#SudanUprising: Despite progress in the anti-Islamist campaign, the institutional agenda of Sudan's democratic transition continues to stall
Introduction
Sudanese authorities continue to make progress against the ousted Omar al-Bashir regime, arresting their supporters and seizing assets gained through corruption. However, the former regime’s considerable resources mean it is able to defend its interests through traditional and social media, despite the transitional government’s intentions to exert more efforts in achieving press freedom. In addition, it seems unlikely that companies linked to the security apparatus will be transferred to the civilian Ministry of Finance.
Meanwhile, infighting within the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition continues to stall the institutional agenda of the democratic transition. The May 9 deadline for the establishment of a transitional parliament and appointments of civilian governors has passed, with the FFC yet to reach an agreement on the distribution of positions. The National Umma Party (NUP) has suspended its FFC activities, with the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebel groups seeking independence within the coalition.
Sudan has made women’s rights progress by outlawing Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), although enforcing the law poses challenges. To read about this in more detail, read our briefing: How can Sudan enforce the FGM ban and do more for women’s rights?
Campaign against the former regime
The transitional government has arrested Islamists and seized assets gained through corruption. However, the former regime continues to defend its interests on traditional and social media, and it is seems unlikely that security apparatus companies will be transferred to the Ministry of Finance.
Anti-Islamist Campaign
Sudan Tribune (April 25) report that the head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, Lt. Gen. Abdelfattah al-Burhan, alleged that the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP) is seeking to sow discord between the military and civilian components of the transitional authority. Al-Burhan said that every time there is a rapprochement between the armed forces and the political "forces of the revolution", rumours emerge about a coup d’etat to destabilise security and stability. Nonetheless, al-Burhan asserted that a meeting was held with Sudan’s Attorney General to discuss ways to speed up the arrests of Islamists, following criticisms that the authorities are not moving fast enough to do so.
Consequently, Sudanese police arrested 23 who protested in demands that members of al-Bashir’s regime are released from prison. With their third protest in eight days, the protesters had ignored directives to ban public gatherings as a precaution against the spread of coronavirus (Radio Dabanga, 1 May). The government has also made progress in recovering the corrupt proceeds of organisations and people affiliated to the ousted regime.
Nonetheless, the former regime is still able to defend its interests through traditional and social media. Hassan Ahmed Berkia, a member of the Sudanese Journalists Network (SJN), said: “most of the 18 daily newspapers that cover politics continue to be affiliated or close to supporters of the former regime and economic conditions prevent the arrival of new actors.” The former regime also possesses a “Cyber Jihadist Unit,” a troll army created by the intelligence services to spy on the opposition and journalists (Reporters Without Borders, April 10).
Anti-Corruption Progress
Sudan’s Anti-Corruption Committee confiscated 79 real estate properties that were illegally acquired by leading members of the ousted regime, confiscating properties amounting to 36,411,114 square metres and seized funds estimated at $1.20 billion. Leading Islamist Abdelbasit Hamza came top of the list – losing swathes of land and shares and ownership of key companies (Radio Dabanga, 24 April).
For a more detailed account of the corrupt activities of Abdelbasit Hamza, and other associates and organisations of the ousted regime, please read our investigation: A Mafia With a State.
In addition, El Gezira University anti-corruption efforts saw the dissolution of the Institute for Islamic Knowledge endowment (Imam) foundation, and the seizure of its assets and properties. The Institute granted al-Bashir and “many” leaders of his regime honorary degrees while receiving funding from organisations that “fell short of transparent financial and accounting procedures” (Radio Dabanga, 5 May).
No discussion of transferring military companies to the civilian Ministry of Finance
Sudan Tribune (24 April) reported on a meeting featuring Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander and Sovereign Council deputy head Himedti, which discussed progress in converting non-military companies belonging to Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation (MIC) into public joint-stock companies to be regulated under civil codes and in observance of transparency and oversight rules.
However, Sudan Tribune’s sources say that the companies will continue to belong to the army and the prospect of their transfer to the Ministry of Finance was not discussed. The source added that the meeting stressed the importance of the MIC in utilising its technical and professional capabilities to solve Sudan’s economic crisis.
2. The Institutional Agenda
The institutional agenda of Sudan’s democratic transition continues to stall due to infighting within the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). Consequently, the transitional parliament and appointment of civilian governors originally planned for November 2019, has been delayed again. The FFC’s internal divides leave the broad coalition at risk of a break-up.
FFC divides
The National Umma Party (NUP) has suspended its activities on all levels for the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). The NUP called for “a new social contract” to rebuild Sudan, calling on its FFC partners to meet within two weeks to discuss ways to achieve democratic transition’s goals (Multiple sources, 23 April). However, leading FFC member, Gaafar Hassan Osman ruled out the NUP’s proposed conference due to coronavirus precautions limiting public gatherings (Sudan Tribune, 3 May).
Highlighting its displeasure with the FFC’s management of the transitional period, the NUP noted “urgent” tasks including: the formation of national commissions as provided in the transitional constitution, and the need to schedule elections - starting locally, followed by state legislative assemblies and state governors elections, ending with the general elections at the end of the transitional period. The NUP also called for an immediate videoconference on economic issues, and criticised the “lack of clear strategy in the Juba peace talks” which “pave the way for blackmail and exaggerated demands by the armed groups” (Multiple sources, 23 April).
However, Sudan’s armed groups, through the the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) also express displeasure with the FFC. In a letter to Hamdok, al-Burhan and Himedti – the SRF said it seeks independence within the FFC, exiting the Sudan Call alliance with civilian political parties the NUP and the Sudanese Congress Party (Sudan Tribune, 5 May).
Indeed, a key SRF and FFC leader, Malik Agar, a factional leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), called for reforms that would enable the SRF to play an “effective” role in Sudan’s democratic transition. The SRF accuses FFC political forces of excluding them from consultations on Sudan’s future, although FFC civilian entities justify SRF exclusion on the basis that the armed movements demanded peace negotiations to address the issues of their regions (Sudan Tribune, 25 April).
The internal divides within the FFC are resulting in the stagnant progress of the institutional agenda of Sudan’s democratic transition. FFC in-fighting mean that Sudan still lacks democratic institutions, with the establishment of a transitional parliament and the appointment of civilian governors being a major point of dispute.
Transitional parliament and the appointment of civilian governors delayed - again.
An international delegation featuring the UK, Norway, USA, EU and Germany proposed the formation of a transitional legislative council, should a peace agreement be signed by the government and SRF by May 9. In the absence of an agreement, the international delegation suggested that armed movements are reserved one third of third of transitional legislative council seats (Radio Dabanga, April 28).
However, FFC coordination council member Gaafar Hassan Osman told Sudan Tribune (3 May) that the formation of the transitional parliament will be postponed until after May 9th, due to the FFC’s failure to reach an agreement on the distribution of the seats. Osman attributed the failure to the absence of appropriate mechanisms in ensuring that the selection process of parliamentarians represents women, youth, resistance committees and political forces, in addition to taking into account geographical variation.
Moreover, Osman said the FFC is unwilling to amend its nominees for state governors, despite opposition from influential civil society groups and the SRF. In response, the FFC wrote to Hamdok, al-Burhan and Himedti to propose that “selected governors should have sufficient administrative experience, acceptance from local residents, especially in the conflict-affected states [and] must be chosen from apolitical and qualified cadre who represent Sudan’s diversity, with fair representation of women” (Sudan Tribune, 5 May).
3. Human Rights
Sudan has outlawed female genital mutilation (FGM), although more progress needs to be made with regards to women’s rights. To read about this in more detail, read our briefing: How can Sudan enforce the FGM ban and do more for women’s rights?. The government also intends to exert more efforts in improving press freedom.
Women’s Rights - FGM briefing summarised:
Enforcement of Sudan’s criminalisation of FGM remains an obstacle due to: Sudan’s socio-economic norms and the fears of sparking a backlash among influential Islamist groups. The solutions proposed have revolved around raising awareness of the FGM ban and facilitating a communal effort against the practice. However, Sudan’s criminalisation of FGM “might seem well-intended” but “[fails to] address the root causes of women’s subordination in Sudan which are deeply ingrained in misogynistic attitudes,” argue Strategic Initiative for the Horn of Africa (SIHA), an influential local civil society organisation.
Press Freedom
Although Reporters Without Borders (April 10) note that systematic media harassment has declined since the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime. Sudan is no longer at the “absolute bottom” of Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index, which the Ministry of Information says “constitutes a motivation to further improve press freedom in Sudan” However, Prime Minister Hamdok said that press freedom in Sudan is “still below the standards set by the transitional government” (Radio Dabanga, 4 May).
A key issue noted by Reporters Without Borders (RWB, April 10) is that news control is being exercised “more insidiously.” RWB cite the case of Lubna Abdella, dismissed by al-Sudan al-Dawlia after an investigative story about corruption within the human rights commission. Hassan Ahmed Berkia, a member of the Sudanese Journalists Network (SJN), said: “most of the 18 daily newspapers that cover politics continue to be affiliated or close to supporters of the former regime and economic conditions prevent the arrival of new actors.”
The SJN also claim that the vast majority of the press institutions still lack health insurance for their journalists and other employees, with publishers violating labour laws and illegally depriving journalists of money. (Radio Dabanga, 4 May).
In addition, RWB note that the former regime’s interests are defended online by a “Cyber Jihadist Unit,” a troll army created by the intelligence services to spy on the opposition and journalists.
For the transitional government to solve press freedom issues, RWB suggest that media outlets and the journalists’ organisations that were most critical of the former regime are consulted in the drafting of press freedom legislation.