#SudanUprising: Ongoing Issues in Sudan’s Democratic Transition

A year from the fall of Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s democratic transition still faces considerable obstacles. This briefing explores the following issues:

· Al-Bashir loyalists pose a security threat to Sudan’s Anti-Corruption committee. In April 2020, Islamist groups staged three protests against the transitional government.
· Analysts argue that the civilian government’s perceived inability to manage Sudan’s economic crisis and the coronavirus pandemic serve as pretexts for military restoration.
· The Rapid Support Forces militia (RSF) continue to be viewed as a threat to democratisation and economic recovery.
· Sudan’s economic woes and the coronavirus pandemic are also argued to stall justice and conflict resolution efforts.
· The appointment of civilian governors continues to divide political groups in Sudan.

Nonetheless, solutions have been presented to Sudan in its attempts to solve issues of: governance, democratic development, justice, economic recovery, and reducing corruption and the influence of the deep-state.

Anti-Corruption Efforts

Sudan’s Empowerment Elimination, Anti-Corruption, and Funds Recovery Committee – a committee tasked with dismantling the remnants of Omar al-Bashir’s deep-state – has made progress in confiscating deep-state assets, despite the security threat it faces.

Sudan’s Anti-Corruption Committee transferred to the Ministry of Finance 390 properties in prestigious neighbourhoods of Khartoum that were registered under the names of officials, families, and affiliates of the deposed al-Bashir regime. (Radio Dabanga, 19 April).

However, the Anti-Corruption Committee faces security threats. Committee member Wajdi Saleh announced that he received anonymous death threats, hours after retrieving 157 plots of land from three prominent leaders of the ousted regime (Radio Dabanga, 13 April). Radio Dabanga (10 April) also reported that armed men attempted to shoot two members of the anti-corruption committee in West Kordofan - Hussein Bakkar, secretary of the Arab Socialist Baath Party in West Kordofan, and lawyer Ibrahim El-Ahmar.

The Ba’ath Party labelled the attack “a political assassination, aiming to eliminate West Kordofan state leaders as part of a plan to launch a counter-revolution against change” in Sudan. The Ba’ath Party blamed Sudan’s General Intelligence Service (GIS) for the attack.

2. Al-Bashir supporters protest

Despite the ban on gatherings, supporters of Omar al-Bashir’s regime have staged three demonstrations against the transitional government in a week. Hundreds belonging to a group called the Unified Popular Movement (UPM) - staged a demonstration in central Khartoum (Radio Dabanga, 10 April). Sudanese police responded to second UPM protest by firing tear gas and arresting 30 demonstrators (Multiple sources, April 13). Islamist groups then held a third demonstration on April 16 (Sudan Tribune).

The demonstrators denounced the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and called for the resignation of the transitional government, chanting slogans including: “down with neo-colonialism” in reference to western support for the civilian government, “one army, one people” in calls for a military takeover, and “no to government of hunger” in reference to the ongoing economic crisis (Multiple sources, April 13).

The Sudanese Cabinet subsequently ordered strict measures against al-Bashir supporters who continue to demonstrate. Madani Abbas Madani, Minister of Industry and Trade, said his Cabinet colleagues agreed that al-Bashir’s supporters “should not be allowed to occupy the spaces of freedom that the Sudanese people have extracted from the former regime.” (Radio Dabanga, 17 April).

Sudan Tribune (April 16) note that various Islamic currents in Sudan believe they can incite the army to take power after the government’s failure to convince international financial institutions to support its economic plans. Indeed, Sudan’s economic crisis has been argued to raise the risks of military rule being restored.

3. Economic crisis

Sudan’s economic crisis has deepened, argues Atlantic Council senior fellow Cameron Hudson – who notes that an ambitious reform plan to generate revenues to fund basic social services and revive “crumbling” government ministries has “gone unimplemented by the new crop of civilian technocrats. Hudson notes that Sudan’s civilian technocrats “are accused of lacking both the acumen to enlist broad political support for painful reforms and the courage to upset the military’s entrenched financial interests” (Radio Dabanga, April 13).

As a result, Jonas Horner, a Sudan analyst at the International Crisis Group, identifies concerns that military leaders could use Sudan’s worsening economy as a “pretext to take a much firmer hold on the transition,” as the “civilian component of the government is made to look weak” (New Humanitarian, April 16).

However, Sudan’s Information Minister, Faisal Mohamed Salih dismissed suggestions that the military was plotting a coup (Bloomberg, April 18). The Sudanese Cabinet has also emphasised the need for Sudan’s security forces “to deal firmly” with demonstrating supporters of al-Bashir’s regime (Radio Dabanga, 17 April).

For his part, General Command of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the chairman of the Sovereign Council, Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan, said the entire military “will keep its covenant with the Sudanese people to protect change and the gains of the revolution.” El Burhan stressed that the leaders of the armed forces “with all their factions, including the Rapid Support Forces”, work in complete harmony and that “their sole goal is to protect the country and the revolution” (Radio Dabanga, 20 April).

4. Coronavirus

The coronavirus is argued to have a negative impact on Sudan’s democratic transition – with factors cited including: the inability to protest, disputes between civilian and military leaders, and a civilian government that is unable to meet Sudanese demands for leadership in dealing with the pandemic.

Foreign policy specialist Stephen Zunes told the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (April 14) that protests reflect how “people in Sudan have acknowledged the power of nonviolent actions to obtain human and minorities rights, accountability and more.” However, civilian officials told the New York Times (April 17) that the coronavirus has put them at a disadvantage since they now could not mobilise supporters lest they risk spreading the virus.

Declan Walsh (New York Times, April 17) also argues that Sudan’s management of the coronavirus underscores the “fragility” of Sudan’s democratic transition, citing a dispute between Prime Minister Hamdok and Khartoum’s ex-military governor Lt. Gen Ahmed Abdoun Hamad, after the latter defied orders to cancel Friday prayers to counter the spread of coronavirus in Khartoum. Walsh also reports that senior Sudanese officials contacted western officials and local journalists to warn that they feared the military would use the coronavirus lockdown to seize power, although a senior US official said Sudan’s “jittery” civilian leaders had “so frequently warned of a possible coup in Khartoum that they had become akin to the boy who cried wolf.”

Nonetheless, the coronavirus “is particularly dangerous for Hamdok as the military - and particularly the RSF - may move to demonstrate their ability to deliver in the absence of broader government action,” argues Jonas Horner (Bloomberg, April 14).

In particular, the RSF is reportedly aiming to win Sudanese hearts and minds by “spearheading” Sudan’s coronavirus fight, in what Cameron Hudson labels as the RSF’s latest push “to reinvent themselves as defenders of the poor and downtrodden. Hudson notes that “unlike Hamdok’s government” the RSF is able to draw on its discipline, organisation and resources (Bloomberg, April 14).

5. RSF

Bloomberg (April 14) quoted political cartoonist Khalid Albaih to say that “the RSF has become one of the main obstacles to [Sudan’s] democratisation.” Although the RSF-linked Al-Junaid company has handed over gold mines in North Darfur to the Sudanese government (Sudan Tribune, 19 March), anti-corruption protesters in South Darfur’s El Radoom have occupied government offices to demand that al-Junaid returns a percentage of profits to the local community (OCCRP, April 14).

Sudan analyst Jihad Mashamoun also accuses RSF commander Himedti of worsening Sudan’s economic crisis through his links with al-Fakher company, “which has been buying gold at uneconomic prices thereby pushing down the value of the Sudanese pound.” Himedti’s emerging political role is also viewed as an obstacle to the democratic transition.

Mashamoun suggests that Himedti’s “intervention” in Sudan’s peace talks “as a means of forming alliances with groups across [Sudan] and controlling the transition to free elections” is in “disregard of the Constitutional Declaration” (Africa Report, 31 March).

Hudson also suggests that Himedti’s emerging role has had a dampening effect on US support for the transitional government - fearing that sanctions relief could deprive the US of “critical leverage down the road” should civilian efforts fail or the military retake absolute control (Radio Dabanga, April 13).

6. Reforming state institutions

Sudan Tribune (April 6) report that Sudan’s ruling partners formed a joint committee in order to reform state institutions, after the Sovereign Council, the government and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) held a meeting to assess the performances of Hamdok’s government. The FFC noted the slow pace of reforms and continued presence of al-Bashir’s regime in state institutions. The ruling partners agreed to form a joint committee to reform security services, implement economic and diplomatic solutions, resolve conflict, secure justice and remove the former regime.

However, the coronavirus pandemic and economic crisis pose obstacles in Sudan’s reform attempts. Sudan must wait until the coronavirus lockdown is over before proceeded to try Omar al-Bashir on charges related to the 1989 coup that brought him to power as well as a crackdown on the protests that eventually led to his ouster (Bloomberg, 7 April). Moreover,

Human Rights Watch (9 April) state that Sudanese prosecutors lack the resources and technical capacity to investigate violations on protesters, relying on victims’ families to collect evidence.

The economic crisis is also impeding the prospects of conflict resolution, amid uncertainty around funding for the proposed security sector reforms, investment into marginalised areas and the demobilisation and reintegration of rebels. In addition, Sudanese writer Ahmed Hussein Adam argues that the peace talks have failed to look at “the root cause of the failure of the Sudanese state” - given their focus on securing armed group representation in various transitional bodies (New Humanitarian, April 16).

Indeed, the peace talks are also stalling the institutional agenda of Sudan’s democratic transition – as the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) - a coalition of rebel groups – continue to oppose the appointment of civilian governors and a legislative parliament before the signing of a peace agreement (Sudan Tribune, 14 April).

7. Governors

The Sovereign Council, Cabinet and the FFC agreed to appoint civilian governors and the legislative parliament before mid-May 2020 (Sudan Tribune, 12 April). Sudan’s Information Minister, Faisal Mohamed Salih, confirmed that Khartoum’s military governor was replaced by a civilian, and the 17 other provincial heads will be replaced by temporary governors until a final peace deal is made between Sudan’s government and a patchwork of rebel groups (Bloomberg, 18 April).

However, the SRF accuses the FFC of seeking to exclude them from the nomination process, saying that “the FFC’s Khartoum faction seeks to exclude [the peripheral regions] and is bypassing the street and the resistance committees by striking a deal to share the state governor positions in a shameful way, and are seeking to appoint unqualified people” (Sudan Tribune, 14 April).

The SRF’s position is supported by the National Umma Party (NUP), who described the FFC civilian governor nominations as “an abyss of quotas, turning a blind eye to the weight of political names, and their presence in the states,” and that they “do not take into account the views of stakeholders in the states, but rather represent the opinion of the political elites in Khartoum.” The NUP also warn that the FFC nominations will impede conflict resolution and “will make stability in [conflict zones] impossible” (Multiple Sources, April 20).

Nonetheless, the SRF said it is willing to back the appointment of state governors and the Transitional Legislative Council in Sudan before peace, provided that the process is based on agreed criteria and that it can take part in the nomination process, threatening to suspend peace negotiations unless its demands are met (Sudan Tribune, 18 April).

The SRF’s position does not represent all rebel groups. The Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North – which is not part of the SRF – accused the SRF of seeking to share power, with the SRF position stated to be “inconsistent with the spirit of the revolution” and a “disruption of the civil democratic transformation process." (Sudan Tribune, April 20).

In addition, key civil society groups – the Darfur Bar Association (DBA) and the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) – also endorse the appointment of civilian governors, with the DBA stating that the appointments will help ongoing efforts to dismantle the ‘deep state’. Nonetheless, the SPA note that consensus has not been reached in the states of: Khartoum, the Northern State, North Darfur and Central Darfur (Radio Dabanga, April 21).

Solutions

Analysts, civil society and political groups have proposed solutions to solve Sudanese issues in the areas of: governance, democratic development, justice, economic recovery, reducing corruption and the influence of the deep-state.

1. Appointing independent and diverse provisional parliamentarians

Sudan analyst Jihad Mashamoun, and Andrew Tchie, a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think-tank, call for Sudan to appoint independent provisional parliamentarians who reflect Sudan’s diversity and hold the Sovereign Council, FFC and Cabinet to account (Africa Report, April 7).

2. Dictating the appointment of governors through local public opinion

The NUP emphasised the importance of local public opinion in determining governors. The NUP announced that it was seeking consultations to develop a mechanism to “determine the weight of political forces,” in order to achieve “the goals of decentralisation” (Multiple Sources, April 20).

3.Establishing a set of standards for the appointment of governors

The SRF demand that the appointment of governors is conducted according to transparent standards that ensure competence, experience, ethnic diversity, women’s participation, non-partisanship, and popular acceptance. The SRF also voiced rejection of any appointment based on "party loyalty or quotas based on narrow organizational selfishness.” (Sudan Tribune, 18 April). The Darfur Bar Association calls for 30 percent of the civilian state governors to be women, with standards for selecting governors including: experience in administration, connection to the state represented and the values of the revolution (Radio Dabanga, April 21).

4. Building political unity

With the leaders of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) stated to be “inexperienced and fragmented,” Mashamoun and Tchie (Africa Report, April 7) call for diverse Sudanese civic groups to build political consensus with a “robust road map that clearly outlines practical steps towards democracy,” including electoral support to prevent electoral manipulation or violence.

5. Civilian leadership

Jonas Horner called for Hamdok to spend his political capital on meeting Sudanese demands for leadership from the transitional government (Bloomberg, April 14).

6. Conflict resolution

SPLM-N al-Hilu faction maintains its position that peace can only be achieved by addressing the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts (Sudan Tribune, April 20). To consolidate peace, Mashamoun and Tchie for Sudan’s leadership to “contend with the influence of Islamic groups and elites that make up Sudan’s deep state” (Africa Report, April 7).

7. Justice

Human Rights Watch (9 April) call for the government to form a special entity “such as an investigation committee or special court,” to investigate cases, with the international community, including donors, seeking to provide technical and financial support.

8. Fighting corruption and the deep-state

Mashamoun calls for the government to accelerate the transfer of businesses run by the security officials linked to al-Bashir’s regime to the Ministry of Finance. Mashamoun also calls for the government and the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition to challenge the deep-state’s social media campaign by “working together in public forums to communicate more clearly what is happening in Sudan” (Africa Report, 31 March).

9. Economic reform

To solve the economic crisis, Mashamoun and Tchie calls for Sudan to focus investment in infrastructure, education, health and agriculture, tackle corruption and strengthen regional trade links (Africa Report, April 7).