#SudanUprising Report: End of 2020
#SudanUprising Report: End of 2020
Transitional Partners Council, civilian-military tensions, economic developments and protests .
Summary
1. TPC: A controversial decree by the chairman of Sudan's Sovereign Council, Lt Gen Abdelfattah al-Burhan, to form a Transitional Partners Council (TPC) sparked opposition from influential civilian stakeholders in Sudan’s transition, including: Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition. Analysts say that the TPC, in its original form, hindered democracy and weakened the civilian government due to the power it gave to the military and some armed movements who are openly hostile to political parties.
2. Civilian-military tensions: There have also been civilian and military tensions over a US Congress bill which challenges the military’s role in Sudan’s economic affairs. While Hamdok said the involvement of Sudan’s military in the private sector is “unacceptable,” a senior member of the Sudanese Armed Forces expressed resentment towards “foreign laws and legislation”.
3. Economic developments: Nonetheless, Sudan’s 2021 Economic Budget suggests that military spending will be increased at the expense of health and education. In addition, the government’s decision to increased electricity tariffs by 500% has been declared “illegal” by the FFC Economic Committee.
4. Protests: Meanwhile, Millioniyah protests highlighted the contrasting radical and gradualist approaches to reform in Sudan among political parties. Finally, the murder of activist Bahaeldin Nouri has triggered calls for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia to be disbanded, and led to the acceleration of anti-torture laws being ratified in Sudan.
5. Solutions: Among the solutions for Sudan’s democratic transition include calls for political parties and FFC to maintain unity, for transitional justice, and for mode of governance that is more attentive to community needs.
1. The controversial TPC
Tensions have grown between civilian and military stakeholders in Sudan’s transitional period following a decision by the chairman of Sudan's Sovereign Council, Lt Gen Abdelfattah al-Burhan, has issued a decision to form a Transitional Partners Council (TPC) of 29 members.
Consisting of six military members, the prime minister, 13 members from the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), and nine rebel group members who were signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement, the aim of the TPC is to direct the transitional period in a way that serves the supreme interests of Sudan, to resolve differences in viewpoints between the various parties, and to mobilise the necessary support for the success of the transitional period” (Radio Dabanga, 4 December). The decree said that the TPC directs the transitional period and can interfere in the government attributions, including obstructing the transitional parliament (Sudan Tribune, 6 December).
According to analyst Hafiz Ismail (Radio Dabanga, 16 December), the TPC has its roots in the Juba peace talks, “consolidates the power of the military and some rebel signatories” and thereby hinders “any genuine process of democratisation” because it “weakens the civilian government.” Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok was reportedly “unhappy” about the TPC’s power to veto the executive government.
I. Civilian opposition to the TPC
The TPC’s formation raised suspicions about attempts by al-Burhan and his military faction to circumvent the civilian government and its divided coalition with the support of some former rebels (Sudan Tribune, 9 December). Consequently, al-Burhan has been accused by political parties and civil society organisations who accused him of abusing his authority to transfer political power away from the country's constitutional institutions to the TPC (Radio Dabanga, 10 December).
However, Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok immediately distanced himself from the TPC, saying that the TPC’s role should exclusively be coordinative and consultative and that it should not interfere in the activities of the executive, legislative organs nor the sovereign council. He warned that he would boycott the TPC unless substantial changes are made (Sudan Tribune, 4 December).
The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) also criticised the TPC, labelling it unconstitutional and arguing that it paves the way for conflicts of power with other institutions of transitional authority. The SPA’s statement added that the TPC “has been imposed by a few dominating the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance and tampering with the goals of the revolution, to serve narrow personal and partisan interests by identifying with the military” (Radio Dabanga, 5 December).
Sudanese political parties that are part of the FFC also joined the criticism. The Sudanese Congress Party said the TPC is “unacceptable and does not comply with what has been agreed upon before”. The National Umma Party accused “some parties to have a hidden agenda to try to disrupt the march towards democracy”. Civil society organisations, including the No to Women’s Oppression Initiative in Khartoum, as well as a large number of Resistance Committees also rejected the TPC. (Radio Dabanga, 7 December).
II. Rebel positions towards the TPC
The TPC was also divisive among Sudan’s Revolutionary Front (SRF) factions. Sudan Liberation Movement factional leader Minni Minnawi and his ally Eltom Hajo defended the decree and calling for its implementation, although SRF leader Hadi idris called for a review of the TPC (Sudan Tribune, 9 December). The vice president of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North Agar faction (SPLM-N Agar), Yasser Arman, echoed calls for more discussions between government parties to resolve differences, saying that the TPC “will reproduce the same problems,” and it should be a “council of wisdom… with the purpose of resolving the disputes facing the transitional period, in addition to forging a unified political will” (Sudan Tribune, 7 December).
III. Al-Burhan’s defence of the TPC
Nonetheless, al-Burhan defended the TPC twice. First, he denied that the TPC is unconstitutional and that it aims to enable state agencies to focus on solving people's problems (Radio Dabanga, 8 December). Then, having criticised the Sovereign Council and Cabinet for their “inability to achieve the goals of the revolution,” al-Burhan stressed that the TPC does not aim to confiscate the powers of executive or sovereign bodies, nor eliminate the role of the Legislative Council, but rather aims to address the differences between the organs of government (Radio Dabanga, 10 December).
IV. Al-Burhan’s concession
Al-Burhan eventually reversed his decision on the mandate of the TPC (Sudan Tribune, 9 December), after which the FFC, military component of the Sovereign Council and the SRF armed movements agreed on limited powers for the TPC – that it cannot interfere in the powers of the Council of Ministers or the Sovereign Council, and that it is strictly limited to coordinating between transitional partners and resolving disputes. Nonetheless, there was no settlement on the position of the Prime Minister in the TPC, with differences over whether they will be an alternate chair of the council or a regular member (Sudan Tribune, 14 December)
2. Civilian-military tensions
Another contributor to tensions between the civilian and military components of the transitional government are disputes over the military’s role in economic affairs following a law passed by the US Congress requiring financial transparency and civilian control over Sudan’s state-owned enterprises as a condition for US assistance to Sudan. Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok said the involvement of Sudan’s military in the private sector is “unacceptable,” and such enterprises should be turned into public companies, adding that resources belonging to the Sudanese people without transparency or accountability cannot be managed without transparency and accountability (Reuters, 14 December).
The Congressional bill, called the Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020, advocates tightened monitoring of the Sudanese army, security forces, and intelligence services. It has caused controversy within the ruling Sovereign Council as it challenges the role of the army in Sudan’s economic affairs. Indeed, Chief-of-Staff Lt Gen Mohamed al-Hussein accused some Sudanese of trying to “bring in foreign laws and legislation,” adding that the army “is not a politicised group and does not seek power” (Radio Dabanga, 17 December).
3. Economic affairs
I. Increased military spending in 2021 Budget
Sudan’s leaked 2021 Economic Budget has sparked controversy. Radio Dabanga (4 January) reported that the budget demonstrates Sudanese government plans to increase the budget for the military and security forces, while decreasing healthcare and education. Thus, Dr Hasan Bashir, Economics Professor at al-Nilein University said he expects Sudanese to continue living in dire conditions in 2021.
Bashir told Radio Dabanga that the budget shows “an imbalance in the expenditure”, citing increased expenses for the ministries of Defence and Interior Affairs, and the Rapid Support Forces,” and that he considers it “a major problem” that revenues from companies owned by military forces are not mentioned in the budget.
The budget was eventually improved by the Council of Ministers, with Finance Minister Hiba Mohammed Ali announcing that education spending will take up 12.5% of the budget,
24% of the budget will go towards social protection, with subsidies for wheat, medicine, gas and electricity will also be retained. However, leaked contents of the Budget suggests that 1/3rd of public revenues will go towards the security and defence sector (Radio Dabanga, 8 January).
II. Controversy over “illegal” electricity tariff increases
Furthermore, the government’s decision to raise electricity tariffs by 500% has been condemned as both unjustified and illegal by the FFC’s Economic Committee. The “inflated power fees will lead to an increase in the prices of many goods and services, and negatively affect agricultural and industrial production and exports,” the FFC warns, adding that “this large increase in the electricity fees is implemented illegally, as it is not included in the 2021 National Budget, that has not been passed yet”.
The committee further the increase in the power tariffs a violation of the September 2020 National Economic Conference – which called for delaying lifting subsidies until necessary economic reforms including direct cash support are conducted – and that the increased prices are a precursor to electricity subsidies being lifted altogether (Radio Dabanga, 4 January).
However, Sudan’s Minister of Energy and Mining Khairy Abdelrahman defended the 500% increase on the basis of the state’s need to cover the deficit in finances concerning electricity provision, citing soaring annual inflation and the “enormous” government employee salaries in 2020 (Radio Dabanga, 7 January).
4. Millioniyah protests
In a new wave of Millioniyah protests, thousands of Sudanese took to the streets to mark the second anniversary of the 2018 December revolution and to demand the correction of the course of the revolution. However, there were contrasting slogans and public demands, ranging from calls for the transitional government to be overthrown, to calls for gradual reform.
I. Radical demands for change
Sudan Tribune (19 December) reported that a leftist camp including the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), the Sudanese Professionals Association (New Secretariat faction) and some Khartoum Resistance Committees called for the cancellation of the Transitional Partners Council and “to stop plots of the military component and its allies from the armed movements".
II. Gradual demands for change
While the Sudanese Communist Party launched campaigns for the removal of the military from power and for the transitional government to be overthrown, the Congress Party, Unionist Gathering, the National Umma Party, and the Arab Socialist Baath Party announced their opposition to calls to bring down the transitional government, despite criticising its “weak” economic performance (Radio Dabanga, 19 December).
Similar reformist calls came from the historical leadership of the SPA, who requested that Prime Minister Hamdok replace the “weak” cabinet, with the Sudanese Congress Party calling for the end of the economic crisis and the formation of the Legislative Council (Sudan Tribune, 19 December).
III. Violence against protesters
Ahead of the protests, Attorney General, Tajelsir El Hibir, prohibiting police forces from using bullets, tear gas, or excessive force against demonstrators. However, two people were injured and several were suffocated after security forces dispersed a sit-in in front of the Republican Palace and the Sudanese Parliament. The Central Committee of Doctors said that a young man had his hand completely lacerated, while another young man was injured by a gunshot wound to the head (Radio Dabanga, 21 December).
Moreover, it was the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) killing of activist Bahaeldin Nouri which sent shockwaves across Sudan, leading to renewed questioning of the RSF’s role in Sudan.
5. The RSF’s murder of Bahaeldin Nouri
The RSF’s killing of activist Bahaeldin Nouri has sparked controversy around the scope of the paramilitary force. Nouri’s family said he was stopped by pick-up truck in al-Kalakla, after which two men abducted him and took him to an unknown destination where he was tortured and killed (Radio Dabanga, 26 December). Sudan’s public prosecution charged RSF members with Nouri’s torture and murder, and the militia said the perpetrators of the crime will be handed over to justice (Sudan Tribune, 29 December).
Brig. Gen. Gamal Goma, the RSF spokesman, said the head of the RSF’s intelligence unit as well as officers involved in Nouri’s detention and interrogation have been suspended or detained, pending an investigation into his death (AP, 27 December). Public Prosecutor Moulana al-Habr later confirmed that the RSF lifted the immunity of the officers who killed Nouri (Radio Dabanga, 31 December). Activist Shamael el-Noor said Nouri’s murder could happen to anyone, adding “this is a serious indication of the state institutions’ inaction towards security issues” (AP, 27 December).
I. SPA demand that the RSF is disbanded
Consequently, Nouri’s murder triggered calls for legal reforms and the dissolution of the RSF. The SPA (Multiple sources, 5 January) called for the RSF to be disbanded and integrated into the national army as part of campaign entitled ‘Know Your Right’, which protests against the RSF’s violence towards “ordinary citizens”.
In a memorandum submitted to Justice Minister Nasreldin Abdelbari and Attorney General Tajelsir al-Hibr, the SPA demanded urgent steps “to criminalise the abduction and detention of citizens by the RSF”, and “to clearly restrict the right to arrest people to the police”. The SPA further urged Sudanese authorities to t form a committee to “review all detention centres of the RSF and other forces, transfer the detainees who have been charged to police stations,” and for the closure of all “illegal detention centres” and “ghost houses of the security apparatus”, with the attorney general requested to form “a permanent commission to investigate allegations of RSF violations”.
On the theme of security sector reform, the SPA also say that serious steps must be taken to restructure security and military institutions in Sudan, calling on transitional authorities, in particular the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and those which signed the Juba Peace Agreement, to push for restructuring, including the rehabilitation and training of security and military members (Radio Dabanga, 2 January).
II. Hamdok says government approved law against torture
In addition, Prime Minister Hamdok announced that his government approved the ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. "Targeting civilians with extrajudicial killing, torture, or enforced disappearance, regardless of the reasons for, is totally unacceptable by all Sudanese,” Hamdok said (Sudan Tribune, 2 January).
Solutions
Proposed solutions for Sudan’s democratic transition have come from civil society leaders, journalists and independent political analysts. The solutions have been directed towards the international community, Sudanese political parties and the government.
Delayed parliamentary formation
Columnist Abdellatif al-Booni (al-Sudani, 7 December) argues that the TPC will culminate in a polarised legislative council in which representation quotas will be shared by four components within the transitional government; namely, Al-Burhan block, Hamdok block, armed movements block and FFC block. Thus, al-Booni calls for a delay to discussions on forming a legislative council, warning that Sudan’s polarised political situation may replicate the Libyan experience whereby the forming of a post-revolution parliament led to the eruption of civil war.
Transitional justice
Albaqir Mukhtar, the director of Al Khatim Adlan Center for Enlightenment (KACE), calls for a transitional justice process that takes into account the impact of crimes against individuals, while addressing the victimisation of entire communities. Mukhtar emphasises the importance ensuring that crucial stakeholders such as survivors, victims’ families, civil society and human rights organisations gain ownership of and inform regional initiatives, “as they can best speak to community-specific abuses and aspirations for the future” (Brookings Institute, 24 November).
Compromise between FFC parties
Shewit Woldemichael, researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS, 18 December), notes that Sudan’s current transition bears similarity to the 1964-65 and 1985-86 transitional periods which culminated in military dictatorships, attributing the previous failures to the “lack of a common vision for Sudan among political elites,” which resulted in alliances “mired in rivalry [which] undermines the unity and strength of civilian actors.”
Thus, Woldemichael calls for the transitional government to manage public expectations and regain public confidence through transparency and regular engagement, and for the FFC to reach compromise on major issues to bridge divisions based on politics and identity, and to maintain civilian unity to ensure the military hands over power in the second half of the transition period.
Political parties to focus on offering visions and solutions
Asmaa Juma’a, the editor-in-chief of al-Democrati (17 December), calls for Sudanese political parties to end their conflicts between the each other, so as to not threaten Sudan’s democratic prospects, “as they have done [since independence]”. Juma’a argues that while parties in most countries that have entrenched democracies have a base that they gained through their principles, vision and targeted national programmes, Sudanese parties pursue their own narrow interests rather than offering visions and solutions.
A community service strategy from the government
Columnist Yousif al-Sondy calls for the transitional government to adopt a changed mindset and paradigm in which it embarks upon a community service strategy aimed at serving common interests. Al-Sondy argues that post-independence Sudanese governments have prioritised taxing the poverty-stricken population to cover running expenses rather than setting citizen service as a priority. Thus, he suggests that a clearly defined public service programme is a bottom-line requirement for any political party that seeks to garner popular support (al-Tahreer, 11 December).