Summary

The UN’s political mission in Sudan – UNITAMS - aims to resolve Sudan’s political stalemate by facilitating between the civilian pro-democracy movement and the military junta that staged the coup on 25 October 2021. However, this briefing reports how the UN is attracting the ire of both parties.

On one hand, the military coup regime has threatened to expel Volker Perthes, the UN’s envoy to Sudan, and accused him of trying to destroy Sudan and fight Islam after Perthes submitted a critical report to the UN Security Council.

On the other hand, the UN also faces sharp criticism from Sudan’s pro-democracy movement, with widespread perceptions in Sudan that it is legitimising the coup and favouring the military junta. Criticisms levelled at UNITAMS by analysts include an inability to understand or grasp Sudan’s political and economic issues, with UN officials in Sudan also accused of career politicking.

Furthermore, the launch of a civilian-military dialogue jointly promoted by UNITAMS, the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority in Development (IGAD) – hereby referred to as the UN-AU-IGAD tripartite mechanism – is argued to favour the coup regime and lacks credibility among the Sudanese revolutionary movement.

Nonetheless, solutions for the UN and western diplomats include: investing in mediation pathways that facilitate inclusive participation in the political process, alongside targeting the financial interests of military leaders as an alternative to mediation.

The UN vs. the Sudanese military

Abdulfattah al-Burhan, the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese army and the chairman of the military-led ruling Sovereign Council, threatened to expel from Sudan Volker Perthes, the head of the UN Integrated Transitional Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that is attempting to mediate a return to Sudan’s democratic transition.
The coup regime took issue with Perthes’ report to the UN Security Council – particularly the labelling of the 25 October 2021 military takeover a “coup” and allegations that 13 cases of rape were committed by Sudanese security forces suppressing anti-coup protests. With regards to the latter claim, the coup regime charged Sulaima Ishaq, the director of the Combating Violence Against Women Unit at Sudan’s Ministry of Social Development, with ‘Offences Against the State’ for allegedly leaking information to Perthes.
The army’s official newspaper then launched a scathing attack on Perthes, accusing him of seeking to destroy Sudan and fight Islam in collaboration with western powers and “their leftist [pro-democracy] agents”.

Al-Burhan threatens to expel UN special envoy

Al-Burhan threatened to expel Perthes from Sudan, accusing him of “flagrant interference” and “exceed the [UNITAMS] mandate” (Multiple sources, 2 April), after Perthes warned that Sudan is heading for “an economic and security collapse” unless it addresses the political paralysis following the October 2021 military coup and moves toward resuming a civilian-led transition. In a report submitted to the UN Security Council, Perthes asserted that the military’s “violent repression” of protests against the coup is continuing and the absence of a political agreement on returning to a transitional path has already led to a deteriorating economic, humanitarian and security situation in Sudan (AP, 29 March).

The coup regime’s issue with the UN report

In response to Perthes’ report, the Sudanese foreign ministry submitted a briefing to the UN Security Council that accused Perthes of focusing on political issues instead of peace implementation and elections (Multiple sources, 2 April). The foreign ministry said that that the methodology of Perthes’ report did not reflect a spirit of cooperation and transparency, as he described the aftermath of the October 2021 coup as a “setback” and focused on human rights violations, rule of law and gender issues (Sudan Tribune, 7 April). However, Saleh Mahmoud, a prominent human rights defender told Radio Dabanga (2 April) that the foreign ministry “has no right to argue that [UNITAMS] is not mandated to talk about the widespread and systematic violations” when Sudanese authorities are responsible for such violations.

In addition, the foreign ministry claimed that Perthes’ use of the word “coup” was “contrary to the truth,” suggesting the term “corrective measures”, alongside criticising Perthes’ report for stating that 13 cases of rape were recorded by the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors whereas the Office of the Public Prosecutor has verified only two cases (Sudan Tribune, 7 April).

Indeed, the coup regime has taken special offence to claims of sexual violence being used by its security forces in its suppression of anti-coup protests. A complaint was filed against Sulaima Ishaq, the director of the Combating Violence Against Women Unit (CVAW), an agency of the Ministry of Social Development, in relation to the UN report. Ishaq said the case was likely lodged by the Sovereign Council or the General Intelligence Service (GIS), and that she is charged with ‘Offences Against The State’ under the Criminal Act upon the accusation of leaking information to Perthes (Multiple sources, 8 April). It is worth noting that Ishaq told the Guardian (16 March) that sexual assault is a “tactic” used by security forces to suppress protests, alleging that “the security apparatus use rape as part of their work”.

Army newspaper fiercely attacks Perthes

The Sudanese military then intensified their fierce criticisms of Perthes and the UN via an article written by Ibrahim al-Houri, the editor-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces newspaper. In a one-page editorial that was the first of its kind since the collapse of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, Al-Houri launched a scathing attack on western countries, accusing them of seeking to destroy Sudan and fight Islam, in call for “jihad” against western powers and “their leftist agents of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Resistance Committee”. Conspiracy theories spouted by al-Houri included that: Perthes is working to spread terrorism in Sudan, and that former civilian Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok is “British agent” who aimed to dismantle Sudan in collaboration with a “European-American Zionist Masonic lobby” in cooperation with the UN World Food Programme’s David Beasley (Sudan Tribune, 18 April). Al-Houri also shared a similar article by Sudanese journalist Ali Mansour Hasaballa who alleged that US and UK diplomats in Sudan, alongside pro-democracy figures in the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition (FFC), are interior agents working to break down Sudan (Multiple sources, 19 April).

The UN vs. the Sudanese revolution

The UN is also attracting the ire of the Sudanese revolutionary movement, with accusations that it is failing to understand Sudan’s economic or political complexities, and allegations that UN officials in Sudan serve their careers at the expense of helping Sudanese people.

UN accused of ignorance on Sudan’s economic problems

While UNITAMS report attracted the fierce ire of the military, it has also faced criticism from the revolutionary movement within Sudan. For example, Muzan Alneel, the co-founder of the ISTiNAD think-tank, argued that political charters published by the Resistance Committees have “an incomparably higher chance of bringing stable peace” than UNITAMS’ report that “had largely no impact on public discourses”. Alneel added that the UNITMAS report “confirmed the disconnect of the international community and its unwillingness to seriously address” Sudan’s political landscape as it offered “superficial and internationally-centred” understanding of Sudan’s economy that neglects how pre-coup IMF-related austerity measures already worsened public economic plight (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 26 April).

Alneel has previously argued the case for the UN’s ignorance on Sudan’s economic issues in an article written for Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (25 March), which noted that while Sudanese civil society acknowledges the curse of the rentier economy as the “root causes” of Sudan’s instability, it is not discussed in UN consultations.

Inability to grasp Sudan’s political complexity

Similarly, Kholood Khair, the founding manager of Confluence Advisory think-tank, argued that UNITAMS has not grasped Sudan’s political complexity and power dynamics, citing the failure to consult frequently neglected Sudanese stakeholders or engage with the resistance committees – with latter stated to demonstrate the UN’s “inability” to recognise Sudan’s political shift to broad-based, coalition-led political change (Arab Center DC, 17 June A).

UN employees in Sudan accused of career politicking

Justin Lynch, who experienced Sudan’s transition as a midlevel UN official, claims that pro-democracy institutions missed an opportunity to prevent the coup during the transitional period as embassies that didn’t know how to spend the money they had been allocated,” ended up giving it to UN agencies in Sudan “even though they knew it would be ineffective”. Lynch added that he felt that “the goal of the UN and some NGOs was to grab more money rather than actually help people,” citing a UN official opposed to funding for peacekeepers amid worsening crisis in Darfur, which “spoke to a system that seemed to value milking money at all costs and career politicking rather than actually helping Sudanese” (Foreign Policy, 3 May).

Criticisms of the tripartite mechanism

The latest attempt to resolve Sudan’s political impasse comes in the form of a civilian-military dialogue jointly promoted by UNITAMS, the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority in Development (IGAD) - an eight-national East African regional group (AP, 29 March).

For the purposes of clarity, the initiative will hereby be referred to as the UN-AU-IGAD tripartite mechanism.

The mechanism faces several criticisms, including:

The dominance of the AU is considered to favour the coup regime.
The UN-AU-IGAD has failed to generate a buy-in from the major Sudanese revolutionary groups, who consider the talks as a legitimisation of the coup.
Sudanese public perceptions suggest that the tripartite mechanism supports the military.

The African Union’s “hijacking” of the UNITAMS process

The UN, African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority in Development (IGAD) – an eight-national East African regional group - agreed to join efforts to facilitate Sudanese-led political talks (AP, 29 March). However, rivalries between the UN on one hand, and the AU and IGAD on the other, are hindering the mediation process. Some in Sudan blame the UN’s secretary-general, Antonio Guterres for being too weak or unwilling to contradict the AU (Africa Confidential, 12 May), which has been accused of hijacking the UN process in the interests of allegedly anti-democratic AU leaders.

Following the publishing of Perthes report – the second step in his mediation was stopped by AU Commission chair Moussa Faki, who appealed to UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, to link the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU to the process, with Faki’s chief of staff Mohamed el-Hacen Labatt publically criticising the UN and saying the AU should take the lead in the political mission (Africa Confidential, 12 May).

Indeed, the incorporation of the AU at the behest of a Sudanese military junta wary of western interference under the guise of “African solutions to African problems” reflects autocrats co-opting anti-colonial refrains when pressured, argues Khlood Khair, the founding manager of Confluence Advisory think-tank (Arab Center DC, 17 June A).

As a result, analyst Khalid Mukhtar Salim argues that the AU “hijacked” the UN’s political process for Sudan’s transition to turn it into “a toothless local process with cosmetic engagement”, citing the removal of Sudan’s portfolio from the African Union Peace and Security Council which includes African leaders with “great” experience of pro-democracy interventions. Salim also suggests that a Sudanese military regime serves the presidential ambitions of Moussa Faki, the chair of the AU Commission and seasoned Chadian politician, who “knows perfectly well that since Chad’s independence, no president has come to power without Khartoum’s support,” with a democratic civilian Sudan is unlikely to interfere in neighbouring affairs. Furthermore, Labatt is “not pro-democracy,” given his experience of being rewarded with ministerial positions for providing civilian backing for coup regimes in Mauritania (Sudan Tribune, 22 April).

“Disruptive” mediation process

Furthermore, the UN-AU-IGAD tripartite mechanism reflects a risk that was raised in African Arguments (1 November 2021) only six days after the coup, in which an anonymous author warned that the proliferation of “self-interested parties rushing in” to mediate a civilian-military agreement “causes confusion”, wastes time, reduces the likelihood potential agreement and may culminate in a “flawed agreement” that “papers over the same unresolved issues: power-sharing, justice and corruption”.

Lack of credibility among Sudanese revolutionaries

The UN-AU-IGAD promotion of civilian-military dialogue is considered a legitimisation of the coup (Arab Center DC, 17 June A) and has thus far been boycotted by key pro-democracy groups within Sudan – the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), resistance committees and Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) (Al-Monitor, 16 June).

"Most people, especially activists, are quite suspicious of these [dialogue] claims, particularly because there is a perception that the international community seems to be insisting on some kind of negotiated settlement with those who conducted the coup," Mohammed Elnaiem, a Sudanese activist based in London, told DW (8 June).

In addition, Mohamed Yousif Almustafa, a Sudanese activist in Khartoum, said he does not regard a tripartite dialogue as a realistic option. “We cannot consider any talks with al-Burhan under the current circumstances because he is trying to ensure he remains in the driving seat of the government… the ultimate objective of any dialogue with the military is to reproduce the partnership with them, to guarantee their immunity from being accountable for the crimes they have committed”,: Almustafa added (DW, 8 June).

Similarly, Justin Lynch notes the suspicions of Sudanese activists that the talks will potentially entrench military rule by providing cosmetic civilian representation in government that would have even less power than ever before (African Arguments, 13 June). Moreover, the UN-AU-IGAD mechanism is perceived to be on the side of counter-revolutionary forces.

Perception as pro-coup

With the FFC critical of the UN-AU-IGAD mechanism for being dominated by pro-military groups and Islamists from the orbit of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, Khalid Mukhtar said the inclusion of such counter-revolutionary forces was “a mistake that turned the [UNITAMS] process upside down and made it similar to al-Bashir’s national dialogues”, adding that the process has deviated from its objective (Al-Monitor, 16 June).

Furthermore, Kholood Khair noted perceptions that the UN-AU-IGAD process supports the generals, given its treatment of concerns regarding justice and accountability for ongoing violence against peaceful protesters as a “backdrop to the process, rather than central to it” (Arab Center DC, 17 June A).

Solutions

Solutions proposed for resolving the political impasse in Sudan following the coup have been directed at the international community. Kholood Khair calls for the UN-AU-IGAD tripartite mechanism to invest in ways of being more inclusive of a broad range of Sudanese, whereas Justin Lynch identified alternatives to mediation for western diplomats.

Develop new mediation pathways

Kholood Khair, the founding manager of Confluence Advisory, calls for the UNITMAS, AU and IGAD tripartite mechanism to invest in developing new, more relevant mediation pathways that complement Sudan’s rich pro-democracy movement in order to prevent itself from becoming irrelevant.

Alongside suggesting closer engagement with the concerns of the resistance committees, the Sudanese Professionals Association, and the families of martyrs, Khair also calls for better and more targeted outreach, particularly to women, young people, and internally displaced persons “who are entirely left out of the process”.

Khair adds that building credibility with a broad range of Sudanese would both dispel suspicions around international actors’ motivations as well as counter the pre-existing center-periphery inequity and privileging of elite narratives in Sudan (Arab Centre DC, 17 June B).

An alternative to mediation

Arguing that the reversal of the coup through mediation is “implausible,” Justin Lynch proposed alternatives for western diplomats, starting with understanding how they falls for the “traps” of the Sudan’s military, including: siphoning aid to entrench their political interests, superficial changes, cowing diplomats with threats of expulsion to prevent human rights investigations and offering “dubious” terrorism and migration intelligence.

Instead, Lynch calls for western diplomats to undermine Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander and the deputy-chairman of the ruling military-led Sovereign Council Himedti by “changing the behaviour of their diplomatic colleagues from their own nations working in the Gulf” by pressuring Gulf institutions that facilitate Himedti’s finances and use his forces, alongside reforming the export process of Sudan’s gold, and economic empowerment across Darfur (African Arguments, 13 June).