiple sources, March 11).

 Khalid Omar, the secretary general of the Sudanese Congress Party, a leading member of the transitional government’s Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition, said the attempt on Hamdok’s life was a new chapter in the conspiracy against the Sudanese revolution (Multiple sources, March 9).

 People across Sudan took to the streets to show their support for Hamdok and the transitional government. Khartoum, Wad Madani, El Gedaref, Kassala, Abyei and Port Sudan saw protests against what was described as a “terrorist act”, demanding the swift apprehension of those responsible (Radio Dabanga, March 10).

 Consequently, Cameron Hudson, a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council (March 11), argued that the assassination attempt on Hamdok “failed miserably” if the intent was to derail the government’s reform agenda, undermine international confidence in the government, and serve as a wakeup call to those inside Sudan that al-Bashir’s regime is still a force to be feared.

Hamdok’s importance in Sudan’s democratic transition

 The outpouring of international support for Hamdok is also reflective of how importantly he is viewed in Sudan’s democratic transition. Hudson cites the US’ political and technical support into the investigation as a sign that Hamdok is viewed as an essential component in unifying and building bridges between civilian and armed actors in Sudan (Atlantic Council, March 11).

 However, Hamdok’s importance may also be disputed on the basis that he “largely confines himself to the role of an economic administrator,” as argued by Jean-Baptise Gallopin of the European Council on Foreign Relations (March 18).

 Nonetheless, Hudson, a former US diplomat, argues that Hamdok’s surivival – both political and literal – is crucial for US’ lifting of Sudan’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation. Hudson attributes US caution in delisting Sudan to an apprehension that Hamdok might “rapidly, and inadvertently, outlive his usefulness in the eyes of the security sector [who are believed to] not yet given up their designs on power” (Atlantic Council, March 16).

 The attempt of Hamdok’s life was preceded by the further progress made by the Sudanese transitional government in dismantling the remnants of al-Bashir’s regime.

Progress in dismantling al-Bashir’s regime

 Firstly, in line with its mandate to purge the civil service, the Empowerment Removal Committee – tasked with dismantling the “old guard of al-Bashir’s regime” - dismissed 50 ambassadors and other diplomats (Sudan Tribune, March 1).

 Secondly, Sudan stripped 3,000 foreigners of their naturalised Sudanese citizenship. An official at the Interior Ministry said the decision focused on citizenships granted under al-Bashir’s regime to those with ties to “extremist Islamist groups” (Sudan Tribune, March 3).

 Nonetheless, the continued existence of the deep-state affiliated to al-Bashir poses structural obstacles for Sudan’s democratic prospects.

Obstacles in challenging the deep-state in Sudan

 The struggle to disempower political entities empowered during al-Bashir’s regime is complicated by structural factors which result in the continued dominance of affiliates of the former regime, at the expense of political forces that are not affiliated to Islamist groups or the security sector.

 Affiliates of al-Bashir’s regime still dominate government agencies

According to Sudanese activists, the Empowerment Committee tasked with dismantling affiliates of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, also suffers from deep-state interference. The Empowerment Committee issued a decision to form subcommittees, which are to comprise of representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Finance and Justice, the Central Bank of Sudan, Sudanese Armed Forces, the General Intelligence Service and the Rapid Support Forces militia (Radio Dabanga, March 5).

 Activist Jaafar Khidir told Radio Dabanga that the aforementioned government agencies have not seen any change since al-Bashir’s fall, with “affiliates of [al-Bashir’s regime] representing a majority in the subcommittees, hindering the fight against corruption, and the recovery of stolen funds.”

 The power of the Sovereign Council

Moreover, according to Jean-Baptise Gallopin, the progression of the institutional agenda of Sudan’s democratic transition has been stalled. Gallopin suggests that the ruling Sovereign Council - that “largely abides by the wishes of generals inherited from the Bashir era” is exploiting Sudan’s peace process to sideline the civilian-led cabinet.

 Thus, if Hamdok “continues to largely confine himself to the role of an economic administrator,” and if the FFC fail to organise beyond their “narrow” social base in Sudan’s central Arab regions, Gallopin warns that military rule may be reasserted (European Council on Foreign Relations, March 18).

 Limited capacity of the deep-state’s rivals

According to Andrew Tchie, a Research Fellow for Conflict, Security and Development at Kings College London, an overwhelming obstacle for Sudan’s democratic prospects is the absence of a single party that is capable of governing Sudan without support from Islamist groups and the security forces (Africa Report, February 26).

Solutions

 To restore Sudan’s democratic prospects, and prevent the deep-state affiliated to al-Bashir from derailing the transition, the proposed solutions have focused on institutional reforms and international support.  

 Institutional reforms

Gallopin calls on Hamdok and the FFC to begin vigorous institutional reforms that bring together the cabinet, FFC, civil society and armed groups, and address the grievances of Sudan’s regions. Gallopin suggests that the venues for such reforms could be the transitional parliament, or a constitutional or thematic conference (European Council on Foreign Relations, March 18).

 Tchie calls on Sudan’s transitional government to focus on building state institutions that are “independent, politically impartial and able to develop policies and deliver public services.” Tchie highlights the former ruling National Congress Party’s ongoing influence in South Darfur to call for the government to address weak institutional structures and the gaps in governance that exist throughout the country (Africa Report, February 26).

 In addition, Tchie also calls for the implementation of laws to combat money laundering, the addressing of concerns around illicit trade and black market economies, the retrieval of billions that former regime leaders stashed offshore, and security sector reforms that would retire members of the old regime.

International support

Finally, Hudson argues that continued international support for civilian and democratic rule will “remain an essential ingredient” for Sudan’s governing coalition to survive at the expense of the “last gasps” of Omar al-Bashir’s regime (Atlantic Council, March 11).