Summary

A round-up of key Sudan news, analysis and proposed solution published from 31 May to 6 June 2024.

· 1. War: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia has been accused of genocide in Wad Al-Noura village in Al-Jazira State and Al-Fashir in Darfur, as the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) offensives continue to surge.

· 2. Humanitarian: The UN warned that Sudan is at imminent risk of famine, while the number of displaced threatens to exceed 10 million amid ongoing displacement risks.

· 3. Politics: Former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok was selected to be the leader of the Taqaddum coalition.

· 4. Diplomacy: The SAF-led government agrees to give Russia a naval base on the Red Sea in exchange for weapons, to the concern of the west and Saudi Arabia.

· 6. Analysis: Analysts questioned the impact of Sudan’s deal with Russia, Taqaddum’s neutrality and the US’ Sudan policy.

· 7. Solutions: To prevent an RSF genocide in Al-Fashir, proposed solutions revolved around calls for a UN-authorised peacekeeping mission and US pressure on the UAE to stop supporting the RSF.

War

· At least 150 are feared dead following what has been described as an RSF genocide in Wad-Noura village in Al-Jazira state.

· The RSF cut off the water supply in Al-Fashir, and killed its fleeing residents on an ethnic basis, amid concerns that the militia will complete their genocidal project in Darfur should Al-Fashir fall to it.

· The army has gained ground in Bahri, Khartoum North and repelled RSF attacks in Babanusa, West Kordofan as increased foreign supplies aid offensive operations.

Wad al-Noura, Al-Jazira: RSF genocide

Wad Madani Resistance Committee announced that Wad Al-Noura village in Al-Jazira state “witnessed a genocide after the RSF attacked it twice”, using heavy artillery against civilians, looting, and driving women and children to seek refuge in the nearby town of Managil (Reuters, 6 June). The coordination of Khartoum Resistance Committees also labelled the massacre as a genocide and forced displacement of residents of Al-Jazira’s villages (Radio Dabanga, 6 June).

With militia opening fire on residents after they tried to stop the RSF from entering (Bloomberg, 6 June), at least 150 are feared dead following the massacre, although Hafiz Mohamad of Justice Africa Sudan said many more people are still missing but that it was "difficult to count all the dead" because "RSF elements are still around the area looting" (BBC, 6 June).

The RSF claimed it was targeting Islamist forces preparing to attack the militia Radio Dabanga, 6 June), but did not acknowledge any civilian casualties. The attack is the latest in a strong of dozens by the RSF on small villages across al-Jazira after it took control of the capital Wad Madani in December 2023 (Reuters, 6 June).

RSF abuses in Al-Jazira in 2024

Since taking control of the state, the RSF has been raiding villages, committing heinous crimes against unarmed residents, including killing, kidnapping, forced displacement, and looting of properties, including crops and household furniture. In addition, the RSF offers to recruit individuals from the villages in exchange for protection, with Al-Hasahisa Resistance committees saying the militia aims to “expand militarization until Al-Jazira’s communities are fully militarized” (Sudan Tribune, 5 June).

Al-Fashir, Darfur: RSF genocide

Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur, is under siege by the RSF, with David Simon, the director of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program, warning that the fall of the city to the militia would enable it to “complete their genocidal project” (Washington Post, 3 June). The RSF have reportedly cut off food supply lines, seized water resources, and control crop distribution, “all of which have placed those living inside the city in a dire humanitarian situation” (Mada Masr, 31 May).

RSF cuts off the water supply

As per Mada Masr (31 May), the most intense clashes took place in the Golo reservoir area, which supplies 20% of the city’s water needs. The leading RSF militant deployed to the area – Savanna – declared the capture of the reservoir and disruption of water supply.

The RSF captured the reservoir, a critical resource for an estimated 270,000 people (including over 130,000 children) on 26 May, but the army and allied groups managed to retake it the next day (Sudan Tribune, 2 June).

Adele Khodr, UNICEF Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, warned that damage or destruction of the reservoir would cut off families and children from safe water, increasing the risk of waterborne diseases in a region already ravaged by conflict. Children suffering from acute malnutrition and weakened immune systems would be particularly vulnerable, Khodr added (Sudan Tribune, 2 June).

RSF’s ethnic killings

The militia has also targeted southern Al-Fashir, including the only operational medical facility in the city. Mohamed Suleiman Hamed, a volunteer at the southern hospital, condemned the RSF’s targeting of civilian facilities, including hospitals and said “the army leadership and the joint forces do not target hospitals” (Sudan Tribune, 31 May).

The RSF’s genocides in Al-Gineina (West Darfur) and Nyala (South Darfur) makes Al-Fashir the last refuge the last refuge for Darfur’s non-Arab citizens (Washington Post, 3 June). However, further displacement is inevitable with ongoing attacks targeting civilians and the Abu Shouk camp for internally displaced persons “part of [RSF] tactics”. Nonetheless, “extreme” challenges accessing water and food supplies, mean that families face severe hurdles leaving Al-Fashir due to the RSF-imposed siege (Mada Masr, 31 May).

For example, the RSF allegedly executed nine people based on their ethnicity as they fled Al-Fashir, with a relative of the victims saying RSF militants accused them of supporting the joint force of armed movements battling the RSF. Indeed, the RSF are reportedly committing widespread abuses against fleeing civilians, including torture, murder, and detention under the pretense of supporting the armed movements, alongside extorting exorbitant fees from drivers transporting people (Sudan Tribune, 4 June).

Army goes on the offensive

Mada Masr’s (31 May) military sources said the Sudanese Air Force spearheaded an unprecedented surge in offensives in May 2024, with a field commander saying the military’s strategies shifted toward offensive operations and territorial expansion at the start of the year.

As per Mada Masr’s sources, the intensified airstrikes are a result of increased foreign military supplies, with the army’s logistical support centers bolstered through agreements with China, Russia and Iran. There is also a renewed focus on reviving Sudan’s domestic military industry.

Alongside intensified airstrikes in North Darfur, Al-Jazirah and the White Nile states, RSF positions were reportedly destroyed across Khartoum state including Baraha hospital in Bahri - “used by the RSF as a stronghold and field hospital”, with RSF supply locations in North Kordofan intercepted.

Bahri, Khartoum North: army gains ground on the RSF

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) crossed the Halfaya bridge connecting Omdurman and Bahri, after destroying RSF positions on the bridge’s eastern side and enabling the army’s entry into Bahri. Military sources indicated that the operation aimed to deliver critical supplies to forces stationed at the Signal Corps in Bahri, where the RSF controls most parts. The army simultaneously advanced into the Dardoog area of Bahri while warplanes bombarded RSF forces coming from Sharg al-Nile and Khartoum (Sudan Tribune, 31 May).

Babanusa, West Kordofan: army repels RSF attacks

SAF repelled waves of RSF attacks on the military’s 22nd infrastry division in Babanusa, West Kordofan, subsequently inflicting losses on the militia and forcing its retreat. Since January 2024, the RSF has been attempting to capture the division in Babanusa. However, the soldiers and mobilized civilians have managed to repel the repeated assaults and push back the attacking forces to more distant and less high-risk areas (Mada Masr, 31 May).

2. Humanitarian

· The UN warned that Sudan is at risk of famine.

· The number of displaced by Sudan’s war is close to exceeding 10 million, as displacement risks continue to intensify.

Famine warnings

In a joint statement, UN agencies said the people of Sudan are at imminent risk of famine, with around 18 million already acutely hungry, including 3.6 million children who are acutely malnourished (Reuters, 31 May).

The UN World Food Programme (WFP, 6 June) subsequently announced that it is scaling up its emergency food and nutrition assistance amid the looming threat of famine, with life-saving food and nutrition assistance to be provided to an additional 5 million people, thus doubling the number of people WFP had planned to support at the start of 2024. Communities in areas where fighting is ongoing are said to be “at a high-risk of slipping into famine-like conditions if they do not receive urgent and sustained support,” the WFP added.

Displacement

The number of internally displaced by conflict in Sudan is on the verge of exceeding 10 million, warn the International Organization for Migration (IOM). 9.9 million are displaced across Sudan, with 7.1 displaced since the war began.

Approximately 12 million have been forced to flee their homes, with 70% of the displaced population struggling to survive in famine-risk areas, while humanitarian access remains limited or non-existent. The approaching rainy season threatens to worsen the situation, potentially leading to climate-related disasters and disease outbreaks (Sudan Tribune, 6 June).

Ongoing displacement risks for those already displaced

Sudan Tribune (4 June) also reported on the plight of Sudanese who have been displaced several times during the war. Mohamed Kandasha, spokesperson for the South Belt Emergency Room, said the area – which has been controlled by the RSF since the onset of war - experienced a wave of displacement, but some residents returned after the RSF seized control of Al-Jazirah State.

However, soaring food prices alongside the deteriorating security and health situation over the past three months forced them to flee again, with the ongoing communication blackout in vast areas of Khartoum further exacerbating the residents’ plight amid severe difficulties in obtaining drinking water due to power outages and hospitals’ inability to treat chronic disease patients.

3. Politics

Taqadum’s founding conference

The founding conference of the Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadom) concluded with ex-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok confirmed as the coalition’s president. During the conference, some groups reportedly advocated forming a ‘shadow’ government in exile, while others reject this proposal. Participants agreed not to recognise the current de-facto government in Port Sudan, viewing it as “a war government promoting continued conflict” (Radio Dabanga, 31 May).

4. Diplomacy

· The SAF-led government’s turn to Russia and Iran for weapons raises Saudi and western concerns.

Sudan turns to Russia

Sudan’s deputy leader Malik Agar travelled to Russia for meetings with its president Vladimir Putin, after the army said it may get weapons in exchange for letting Russia establish a military fuelling station on the Red Sea coast (Bloomberg, 3 June). Sudan previously delayed implementing the agreement, but the external support for the RSF prompted the military-led government to reconsider its position (Sudan Tribune, 1 June).

Saudi and western concerns about Sudan turning to Russia

Saudi Arabia had pressed Sudan to not allow the establishment of a Russian base on the other side of the Red Sea, but it is believed that the inability or unwillingness of Washington and Riyadh to persuade their regional allies to cease support for the RSF drove the government to seek assistance from Iran and Russia to acquire necessary weapons (Sudan Tribune, 1 June).

According to Bloomberg (3 June), the move is likely to stoke Western concern about Russia’s growing African profile, alongside the Sudanese army’s revitalised ties with Iran, which has supplied armed drones that have helped the military regain control of much of Khartoum. “The army’s decision to look to Russia and Iran has happened after “a lack of support from other partners, including the West,” said the Institute for the Study of War.

Kabbashi visits Niger

The deputy commander-in-chief of the army, General Shamsaldin Kabbashi, embarked on official visits to Niger and Mali, accompanied by Defence Minister General Yassin Ibrahim. Sudan accuses the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of recruiting fighters from Arab tribes in Chad and Niger and Mali, and smuggling looted vehicles and weapons into these countries (Sudan Tribune, 4 June).

5. Analysis

· Analysts suggest that Russia’s supply of weapons to SAF are unlikely to have an impact.

· Taqadum’s discourses have led their neutrality to be questioned.

· Analysts criticised US policy on Sudan, with a focus on the impact of sanctions and the Jeddah peace talks.

· Analysts also highlighted the global risks of the international community’s neglect of Sudan.

Will the Russia deal have an impact?

Analysts are divided over the impact that Sudan’s weapons-for-base agreement with Russia will have. The ISW said such a deal may end Russia’s support for the RSF, who have protected Russian interests in Sudanese gold to help fund its war in Ukraine and mitigate the impact of Western sanctions (Bloomberg, 3 June).

However, Sudanese political analyst Mujahid Bushra said Russia’s support for the army is “unlikely” to have a major impact given that Rapid Support (RSF) finances can sustain a five-year war. In addition, Samuel Ramani, an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, said Russia does not want to align itself to closely with either the army of the RSF militia as “neither side will be able to completely destroy the other” and it wants to “maintain close ties with whoever is in power” (New Arab, 3 June).

Analyst Elfadil Ibrahim also noted that Sudan is simultaneously deepening ties with Ukraine, finding common ground over "illegal armed groups financed by Russia", with Ukrainian Special Forces carrying out night raids on RSF-controlled areas in Omdurman (New Arab, 3 June).

Taqqadum’s neutrality questioned

Taqadum’s claims of neutrality have been questioned by veteran journalist Osman Mirghani, who argues that the civilian coalition’s discourses are biased against the army.

Mirghani argues that Taqadum (previously the FFC) discredit the army’s air force operations while “they overlook the Rapid Support militia’s (RSF) deliberate shelling of safe civilian neighbourhoods, which has claimed many lives”. Mirghani also accused Taqadum leaders of remaining silent about the RSF’s tribal mobilisation and recruitment of foreign mercenaries while attacking the popular resistance to the RSF by accusing the army of seeking a civil and tribal conflict.

Noting trends in Taqaddum discourses whereby condemnations of the RSF are immediately followed by condemnations of the army, Mirghani argued that “army violations are individual, while RSF violations are systematic,” which explains why “when RSF forces enter a town or village, people flee, while the army’s arrival is met with celebration”.

US’ Sudan policy criticised

American policymakers and analysts have criticised the US president Joe Biden administration’s Sudan policy, with particular attention drawn towards the impact of sanctions and the prioritisation of the Jeddah peace talks.

Criticism of sanctions

US special envoy to Sudan Tom Perriello claims that the threat of US sanctions pressured RSF commander Himedti to hold off on a full-scale assault of Al-Fashir (Foreign Policy, 5 June). However, Rep. Michael McCaul (Republican), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who said the Biden administration’s sanctions policy is “uncoordinated and not part of a larger strategy to achieve a lasting cease-fire” (Politico, 31 May). Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies said the US should be negotiating the removal of sanctions to incentivise peace talks or impose high costs forcing the warring parties to attend (Foreign Policy, 5 June).

Criticism of Jeddah peace process

Similarly, Michelle Gavin, an ex-ambassador to Botswana, said “the US appears to be far more invested in the Jeddah process than the belligerents or other influential regional actors [and] the US does not have much leverage with the warring parties, and seems unwilling to use real leverage on their foreign supporters” (Politico, 31 May). Indeed, Mutasim Ali and Yonah Diamond of the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights warned that the international community is mistaken in “prioritising a sham political process in [Jeddah]” (Foreign Policy, 5 June).

The neglect of Sudan

Various insights were published this week arguing that Sudan’s crisis is neglected by the international community. Cameron Hudson argued that Sudan is deprioritised, noting that the wars in Ukraine and Gaza “where Western governments have far greater strategic interests at stake” are absorbing so much of the media’s attention, donor dollars, and policymaker time, that little is left to devote to Sudan (Persuasion, 5 June).

A reflection of the inefficiency of international mechanisms

Nonetheless, Council on Foreign Relations (31 May) fellow Michelle Gavin argued that Sudan’s suffering proves that international mechanisms designed to address threats to peace and security are dysfunctional, basic norms around humanitarian access and civilian protection have eroded, and that “the shame that should accompany support for senseless destruction elude far too many decision-makers.”

International risks of neglecting Sudan

Both analysts highlighted international consequences of the neglect of Sudan’s crisis. Hudson suggested that Sudan’s collapse would result in control being lost over the illegal flow of drugs, weapons, migrants, fighters across unstable regions in Africa, with Perriello warning that Sudan’s conflict may pull in neighbouring countries (Foreign Policy, 5 June).

Similarly, Gavin cited the re-empowerment of extremists to warn that the conflict in Sudan “will only make bad situations in South Sudan and Chad all the more precarious, Moreover, Gavin added that the “anemic” global response to Sudan signaled to “transactional actors like the UAE, who are willing to pay for influence and bankroll the destruction, that they simply need to stay the course to achieve their aims,” which “will be a lesson those same actors are sure to apply elsewhere, regardless of the costs to others” (Council on Foreign Relations, 31 May).

6. Solutions

· Calls for a UN-authorised peacekeeping operation to prevent an RSF genocide in Al-Fashir.

· Calls for the US to pressure the UAE to stop arming the RSF.

· Calls for humanitarian aid to prevent famine.

UN-authorised peacekeeping operation

Two articles were published this week calling for a UN-authorised peacekeeping mission to protect civilians in Al-Fashir from an imminent RSF genocide.

David Simon, the director of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program, said the mission should secure Al-Fashir’s airport for humanitarian assistance delivery, with the African Union sourcing and organising troops and western states supplying materiel (Washington Post, 3 June). Similarly, Mutasim Ali and Yonah Diamond of the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights call for the US to build regional support for an African Union-led civilian protection mechanism in Al-Fashir (Foreign Policy, 5 June).

Simon argues that this “most extreme measure in the atrocity-prevention tool kit” is necessary as “the world’s dithering…has left Sudan facing resumed genocide, with no other options to prevent it” (Washington Post, 3 June).

Pressuring the UAE

Politicians and human rights activists are calling for the US to apply pressure on the UAE to stop arming the RSF.

With Rep. Michael McCaul, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, calling on the White House to target countries who supply weapons and materiel to the warring parties (Politico, 31 May), Democrat Sara Jacobs said “one of the fastest ways to end this war and suffering is to get the UAE to stop supporting the RSF (Foreign Policy, 5 June). Jacobs recently introduced a bill prohibiting US arms sales to the UAE until the US certifies that the UAE is no longer supporting the RSF.

Ali and Diamond of the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights urged President Biden to openly call on RSF commander Himedti to call off his attack on Al-Fashir, on the UAE to cease its support for the RSF, and to call an emergency open debate on Al-Fasher at the UN Security Council with a resolution passed for immediate consequences on all actors “openly fueling this genocide, including the UAE” (Foreign Policy, 5 June).

Famine prevention

Finally, Ali and Diamond call for humanitarian aid pledges made at the Paris conference for Sudan to be immediately implemented to prevent wide-scale famine (Foreign Policy, 5 June).