Summary

1. Events

A failed coup attempt has triggered a crisis in relations between the military and civilian components of Sudan’s government. After Sudan’s military leaders blamed the coup attempt on the performance of the civilian government, they also withdrew security from civilian government figures and key buildings. In response to the escalation, an estimated 20,000 civilians protested in support of a civilian-led democratic transition.

2. Analysis

The words and actions of Sudan’s military leaders have been considered a threat to the democratic transition, culminating in analysts raising the prospect of military utilising the coup to justify its prolonged hold on power ahead of its required transfer of the leadership of Sudan’s highest political authority to civilians. Furthermore, the events of the failed coup led to a proliferation of articles in the Sudanese media which reflected public scepticism over the military’s version of events.

3. Solutions

Thus, among the solutions proposed, to both the Sudanese and international policymakers, are more transparency over the coup, alongside helping the civilian government to avert further coup attempts by achieving the political and economic goals demanded by the Sudanese public.

Events

1. Sudan In The News Sudan Uprising coup attempt Events.png

In developments that are considered dangerous to Sudan’s democratic transition, tensions are escalating between transitional ruling partners amid a crisis between the civilian and military components of the government.

1.1 The hostilities were triggered by a failed coup attempt.
1.2 The coup was reportedly masterminded by Major General al-Bakrawi, who the Sudanese media have profiled as an Islamist.
1.3 Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok blamed remnants of Omar al-Bashir’s ousted Islamist regime.
1.4 However, the civilian government’s political and economic mismanagement was blamed for triggering the coup attempt by Sudan’s military leaders - the chairman of the ruling Transition Sovereign Council Chairman, Sudan’s highest authority, and commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces - Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan – and his deputy in the Sovereign Council, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia – Himedti.
1.5 Senior civilian government figureheads responded that al-Burhan and Himedti’s comments were a threat to the democratic transition.
1.6 Sudan’s military leadership then withdrew their protection of civilian government personnel and the nationwide offices of Sudan’s anti-corruption committee.
1.7 An estimated 20,000 Sudanese protests what they view as a threat to the democratic transition.
1.8 The UN offers to mediate between the civilians and military, with western states emphasising their support for Sudanese democracy. A US official said that anti-democratic actions in Sudan put US support at risk.

1.1 How the coup unfolded

Multiple sources (21 September) reported that Islamist troops loyal to Sudan’s ousted dictator Omar al-Bashir launched an attempt at a military coup. 21 officers and a number of soldiers were detained in connection the coup attempt, and a search continued for others (Reuters, 21 September).

Following “intense” military activity in Khartoum and nearby Omdorman, the main bridge across the River Nile was shut. In the early hours of the morning, shooting was heard near a military base housing a tank division in Omdurman. Shortly after that, a news flash on state TV said that a coup attempt had been thwarted. The coup plotters had tried but failed to take over a building housing the state media (BBC, 21 September). According to Defence Minister Lt. Gen. Yassin Ibrahim, the leader of the coup was the commander of the Armored Corps based in al-Shajara camp in South Khartoum, Major General Abdalbagi Alhassan Othman Bakrawi (Reuters, 21 September).

A “well-informed” military source provided al-Taghyeer (22 September) with further information on how the coup plot unravelled. Al-Bakrawi and his group launched the coup at three in the morning by preventing the commander of the Armored Corps from entering his office. However, they were unable to seize control of any institution or road. “After learning of the failure of their attempt, they allowed him to enter his office”, the source added. Al-Bakrawi and his group were then locked in another office until they were handed over to Military Intelligence. Al-Taghyeer’s military source denied that negotiations occurred, stating the plotters surrendered on their own, and that they will be charged with undermining the constitutional order, although their whereabouts were not revealed.

1.2 The reported mastermind – Who is Al-Bakrawi?

The Sudanese media provided details on the reported mastermind of the coup attempt, Major General al-Bakrawi. Al-Jareeda (22 September) profiled the alleged coup leader, in a headline that described him as a Koz (Sudanese dialect for a supporter/member of al-Bashir’s regime) from Kosti, a city on North Kordofan. Al-Bakwari was recruited to the Islamist party, the National Islamic Front (the NIF – the predecessor to the dissolved former ruling National Congress Party), in his second year of secondary school. After working for the NIF during the 1986 elections, he obtained a master's degree in military sciences from Sudan and Malaysia, and a fellowship from the Sudan Academy of Administrative Sciences.

In comments made to al-Taghyeer (22 September), a “high-ranking military source” said that al-Bakrawi served a six-month military suspension following the ouster of Omar al-Bashir, following his arrest after an audio recording went viral where he pledged to “eliminate the Rapid Support Forces with a single tank”. He was also accused of insulting Rapid Support Forces commander-in-chief, Sudan’s currently deputy chairman of the ruling Sovereign Council, Himedti (al-Jareeda, 22 September).

Al-Bakrawi’s military detention caused health issues which forced him to travel to Cairo where diabetes-induced gangrene led to an amputation, before he returned Khartoum a week before the coup attempt (al-Taghyeer, 22 September).

According to Sudan Tribune (21 September), when al-Bakrawi was in Cairo, he is suspect to have planned the coup attempt with other Sudanese Islamists in Egypt. Al-Taghyeer’s (22 September) military sources also said the second-in-command of the foiled coup was deputy major at the armored forces who had a very faithful following.

1.3 Hamdok reacts

Following the coup attempt, in a speech which emphasised need for security sector and army reforms, Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok said the coup was orchestrated “by parties inside and outside the armed forces,” and that it was “another attempt of the remnants of the former regime to abort the civil democratic transition [which was] prepared extensively, as witnessed by the lawlessness”, citing unrest in eastern Sudan which saw highways blocked, ports closed, oil production disrupted and continuous incitement against the civilian government (Radio Dabanga, 21 September).

1.4 Al-Burhan and Himedti’s comments

The civilian government selected by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition were blamed for the coup attempt by Sudan’s military leaders – the chairman of the ruling Transition Sovereign Council Chairman, Sudan’s highest authority, and commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces - Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan – alongside his deputy in the Sovereign Council, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia – Himedti.

Immediately after the coup was foiled, al-Burhan visited army corps at al-Shajara camp in south Khartoum, where the attempt reportedly originated, where he said: “the armed forces are leading the change and take it wherever they want” (Radio Dabanga, 22 September). Al-Burhan also went on to say that the military are “the guardians of Sudan’s future, despite anyone's objection” (Radio Dabanga, 23 September). Controversially, al-Burhan said: “[the military] are protecting [the revolution] from the [civilians who want to steal it]” (Reuters, 22 September).

Indeed, both al-Burhan and Himedti accused civilian politicians of opening the door to the coup attempt by neglecting public welfare while they were consumed by internal squabbles. Both said that civilians were pre-occupied with fighting over power positions, with al-Burhan saying that “no political party [seeks to] address citizen’s problems” and Himedti accusing civilian politicians of creating opportunities for repeated coups because they failed to address public concerns. “The military is met with humiliation and insults day and night, so how can there not be coups?”, Himedti asked (Reuters, 22 September).

1.5 Civilian government responds to al-Burhan and Himedti’s comments

Civilian leaders in the transitional government reacted vociferously to the comments made by Sudan’s military leaders which expressed anti-civilian sentiments. Al-Burhan’s statement of the military’s guardianship over the transition was described as a "direct threat to the transitional period" by Cabinet Affairs Minister Khalid Yousif, who stressed that any setback or violation of the transitional Constitutional Document will be faced by the Sudanese street, and that the military component has to pick between implementing the constitutional document or confronting Sudanese people (Sudan Tribune, 23 September).

Similarly, Mohamed al-Faki, the civilian spokesman of the Sovereign Council, also rejected al-Burhan’s statement that the military are the guardians of the democratic transition. adding that al-Burhan’s comments about divisions in the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) aim to give the military the control of the transition in Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 25 September).

The FFC coalition which occupies civilian government positions also responded to al-Burhan and Himedti’s statements blaming civilians for the coup attempt, labelling them: “a setback to the agenda of the revolution and the democratic transformation”, which contained “a load of fallacies and baseless accusations against the FFC”, which constitute “a direct threat to the democratic transition as they attempt to create a rift between the forces of the civil revolution and the armed forces of the people, and undermine the foundations on which the revolution was based” (Radio Dabanga, 24 September).

Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok disputed al-Burhan’s allegations that civilians seek to exclude the military from the transition, stating that he discussed his initiative "The Way Forward" with al-Burhan and Himedti. (Sudan Tribune, 23 September).

1.6 Military withdraws security from civilians

The war of words between the military and civilian components of the transitional government escalated after relations worsened following the withdrawal of security forces charged with protecting the headquarters and 22 properties of the Empowerment Removal Committee, upon the request of al-Burhan. The committee - whose purpose is to dismantle the political and financial apparatus of [former dictator Omar al-Bashir’s] regime… has been criticised by the military generals participating in the transition, who served under al-Bashir” (Reuters, 26 September).

Upon the request of the Committee, hundreds of activists turned up at its Khartoum offices declaring their readiness to fill the security vacuum. Addressing the crowd Mohamed Al-Faki said his official protection had also been withdrawn, and that the building may turn into a centre of confrontation and resistance if necessary (Multiple sources, 27 September). Al-Faki also said: “if there is any threat to the democratic transition we will fill the streets” (Reuters, 26 September), with Cabinet Affairs minister Khaled Omar labelling the withdrawal of guards “a part of a series of developments aimed at undermining the transitional period (Multiple sources, 27 September).

Meanwhile, protests erupted across Sudan - in Khartoum, al-Gadarif, North Kordofan, Darfur, the Red Sea, Northern and White Nile states – in solidarity with the Empowerment Removal Committee after the removing of its military guards, although the committees’ office in Central Darfur was plundered in the absence of security provisions (Radio Dabanga, 28 September).

In efforts to mediate the escalating tensions between the military and civilian components, head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)

said the UN was ready to hold comprehensive dialogue between the partners of the transitional period, calling on Sudan’s ruling partners to reduce escalation and media exchanges and focus on dialogue and cooperation instead (Radio Dabanga, 28 September).

However, in a “confrontational” tone, Himedti said: “the international community cannot threaten us…it was civilians that blocked the streets…the armed forces are not responsible for the insecurity” (Radio Dabanga, 27 September).

1.7 Protests supporting civilian rule

Sudanese security forces fired tear gas to break up a demonstration in Khartoum by an estimated 20,000 people in support of a civilian-led transition to democracy. Protesters chanted “the army is Sudan's army, not Burhan's army". A statement issued by the Sudanese Professionals Association said: “The objective of these marches is to protect Sudan’s democratic transition and there is no way to achieve that without ending any partnership with the military council” (Multiple sources, 30 September).

1.8 International reactions

As noted by Jonas Horner, senior Sudan analyst at the International Crisis Group a successful coup may have meant the end of international aid dollars that the new government has been increasingly successful at getting (Washington Post, 21 September).

Indeed, the coup was condemned, and support for Sudan’s democratic transition was emphasised by the UN Security Council (Sudan Tribune, 23 September), alongside the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the Sudan Troika (the US, UK and Norway) and African Union (Radio Dabanga, 22 September), alongside the EU and the Friends of Sudan group (the aforementioned states and intergovernmental bodies, and France, Germany, KSA and the UAE). The spokesperson for the US Department of State, Ned Price, said that US mobilisation of substantial assistance to Sudan will be advanced as Sudan makes “continued progress in its ongoing transition” (Radio Dabanga, 23 September).

Furthermore, the U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Jeffrey Feltman, warned that actions against the civilian-led government in Sudan will put US support at risk. In a meeting with Prime Minister Abdallah, Feltman condemned the failed coup attempt, underscoring that such attempts might lead "the Congress to stop supporting Sudan," said Hamdok’s office. In December 2020, the US Congress passed the "Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020", which aims to tighten oversight of the Sudanese security and intelligence forces, including an assessment of the security sector reforms which should lead to militias’ merging with the regular army and strengthening civilian control of the military sector (Multiple sources, 30 September).

2. Analysis/issues:

2.1 Contradictions: The military and civilian components of the government initially gave conflicting accounts as to who was behind the coup attempts. Senior army officers contradicted the Minister of Information and the Prime Minister, who blamed Islamist loyalists of the former regime.
2.2 The previous regime: While the coup attempt is argued to reflect the ongoing influence of the former regime, civilians accused al-Burhan of facilitating the attempt by not sacking Islamists from the army, while al-Burhan blames coup attempts for the poor performance of civilian government.
2.3 Coup risks: Indeed, given public dissatisfaction with the performance of the civilian government, analysts have argued that coup risks remain.
2.4 Anti-democratic comments: Nonetheless, al-Burhan and Himedti’s anti-civilian comments in the immediate aftermath of the coup have labelled as threat to the democratic transition, or a precursor to a coup.
2.5 Military power-grab: As we edge closer to the date in which the leadership of Sudan’s highest authority, the ruling Sovereign Council, must be handed over from the military to civilians, civil society voices suspect that the military leadership played a role in the coup attempt, as foiling it would enable them to justify their prolonged leadership on security grounds.

2.6 Was it a real coup?: Indeed, the proliferation of articles in the Sudanese media that were sceptical about the official version of events surrounding the coup suggests that credence is given to the suspicions of coup being used as a military power-grab. Numerous articles analysed the logistical operations of the coup attempt to question whether it was real.

2.1 Contrasting accounts of Islamist involvement in the coup

As mentioned earlier, in his speech which immediately followed the coup attempt, Hamdok said it was orchestrated “by parties inside and outside the armed forces,” and that it was “another attempt of the remnants of the former regime to abort the civil democratic transition (Radio Dabanga, 21 September).

Indeed, Hamdok’s statements were backed up by Minister of Information, Hamza Balol, who affirmed that civilians were involved in the planning of the attempted coup. Balol accused remnants of Omar al-Bashir’s deposed regime of being complicit in the failed coup in an attempt to regain power in the country, adding that efforts are ongoing in pursuing remaining members of the dissolved regime who aided in the attempt to overthrow the government (al-Taghyeer, 22 September).

However, the Prime Minister and Minister of Information were contradicted by senior officers in the Sudanese army, including spokesman Brig-Gen Tahir Abu Haja, who said that no civilian politicians were arrested in connection with the failed coup attempt. Commander of the Ground Forces, Lt-Gen Issam-al-Din Karrar said the coup plotters comprised of one retired general, with the others are still in service (Sudan Tribune, 22 September).

To further add to the confusion, head of the Sudanese army, Abdulfattah al-Burhan, pointed to the involvement of civilians in the failed coup attempt, “but stopped short of admitting they were Islamists”. Al-Burhan said that the political affiliation of the coup plotters will be disclosed at the end of the investigation (Sudan Tribune, 24 September).

Despite contrasting accounts of whether civilian Islamists were behind the coup attempt, the event has nonetheless triggered analysis that the remnants of al-Bashir’s ousted Islamist regime are working to spoil Sudan’s democratic transition.

2.2 The remnants

According to Brian D’Silva, an analyst on Sudan, the coup reinforces the fragility of Sudan’s democratic transition and indicates the “persistent influence of remnants of Bashir’s regime”. In addition, Yasir Arman, an adviser to Prime Minister Hamdok, called the events “a wake-up call" about support among Islamist forces loyal to al-Bashir and the extent to which they oppose the transitional government (Washington Post, 21 September).

Indeed, Sudanese transition underwent “more than 3 coups during three years” and “the conspiracies against the transitional period will not stop,” according to FFC spokesman Jaafar Hassan (al-Taghyeer, 22 September). Thus, the coup attempt “indicates persistence of opposition to Sudan's new, more inclusive direction", according to Jonas Horner, the senior Sudan analyst at the International Crisis Group (AFP, 22 September).

Potential motivations for the Islamist coup have been provided by Mohanad Hashim, a journalist for government-run Sudan TV in Khartoum, who said that loyalists to former dictator Omar al-Bashir who were blamed for the coup say they are disgruntled with Sudan's tough economic situation (BBC, 21 September). In blaming the Islamist remnants of al-Bashir’s regime, with Salah Halima, former assistant foreign minister, told Al-Monitor (28 September) that “the Sudanese army has become ideological given the large-scale incorporation of Muslim Brotherhood members in the military institutions just like the rest of the state’s institutions”.

While al-Burhan says Islamists would not have the opportunity to seize power if civilian forces stopped quarrelling, Hamdok and the leaders of the FFC attribute Islamist attempts to seize power to al-Burhan delaying the sacking of Islamists from the army (Sudan Tribune, 24 September), with Sudan Tribune (22 September) outright accusing al-Burhan of refusing to sack Islamists from the army.

2.3 Coup risks remain

Despite the failure of the coup attempt, various analysts suggest that the risks of a military coup remain, with some pointing to the failure of civilians in government to achieve transitional goals, both political and economic, as a triggering factor. Indeed, Joseph Tucker, the US Institute of Peace (USIP, 22 September) Senior Horn of Africa expert, warns that Sudanese public frustrations towards a civilian government that has failed to achieve its political goals, and is not sufficiently inclusive of the wider public, “could chip away at popular support for a civilian-led government”.

Arguing that Sudan’s transition “has entered its most difficult period”, Bloomberg (23 September) columnist Bobby Ghosh suggests that Hamdok is at his most vulnerable, amid economic issues triggering public frustration. Although the coup plotters “misread the national mood”, Ghosh warns that there may be other bids to overthrow the government before the elections expected in early 2024.

Similarly, senior Sudanese journalists also warn of future coup attempts. Firstly, Khaled al-Tijani, head of Sudan’s Elaph newspaper, warned that the deteriorating economic and social conditions of Sudan will lead to “more coup attempts, even more violent than this one” (al-Monitor, 28 September). Secondly, Osman Mirghani, the editor-in-chief of al-Tayyar newspaper, warns that a successful coup may still occur amid “the failure of Sudan’s ruling partners to build vital institutions without which the strength of the state will not be upright” (al-Taghyeer, 22 September).

Mirghani criticises the “frequent” statements of civilian and military officials that they do not expect a coup by highlighting Sudan’s political and economic environments which culminate in the “slackening of citizen reactions to the idea of the coup”. Alongside citing the “corrosive” economy, Mirghani also states that the “political situation cannot get any worse”, amid divided ruling forces that are unable to establish institutions of governance such as Legislative, Supreme Prosecution, and High Judicial Councils and the Constitutional Court (al-Taghyeer, 22 September).

Mirghani adds that these failures are compounded by “the complete absence of any vision and strategic plan that inspires the path of development and renaissance” (al-Taghyeer, 22 September). Waleed Madibo, founder of Sudan Policy Forum, also cited the failure of civilian politicians to form a legislative body to state that there is a “lack of leadership and vision that can lead Sudan out of this quagmire” (Radio Dabanga, 23 September).

Columnist Shamael Al-Nour also highlights the flaws of the civilians in government. With the latest events reflecting a :”transitional crisis,” whereby the military and civilians are apprehensive about each-other, she adds that “some civilian circles are not fully prepared for the transfer of the presidency, and “they do not have a clear vision for this process” (al-Yom al-Tali, 22 September).

2.4 Military leader’s comments threat to the transition

Al-Burhan and Himedti’s expression of anti-civilian sentiments immediately after the coup attempt triggered a blowback from Sudanese civil society, and suspicions over the democratic commitment of Sudan’s military leaders.

Writing in al-Jareeda (23 September), Sabah Mohammed al-Hassan raised the prospect of the military leaders being connected to the coup attempt in how they spoke about it “with frustration rather than the pride [of successfully thwarting coup attempts]”, and that they attacked civilians rather than the remnants of the former regime, which, according to al-Hassan, “confirms that the remnants have nothing to do with the coup, or the military partnered with them in it”.

The Sudanese Journalist Network (SJN, 23 September) also consider al-Burhan and Himedti’s anti-civilian comments an “advanced step towards the seizure of power”. The SJN further stated that the al-Burhan and Himedti’s comments proved the correctness of its position rejecting the power-sharing agreement with military forces, which put the revolutionaries in “an imbalanced partnership dominated by the military of the former regime, with civilians marginalised”.

Furthermore, Taha Osman Ishag, member of the Anti-Corruption Committee for the Sudanese Professionals Association, said that the statements of the military leaders “are more dangerous than the coup itself”, with “this rhetoric of accusations and threats” hindering a national solution (Radio Dabanga, 23 September).

The timing of the coup attempt culminated in suspicions that Sudan’s military leaders are keen to prolong their hold on power ahead of their requirement to handover the chairing of Sudan’s highest authority to civilians.

2.5 Military prolonging power

Reactions to the coup in the Sudanese and western media highlighted the prominence of a narrative that the coup was motivated by the military’s attempt to prolong its presidency of Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council before it is required, in Sudan’s transitional constitution, to handover presidency to civilians.

However, the date of the transfer of the leadership of the Sovereign Council from military to civilians remains unclear, according to Mohammed al-Faki, the civilian spokesman for the council. Sudan’s 2019 constitutional declaration signed in 2019 set the power transfer to civilians for May 2021, but the Juba Peace agreement of October 2020 reset the clock on the transition without specifying a new date for handover. A simple reset of the clock would set a handover of July 2022. Al-Faki said that the transfer requires discussion and a new legal decree from the Justice Ministry, and that he favours a proposal to conduct the handover in November 2021 (AP, 24 September).

Bloomberg (23 September) state that the Sudanese army is required to surrender its chairmanship of the Sovereignty Council by mid-2022, a step that “would theoretically curtail a monopoly the [army] has had on decision-making for at least a generation [which] could usher in transparency that is rare in the broader Middle East and Horn of Africa regions”. Various analysts have raised the prospect of the military using the coup to justify their prolonged power under the guise of maintaining security.

In his questioning of the army’s account of the coup attempt, Jonas Horner told Bloomberg (23 September) that “the coup presented the military with an avenue to show national and international audiences that they remain integral to the security of Sudan’s transition…they’re saying ‘we’re the only ones that can keep this place together.’”

Similarly, with AFP (22 September) noting that the coup attempt could help in the military's push to prolong their leadership of the sovereign council, analyst Magdi el-Gizouli of the Rift Valley Institute added “the argument will simply be that the country is facing a security crisis that requires that they remain in power…. it’s likely we will continue to hear of similar coups," which reflects the transition's "fragility". Similar narratives were also present in the Sudanese media.

In Mu’tasim al-Qadhi’s suspicions of ulterior motives behind the coup attempt, it was noted noted that that the military denied reports of a coup ten days before it occurred, before blaming the attempt on civilian incompetence ahead of the transfer of the Sovereign Council presidency to civilians, at a time when the military is accused of failing to maintain security (al-Rakoba, 23 September). Al-Burhan’s comments also lend credence to suspicions that the military could use the foiled coup to justify their power on security grounds, with the chairman of the Sovereign Council saying that the army had intelligence on the coup attempt but waited “to arrest [putschists] in the act so that the coup attempt will be easy to prove” (Sudan Tribune, 24 September).

Analysts have also inferred that the failed coup is the precursor to a successful one, with Horner telling the Washington Post (21 September) that: “this coup attempt may have been a test…to see how the street reacts”. The Sudanese media has also been rife with analytical inferences that the foiling of the coup attempt merely disguises the military’s intent to prolong power.

Columnist Shamael al-Nour argues “something is being covered up” by the coup attempt, as it is not far away from the date by which the presidency of the Sovereign Council will be transferred from the military to civilians (al-Yom al-Tali, 22 September). Writing in al-Rakoba (23 September), Dr. Mu’tasim Bukhari noted that, with the end of military’s presidency of the Sovereign Council looming, “something is being woven in complete darkness, and there is an intent to do something,” as the military are “in fear and apprehension of the consequences of leaving power in the hands of civilians”.

Moreover, the proliferation of articles in the Sudanese media that cast doubts about the coup and its motives also tended to question the events of the coup itself, thereby reflecting skepticism around the authenticity of the reports of the coup.

2.6 Scepticism: was it real coup?

Writing in al-Jareeda (23 September), journalist Haider al-Mikashfi states that: “people did not witness events that indicated coup attempts,” citing the lack of military deployments in strategic locations, and that passengers moved on the streets regularly.

Dr. Mu’tasim Bukhari (al-Rakoba, 23 September) went into granular details in his disputation of the authenticity of the coup attempt, by asking several questions:

Why did the coup leaders not first arrest all political and military leaders? Why was General Command of the Armed Forces was not taken over, nor vital facilities such as the airport, television and communication facilities, and bridges across the capital? Why were the two officers who attempted to get the coup statement broadcasted unarmed, and why were they turned away “like delivery workers who got the address wrong” from the national media centre?

Consequently, Shamael al-Nour (al-Yom al-Tali, 22 September), explained public skepticism towards the authenticity of the coup attempt by questioning whether it was just “restlessness in the army employed to serve a party”, citing “the lack of signs indicating that the country is experience a military coup” and that commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, Abdulfattah al-Burhan, “spoke with friendliness during his visit to the Armored Corps that attempted the coup”.

With the latest coup attempt being the fifth since the start of the transitional period, al-Mikashfy (Al-Jareeda, 23 September) suggests that the “excess” of reports of coup attempts – and the lack of official information about them - raises public skepticism, whereby the authenticity of the news of the coup attempts is questioned, especially as “not a single one of the masterminds of these coup was brought to trial despite the declaration of their arrest and investigation”, with leaks the perpetrators were released for a lack of evidence.

Furthermore, the Sudanese Communist Party argue that the failure to prosecute those involved in previous coup attempts tempted others to try to take power too (Radio Dabanga, 22 September).

3. Solutions

Solutions proposed in the wake of the coup attempt have been directed at both Sudanese and international policymakers.

3.1 Sudanese policymakers

Transparency over the coup

With the latest coup attempt being the fifth since the start of the transitional period, columnist Haider al-Mikashfy calls for transparency from the military, arguing that the public must be informed of the full facts and details of the coup attempts through a public trial that is broadcasted publicly, “otherwise the latest coup attempt will only be another episode of a continuous series”. Al-Mikashfi suggests that the “excess” of coups, and the lack of information about them, raises public skepticism, whereby the authenticity of the news of the coup attempts is questioned (al-Jareeda, 23 September).

Islamist purge

Wajdi Saleh, a member of the Empowerment Removal Committee, repeated calls to purge the military and security agencies from the Islamists in order to mitigate the risk of coups d’état and to protect the transition (Sudan Tribune, 21 September).

Unified armed forces

Noting that differences within both the civilian and military camps “serve as fertile ground for coup attempts”, alongside the Islamist coup risks that are exacerbated by divides within Sudan’s armed forces, Salah Halima, former assistant foreign minister called for a single structure that would bring Sudan’s military and security components under one umbrella” (al-Monitor, 28 September).

Creating governance institutions

Joseph Tucker of USIP (22 September) calls for the creation of governance institutions, including “the long-delayed” legislative council, the constitutional court and judicial bodies. Tucker particularly emphasises the legislative council, which is “needed to give popular legitimacy and political direction to the transitional government’s decisions and provide space for other political and civic stakeholders to participate”, with the absence of such institutions argued to leave the government vulnerable to coup attempts.

Security sector reform

Tucker also suggests that security sector reform, which would include civilian oversight over the security apparatus, builds consensus around policy that shifts the military’s role from one of regime protection to citizen protection.

Addressing the demands of Sudan’s diverse population

Noting that Sudan’s “long-neglected constituencies” are impatient with the government, Michelle Gavin, Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (27 September) warns that their “frustration is ripe for manipulation by those interested in impeding a transition to genuine democracy”. Thus, Gavin calls upon Sudan’s leaders to address the demands of Sudan’s “complex and diverse population impatient for change that brings about relief from economic hardship and political marginalisation.”

3.2 International community

International support for Sudan’s economic recovery

Bloomberg (23 September) columnist Bobby Ghosh calls for the international community to speed up debt-forgiveness and aid for Sudan, as well as encouraging private investment in order to help Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok get the economy on track, and thereby “keep the population on his side”. Ghosh adds that Sudan has been “a shining exception to the trend of democratic retrenchment across much of Africa and a beacon of hope amid the gathering gloom of autocratic populism worldwide,” concluding that “this bright spark of democracy in Africa deserves special consideration.”

Neutralising military weapons with international help

Questioning the fate of the military-civilian transitional partnership after the failed coup attempt, Mu’tasim al-Qadhi calls for military weapons to neutralised, with the help of the international community, to prevent it from using its weapons to abort the transition to full-fledged democratic civilian rule, which can be helped by the Sudanese diaspora and their relations with international institutions and human rights associations, and their abilities to file cases before international courts (al-Rakoba, 23 September).

US support for Sudanese reformers

Michelle Gavin of the Council on Foreign Relations (27 September) notes that that a democratic and stable Sudan could “play an important bridging role between Africa and the Middle East,” before warning that if the US “neglects to do what it can to support Sudan’s reformers, other states with quite different agendas will surely fill the gap. “

Using the US Congress’ Sudan 2020 Act as a blueprint

USIP’s Joseph Tucker calls on the international community to use US Congress’ 2020 Sudan Democratic Transition Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act as blueprint for support for Sudan’s democratic transition. The act is said to encompass possibilities that include civilian-led security sector oversight and reform (22 September).