Summary

RSF commander Himedti’s latest speech raises more questions than gave answers.

This is why we translated and analysed EIGHT excerpts from his speech, with a particular focus on parts that did not generate much media attention, to ask whether this marks a new stage in the war and the RSF’s communications strategy.

Unlike previous speeches, Himedti’s latest was not scripted or subtitled in English. It also departed from the carefully crafted image his advisers have attempted to forge of Himedti as statesmanlike figure palatable to the international community.

But what did Himedti try to achieve with in a speech described by analysts as incoherent and confusing. Therefore, we ask the following questions:

· Is Himedti ignoring his advisers or is he poorly advised?

· Was this a desperate attempt to boost troop morale following recent battlefield defeats?

· Has Himedti admitted that he does not have control over his troops, and that RSF is facing supply issues?

· Can we expect the tribal incitement espoused in his speech to become part of the RSF’s official communications policy?

· Why did Himedti lash out at the international community including – indirectly – the UAE which is accused of supporting the RSF?

· Why has Himedti gone public over his tensions with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition widely accused of being the RSF’s political ally?

CLIP 1: Himedti blames international community for supporting an agreement he says caused the war.

“This is a message for the international community under the leadership of the Americans. We told you about the Framework Agreement. We told you it will bring problems. I spoke about it with all of you: from [former UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Sudan chief] Volker [Perthes], to the Quartet [Saudi Arabia, UK, US, UAE] to the Troika [Norway, UK, US], to the African Union. I told all of you. So that I can prove that I have witnesses. There was a meeting attended by [army generals] Shams Al-Deen Kabbashi to Ibrahim Jabir, and the Americans and the Saudis. In the Saudi ambassador’s house. The Saudi staff were present and the American staff were present led by [US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs] Molly Phee. The Saudi staff were led by the Saudi ambassador.
“I rejected [the Framework Agreement]. After the Forces of Freedom and Change [FFC] concluded their words, I rejected what they said. I was criticised by [FFC leader] Yassir Arman. I disagreed with Arman in front of them. Even Molly Phee said ‘this is frustrating’! I told them it’s better if I go. The Saudi ambassador told me to stay. Kabbashi said he believes in every word said by Arman. I’m the one who rejected it! I’m not sure what Ibrahim Jabir said, but it had no worth. Then they went and wrote a statement and published it. I wasn’t a part of this.
“OK, international community – under the leadership of the Americans. If you wanted to bring the Islamic Movement – yesterday Kabbashi was dancing like a girl – with Ahmed Abbas, the former governor of Sennar. Yesterday, Ibrahim Mahmoud was received. If you wanted to bring the National Congress Party, why did you destroy the country? If you wanted the Islamic Movement to rule the country, why did you destroy the country with the Framework Agreement? The Framework Agreement caused the war, there’s no other reason. The Framework Agreement caused the war. We didn’t reject the Framework as the start of a transition. No – the Framework includes things that we told you about and said in the media that this cannot be! Why? Why did you do all of this? To destroy Sudan, right?
“Now I’m speaking about the international community. From the US to the EU, to those supporting the Framework Agreement. If you’re in agreement with Islamists, Why did you destroy our country? I hold you fully responsible! You must take full responsibility for the war? Because you made the Framework Agreement. And I told you that the Framework will bring problems. It will bring Sudan to war. I told you thi and it was witnessed. You can’t deny it. Neither the Saudis or the Americans or the Europeans or Volker. They can testify what I said. You won’t be able to deny it. Why did you destroy our country? And you’re in agreement with Islamists? Why destroy our country?”

Analysis

· Are frictions developing between the RSF and the UAE?

· Is Himedti borrowing from the Bashir-era playbook by stoking fears of an international conspiracy to inspire his loyalists?

· Is the end of the RSF partnership with the FFC?

· Is the RSF Islamist faction winning the battle for influence within the militia?

UAE-RSF friction
While Himedti’s speech was addressed to RSF fighters and the Sudanese people, he lashed out at the international community, with a particular focus on “all of [the states]” who supported the Framework Agreement for a democratic transition.

While not referring to the UAE by name, the Gulf state was among the Framework Agreement’s supporters. Himedti also explicitly blamed the outbreak of the war on the Quartet (KSA, UK, USA and UAE). This raises questions as to whether friction is brewing between the RSF and the UAE - who continue to publicly deny assisting the RSF despite mounting evidence of its covert support. But what would lead the RSF to become a liability for the UAE?

Beyond the reputation damage caused by associating with a genocidal militia, there is a chance that the RSF may increasingly become a financial burden. The army’s recent victories - not only territorially but also in terms of depleting RSF resources - show how it is not a foregone conclusion that the UAE investment in the RSF will guarantee their interests in Sudan. In addition, while the UAE is believed to support the RSF as part of its global war on the Islamists, there are signs that the Islamist faction within the RSF is growing in influence.

Borrowing from the Bashir-era playbook

Himedti’s speech raises questions as to what is happening behind the scenes at the RSF. His verbal attacks on the international community contradicted the consistent communications position adopted by the RSF: that the Islamist former regime isolated Sudan from the world, with the RSF portrayed as more cooperative and compliant.

Yet, in his latest speech, Himedti borrowed from ex-president Omar Al-Bashir’s playbook: by stoking fears of an international conspiracy in order to cultivate a “them vs. us” mentality among his loyalists. This would suggest that Himedti’s speech aimed to boost troop morale amid recent battlefield losses across Sudan.

Nonetheless, it is worth considering whether: a) the RSF’s communication strategy has changed as part of a battle for influence within the militia’s advisory office or b) Himedti is ignoring his advisors, especially given that Himedti made public his disagreements with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition over the Framework Agreement.

RSF friction with the FFC

In a tweet, independent researcher and consultant Nada Wanni argued that Himedti’s speech reflect his frustration that FFC were not able to politically market him and his ‘rationale’ for the war to western states, thereby helping him to avoid sanctions and – in other words – “to do what he expected of them, given their relations with the International Community”.

In the summer, Himedti fired his main advisor - Yousif Izzat - a smooth-talking Sudanese-Canadian lawyer said to be responsible for shaping Himedti’s ideology. As we reported, a key factor for Izzat’s sacking were his disagreements with Abdulrahim Hamdan Dagalo - Himedti’s older brother and the militia’s second-in-command. With Izzat said to coordinate between the RSF and the FFC, Abdulrahim’s frictions with Izzat grew over the former’s distrust of the FFC.

We also reported on the amount of former regime Islamists serving the RSF as advisors. There are also murmurs that the powerful Islamist faction within the RSF is growing in influence given their political expedience for two key reasons:

Firstly, many of them have experience of serving in government on a national or regional level thereby ensuring their know-how in terms of getting things done. Secondly, most of the RSF’s Islamist advisors hail from the militia’s tribal or regional bases. With the RSF failing to build a broad national support base, there are signs that it is investing more in tribal loyalties - which is further reflected in the next excerpts of Himedti’s speech.

CLIP 2: Himedti accuses Egypt (and the US) of attacking his militia

“Egypt is fighting us. Egypt attacked us. Right now, during the Geneva negotiations, [Egypt] brought [Sudan] eight K-8 Chinese warplanes. The machines are American. We have the details. The planes that hit us, Egypt used to bring them secretively. Now they bring it in plain sight, through Dongola. Egypt brings 250 kilogram bombs and American bombs. If the Americans didn’t agree, their bombs would not have reached Sudan. I called Molly Phee a year ago and I told her this. I told her the bombs hitting me now are American. She said she’ll talk to the Egyptians, that if the [military aid] Egypt gets from the US, if it’s used in Sudan we reject it. I said this. I dare Molly Phee to come out and say I didn’t tell her this. A year ago! I said American bombs are hitting us.”

Analysis

· Shift in RSF messaging given recent internal tensions over an RSF leader’s threats towards Egypt.

· Nonetheless, Himedti’s comments also help him connect with his base given that they validated the rife pre-existing anti-Egyptian sentiments present within the RSF’s discourses.

· Analysis of the escalatory shift in the tone towards Egypt suggests that it may aim to distract from UAE support for the militia

Himedti’s accusations that Egypt was involved in air strikes against his forces generated the most international media attention. Alongside claiming that Egypt provided Sudan’s army with Chinese warplanes and that American bombs were used on the RSF, Himedti also challenged US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee to come out and say that he did not bring up these matters with her.

The Egyptian foreign ministry subsequently put out a statement denying the accusations which addressed the RSF as a “militia”. The RSF responded with a statement of their own accusing Egypt of harbouring Sudanese Islamists.

RSF previous messaging on Egypt

The RSF’s verbal attacks on Egypt reflect a change of communications strategy. As we reported over the summer, a war of words erupted between RSF militants on social media that threatened to evolve into a fully-fledged tribal conflict within the militia.

This was triggered by an RSF commander known as ‘General Jalha’ threatening Egypt. Then, when asked about the comments on an Arab regional news station, UK-based RSF advisor Omran Hassan attempted to distance the RSF, as an institution, from the threats towards Egypt by belittling Jalha and saying that he is “just a solder” who does not have a say in the RSF.

Jalha’s loyalists considered Omran’s comments an affront to them as members of the Misseriya tribe - a key RSF constituent. However, RSF’s media channels, alongside militants from the Mahariya clan of the Rizeigat tribe - the most powerful in the militia - took the side of Omran. This shows how the RSF, as an institution, prioritised avoiding antagonising Egypt above appeasing a key constituent of fighters on the ground.

So, what has changed in just under three months? And what does Himedti have to gain from attacking Egypt?

RSF supporters’ pre-existing contempt for Egypt

While Himedti may genuinely believe that Egyptian intervention has tipped the balance against his militia following its recent battlefield losses, escalating tensions with Egypt also helps him to connect with his base and fighters.

Anti-Egypt sentiments are rife within the RSF, with Sudan’s northern neighbour historically viewed as a colonial power. Those anti-Egypt sentiments also tie into the anti-northern Sudanese discourses of RSF fighters and mouthpieces. For example, two of the RSF’s most influential mouthpieces such as Alrabea Abdelmoneim and Issa Musa Himeidan regularly describe northerners as ‘the sons of Fawzia [an Egyptian princess]’, ‘the slaves of Egyptians’ or ‘the children of colonial [Egyptian] brothels’.

According to a grievance narrative commonly espoused by RSF supporters and fighters, northerners collaborated with Anglo-Egyptian colonial forces to be left in charge of Sudan through control of the army. Portraying northerners as Egyptian rather than “true” Sudanese plays into the narrative that the army and the Sudanese state are illegitimate colonial endeavours, with the RSF and its tribal base argued to be the true rulers of the country.

Thus, Himedti’s accusations that Egypt supports Sudan’s army aims inspire the RSF’s base. Not only do they validate pre-existing anti-Egyptian sentiments, but also the RSF “cause”: to take control of a Sudanese state deemed an illegitimate colonial endeavour.

Himedti’s speech inspired influential UK-based RSF mouthpiece Alrabea Abdelmoniem to threaten Egypt with severe destruction. Immediately after the RSF commander’s speech, a TikTok live was held in which Abdelmoneim made a veiled incitement towards an attack on Aswan High Dam in Egypt.

He said: “We can take a position on the High Dam.” After the host told him to “relax,” Alrabea responded: “but it’s a war. You’re talking about a war, right? All options are available”.

The Dam is of critical importance to Egypt. It controls flooding, is a key source for Egypt’s population of over 100 million and stimulates the country’s pivotal agricultural and fishing sectors. As a result, the attack on the Dam that Alrabea hints at would have severe ramifications for Egypt. It is worth noting that the live was also attended by Albasha Tabiq (to the right of the presenter), an RSF advisor who was a government official in the ousted Islamist regime.

Distraction from UAE support for the RSF

Nonetheless, in comments to Noon Post, journalist Eiman Kamal suggested that Himedti’s accusations towards Egypt aim to divert attention away from credible allegations over the UAE’s involvement in Sudan. She pointed towards a notable increase in RSF mouthpieces, alongside platforms affiliated to its civil alliances, accusing Egypt of killing Sudanese. Indeed, RSF propaganda accounts have started to extensively promote the hashtag #الطيران_المصري_يقتل_السودانيين [Egyptian planes Kill Sudanese].

CLIP 3: HIMEDTI TAKES AIM AT THE SHAWAYGA

“They say ‘the return of the Islamic Movement’. This is not a return. It’s a continuation. They took power on 25 October [2021, military coup]. We participated with them [in the coup]. We corrected our position from the first day.They took total power. They spread their people. All of it was [Islamist leader Ali] Karti.
“All of it was Shawayga [a northern Sudanese tribe]. We’ve stayed quiet for a long time. You said we are diaspora Arabs. The RSF is from all of Sudan. But you? We’ve been quiet about you for too long. Not all Shawayga are criminals. Not all Shawayga want to destroy the country. But – at this moment – the Shaygis and those influenced by Shaygis – like Burhan’s people – you are all responsible [for the war].
“You removed [ex-president] Omar Al-Bashir. A conspiracy between [Shawayga]. You conspired with each other! What [ex-army general] Elfatih Erwa said was right. He said: ‘we replaced a regime with a regime’. But he also said something untrue. He said the RSF has no role. You’re a liar, Elfatih Erwa.”

Analysis

· By attributing Sudan’s problems to a Shaygi conspiracy, Himedti appeals to a historical grievance narrative prominent in RSF discourses.

· Warning signs that this could herald a new pattern whereby the RSF increasingly rely on tribal incitement would be future threats to invade Shendi from official platforms.

Despite dominating discussions among Sudanese people on social media, Himedti’s claims that the northern Sudanese Shaygi tribe are behind Sudan’s problems did not generate attention in English-language reporting of the RSF commander’s speech.   It was the first time during the course of the war that Himedti made such explicitly tribalist remarks, hinting at a shift in strategy whereby the RSF directly makes incitements on a tribal basis.

But why did Himedti specifically pick out the Shawayga and suggest that they are conspiring with each-other to rule Sudan?

“The Shaygi conspiracy”
The Shaygi tribe that Himedti suggested are behind a conspiracy to destroy Sudan are one of the four largest northern Sudanese tribes. They feature prominently in the RSF’s historical grievance narrative that certain groups were empowered at the expense of the RSF’s base during the colonial encounter.

As noted by the British Sudan historian Willow Berridge, when the British formed the ‘Sudan Defence Force’ (which would evolve into the army), it was a policy to avoid recruit from Mahdist groups. Of course, the Mahdist state that ruled Sudan from 1885 to 1899 was led by, and predominantly recruited from, the same tribal base as the RSF: western Sudanese nomadic Arabs. Instead, major training institutions such as the military school were set up in northern Sudan, where the majority of recruits were said to be Shawayga.

In this regard, RSF discourses portray the Shawayga as the backbone of the army, and by extension, the “56 state” that the RSF vow to destroy in order to take back what was lost after the fall of the Mahdist state. Thus, in attributing Sudan’s problems to a conspiracy of the Shawayga, Himedti attempted to rile up his base through tribal incitements and reference to their historical grievance narratives.

However, it is worth noting how these comments were followed by “we have stayed quiet for too long,” which implies that the belief in a Shaygi conspiracy was privately held albeit not publicly expressed.

This raises the question as to why he has taken aim at a northern tribe at this stage in the conflict. It could spell Himedti giving up on any pretenses of being a national ruler, which may indicate a shift of strategy towards a greater and more overt investment on tribal incitement and mobilisation.

Shendi
Should threats towards the city of Shendi in the northern Sudanese River Nile state increasingly come from official RSF channels, it would signal an even greater reliance on tribal incitement and rhetoric.

RSF mouthpieces and fighters alike regularly upload provocative messages threatening to enter Shendi, as indicated by a scroll through the city’s hashtag.

Shendi is known for being the home of the Ja’aleen - another of Sudan’s large northern tribes.

While the RSF has only been able to attack Shendi and nearby northern cities with drones, the prospect of its militants entering Shendi en masse plays up to a traumatic incident that occurred in nearby Al-Metemmah during the Mahdist period.

Back in 1897, Mahdist troops - who were predominantly recruited from the same tribal base as the RSF - waged a continuous massacre which infamously led to women jumping into the River Nile to avoid being raped by the Mahdist army. It is for this reason that RSF threatens to enter Shendi hit close to home for northern Sudanese.

CLIP 4: Himedti accuses the army of discriminate airstrikes

“Right now I see that army planes attack the whole of Sudan. Except for the River Nile and Northern states. Look at the difference between us. Who are you [Al-Burhan] to talk? You say Himedti is ignorant to anyone you talk with. Who’s the ignorant one out of us? The ignorant one speaks about tribalism. The ignorant one is a liar. [RSF] are in Garri [north of Khartoum]. [RSF are] in Hajar al-Assal [River Nile state]. Hajar al-Assal is the birthplace of [Islamist leader] Ali Karti. And [Burhan’s birthplace] is nearby in Gandatu. Why don’t you attack them if I’m ignorant like you?
“Why haven’t I attacked them? Instead, I protect them. But there is racism in the attacks themselves. We are in these locations, why don’t you attack them? Why do you attack [various parts of Sudan]? We are close to Garri, Hajar al-Assar and Al-Basabir [northern Sudan]. Why not airstrikes there?”

Analysis

· Himedti suggested that the army only spares northern Sudan of air strikes.

· However, attempts to appeal to unite the rest of Sudan against an army portrayed as solely catering to the north will be challenging given the breadth of opposition to the RSF across Sudan.

Despite RSF fighters and mouthpieces regularly inciting advances into Shendi, the militia’s incursions into northern Sudan have been limited but for drone strikes targeting Shendi, Merowe and Atbara. This has reduced a need for air strikes in northern Sudan but for Khartoum.

Yet Himedti has attempted used the absence of such in order to isolate Sudan’s army from the rest of Sudan, thus uniting the rest of the country against an army portrayed as solely catering to the north.

However, this will be extremely challenging for the RSF provided that it has found itself deeply opposed in all corners of Sudan - even in its regional stronghold and among its tribal base.

Opposition to the RSF across Sudan
In Darfur, the RSF has faced stiff resistance from non-Arab armed movements fighting alongside the army. In West Kordofan, the RSF has found itself opposed in the lands of the Arab Misseriya tribe. While the Misseriya are a key constituency of the RSF given that it is a nomadic western Sudanese group, the tribe’s loyalties are split between the army and the RSF. The militia’s advances into Misseriya land at the start of the year triggered a mass exodus of civilians amid the RSF’s anticipated campaign of looting and killing. It is also worth noting the internal tensions between Misseriya RSF and the Rizeigat who hold the final say in the militia.

In South Kordofan, the RSF has faced resistance from the predominantly Nuba Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, which reportedly joined forces with the army to fight the RSF. This is despite the fact that the SPLM-N al-Hilu, which threatens to declare self-determination in its territories, is itself a rebel group which has long-held grievances grievances on issues such as religion and regional disparities that the RSF have since appropriated.

Meanwhile, central Sudanese areas states such as North Kordofan, Al-Jazira and Sennar have witnessed a rise of popular mobilisation against the RSF in response to RSF advances.

Nonetheless, the army’s success in uniting Sudan against the RSF cannot be attributed to a specific campaign. It is the conduct of RSF fighters that has pushed most of Sudan to either side with the army or resist the RSF, given the militia’s campaign of documented atrocities and genocidal intent.

CLIP 5: HIMEDTI ORDERS RSF FIGHTERS TO NOT RECORD ON THE BATTLEFIELD

“Filming is strictly forbidden. Filming. Strictly forbidden. In all the battles. Strictly forbidden. The prisoners are a red line. Nobody can challenge a prisoner. There are bodies responsible for the prisoners. Nobody is allowed to interrogate a prisoner and then record the interrogation. You don’t have anything to do with the investigation. There are people responsible for that. You don’t have anything to do with that. Killing prisoners is forbidden. So that we can win with our manners.”

Analysis

· By publicly issuing orders to his fighters in this manner, Himedti took a huge risk which raises questions as to whether he is a) ignoring his advisors or b) he is poorly advised.

· If his demands are not implemented, it would serve as proof that Himedti has lost control of his fighters.

Calling upon his fighters to stop recording on the battlefield may have been necessitated by increased pressure on the RSF and its sponsors caused by the documentation efforts of Sudanese people and international organisations.

For example, a recent report by the Centre for Information Resilience compiled clips of RSF militants burning villages. The International Criminal Court has also appealed for evidence to aid an investigation into allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

Nonetheless, the RSF leadership also faces accusations - which it strenuously denies - that it has lost control of its fighters. Himedti’s orders that RSF fighters stop recording on the battlefield will put those denials to test

Should footage of RSF crimes recorded by its militants continue to appear on social media at the same rate, it could serve as proof that Himedti has no control of the militia he formally leads.

This would play into the hands of the Sudanese army, who hold an aversion to negotiations on the basis that the conflict can only be resolved militarily rather than politically. In other words, that the RSF problem should be treated exclusively as a security issue rather than political one.

Thus, it would strengthen the case that a peace agreement with the RSF’s leadership would not resolve the conflict - only the military defeat of the militia would.

Suliman Baldo, the director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, suggested that Himedti’s speech revealed a loss of control of his forces. “Hemedti’s references to the chaotic and criminal behaviour of his troops, including indiscriminate shootings, civilian casualties, and filmed human rights violations, raise alarms about potential war crimes. This indicates Hemedti’s dissatisfaction with his forces and his inability to command their behaviour effectively,” told Radio Dabanga.

CLIP 6: HIMEDTI ORDERS RSF TROOPS TO STOP FIRING BULLETS INTO THE AIR

“3 or 4… the best video…as soon as I see one [celebratory gunshot fired in the air], I close the video and I don’t watch it. Don’t fire your bullets [into the air]. You don’t have reinforcements. You’re not supported by another state. You take from [the army]. That’s why you shouldn’t fire bullets. Firing celebratory gunshots into the air I forbidden from today. Forbidden, forbidden, forbidden.”

Analysis

This order hints at the RSF facing supply issues. Recent battlefield developments further reinforce this view.

Since the start of the conflict, Sudan’s army has adopted a defensive strategy focused on depleting the militia’s resources. As per army sources, this was necessitated by the RSF’s advantage in terms of manpower and its tactic of waging war in urban centres.

Throughout the summer, army generals such as Yasir Al-Atta promised that an offensive is pending. The army’s commander-in-chief Abdulfattah Al-Burhan had also privately stressed the army’s “invisible” victories in terms of depleting RSF resources.

Towards the end of September, the army moved into offensive mode in a campaign that made advance across Sudan including capital city Khartoum, Darfur and Sennar. The timing of these developments suggest that the army is confident that the RSF’s supply issues are significant enough to enable the wave of offensives.

CLIP 7: HIMEDTI PROMISES 1 MILLION TROOPS

“Right now, [RSF] must get organised. Arrange ranks. Arrange themselves. This war, it’s not known whether it will end today or in 1, 2, 3, 4 years. Some people talk about ‘a million troops’. With God’s will, this time we will deliver them a million troops. With God’s will, a million patriotic troops. A million troops that fear God. Not a million looting troops, or thieves, criminals or murderers – No. A million troops that we know. We will deliver them a million troops. I don’t have much to say after this. Greetings to our heroes in the RSF. They have not fallen short. You haven’t come up short. And you’ve been steadfast. No man in the whole world can endure what you have endured.”

Analysis

In an escalatory speech that emphasised that it is unknown when the war will end, Himedti declared that the RSF will deliver one million troops.
This part of the speech has been interpreted as a show of bullish defiance aiming to raise internal morale following recent battlefield losses.

Baldo noted that Himedti’s speech lacked any mention of negotiations or peaceful resolutions and instead “called for further military mobilisation, urging soldiers to prepare for ‘Plan B’, signalling a potential escalation on all fronts,” which reflected a “growing frustration within the RSF due to military pressures on multiple fronts”.

Indeed, Himedti’s promise to deliver one million troops came a week after RSF propaganda accounts began to promote the hashtag #الحرب_بدأت_الآن which translates to “the war starts now” following the army’s counteroffensive in late September.

Himedti’s tone marked a departure from the rhetoric adopted around the Geneva peace talks in August that the army boycotted, where the RSF’s official channels claimed that it supported any initiative to stop the war.

While analysts cast doubt on the RSF’s commitment to peace, the militia’s official position was that it was open to it. It was able to do this because, over the past year, it seemed like momentum was in the RSF’s favour. Thus, the RSF could theoretically enter negotiations with more leverage.

However, RSF leader Himedti’s escalatory rhetoric suggests a fear that the pendulum has swung the army’s way, thus making it necessary for the RSF - as an institution- to more overtly stress that it will keep fighting “until victory or martyrdom” as their slogan goes.

CLIP 8: HIMEDTI INSULTS ARMY LEADERS

“Al-Burhan – you speak about rape crimes. You yourself are a rapist. Forget about your soldiers. You yourself are a rapist. This will be proven against you. So you don’t just for the sake of it. Your crimes are clear.”

Analysis

Himedti labelled the army’s commander-in-chief a r(a)pist. Throughout the speech, he also made cheap digs at other army generals.

Alongside consistently saying that Shams Al-Deen Kabbashi “raised his nostrils and danced like a girl” in reference to his celebrations over the army taking back the strategic Jabal Moya in Sennar, Himedti also said that Ibrahim Jabir’s words are worthless.

While it was not repeated in his latest speech, Himedti has previously publicly accused other army generals of drinking alcohol and not performing their mandatory Islamic prayers.

With Himedti’s speech being described as an improvised and rambling tangent, those insults play a part in conforming to that view.

The vulgar tone that Himedti adopted is a stark contrast to the image his advisors have attempted to forge.

When it seemed that the RSF was in the ascendancy, Himedti would read from a script that was written for him in an attempt to portray him as a statesmanlike figure palatable to the international community.

As indicated by Himedti’s insults, however, the latest speech represented a return to his roots: the crude leader of a tribal militia.

This also raises the question as to whether the speech is an admittance of defeat.

Is the speech an admittance of defeat?

Analysts take contrasting views over whether Himedti’s speech admits his defeat.

Writing in Noon Post, journalist Mohamed Mustafa Gamea noted how the improvised nature of the speech, alongside the colloquial dialect “far from the language of official speeches”, suggested that he was resorting to addressing his troops through social media in light of his lengthy absence from the field, amid the RSF’s collapse in most axes where fighting is taking place.

However, conflict observer Yasser al-Fadol expressed skepticism about “wishful analyses” considering Himedti’s speech one of defeat. Al-Fadol noted that Himedti appeared defeated in a number of speeches at the start of the war but “was still able to change the situation in his favour,” stressing that he still has men, weapons and the UAE.

Nonetheless, Gamea argued that it is difficult to analyse Himedti’s speech with a logical political approach “as it was dominated by confusion and disorder”.