After an assassination attempt on Hamdok, how can #SudanUprising be saved from the deep-state?

An attempt to assassinate Sudan’s civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is believed to been orchestrated by loyalists of former president Omar al-Bashir, in an attempt to derail Sudan’s democratic transition. While the transitional government has made progress in its attempts to dismantle the remnants of al-Bashir’s regime, the deep-state affiliated to al-Bashir continues to pose structural obstacles for Sudan’s democratic prospects. Therefore, the solutions presented involve vigorous institutional reforms and international support.

Hamdok survives assassination attempt

Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok survived an assassination attempt after a motorcade carrying the armoured vehicle he was in was struck by an explosion and sustained gunfire. In its claim of responsibility, the Sudanese Islamic Youth Movement, which sometimes refers to itself as the “Sudanese Taliban”, called Hamdok “an American agent” (Multiple sources, March 9). The Sudanese Information Minister Faisal Mohammed Salih labelled the attempt “a terrorist attack” (Reuters, March 9).

Sudanese police revealed that the explosive used in the attempt was locally manufactured (Sudan Tribune, March 11). The Sudanese government has since arrested several people, including foreigners, with security forces stating that six months ago, a militant Islamist group arrived in Sudan with forged Syrian travel documents. The group allegedly planned to conduct explosive attacks to kill Sudanese officials tasked with dismantling the former regime (Sudan Tribune, March 12).

Moves by the transitional government further suggest a belief that loyalists of former president Omar al-Bashir organised the attack. The spokesman for Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council, Mohamed al-Faki, said the General Intelligence Service (GIS) will be brought under control of the government’s interior ministry (Reuters, March 10).

It is worth noting that GIS is a rebrand of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) - a branch of Sudan’s security services that was closely linked to al-Bashir. Alongside the Ministry of Defence, the Interior Ministry is one of the only two cabinet ministries controlled by the military. Al-Faki added that the ‘Empowerment Committee’ tasked with “dismantling” the old regime will also be given additional powers, having already disbanded the former ruling National Congress Party and dismissed officials at banks and embassies.

Reactions to the assassination attempt

The attempt on Hamdok’s life has been condemned by both the civilian and security elements of Sudan’s transitional government.

A statement by Sudan’s security council said it would seek help from friendly countries to identify those involved and bring them to justice (Reuters, March 9). Indeed, Sudanese Information Minister Faisal Mohammed Salih subsequently announced that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will help Sudan investigate the attempt on Hamdok’s life (Multiple sources, March 11).

Khalid Omar, the secretary general of the Sudanese Congress Party, a leading member of the transitional government’s Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition, said the attempt on Hamdok’s life was a new chapter in the conspiracy against the Sudanese revolution (Multiple sources, March 9).

People across Sudan took to the streets to show their support for Hamdok and the transitional government. Khartoum, Wad Madani, El Gedaref, Kassala, Abyei and Port Sudan saw protests against what was described as a “terrorist act”, demanding the swift apprehension of those responsible (Radio Dabanga, March 10).

Consequently, Cameron Hudson, a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council (March 11), argued that the assassination attempt on Hamdok “failed miserably” if the intent was to derail the government’s reform agenda, undermine international confidence in the government, and serve as a wakeup call to those inside Sudan that al-Bashir’s regime is still a force to be feared.

Hamdok’s importance in Sudan’s democratic transition

The outpouring of international support for Hamdok is also reflective of how importantly he is viewed in Sudan’s democratic transition. Hudson cites the US’ political and technical support into the investigation as a sign that Hamdok is viewed as an essential component in unifying and building bridges between civilian and armed actors in Sudan (Atlantic Council, March 11).

However, Hamdok’s importance may also be disputed on the basis that he “largely confines himself to the role of an economic administrator,” as argued by Jean-Baptise Gallopin of the European Council on Foreign Relations (March 18).

Nonetheless, Hudson, a former US diplomat, argues that Hamdok’s surivival – both political and literal – is crucial for US’ lifting of Sudan’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation. Hudson attributes US caution in delisting Sudan to an apprehension that Hamdok might “rapidly, and inadvertently, outlive his usefulness in the eyes of the security sector [who are believed to] not yet given up their designs on power” (Atlantic Council, March 16).

The attempt of Hamdok’s life was preceded by the further progress made by the Sudanese transitional government in dismantling the remnants of al-Bashir’s regime.

Progress in dismantling al-Bashir’s regime

Firstly, in line with its mandate to purge the civil service, the Empowerment Removal Committee – tasked with dismantling the “old guard of al-Bashir’s regime” - dismissed 50 ambassadors and other diplomats (Sudan Tribune, March 1).

Secondly, Sudan stripped 3,000 foreigners of their naturalised Sudanese citizenship. An official at the Interior Ministry said the decision focused on citizenships granted under al-Bashir’s regime to those with ties to “extremist Islamist groups” (Sudan Tribune, March 3).

Nonetheless, the continued existence of the deep-state affiliated to al-Bashir poses structural obstacles for Sudan’s democratic prospects.

Obstacles in challenging the deep-state in Sudan

The struggle to disempower political entities empowered during al-Bashir’s regime is complicated by structural factors which result in the continued dominance of affiliates of the former regime, at the expense of political forces that are not affiliated to Islamist groups or the security sector.

Affiliates of al-Bashir’s regime still dominate government agencies

According to Sudanese activists, the Empowerment Committee tasked with dismantling affiliates of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, also suffers from deep-state interference. The Empowerment Committee issued a decision to form subcommittees, which are to comprise of representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Finance and Justice, the Central Bank of Sudan, Sudanese Armed Forces, the General Intelligence Service and the Rapid Support Forces militia (Radio Dabanga, March 5).

Activist Jaafar Khidir told Radio Dabanga that the aforementioned government agencies have not seen any change since al-Bashir’s fall, with “affiliates of [al-Bashir’s regime] representing a majority in the subcommittees, hindering the fight against corruption, and the recovery of stolen funds.”

The power of the Sovereign Council

Moreover, according to Jean-Baptise Gallopin, the progression of the institutional agenda of Sudan’s democratic transition has been stalled. Gallopin suggests that the ruling Sovereign Council - that “largely abides by the wishes of generals inherited from the Bashir era” is exploiting Sudan’s peace process to sideline the civilian-led cabinet.

Thus, if Hamdok “continues to largely confine himself to the role of an economic administrator,” and if the FFC fail to organise beyond their “narrow” social base in Sudan’s central Arab regions, Gallopin warns that military rule may be reasserted (European Council on Foreign Relations, March 18).

Limited capacity of the deep-state’s rivals

According to Andrew Tchie, a Research Fellow for Conflict, Security and Development at Kings College London, an overwhelming obstacle for Sudan’s democratic prospects is the absence of a single party that is capable of governing Sudan without support from Islamist groups and the security forces (Africa Report, February 26).

Solutions

To restore Sudan’s democratic prospects, and prevent the deep-state affiliated to al-Bashir from derailing the transition, the proposed solutions have focused on institutional reforms and international support.

Institutional reforms

Gallopin calls on Hamdok and the FFC to begin vigorous institutional reforms that bring together the cabinet, FFC, civil society and armed groups, and address the grievances of Sudan’s regions. Gallopin suggests that the venues for such reforms could be the transitional parliament, or a constitutional or thematic conference (European Council on Foreign Relations, March 18).

Tchie calls on Sudan’s transitional government to focus on building state institutions that are “independent, politically impartial and able to develop policies and deliver public services.” Tchie highlights the former ruling National Congress Party’s ongoing influence in South Darfur to call for the government to address weak institutional structures and the gaps in governance that exist throughout the country (Africa Report, February 26).

In addition, Tchie also calls for the implementation of laws to combat money laundering, the addressing of concerns around illicit trade and black market economies, the retrieval of billions that former regime leaders stashed offshore, and security sector reforms that would retire members of the old regime.

International support

Finally, Hudson argues that continued international support for civilian and democratic rule will “remain an essential ingredient” for Sudan’s governing coalition to survive at the expense of the “last gasps” of Omar al-Bashir’s regime (Atlantic Council, March 11).