Summary

The relationship between Sudan’s military regime and the Russia are highly convenient for both, provided that they can both meet interests that are critical to the survival of both. Moreover, the importance of their mutual interests have increased given recent developments that have triggered the international isolation of both Sudan and Russia: the 25 October 2021 military coup in Sudan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Thus, both the Sudanese military and Russia need each-other more than ever before, which is reflected in the deepening of their ties. This briefing explores Russia’s interests in Sudan, the drawbacks for the Sudanese coup regime in strengthening its ties with Russia, alongside proposed solutions.

Russia’s interest in Sudan’s gold: As international sanctions related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean the Kremlin is cut off from global financial systems, Russia aims to stockpile gold in order to stave off economic collapse, fund its war efforts and prevent its currency plummeting. With Sudan being the ninth-largest global gold producer, Russia is accelerating its extraction and smuggling of Sudanese gold through the strengthening of relations between a private military company that does the Russian state’s “dirty work” and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia that dominates Sudan’s gold resources.
Russia’s interest in a Port Sudan naval base: Russia also seeks immense geostrategic gains via a naval base on Sudanese territory that would enable its presence on of the world’s most important shipping routes, which it could leverage for its international relations.
Drawbacks: However, the Port Sudan naval base that Sudan’s military appears open to displeases the UAE and Saudi Arabia, who the international isolated coup regime seek as a key ally. In addition, anti-Russian sentiments are growing in Sudan, and potentially within the security apparatus’ business networks that fear secondary sanctions for business with Russia.
Solutions: Analysts proposed that supporting Sudanese civil society in its democratic quest is the answer to spoiling the marriage of convenience between Russia and the Sudanese military.

Russia’s interests in Sudan: Gold

The first Russian interest in Sudan that this briefing will explore is Russia’s aims to increase its supply of Sudanese gold. After its invasion of Ukraine triggered international sanctions that means that Russia is increasingly cut off from foreign currency and financial systems, gold laundering helps Russia generate profits and move finances across borders because gold can be physically moved across the world outside of digital financial networks, including SWIFT financial messaging, making it harder to regulate and track (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 7 April).

Thus, not only can gold fund Russian military operations, but it can also be pegged to, and increase the value of, Russian currency that steeply plummeted due to Ukraine-related sanctions. To meet its interests in Sudanese gold, ties are deepening between the Wagner Group, “a shadowy private military company close to the [Russian regime]”, and Rapid Support Forces (militia) – with both parties involved in extracting and smuggling Sudanese gold. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia has accelerated its extraction of Sudanese gold.

Why does Russia want Sudanese gold?

As part of efforts to ward off the possibility of increased sanctions related to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia smuggled hundreds of tonnes of illicit gold from Sudan over the last few years. While official statistics suggest that Sudan exports hardly any gold to Russia, an executive of one of the largest Sudanese gold companies told The Telegraph (3 March) that Russia is the largest foreign player in the country’s huge mining sector. A key player in Russia’s plundering of Sudanese gold are the Wagner Group – “a shadowy private military company close to the Kremlin” and Sudan’s military regime (Al-Monitor, 13 April).

Closer ties between the Wagner Group and the Sudanese military

Following the 25 October 2021 military coup in Sudan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered international isolation for both states, ties have been expanded between the coup regime and the Wagner Group, with researcher Raphael Parens arguing that Wagner does the “dirty work” for the Russian state in Africa. Wagner’s involvement in Sudan reportedly started back in 2017, when M-Invest, a Russia-based entity considered to be a cover for Wagner, was given gold-mining exploration contracts in Sudan by ex-dictator Omar al-Bashir (Al-Monitor, 13 April).

Dozens of miners, executives, engineers, consultants and analysts in Sudan interviewed by Bloomberg (April 30) said that Wagner’s relationship with al-Bashir’s regime helped Meroe Gold, a company that the US Treasury Department says is connected to Wagner, secure an operating permit and access to cheap, semi-processed gold ore extracted by small-scale operators. Before al-Bashir was ousted in a palace coup, the Sudanese military regime’s relationship with Russia subsequently evolved into Wagner providing political and military assistance for suppressing revolution that toppled al-Bashir and launching social media disinformation campaigns (Al-Monitor, 13 April).

Wagner has also forged close ties with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander-in-chief Himedti, who is also the vice-chairman of the ruling military-led Sovereign Council in Sudan, with both parties involved in extracting and smuggling Sudanese gold, which is increasingly important to Russia as it seeks to stock gold reserves in its Central Bank to mitigate Ukraine-related sanctions.

Russia steps up its extraction of Sudanese gold after Ukraine invasion

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian companies in Sudan have intensified their exploration of Sudan’s lucrative mineral assets including gold. Commercial Registry documents seen by Bloomberg (April 30) provided the first evidence that the gold mining compound in Atbara in the River Nile state is owned by Meroe Gold, with anonymous US and UK officials saying that Meroe had intensified work at the project site since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In addition to access to lucrative mineral deposits, Meroe has licenses to operate in Sudanese industries ranging from transport and agriculture to plastics, Bloomberg revealed.

Alongside its interests in Sudanese gold, Russia is also keen to build a naval base in Port Sudan, and their ties with Himedti form a key part of achieving that goal.

Russia’s interests in Sudan: a naval base in Port Sudan

The second Russian in interest in Sudan that this briefing explores is Russia’s aims to build a naval base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The Port Sudan naval base holds immense geostrategic importance, as it would facilitate a Russian presence on of the world’s most important and active shipping lanes. Key to achieving this goal is Russia’s deepening ties with RSF commander-in-chief Himedti, a partner for Russia in its first interest – stockpiling Sudanese gold.

Why is a naval base in Port Sudan important to Russia?

Robert Rotberg, the founding director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s program on intrastate conflict, emphasised the geostrategic importance of a naval base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea to Russia, stating that it is “one of the globe’s most active shipping corridors [which] would give Russia agency for the first time below the southern entrance to the Suez Canal and halfway to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean” (Globe and Mail, 19 April).

Thus, Rotberg argues, attempts from western diplomats to prevent Russia’s “encroachment” upon important global shipping lanes – “especially in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine” - are contingent upon the personal ambitions and enrichment plans of Russian president Vladimir Putin and Himedti.

The importance of Himedti

Following Himedti’s visit to Moscow on the day of Russia’s attack of Ukraine, Theodore Murphy, Africa director at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) said that the RSF commander-in-chief and vice-chairman of Sudan’s military-led ruling Sovereign Council "has been courting the Russians most aggressively and they have been responding very positively” (DW, 21 April). Given Russia and Himedti’s mutual interests in plundering Sudanese gold, Himedti is alleged to have raised the possibility of allowing Russia to establish a naval base in Port Sudan (Al-Monitor, 13 April).

Drawbacks for the military in strengthening its Russian ties

Nonetheless, the deepening of ties between Russia and Sudan’s military apparatus has its drawbacks. Firstly, the prospect of a naval base in Port Sudan is likely to alienate the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with the former reportedly already not supportive of the rehabilitation of Islamists within Sudan’s domestic polity. Secondly, anti-Russian sentiments in Sudan may rise amid food insecurity and public exposure of Russian plundering of Sudanese gold. The growing relationship between Russia and the coup regime may also cause internal friction within the latter’s security apparatus.

Alienating the UAE and Saudi Arabia

There are diplomatic drawbacks for Sudan’s coup regime should it allow Russia to build the Port Sudan naval base. The strengthening of its alliance with Russia would come at the expense of its relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia - who the coup regime views as an economic lifeline. The UAE is already not supportive of the rehabilitation of Islamists by Lt. Gen. Abdulfattah al-Burhan, the chairman of the military-led Sovereign Council, in his attempts to build a civilian base to administer and legitimise his coup regime. The Emiratis, who are known to be hostile to Islamists in the region, are said to be unconvinced that Islamists would limit themselves to civic duties. Furthermore, the coup regime can intensify the ire of the Gulf powers if it allows a Russian naval base at Port Sudan, just across the narrow Red Sea from Jeddah in Saudi Arabia – which is argued to be red-line for the Gulf powers, even as they resist pressure from the US president Joe Biden administration to cut ties with Russia (Africa Confidential, 12 May).

Alienating the Sudanese public and security sector business interests

In addition, Samuel Ramani, a Politics tutor at the University of Oxford, argues that economic factors could restrict the scope of Russia-Sudan cooperation.

Firstly, anti-Russian sentiments in Sudan may rise due to food insecurity exacerbated by poor harvests and one-third of Sudanese wheat imports coming from Russia and Ukraine. Secondly, the public exposure of sanctioned Russia’s reliance on illicit economic practices, such as the smuggling of gold from Sudan, “has further eroded Moscow’s reputation in Sudan”. Ramani also notes that up to 250 Sudanese military-controlled companies that have dealings with Russia could face secondary sanctions (Middle East Institute, 25 April), which means that the deepening of relations between the Kremlin and the coup regime may trigger internal friction within Sudan’s security apparatus.

Solution: Support Sudan’s democracy movement

Proposed solutions for restricting growing relations between Sudan and Russia revolve around supporting and empowering the pro-democracy movement.

Ramani notes that Russia is unlikely to abandon or downsize its ambitions in Sudan as the Ukraine war drags on leaving its long-term influence contingent upon “opportunistic aspiring autocrats”. Thus, Ramani argues, “Moscow would lose out if [Sudan] takes a definitive step toward democracy” (Middle East Institute, 25 April).

Similarly, the ECFR’s Theodore Murphy, after raising the prospect of Al-Burhan openness to working with the Kremlin amid fears of “being outflanked” by his deputy-cum-rival Himedti, argued that civil society is the only "true protection against Russian influence in Sudan, because their ideology is completely opposed to any kind of role for Russia” (DW, 21 April).