Solutions: How can Sudan overcome the UAE lobby in the US?
BACKGROUND
Sudan In The News’ recently published an exclusive investigation into the UAE’s lobbying in the US since the outbreak of war in Sudan. The UAE reportedly arms the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia accused of genocide in Sudan. Amid campaigns to ban US arms sales to the UAE, a major obstacle is a powerful Emirati lobby that US intelligence officials say exploit the vulnerabilities in American governance, including the reliance on campaign contributions, susceptibility to powerful lobbying firms and lax enforcement of disclosure laws that guard against foreign interference.
SUMMARY
Amid expectations that the UAE lobby in the US will maintain its influence as the Trump administration takes office, two of the most prominent US-based Sudanese voices proposed solutions on how the Sudanese people and government can counter an Emirati lobby that has a significant impact on the war in Sudan.
INTRODUCTION
Sudan In The News’ investigative report was published on the 17th of January: the day that the outgoing US President Joe Biden administration was meant to report to Congress on UAE assurances that it is no longer arming the RSF.
This promise came in an 18 December letter from Brett McGurk, the White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, who stated that the UAE is no longer supplying weapons to the RSF.
Yet, on 16 January, Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab reported the arrival of three drones at an RSF-controlled airport, two of which arrived between McGurk’s claim and the date on which the Biden administration was meant to report to Congress. It initially seemed that the Biden administration departed without complying with its commitment.
However, a 24 January statement from Senator Chris Van Hollen and Representative Sara Jacobs – both Democrats attempting to block US arms sales to the UAE – cited a briefing from the Biden administration and “other reporting” to say that the UAE broke its promise and is still transferring arms to the RSF.
“Based on my conversations with the Biden Administration, it’s clear that the UAE is continuing to provide weapons to the murderous RSF, violating the assurances provided to the former Administration. It is imperative that the United States not provide weapons to countries that are in turn providing military support to the RSF and complicit in its genocidal actions,” Van Hollen said.
Jacobs added that “the US has the opportunity to end this war and bring stability to Sudan by withholding weapons to the UAE and essentially cutting off the supply chain to the RSF,” with both promising to block arms sales to the UAE until it stops supporting the RSF.
WHAT CAN WE EXPECT?
Nonetheless, analysts project that Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency is an opportunity for the UAE to evade pressure over its support for the RSF. In addition, cooperation on advanced technology is expected to continue its emerging role in the UAE’s influence in Washington, particularly amid a hefty planned investment into US data centres by an Emirati business partner of Trump’s.
“Nowhere in the Gulf is Trump’s return more welcomed than in the Emirates,” wrote Dr. Andreas Kreig, an associate professor at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London. Noting that the UAE maintains one of the most powerful lobbies in Washington, Kreig argued that the Emirates will be able to frame its assertive stance on Sudan “as aligned with the Trump maxim of delegating policy on the periphery to local partners”. Kreig added that “via its vast network of surrogates such as… the RSF in Sudan… [the UAE] can present itself as an indispensable broker for a more isolationist US president”.
Beyond security ties, artificial intelligence (AI), advanced technology and space exploration are also crucial components of the UAE’s bid to maintain influence in Washington, with cooperation on those matters coming under discussing during UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed’s visit to Biden in September 2024.
Indeed, as revealed by Sudan In The News’ investigation, 16.8% of the 327 contacts between January and June 2024 made by Akin Gump – the lobbying firm registering the most activity on the UAE Embassy’s behalf – were related to AI or the UAE’s space programme, a reflection of their growing importance to Emirati diplomacy.
UAE-US cooperation on technology is expected to continue as the Trump admin takes office, with Emirati billionaire Hussain Sajwani announcing that he plans to invest $20 billion in US data centres over the coming years. Sajwani is a real estate estate tycoon who owns DAMAC Properties. More importantly, he is a longtime business partner of Trump, with DAMAC owning the only Trump-branded golf course in the Middle East.
While insiders suggest that Salwani does not wield major national influence in the UAE, such ties nonetheless reflect the broader influence networks that the UAE can leverage in the US.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Insights on the UAE’s influence in Washington were provided by two of the most prominent US-based Sudanese voices on the matter.
Yasir Zaidan is a PhD candidate at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, where his research focuses on the growing of influence of Middle Eastern countries in the Horn of Africa. He has authored numerous articles published in outlets including Foreign Affairs, War on the Rocks and World Politics Review. Also a frequent contributor to Foreign Policy, his August 2024 article ‘To End Sudan’s War, Pressure the UAE’ called for the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to publicly address the UAE’s support for the RSF.
A senior researcher at Northeastern University in Boston, Mohamed Suliman also writes regularly on the RSF and its Emirati support for outlets including Middle East Monitor and Politics Today. In 2024, Suliman led a successful campaign to get the RSF’s official and propaganda social media accounts banned on X, Facebook, YouTube and Instagram.
ANALYSIS: IMPACT OF UAE’S US LOBBY ON THE WAR IN SUDAN
The US-based Sudan analysts identified two key ways that the UAE lobby in the US influences the war in Sudan. Zaidan attributed the UAE-driven “both sides” narrative of the war in Sudan to struggles holding the RSF accountable. Suliman stressed the UAE lobby’s impact on Congressional bills aimed at weakening the RSF.
UAE framing of the war in Sudan
Highlighting the “profound impact” of the UAE’s lobbying efforts, Zaidan cited the UAE’s framing of the war in Sudan as an obstacle towards justice.
“Over the past two years, the UAE has actively shaped the narrative of the conflict, presenting it as a power struggle between two equally positioned generals,” Zaidan said.
“This framing, driven by UAE influence, minimises the atrocities and genocidal acts committed by the RSF,” he added, before noting that “the UAE has steered US policymaking in ways that obscure the RSF’s crimes, hindering international accountability and justice”.
Influencing voting on bills
With the UAE lobby in the US having a “considerable impact” on the war in Sudan, Suliman said it “neutralised US policy toward Sudan to a large degree at the administration level, which, hitherto, did not take a strong position against RSF and classify it as a terrorist organization”.
Suliman added that while the UAE lobby could not prevent the introduction of Congress bills that call out RSF violations, sanction its leader or propose blocking US arms sales to the UAE, “it could have a potential impact on influencing the voting process of these bills”.
SOLUTIONS: WHAT CAN SUDANESE PEOPLE DO?
Proposed practical steps that Sudanese people can take in order to counter the influence of the UAE lobby in the US revolved around publicising the RSF’s crimes in protests, alongside through media and political outreach.
Activism
Suliman suggested that Sudanese in the US can reach out to their Congress representatives and share their views on the RSF and its massacres, with activists able to publish articles to influence public opinion alongside organising marches.
Media and political outreach
Zaidan noted that Sudanese in the US and Europe have been “instrumental in exposing the UAE’s destructive role through media advocacy and protests”.
Nonetheless, to further counter the UAE’s influence, Zaidan called for Sudanese activists to continue uncovering and publicising the UAE’s involvement in the RSF’s heinous attacks on civilians.
“Strengthening these efforts, particularly by engaging with international media and lobbying policymakers, will ensure their message reaches influential audiences and creates pressure on decision-makers to reconsider their positions,” Zaidan said.
SOLUTIONS: WHAT CAN SUDAN’S GOVERNMENT DO?
Taking into account Sudan’s financial challenges, inexpensive measures that the Sudanese government can take to counter the UAE lobby’s influence were also outlined.
Congressional outreach
Suliman suggested that the Sudanese government, through its embassy in Washington, can reach out to Congress members and decision-makers to influence them and provide a counter-narrative.
Aligning Sudan-US priorities
Zaidan proposed ways that the Sudan can counter the UAE’s influence by aligning with the US’ international and domestic priorities.
“Sudan can leverage the strategic importance of the Red Sea for international security, particularly in light of recent US interests in stabilising the region after the Gaza ceasefire,” Zaidan said. “By aligning with global security priorities, Sudan can challenge the UAE’s narrative and build international support without significant financial investment,” he added.
In addition, Zaidan called for Sudanese officials to engage US conservative allies by emphasising the RSF’s attacks on Sudanese Christians, “which could resonate with this political base”.
In a recent article for World Politics Review, Zaidan called for Trump administration to threaten to designate the RSF as a terrorist organisation should it continue its attacks on Sudanese Christians.
Finally, Zaidan noted that the Sudanese government can counter the UAE’s influence by denying the RSF access to gold, which is a key driver of the UAE’s interests in the conflict.
