7-14 June 2024: Sudan In The News weekly report
This is the Sudan In The News weekly report, rounding up news, analysis and proposed solutions for Sudan published from 7 to 14 June 2024.
Summary
The report covers the following:
· 1. War: Amid the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) ongoing siege on Al-Fashir, the militia has also perpetrated massacres and crimes across Sudan this week. The army’s military’s successes were also covered.
· 2. Humanitarian: Famine is estimated to reach 756,000 by September 2024, with the number of internally displaced in Sudan now exceeding ten million. The report also covers the plight of Sudanese refugees in an Ethiopiam forest and Sudanese dying on the road to refuge in Egypt.
· 3. Politics: The Taqadum coalition of civilians continues to attract the ire of the army, while causing a divide within one of its most influential political parties.
· 4. Diplomacy: As the international community responded to the RSF massacre in Al-Jazira and siege in Al-Fashir, more information has come to light on the military government’s weapons agreement with Russia.
· 5. Analysis: The analysis section covered obstacles to resolving the humanitarian crisis, accusations over Taqadum’s perceived alliance with the RSF, Sudan turning to Russia and Iran amid the US’ lack of influence, and contributing factors as to why Sudan fails to command the international community and media’s attention.
· 6. Solutions: Alongside proposed solutions for alleviating the looming famine, recommendations were also were directed towards Taqadum, the US and the UN Security Council.
1. War
· 1.1 – RSF siege in Al-Fashir: as the RSF siege in al-Fashir continues, the militia put the last functioning hospital in the city out of service.
· 1.2 – RSF crimes across Sudan: Further information came to light of the RSF’s massacre in Wad al-Noura village the previous week, with the militia also perpetrating massacres in Sennar and Khartoum states.
· 1.3 – Army successes: The army and allied forces in Al-Fashir killed the RSF’s commander in the city. The army also broke the militia’s siege in Babanusa, West Kordofan.
1.1 Al-Fashir: the RSF siege continues
Amid growing fears of an RSF genocide in Al-Fashir, the militia put the city’s most capable hospital out of service in its ongoing siege.
1.1.1 Genocide
The situation in Sudan bears “all the marks of genocide,” according to Alice Nderitu, the UN special adviser on the prevention of genocide, with “civilians being attacked and killed because of the color of their skin, because of their ethnicity, because of who they are” (DW, 7 June). This is particularly evident in Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur which remains the only state capital in Darfur not taken by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia (Multiple sources, 13 June). Indeed, in Darfur, rights groups say that the RSF is using rape as a weapon of war, and is targeting darker-skinned Masalit people and other non-Arab groups in a campaign of ethnic cleansing (BBC, 10 June). As noted by Philip van Niekerk, smaller militias representing African tribes have joined forces with the army – known as the ‘Joint Forces’ - to defend Al-Fashir “while Arab groups from as far afield as northern Nigeria…have joined up with the RSF – and have no intention of going home” (Daily Maverick, 13 June).
1.1.2 RSF attacks on Abu Shouk IDP camp
In the latest developments of the RSF’s siege of Al-Fashir, four civilians – three of them children - were killed in artillery shelling by the militia on Abu Shouk camp for internally displaced persons. With the camp hosting many displaced from other parts of Darfur by the RSF, it has been under fire for several weeks as part of the RSF’s campaign of indiscriminate shelling and attacks on residential neighbourhoods (Radio Dabanga, 9 June). Leaving the city has proven dangerous, as residents say those fleeing have been attacked and even killed on the main RSF-controlled road out of the city (Multiple sources, 9 June).
1.1.3 RSF attacks last hospital in Al-Fashir
An incident that was covered by global media was the South Hospital - the main hospital in Al-Fashir – being put of service following an RSF attack. It was the only hospital in the city capable of handling daily mass casualty events according to Doctors Without Borders (MSF). Michele Lacharite, the head of MSF emergencies, said: “it is outrageous that the RSF opened fire inside the hospital. This is not an isolated incident - staff and patients have endured attacks on the facility for weeks from all sides, but opening fire inside a hospital crosses a line” (Multiple sources, 9 June). Eyewitnesses say the RSF opened fire and looted drugs, medical equipment, stole an ambulance and assaulted staff (BBC, 10 June).
It subsequently transpired that the RSF exploited a security lapse before attacking the hospital, with Sudan Tribune’s (10 June) military source saying that elements of the Joint Force received deceptive orders from individuals disguised in Joint Force uniforms, instructing them to retreat due to inclement weather and rain, before an RSF unit using civilian vehicles entered the city centre through this opening and attacked the South Hospital, the only functioning medical facility in the area.
With the South Hospital in Al-Fashir being put out of service by RSF attacks, the WHO said that more than 70% of hospitals in conflict-affected states of Sudan and 45% of health facilities in another five states are not working (Reuters, 12 June).
1.2. RSF crimes in other parts of Sudan
· More information came to light about the RSF’s massacre on Wad al-Noura village in Al-Jazeera state that killed hundreds, with residents having no option but to defend themselves from a militia that is reportedly out of control and attacking neighbourhoods for financial gain.
· In neighbouring Sennar state, the RSF has reportedly killed at least 20 in
· In Khartoum state, RSF shelling in Omdorman has reportedly killed at least 40, with the militia reportedly killing disabled individuals on site. Reports have also emerged of South Sudanese mercenaries fighting alongside the militia.
1.2.1 Al-Jazira: Wad al-Noura
More information has come to light following the RSF’s massacre on Wad al-Noura village in Al-Jazira state which killed hundreds. According to Mada Masr (7 June), eyewitnesses said the RSF’s first attempt to raid another village was thwarted by resistance from locals and the Sudanese air force, before the RSF redirected their attack towards Wad al-Noura with around 15 combat vehicles and heavy weaponry, including Katyusha rockets and anti-aircraft guns. A local medical source said most of the casualties were deliberate targets.
The Middle East Eye (7 June) reported that the massacre was prompted by the militia’s fear of growing resistance, with an anonymous source who fled Al-Jazira for al-Gadarif state in eastern Sudan saying: “the people of al-Jazira have the right to defend themselves as long as the RSF want to kill them and the army is derelict in its duty to defend civilians and the entire country”. Groups that are forming defence groups in areas the RSF is attacking deny accusations that they are backed by hardline Islamists.
As per Mada Masr (7 June), the RSF’s presence in Al-Jazira is divided under four leaderships, with a field military source indicating the undisciplined nature of these RSF combat units, “as they do not follow military orders, and are primarily motivated by looting and theft [and] consequently, attack villages and neighborhoods for financial gain.”
1.2.2 Sennar: another RSF massacre
The RSF committed a new massacre targeting civilians, this time in the village of Sheikh Al-Samani (Sennar State), which killed at least 20 civilians and wounded 25 others as a result of artillery shelling. Residents of the village reported that some victims of RSF attack were “torn to pieces” with others transferred to Sennar Hospital for treatment. There was subsequently a mass exodus of the village’s residents for fear of further attacks from RSF stationed in east Sennar (Meda Meek, 14 June).
1.2.3 Khartoum
In Sudan’s capital state, reports emerged of RSF mass killings in Omdurman and Bahri, alongside the militia’s use of South Sudanese mercenaries.
1.2.3.1 RSF shelling in Omdurman kills 40
According to the Karari Resistance Committee, about 40 were killed in “violent artillery fire” by the RSF in Omdurman. The committee, which is one of hundreds of grassroots pro-democracy groups that coordinate aid across Sudan, also said that over 50 were injured, “some seriously” (AFP, 7 June).
1.2.3.2 RSF killing disabled
Several mentally disabled individuals have been killed in various areas of Khartoum by the RSF, either by shooting or torture. Two members of Emergency Committees in Bahri confirmed that more than three mentally disabled people were shot on sight by RSF militants, with a Bahri resident who fled to South Sudan saying he witnessed the killing of three mentally disabled people at different times. The RSF reportedly justifying the killings of some residents by claiming the individuals posed a danger to them (Sudan Tribune, 10 June).
1.2.3.3 South Sudanese mercenaries
Mada Masr (7 June) reported that a South Sudanese delegation engaged in discussions with Sudanese officials in Port Sudan. Among the topics on the agenda was Sudan’s concern over South Sudanese militias fighting alongside the RSF
The Sudanese military had previously released footage of South Sudanese mercenaries fighting in the RSF’s ranks, stating that they were apprehended following the military’s recapture of Old Omdurman in March 2024. Two military sources in the Signal Corps in the capital’s Bahri city and the Armored Corps in southern Khartoum told Mada Masr that the majority of RSF fighters involved in the attacks on the two camps are affiliated with South Sudanese militias.
1.3. Army successes
· There were celebrations on the streets of Al-Fashir despite the ongoing RSF siege after the Joint Forces killed the RSF militia’s commander of operations.
· In West Kordofan, the army broke the five-month RSF siege on the 22nd Infantry Division HQ of Babanusa.
· The army also announced that it shot down drones in the White Nile state and Omdurman.
1.3.1 Joint Forces resistance in al-Fashir
As the RSF siege on Al-Fashir continued, the Joint Forces destroyed seven RSF vehicles and killed several of their militants, alongside shooting down an RSF drone
near the Abu Shouk camp (Sudan Tribune, 11 June). At least 35 civilians were reportedly killed between 10 and 12 June due to the RSF’s heavy artillery shelling. With Al-Fashir’s healthcare system under strain amid the South Hospital being put out of service and the Sayyid al-Shuhada Centre severely lacking in medical supplies, victims of the RSF’s shelling are being transferred to the army’s medical corps, while others receive treatment at home (Sudan Tribune, 12 June).
Celebrations then erupted in Al-Fashir after the Joint Forces killed Ali Yaqoub, commander of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) operations in al-Fasher. Yaqoub, a former tribal militia leader in Central Darfur state, was accused of widespread violations and crimes against the Fur ethnicity before joining the RSF and assuming command of the Central Darfur sector. He played a crucial role in the RSF’s operations in Darfur (Sudan Tribune, 14 June).
1.3.2 West Kordofan: Army breaks the Babanusa siege
In a military success, the Sudanese army broke the RSF siege on its 22nd Infantry Division HQ in Babanusa, West Kordofan after regaining several neighbourhoods in the city. Since January 2024, the RSF had attempted to seize seize control of the 22nd Infantry Division but faced stiff resistance from the army. The intense fighting in West Kordofan has displaced over 50,000 people, who are now living in dire conditions in displacement centres. The assault on Babanusa coincided with a growing rift within the Misseriya tribe, the second-largest ethnic group from which many RSF soldiers and officers hail. In early June, a high-ranking Misseriya delegation from West Kordofan arrived in Port Sudan to declare their support for the armed forces and reject the RSF’s control of their territories (Sudan Tribune, 9 June).
1.3.3 RSF drones shot down
The army announced that it shot down four RSF drones above Kosti and Kenana in White Nile state, and two in the neighbourhood of the Wadi Sayedna army base in Omdurman (Multiple sources, 7 June). Sudan Tribune’s sources suggest that the RSF launched the drones from the Jebel Aulia area, located in the far south of Khartoum and adjacent to the White Nile state. RSF drones have been targeting towns and cities in the so-called ‘safe states’ in northern and eastern Sudan this year.
2. Humanitarian
· 2.1 - Famine: Although a formal famine declaration in Sudan is yet to be made, preliminary projections are that an estimated 756,000 will face catastrophe or famine by September 2024.
· 2.2 - Displacement: The number of internally displaced in Sudan has reached over ten million as per the UN. Meanwhile, there has been media coverage of the plight of Sudanese refugees in an Ethiopia forest and Sudanese dying by the dozens on their way to seek refuge in Egypt.
2.1 Famine
The World Health Organisation (WHO) said that mass starvation is a "very real risk" in some regions of war-torn Sudan (Reuters, 12 June). In addition, the US’ envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello, said parts of Sudan are in famine, although the extent of extreme hunger remained unclear (Reuters, 11 June).
A formal famine declaration has not yet been made in Sudan. Famines are determined through a complex set of technical criteria set called the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), an initiative of UN agencies, regional bodies and aid groups (Reuters, 11 June). The IPC’s famine determination scale has five classifications: ranging from Phase 1 (no serious food issues), to Phase 5 (catastrophe or famine) (Reuters, 13 June).
A preliminary IPC projection warns that an estimated 756,000 people in Sudan will face a Phase 5 catastrophe between June and September 2024 across 32 localities and clusters. 15% of the population faced IPC 5 catastrophic conditions in Al-Fashir and nearby Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons. Three other areas were cited where 10% of the population had reached the threshold. Many of the areas in the projection where seized by the RSF (Reuters, 13 June).
2.2 Displacement and refugees
The UN’s migration agency – the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) – said the number of internally displaced in Sudan has reached over 10 million. The internally displaced include 2.8 million who fled their homes before the war began, with another two million driven abroad, mostly to neighbouring Chad, South Sudan Egypt and Ethiopia (AP, 10 June). Media coverage over the past week has brought attention to the plight of Sudanese refugees in the latter two countries in particular.
2.2.1 Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia
Reuters (7 June) reported on around around 8,000 Sudanese refugees stranded in a forest in the Amhara region of northern Ethiopia following repeated attacks by gunmen on Kumer and Awlala refugee camps. With the refugees staying in makeshift dwellings made out of branches, cholera has spread in Kumer amid a shortage of doctors and the refugees face violence when venturing to the valley to wash. Many of them began a 10-day hunger strike over conditions as supplies ran low, which they stopped after donations came in from Sudanese abroad, the only assistance received so far. 6,000 walked to the UN refugee agency’s HQ in Amhara to protest their conditions but were stopped by police, whereas 2,000 had to flee Kumer camp after gunmen fired at them.
2.2.2 Sudanese refugees dying on the way to Egypt
Meanwhile, dozens of Sudanese attempting to cross the border into Egypt to escape the war died from scorching heat, as hospitals in Aswan, Egypt reportedly received dozens of Sudanese bodies. Reports on the number of deaths vary. Medameek reported 24 dead, while Mada Masr cited up to 50. According to the Refugee Platform in Egypt (RPE), between June 7 and June 9, 40 people were killed, including children, women, and entire families. The number is expected to rise as more bodies are uncovered. The Sudanese General Consul in Aswan, Abdelgadir Abdallah noted the dangers of smuggling between Egypt and Sudan, stating that those who resort to this method often do so because they are unable to obtain a visa or their residency in Egypt expired (Radio Dabanga, 11 June).
2.2.3 Elfashir’s displaced
Amid the RSF siege on Al-Fashir, there is a continous influx of those entering areas controlled by Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdelwahid Nur. Mohamed Abdel Rahman Alnayer, spokesperson for the movement, said that many of Elfashir’s displaced are suffering from hunger and disease, with children, with dozens dying daily due to malnutrition and lack of medicine. While the SLM-Nur is providing security and shelter for the displaced, it lacks the resources to provide adequate food and medical care due to the overwhelming numbers, Alnayer added before calling for assistance from the international community and humanitarian organisations (Sudan Tribune, 11 June).
3. Politics
As divisions arise within the National Umma Party (NUP) over its position within the Taqadum coalition, army leader Abdelfattah Al-Burhan strongly criticised the coalition amid its perceived ties to the RSF.
3.1 NUP rifts over Taqadum
An internal rift in the National Umma Party (NUP) is reportedly widening over its stance on the Taqadum coalition. While NUP Deputy Chairman Mohamed Abdallah Al-Douma stated that the party leadership considers those participating in the Tagadum founding conference to be violating party decisions, the party’s leader - Fadlallah Burma Nasir insists on participating in the coalition, threatening to refer his deputies to the disciplinary committee. NUP Secretary-General Al-Watheq Al-Berair, Political Bureau member Zainab al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, and her brother Siddiq participated in the Tagadum conference in Addis Ababa the previous week (Sudan Tribune, 7 June).
3.2 Burhan threatens Taqadum
Army leader Abdelfattah Al-Burhan vowed to hold Taqadum’s leaders accountable, accusing them of colluding with the RSF and conspiring to kill Sudanese citizens. Al-Burhan said: “we are astonished and dismayed by those who rejoice at the death of Sudanese citizens, their looting, and the rape of girls while speaking about the government’s illegitimacy” (Sudan Tribune, 7 June).
4. Diplomacy
· 4.1 – International reactions to Wad al-Noura massacre: Despite international condemnations of the RSF massacre in Wad al-Noura, the African Union was criticised for not naming the perpetrators. The Sudanese government also took offence to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ statement.
· 4.2 - Al-Fashir: The US said it will not recognise Darfur as a breakaway state should it fall to the RSF, as the UN Security Council passed a resolution to demand the RSF halt its siege on the city.
· 4.3 – Sudan-Russia ties: More details emerged of Sudan’s agreement with Russia
· 4.4 - Iran and the UAE: both states have been accused of breaching a UN arms embargo by supplying the army and RSF respectively.
4.1 Wad al-Noura reactions
The RSF massacre in Wad al-Noura was condemned by the US (AFP, 7 June), the UN (Sudan Tribune, 7 June) and the EU (7 June). The African Union also condemned the massacre, although its statement did not mention the perpetrators (7 June) which triggered negative reactions by Sudanese Twitter users.
The Sudanese government’s National Mechanism for Human Rights also reacted negative to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk’s response to the massacre. The mechanism criticised phrases in Türk’s statement that it interpreted as justifying the attack, emphasising that targeting civilians is a consistent tactic of the RSF, alongside denouncing Türk’s call for the RSF to investigate the incident, arguing that it lacks the necessary command structure and has devolved into “gangs of looting and killing” (Sudan Tribune, 11 June).
4.2 Al-Fashir
The US envoy to Sudan said that the US will not recognise Darfur as a breakaway state should it fall to the RSF. The International Criminal Court is calling for evidence to investigate ethnically-motivated attacks in Al-Fashir, while the UN Security Council passed a resolution to demand the RSF halt its siege on the city.
4.2.1 US will not recognise RSF breakaway state
Warning that Al-Fashir could fall to the RSF imminently, US envoy to Sudan Tom Perriello told the BBC (11 June) that if some in the RSF think capturing al-Fashir will help them establish Darfur as a breakaway state, the US would not recognise an independent Darfur "under any circumstances". Al-Fashir remains the last of Darfur’s five state capitals not yet taken by the RSF.
4.2.2 ICC Al-Fashir investigations
The International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor Karim Khan is urgently investigating allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Darfur city of al-Fashir. His investigators had seen credible allegations of what looked like ethnically-motivated attacks against the civilian population, widespread use of rape and attacks against hospitals, he added. Khan called for anyone with possible evidence, video or audio material to submit it to his office (Multiple sources, 11 June).
4.2.3 UN Security Council on Al-Fashir
The UN Security Council adopted a British-drafted resolution that demands the RSF halt the siege of Al-Fashir. The resolution, which was approved by a vote of 14-0 with Russia abstaining, expresses “grave concern” at the spreading violence and credible reports that the RSF are carrying out “ethnically motivated violence” in al-Fashir. The resolution demands that the RSF and government forces ensure the protection of civilians, including allowing those wishing to move in Al-Fashir or leave the North Darfur capital to safer areas (Multiple sources, 13 June).
4.3 Sudan-Russia relations
Mada Masr (7 June) shed more light on Sudan’s agreement to provide Russia a logistics supply center on the Red Sea in exchange for weapons and ammunition.
Russia reportedly demands that Sudan cease dealings with Ukraine, allocate mining areas, and commence naval base construction while the Sudanese government requested that the Wagner group not engage with the RSF and that the Sudanese Armed Forces are supplied with ammunition and weapons.
4.4 Iran and UAE
The BBC (13 June) reported on allegations that Iran and the UAE are violating a UN arms embargo by supplying drones to the warring parties in Sudan. The army’s recapturing of the state broadcaster’s HQ in March was attributed to Iranian made drones, particularly the Mohajer-6, with Wim Zwijnenburg of the Humanitarian Disarmament Project at PAX saying they “are very effective because they can identify targets accurately with minimal training”. The BBC add that evidence emerged of the RSF using quadcopter drones capable of dropping 120mm mortar shells, with Brian Castner, a weapons expert at Amnesty International, points the finger at the UAE
5. Analysis
· 5.1 - Humanitarian crisis: obstacles to resolving the humanitarian crisis identified include funding shortfalls, hindrances to agricultural harvesting and political disagreements preventing humanitarian aid.
· 5.2 - Politics: While the Taqadum coalition of civilians continues to be considered the only viable option for the international community, it continues to face accusations of allying with the RSF.
· 5.3 - Diplomacy: Analysts offered a range of views on Sudan’s army turning to Russia and Iran for help, with disagreement over the extent of the US’ leverage and influence on the warring parties.
· 5.4 – Lack of attention on Sudan: the inability to differentiate between the RSF and an army believed to be linked to Islamists is considered by analysts a contributing factor to global inaction on the Sudan crisis.
5.1 Obstacles to resolving the humanitarian crisis in Sudan
· 5.1.1 - Various UN agencies are complaining the alleviating the humanitarian crisis is being hindered funding shortfalls.
· 5.1.2 - As Sudanese people are resulting to eating tree leaves, mitigating the famine is hampered by factors preventing agricultural harvesting including the RSF’s looting of agricultural maintenance equipment and cash liquidity shortages.
· 5.1.3 - In the Nuba Mountains, aid delivery is being impeded by political disagreements, with the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement faction of Abdelaziz Al-Hilu calling for a political agreement to precede humanitarian relief.
5.1.1 Humanitarian crisis: Funding shortfalls
Amid the looming famine and displacement crisis, aid agencies are reportedly struggling to keep up with rising needs. Mohamed Refaat, Sudan Chief of Mission for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said: "funding shortfalls are impeding efforts to provide adequate shelter, food and medical assistance” (Reuters, 7 June).
William Spindler, spokesperson for the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), said that the UN’s efforts in Sudan have been severely hampered by the lack of funding. Funding for humanitarian aid in Sudan is severely lacking, with only 165 ($432 million) raised out of the $2.7 billion needed to reach 14 million people (Sudan Tribune, 8 June). Indeed, a report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), close to 1.1 million people were denied crucial humanitarian assistance in Sudan during May 2024, in a situation that has been deteriorating since April 2024. The affected areas include Kordofan, Darfur, Khartoum, and Al-Jazira states, with the main reasons cited as denial of travel permits, border crossing restrictions, insecurity, and obstructions by parties involved in the conflict (Sudan Tribune, 8 June).
5.1.2 Famine: obstacles to harvesting
Radio Dabanga (11 June) reported that locals in the Nuba Mountains are resorting to eating tree leaves as the war reduces chances of a successful agricultural harvest. Contributing factors include the maintenance of agricultural machinery being hindered by the RSF’s looting and sabotage of maintenance stores and agricultural machinery, with the RSF’s advances in the Kordofan region causing skilled workers to flee. In addition, there are challenges financing agricultural operations, with distribution stations supplying fuel to agricultural projects ceasing operations leading petrol prices to soar amid pre-existing cash liquidity shortages.
5.1.3 Famine: The politics of aid delivery
Aid delivery is being hindered by the politicisation of the humanitarian crisis. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, which controls territory in the Nuba Mountains, urged UN agencies to refrain from cooperating with the Sudanese government’s plans to deliver aid without a comprehensive agreement with all warring factions. Negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SPLM-N regarding aid delivery to the Nuba Mountains reached an impasse. The SPLM-N insists on a nationwide aid distribution plan, while the army claims that the talks have stalled due to the SPLM-N’s insistence on involving the RSF in humanitarian arrangements (Sudan Tribune, 8 June).
5.2 Politics: the Taqadum-RSF alliance
Writer Ahmed Mahmoud Kanem, who is opposed to both the army and the RSF, argues that an obstacle to the international community’s efforts to prevent the war is that the view that there is “no other option but Taqadum”. However, Kanem argues that the civilian coalition “threw themselves into the arms” of the RSF, upon the assumption of their shared enemy in the Islamists. Nonetheless, Kanem warns that Taqadum’s alliance with the RSF is dangerous on the basis that the latter’s rebellion is not revolutionary, seeks to maintain and expand the RSF’s financial and political power, and has ethnic goals that contradict Taqadum’s slogans on Sudan’s unity (Al-Rakoba, 8 June).
5.3 Diplomacy: Russia and Iran’s influence in Sudan grows as the US’ expense
With the US argued to lack leverage in Sudan, the army turning to Russia and Iran to aid its effort against the RSF triggered a diverse range of views from analysts.
Political analyst Magdy Abdelqayyum was quoted in Mada Masr (7 June) to say the Sudanese-Russian agreement is needed as it “thwarts the US-sponsored project of dismantling and fragmenting Sudan, which is facilitated by the UAE through the RSF militarily and [Taqadum] as a civilian political cover”. By contrast, Cameron Hudson, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, challenged notions of US influence or leverage in Sudan. Noting that the army “has turned to Russia and Iran as suppliers of last resort and over whom the US has no direct leverage,” Hudson said “the US should have been using its leverage over countries like the UAE to suspend their support for this war…and it should have been encouraging other closer allies of the US who are inclined to support Sudan’s army, like Turkey or Egypt, to do so (Fox News, 10 June).
Writer Nidal Abdulwahab attributed Russia and Iran’s growing influence in Sudan to the US “falling in line” with Arab countries that “do not support democracy in Sudan” (Al-Rakoba, 8 June). Nonetheless, African affairs analyst Adel Ahmed Ibrahim argued that the Sudanese-Russian agreement may exert pressure on the RSF to go to the Jeddah platform to seek an agreement to stop the war (Mada Masr, 7 June).
5.4 Diplomacy: lack of attention on Sudan
Sudan analysis over the past week has also explored the international community’s perceived inaction, with Hudson said to “complain” the international community’s “responsibility-to-protect” doctrine has been shelved as “we are forced to watch in real-time as the noose tightens around millions of civilians begging to be saved,” with Sudan being “deprioritised” rather than “ignored” (Daily Maverick, 13 June).
World Politics Review (11 June) argue that the international community’s failure to address the Sudan crisis “ultimately amounts to a choice”. WPR suggested that the civil war in Sudan has received little to no international attention or diplomatic engagement,” as the US and Europe remain focused on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, “and Sudan’s crisis is not yet driving the kind of mass migration into the EU that would get European countries to pay closer attention”.
5.4.1 The “both sides: narrative
With the regards to the international media, the lack of attention on Sudan was attributed to it being unclear “who the good guys are,” argues Philip van Niekerk, who wrote that “while the RSF have been rightly condemned for looting and pillage…it was [Al-Burhan] who led the coup that ended [Sudan’s] democratic experiment,” with the army “still allied with the Islamists” (Daily Maverick, 13 June). Writer Ahmed Mahmoud Kanem identified similar reasons behind the international community’s “failure” to stop the war in Sudan, arguing that while the the danger of the RSF is understood, supporting the army risks reviving the Sudanese Islamic movement (Al-Rakoba, 8 June).
6. Solutions
Proposed solutions for resolving the crisis in Sudan have been directed towards the Taqadum coalition, the international community, UN Security Council and the US.
6.1 Breaking up the Taqadum-RSF alliance
For Taqadum to gain respect from Sudanese people and the international community, writer Ahmed Mahmoud Kanem argues that the coalition “must be freed from [its] dangerous dependency” on the RSF. Kanem argues that the main reason behind the international community’s failure of to stop the war in Sudan is that while the danger of the RSF is understood, supporting the army risks reviving the Sudanese Islamic movement, leaving no other option but Taqadum. However, since the war began, Kanem argues that Taqadum “threw themselves into the arms” of the RSF, upon the assumption of their shared enemy in the Islamists (Al-Rakoba, 8 June).
6.2 Famine prevention
Oliver Kiptoo Kirui, who co-authored the Sudan National Household Survey, recommended various solutions to alleviate the risks of famine in Sudan (Conversation, 12 June).
· Immediate humanitarian aid: rapid deployment of food aid and nutritional support; opening and maintaining secure humanitarian corridors for uninterrupted aid delivery.
· Support for agricultural production: providing farmers with seeds, tools and training; initiatives to improve water management and irrigation infrastructure; long-term investments in sustainable farming practices and infrastructure.
· Economic support: financial aid, reducing inflation and ensuring the availability of affordable basic goods.
· Conflict resolution and security: efforts to mediate the conflict and establish peace to allow safe access for humanitarian efforts.
· International coordination: a coordinated international response to ensure efficient use of resources and address displaced populations’ needs; Collaboration and resource-sharing among humanitarian actors can enhance the effectiveness of aid delivery.
6.3 Human rights
A group of 118 feminist, women’s human rights, and human rights groups call on the members of the UN Security Council to (International Service for Human Rights):
Protect civilians and protect women and girls under the UNSC Resolution 1325 specifically addressing women’s human rights in conflict and create a monitoring and reporting mechanisms on the widespread conflict-related sexual violence the Sudan war.
Create a mechanism to guarantee immediate and unconditional access for humanitarian aid.
Immediately restore telecommunications across the country
Ensure that accountability is guaranteed against warring parties for the war crimes committed and genocide perpetrated against certain tribes in Darfur.
Extend the arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan and create effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the embargo.
Refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) so that the ICC’s jurisdiction is extended to include all conflict areas in Sudan.
6.4 RSF and Islamist terrorist classification
Writer Nidal Abdulwahab called for the US to consider both the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the RSF to be considered terrorist movements, especially in the event of their failure to fully comply with the cessation of the war. He argued that it would be in the US’ regional interest to restrain the UAE and prevent it from supporting the Rapid Support militia (RSF), and prevent Russian and Iranian influence in Sudan from expanding.