Sudan Uprising: July 2020

Summary

1. What happened? - Sudan’s civilian government responded to a wave of major protests across Sudan with progress on the institutional agenda of Sudan’s democratic transition and a major cabinet reshuffle.

2. Key issues - However, Sudan’s finance ministry is impeded in solving the economic crisis due to difficulties taxing dominant military and security sector businesses. “Tough” economic reforms initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are a source of divide within the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition. Internal FFC power contestations and in-fighting over “narrow privileges” are viewed as a risk to the democratic transition.

3. Solutions – The civilian government has been called on to be more assertive in raising government revenue through taxation, with support from the western states in doing so. Civil society groups also seek permanent dialogue mechanisms to strengthen political participation.

1. What happened?

Following the symbolic June 30 ‘March of the Millions’, sit-ins and protests proliferated across Sudan.
The civilian government responded to protesters demands by finally appointing civilian governors, demonstrating progress towards the establishment of a parliament, and implementing a major cabinet reshuffle.
The most notable ministerial departure was former finance minister Ibrahim Elbadawi, who revealed differences with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok over Sudan’s economic direction.

I. March of the Millions and a new wave of protests

On June 30, Sudan witnessed the ‘Millioniyah’ or the ‘March of the Millions’. Across Sudan, hundreds of thousands protested, united in their calls for civilian rule, peace, retribution for the protestors killed during demonstrations, better living conditions, and dismantling the remnants of Omar al-Bashir’s regime (Radio Dabanga, 1 July). Few observed the social distancing requirements to avoid contracting coronavirus, emphasising the importance of street protests in Sudanese civilian political participation (AP, 30 June).

As noted by Reuters, 30 June symbolically marks the anniversary of former president Omar al-Bashir’s ascent to power. The Millioniyah of 2019 saw thousands marching to pressure the then-ruling transitional military council to resume negotiations over a peaceful power-sharing deal with civilian opposition.

The protests were organised by the Sudanese Professionals’ Association and the Resistance Committees, who called for the implementation of key parts of the aforementioned deal which remained incomplete, including: the appointment of civilian governors for Sudan’s provinces, the establishment of a parliament, peace with Sudan’s rebels, and swift public trials for former president Omar al-Bashir and his top officials (AP, 30 June).

Radio Dabanga (1 July) identified state specific grievances from Millioniyah participants across Sudan, including:

In West Sudan, protesters in the capitals of the five Darfur states demanded just peace and disarmament of militias.
In East Sudan, protesters in Gadarif, Kassala and Port Sudan called for the end of water shortages, whereas in the Northern State protesters demanded improved living conditions
In the Northern State and River Nile State, protesters demanded the appointment of civilian governors and the formation of the Legislative Council.
Central Sudanese protesters in Sennar, Wad Madani and Kosti stressed that the goal of the marches is to correct the course of the revolution, and not to topple the government.

Although the government responded with a vast Cabinet reshuffle and demonstrable progress towards the establishment of a parliament and the appointment of civilian governors, protests across Sudan did not seize. Radio Dabanga (13 July) reported that sit-ins spread across Sudan, with protesters from Darfur in the West to Kassala in the East demanding security, rights, freedoms, justice, better living conditions. Protesters also expressed displeasure at difficult agricultural conditions, the absence of roads, and the continued presence of officials affiliated to Omar al-Bashir’s ousted regime.

In addition, Resistance Committee said they are planning announced a comprehensive revolutionary escalation to press for the implementation of Sudanese public demands during the June 30 Millioniya (Radio Dabanga, 22 July).

II. Progress on local governance issues

With a week of the Millioniyah, progress was made towards establishing a parliament. Sudan’s transitional government, Freedom and Change Forces (FFC) and armed groups agreed to allocate 75 parliamentary seats to the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and Sudan Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi. The deal followed ten days of talks, in which the armed groups initially requested 140 out of the 300 available seats (Sudan Tribune, 8 July).

However, the “long-awaited” appointment of civilian governors in Sudan has witnessed protests against some selected state rulers, particularly in Kassala, al-Obeid (North Kordofan) and El Daein (East Darfur), with protesters in the latter two localities displeased that the appoints were not nominated by the FFC. Feminist groups in Khartoum and Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) also denounced women’s underrepresentation (Radio Dabanga, July 24).

III. The Cabinet Reshuffle – the motivations?

Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok announced a major Cabinet reshuffle in hopes to defuse public discontent over economic collapse and other crises following the June 30 rallies (AP, July 9). Hamdok said the reshuffle intends to “advance the performance and execution of the transitional period’s missions and respond to accelerated economic and social changes” (Reuters, 9 July).

However, according to Sudanese newspaper editor Osman Mirghani, the reshuffle seems unlikely to satisfy demonstrators. Mirghani cites the continuing employment of key officials such as commerce minister [Madani Abbas Madani] despite calls for his removal. Mirghani added that “Hamdok was forced” and “the government [lacks] any real road map for how to create deeper change” (AP, July 9).

Nonetheless, both Reuters and AP note that the reshuffle could be a precursor to the government appointing several ministers from the Sudan Revolutionary Front, as a condition of peace negotiations.

IV. The Cabinet Reshuffle – which ministers went?

Acting replacements were appointed in the following seven ministries (Sudan Tribune, 9 July).

Foreign Affairs: Omer Gamer Eldin replaced Asma Abdallah
Energy: Khairy Abdel-Rahman replaced Adel Ali Ibrahim
Agriculture: Abdel Gadir Turkawi replaced Issa Osman Sharif
Infrastructure and Transport: Hashim Abu Naouf replaced Hashim Tahir Sheikh Taha
Animal Resources: Adel Farah Idris replaced Allam Eddin Abdallah Absher
Health: Sarah Abdelazim Hassanein replaced Akram Eltom
Finance: Heba Ahmed Ali replaced Ibrahim al-Badawi.

It was the replacements of the latter two ministers which generated the most attention, with Sudan facing both the coronavirus and economic crisis.

Former health minister Akram Eltom was the only minister sacked, having refused to resign as all his ministerial colleagues were requested to (Reuters, July 9). According to Sudan Tribune (July 11) Sudanese leftists claim that the “popular” Eltom was sacked due to his plans to implement free universal healthcare. However, footage circulated of Eltom being protected from a beating by an angry crowd during a Millioniyah rally, amid allegations that he mismanaged Sudan’s response to coronavirus.

Meanwhile, Elbadawi was dismissed despite “spearheading ambitious economic reform plans sought by foreign donors and the International Monetary Fund, which included painful steps like [subsidy cuts]” (AP, July 9).Suggested reasons for his departure include opposition to the IMF-backed subsidy cuts, conflict with Hamdok and the Finance Ministry’s inability tax the military and security apparatus’ lucrative companies.

V. Ibrahim Elbadawi’s resignation

In a five-page statement addressed to the public, Elbadawi attributed his resignation to a dispute with Hamdok over the implementation of the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) he negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Elbadawi said he requested “a full delegation of powers” over specific areas to avoid "conflicts of authority,” in light of differences with Hamdok over important issues whereby “the specialised technical opinion was not respected.” Nonetheless, it was also reported that FFC leftist groups opposed Elbadawi’s IMF-backed subsidy cuts (Sudan Tribune, 19 July).

However, National Umma Party (NUP) leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi said that Elbadawi’s dismissal will not prevent the reforms initiated with the IMF (Sudan Tribune, 11 July). According to Sudan Tribune (19 July), the NUP is demanding authority over Sudan’s finance ministry to ensure that the IMF-supported reforms are fully implemented.

2. Key Issues

Elbadawi attributed the finance ministry’s inability meet the needs of Sudan’s economy to difficulties controlling tax-exempt military and security sector businesses.
“Tough” economic reforms initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), including subsidy cuts, are a source of divide within the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition of parties.
·While senior Communist Party members say that the FFC is not consulted on the cabinet reshuffle nor economic strategy, the Sudanese Congress Party has stated its intention to join the government, and the National Umma Party is allegedly seeking authority over the Finance Ministry.
The FFC’s internal competition over “narrow privileges” is argued to be a threat to the democratic transition, with the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) citing this as a reason for their departure from the coalition.

I. Finance Ministry unable to meet Sudan’s economic needs

In his statement, Elbadawi attributed the finance ministry’s inability to manage its liquidity and meet the needs of Sudan’s economy to difficulties controlling tax-exempt military businesses (Sudan Tribune, 19 July).

Indeed, Dr John-Baptiste Gallopin, a visiting fellow at the European Council of Foreign Relations (9 June), published a lengthy article explaining the threat posed to Sudan’s democratic transition by the civilian wing of the government’s reluctance to confront its financial dependence on the economically dominant military and security sectors.

In addition, leading NUP members allegedly claimed that Elbadawi expressed frustrations to Hamdok about his lack of support for attempts to hand over military firms to the Finance Ministry (Sudan Tribune, 11 July).

II. “Tough” IMF-initiated economic reforms are divisive

NUP leader al-Mahdi differentiated between the two competing economic positions within the FFC: “the dreamers and the [pragmatists].” Claiming the former camp will “destroy the economy,” Al-Mahdi said he belongs to the latter camp, who intend to implement the “tough” IMF reforms which Elbadawi pursued (Sudan Tribune, 11 July).

This divide re-appeared on July 24 (Sudan Tribune), after the FFC Economic Committee announced its rejection of the government’s budget amendment. The FFC Economic Committee said the new budget “ignores the demands of the June 30 demonstrations” by continuing IMF policies that “destroyed the national economy and impoverished the masses.”

The FFC Economic Committee stated that the increases in commercial fuel, dollar prices and salaries without “real resources” contradict budgetary laws. The committee also likened the budget to the one approved by Omar al-Bashir’s regime in December 2019, which eventually “collapsed the currency exchange rate and raised inflation to over %130.”

III. Power contestations within the FFC

Recent reports suggest that the Communist Party’s political influence over the civilian government is waning, at the expense of the Sudanese Congress Party and the National Umma Party.

FFC Economic Committee member and senior Communist Party member Sidgi Kaballo said the government does not consult the committee on economic policies, reflecting the power dynamics within the civilian component of the government (Sudan Tribune, 24 July). Under a fortnight earlier, leading FFC member and Communist Party political bureau member Siddiq Youssef alleged that Hamdok is yet to consult the FFC on the cabinet reshuffle, despite the Constitutional Document governing the transitional period stipulating their consultation (Sudan Tribune, 12 July).

Nonetheless, it seems that the cabinet reshuffle could stimulate Sudan’s move away from a technocratic cabinet, with the Sudanese Congress Party (SCoP) announcing its intention to “contribute positively” by joining Hamdok’s second government, which is said to include the FFC and armed groups (Sudan Tribune, 12 July). In addition, Sudan Tribune (19 July) sources claim that the NUP demands authority over the finance ministry to ensure that IMF-backed reforms are fully implemented.

IV. Risk posed to democratic transition by FFC in-fighting

Hussein Arko Minnawi, a member of the political bureau of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), warns that Sudan’s transitional period is at risk as political parties in Khartoum “still see politics within conflict over their vested interests.” Minnawi cites the FFC’s intensified “competition over narrow privileges,” which reflects “feverish political competition over power privilege and social class interests” (Sudan Tribune, 26 June).

As a result, Minnawi argues that Sudanese parties are “stuck” in the [failed] uprisings of 1964 and 1985, whereby “political elites were unable to address the roots of the Sudanese crisis.” Thus, Minnawi concludes that Sudanese politics remains “static” and “stuck on old practices…failing to respond to changes while continuing to revolve within the orbit of the same old ideas.”

Indeed, the internal competition within the broad FFC coalition led to the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) announcing its departure from the FFC (July 25). In a statement, the SPA said that FFC’s performance since al-Bashir’s fall has been “confused”, with narrow interests and tactical considerations prevailing over major strategic interests such as seeking accountability for the former regime’s crimes. The SPA added that the FFC’s internal chaos produced an “incompetent” government amid deteriorating economic conditions and "a lack of resolve" in the peace talks.

3. Solutions

1. Firmer civilian government

Assertive civilian government - In a letter to the Financial Times (14 July), Mohamed El Mustafa Hammad noted that Sudan’s finance ministry is unable to set economic policy respectively. Hammad called for Sudan’s civilian administration to demand to take on the “real role of government,” requiring “a more assertive stance on assuming powers, as the public has demanded.”

Practical ways for the government to mobilise revenue - Jean-Baptiste Gallopin (European Council on Foreign Relations, 9 June) provided practical strategies for the civilian government to implement. Gallopin called for Hamdok to “become visibly involved” in confronting the civilian government’s financial dependence on the economically dominant military and security sectors. To raise awareness of the importance of raising government revenue and ensuring transparency in public finances, Gallopin suggested that Hamdok establishes a committee comprising of civil society and independent retired military officers, as well as explicitly supporting civilian management of non-defence businesses.

2. Economic solutions

Clarity regarding authority over economic policy - Expressing hope that the statement explaining his departure will be viewed as "one of the lessons learned" during the transitional period, former finance minister Ibrahim Elbadawi called for future “clarity” in ascertaining authority over Sudan’s economic strategy, adding that the upcoming period “will witness difficult decisions to enforce profound economic transformations” (Sudan Tribune, 19 July).

Mobilising resources - The FFC Economic Committee said that it presents an alternative national programme based on “the mobilisation of resources inherent in the national economy” (Sudan Tribune, 24 July).

Directing state capabilities towards crisis management - In criticising the FFC’s perceived neglect of peace issues and marginalisation of Sudan’s peripheries, Hussein Arko Minnawi called for state capabilities to be directed towards crisis management and addressing key issues related to peace and security ((Sudan Tribune, 26 June).

3. International support

Gallopin calls for EU members, the US, UK and Norway to support Hamdok by publicly stating their support for his efforts to mobilise revenue streams currently controlled by the military and security sector. Gallopin also calls for European countries to “considerably increase” funding for projects that facilitate Hamdok’s increased popular legitimacy, as well as convincing the UAE and Saudi Arabia that their economic interests in Sudan are best served by competent civilians rather than generals (European Council on Foreign Relations, 9 June).

4. Civil society solutions

A national conference - Dr Mudawi Ibrahim, head of the peace axis at the University of Khartoum Forum for Development and Democratic Transformation, stressed the importance of rebuilding the Sudanese state and ensuring the participation of all Sudanese in the process. Ibrahim added that a national conference will host a societal dialogue discussing issues including: citizenship, the relationship between religion and the state and forms of governance (Radio Dabanga, 22 July).

Permanent dialogue mechanisms - The Darfur Bar Association (DBA) said that peaceful sit-ins can be further developed through conferences, workshops, focus groups, interviews, and employing media to display issues. Thus, the DBA called for permanent dialogue mechanisms, engagement with the authorities in Khartoum and the states, and the development of medium to long-term strategic plans which outline proposals for solutions, that are to be implemented by the authorities and those responsible for organising the sit-ins (Radio Dabanga, 13 July).