Sudan war report (1-7 July)
Executive summary
· 1. Sennar: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advances in the strategically vital state of Sennar has vital ramifications, given the importance of the state to Sudan’s agriculture and food security. In addition, the militia’s positions closer to the South Sudan border potentially opens up new supply routes and raises concerns of its expansion towards the eastern state of al-Gadarif.
· 2. West Kordofan: The militia further strengthened its position across the Sudan-South Sudan border by controlling Al-Meiram, a city near its border.
· 3. Khartoum: The partial destruction of al-Halfaya bridge may potentially benefit the RSF, although the army’s recapture of al-Doha neighhbourhood paves the way for further army advances in Omdurman.
· 4. Al-Fashir: The RSF’s ongoing siege of Al-Fashir continues to be marked by the targeting hospitals and civilian infrastructure, with drones and artillery used against civilians, including a mosque-cum-kitchen and a market.
· 5. Politics: Egyptian attempts to reconcile rival political factions ended with renewed accusations that the Taqadum coalition is the political wing of the RSF after its statement failed to explicitly condemn the militia.
1. Sennar
· The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advances in Sennar state, a strategically vital area in Sudan, has significant repercussions.
· Firstly, Sennar crucial for agriculture, food security and electricity production.
· Secondly, the capture of Sinjah and Al-Dinder positions the RSF closer to the border with South Sudan, potentially opening up new supply routes for the militia alongside raising concerns of its expansion towards Al-Gadarif state in eastern Sudan.
· Moreover, the RSF’s entry into Sennar has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, displacing hundreds of thousands as well as increasing the risk of famine.
The importance of Sennar state
The RSF militia began a campaign on 24 June to seize the city of Sennar, but quickly turned to the smaller towns of Sinjah and Al-Dinder (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).
The RSF’s entry into Sennar state could mark a turning point in Sudan’s war given the strategic importance of Sennar in terms of natural resources, food security, borders and humanitarian operations (Mada Masr, 5 July).
· The RSF’s attack on Sennar jeopardises the summer agricultural season, which heightens the risk of famine in central and western Sudan, especially as the rainy season has cut off roads.
· After neighbouring Al-Jazira state, Sennar is the second most important agricultural state in Sudan as it is a key producer of millet, cotton and gum arabic. The production of around 10,000 tons of raw gum arabic in Sennar last year offset the loss of South Darfur - one of the country’s largest producers of gum arabic — to the RSF in November 2023.
· The state also hosts the Sennar Dam for hydroelectric power generation which irrigates the Jazeera Scheme — the largest irrigation project globally and one of Africa’s largest agricultural projects. Cotton has also been an economic cornerstone in the scheme and similar projects in Sennar.
· In addition to food security, grain mills and electricity production, Sennar is strategically crucial for linking the eastern and western states after the capture of Al-Jazeera’s capital Wad Madani fell to the RSF last year.
· Sennar connects the Gadarif, White Nile, and North Kordofan states and borders South Sudan.
· Sennar has also become a refuge for around 80,000 displaced people fleeing Al-Jazeera State.
Sinjah
Following their entry into Sennar’s state capital last week, the RSF solidified their control over Sinjah. Sudan Tribune’s (1 July) sources said the RSF’s control now extends over the entire city of Sinjah, including the headquarters of the Sudanese army’s 65th Brigade, which was abandoned by the armed forces who retreated to the city of Sennar city. Eyewitnesses reported that the RSF also secured the entrance to the Blue Nile Bridge - a crucial link between Sinjah and areas east of Sennar – in a move that suggested a potential eastward expansion towards Al-Dinder, a locality bordering the eastern Al-Gadarif state.
Importance of Sinjah
In the grand scheme of the war, the RSF’s advances in Sinjah are significant in how they may force the army to change tactics given the strategic benefits gained for the RSF.
A former Sudanese military source told Mada Masr (5 July) that the army’s plans may need revision if the RSF continues to shift battles from Al-Jazira to Sennar. Moreover, according to a source in the General Intelligence Service, shifting military operations to Sennar means that the RSF is nearing the border with South Sudan, which could facilitate the delivery of military supplies to the RSF through smuggling routes, thereby boosting the militia’s capabilities in Al-Jazirah and Sennar.
Additionally, there is a heightened risk of military operations extending to the strategically important Al-Gadarif State. To counter this, the military must regain the initiative and strike deep into the RSF’s positions in Al-Jazirah and Khartoum, the source added.
Dinder
The risk of the RSF striking Al-Gadarif state increased after the militia took control of Al-Dinder – a town located about 25 kilometres east of Sinjah and a strategic location linking Sennar and the Blue Nile with the region of eastern Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 5 July).
The army had initially recaptured Al-Dinder after the RSF seized the town and engaged in widespread violations and looting, with video clips showing the destruction inflicted by the RSF on civilian property (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).
However, the RSF announced that it regained control of Al-Dinder for the second time in less than a week. The militia showed footage of its forces on Al-Dinder Bridge leading to Sennar and Al-Gadarif, where the army and allies are stationed (Sudan Tribune, 5 July).
Displacement
The RSF’s entry to Sennar state has led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands, further hindering an already challenging humanitarian situation. It was initially reported that over 55,400 fled Sinjah (Sudan Tribune, 1 July) upon the RSF’s entry, with reports of escalating costs for those attempting to flee. The UN subsequently reported that more than 136,000 people fled Sennar state after the RSF launched their attack (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).
However, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are facing several challenges.
· State governments had begun to reopen schools and relocate the IDPs from existing shelters (Sudan Tribune, 1 July).
· Sennar residents who fled to neighbouring Al-Gadarif state ended up stranded in the main market without tents and blankets amid downpours of heavy rain after schools that had served as displacement centres were emptied by the government (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).
· Disruption to communication networks is impeding the collection of accurate information (Sudan Tribune, 1 July).
· Amid a mass exodus of civilians, mainly towards neighbouring Al-Gadarif and the Blue Nile states, food aid or shelter is also difficult to find (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).
· Villages in Al-Gadarif, one of several possible targets for the RSF campaign, had already witnessed people fleeing (Sudan Tribune, 4 July).
· The rough terrain, worsened by the onset of the rainy season causing streams and valleys to overflow, has made it a significant challenge to leave Sennar (Mada Masr, 5 July).
· Around 25, most of them women and children, died in a sinking boat as they sought to cross the Blue Nile river in attempts to flee the RSF’s advance in Sennar (AFP, 4 July).
2. West Kordofan
· The RSF has strengthened its position across the Sudan-South Sudan border by taking control of a city close to it.
Under two weeks after the RSF took control of state capital al-Fula, the militia captured Al-Meiram – a city around 60km from South Sudan border, near the disputed Abyei area, reportedly without a fight.
According to Radio Dabanga’s local sources (5 July), the army was allowed a safe exit towards South Sudan following an agreement mediated by community leaders. Army supporters argue that a significant shortage of supplies and ammunition made defending the city challenging, with aviation support arriving too late.
Nonetheless, the fall of Al-Meiram both isolates the 22nd Division in Babanousa falling the fall of four brigades and three garrisons in West Kordofan. In addition, the RSF now controls a large part of the Sudan-South Sudan border, stretching from the disputed Abyei region to the borders of East, South, Central, and West Darfur, which they entirely control.
3. Khartoum
· In the Battle for Khartoum, the partial destruction of Halfaya Bridge over the Nile River is argued to benefit the RSF by hindering army surprise attacks.
· However, the army’s recapture of al-Doha neighbourhood in Omdurman weakens the RSF's buffer zone and potentially paves the way for further army gains in the city.
Halfaya Bridge
The Sudanese army accused the RSF of partially destroying the Halfaya Bridge over the Nile River (Sudan Tribune, 1 July), with the RSF returning the accusations (Mada Masr, 5 July).
The bridge, situated north of the Sudanese capital, connects Khartoum Bahri to the east with Omdurman to the west. It was controlled by the RSF from the east and the army from the west (Sudan Tribune, 1 July).
The bridge remains the last one connecting Bahri to Omdurman following the destruction of Shambat Bridge in November 2023 (Mada Masr, 5 July). Bridges in Khartoum state are strategically important for both sides in the conflict, as they are used to deliver logistical supplies and support during battle (Sudan Tribune, 1 July).
A military source told Mada Masr (5 July) that the RSF benefitted from the bridge’s destruction as it partially neutralises the military’s ability to launch surprise attacks from positions in Wadi Sidna and Omdurman’s outskirts, especially since significant military forces withdrew to participate in Sinjah.
Omdurman
In Omdurman, the army continued to gain ground on the militia after regaining control of al-Doha neighbourhood, west of the city. Al-Doha represented a buffer zone for the RSF, protecting west Omdurman areas under the militia’s control such as Dar al-Salam, Ombada, and the Libya and Kandahar markets (Sudan Tribune, 2 July).
Mada Masr’s (5 July) military sources say the capture of al-Doha pave the way for the army to reclaim Ombada, with the neighbourhood holding significant importance in Omdurman’s urban warfare, primarily due to its proximity to the strategic al-Arda street, which stretches from the east to the west of the city, and the Engineers Corps camp. Moreover, al-Doha served as a headquarters and residence for many influential RSF leaders in Omdurman.
After the army regained the radio and TV headquarters in old Omdurman in March, it made further progress by regaining parts Ombada. Nonetheless, Salha suburb south of Omdurman remains under RSF control (Sudan Tribune, 2 July).
4. Al-Fashir
· In the RSF’s ongoing siege of Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur state, the militia continued its pattern of attacks on hospitals and medical facilities, in attempts to cripple the city’s health sector.
· The militia’s campaign targeting civilians and vital infrastructure also saw drone strikes and artillery shelling on a mosque hosting a volunteer kitchen and a crowded market.
RSF mosque attack (Sudan Tribune, 1 July)
Eight people including women and children were killed and 18 others were injured after an RSF drone attacked a mosque housing a volunteer kitchen providing aid to IDPs, in the latest of the RSF’s daily artillery shelling and drone strikes on al-Fashir.
Another RSF hospital attack (Sudan Tribune, 2 July)
In the militia’s continued targeting of al-Fashir’s health facilities, the militia shelled two hospitals in the ninth such attack since the siege began on 10 May.
Darfur governor Minni Minawi said the RSF destroyed a private hospital in Al-Fashir’s Grand Market, meaning they targeted all hospitals in the area with high-precision cannons reportedly brought from the UAE. Minnawi added that the RSF bombed Jabal Marra hospital less than forty minutes later.
The RSF’s targeting of medical facilities in Al-Fashir is considered an attempt to cripple the health sector, with dialysis centre, South Hospital, the Saudi Hospital, and several private medical centres already destroyed.
Women’s clinic destroyed (Sudan Tribune, 3 July)
An RSF attack then destroyed a clinic belonging to the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), a global healthcare provider and a leading advocate of sexual and reproductive health and rights. Several IPPF staff and volunteers were killed or injured.
The destruction of the clinic further restricts access to lifesaving sexual and reproductive healthcare in Darfur for women and girls, with reports showing how rape victims and survivors are struggling to obtain contraception, abortion medication and post-exposure anti-viral medications. The RSF has also been kidnapping the clinic’s patients, and their whereabouts are unknown.
Crowded market attacked (Sudan Tribune, 3 July)
Fifteen were killed and 29 others injured in a heavy artillery attack by the RSF on a crowded market in Al-Fashir, the latest in a wave of the militia’s relentless attacks that have wreaked havoc on Al-Fashir’s infrastructure, destroying homes, medical facilities, and essential civilian services.
5. Politics
· Egypt hosted a conference aiming to reconcile the Democratic Bloc and the Taqadum coalition.
· The pro-army Democratic Bloc renewed accusations that Taqadum sides with the RSF.
· A joint statement concluding the conference was agreed upon, but three Democratic Bloc leaders refused to sign it as it failed to explicitly condemn the RSF.
Cairo talks
Rival Sudanese political factions – the Democratic Bloc and the Taqqadum faction - formally attended reconciliation talks in Cairo, Egypt (Reuters, 6 June). The Egyptian government organised the conference aiming at uniting Sudanese political forces and garnering support for resolving the conflict, but disagreements between them overshadowed the proceedings (Sudan Tribune, 6 June).
During the conference, the Democratic Bloc refused to hold joint sessions with Taqaddum, which it accuses of siding with the RSF (Reuters, 6 June). Taqaddum is led by UAE-based former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok who has been accused of cosying up to the RSF “which in turn is accused of atrocities including crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing”. The Democratic Bloc demands Taqqadum “condemn the RSF's atrocities and dissolve their partnership with the militia” (AFP, 6 June).
Taqadum statement fails to condemn the RSF
While the two groups agreed to write a shared statement calling for an end to the war, it was not signed by three Democratic Bloc leaders with forces fighting alongside the army (Reuters, 6 June). Darfur governor Minni Minnawi, finance minister Jibril Ibrahim and deputy sovereign council chairman Malik Agar refused to sign the statement due to its lack of explicit condemnation of the RSF (Sudan Tribune, 6 June).
The statement was confined to condemning “all violations committed in the war” without explicitly mentioning the RSF which are accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes, killings of civilians, rape, and looting. Minnawi said that the statement fails to address the suffering of RSF victims. Ga’afar Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, a leader of the Democratic Unionist Party and chairman of Democratic Bloc signed the statement, but said the text failed to explicitly address his condemnation of RSF attacks on Sinjah, cities sheltering IDPs, and the atrocities committed in Darfur (Sudan Tribune, 6 June).
Taqadum spokesperson Bakri al-Jak denied accusations that the coalition is the RSF’s political wing by saying that it condemns atrocities committed by both sides (AFP, 6 June).