Summary

· 1. Battle for Khartoum: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia now resembles “rogue gangs” in capital state Khartoum as it directs its energy towards Al-Fashir, while the Sudanese army has reportedly put all strategic fuel depots out of service.

· 2. Sennar: The RSF’s entry into Sennar saw widespread looting and civilian deaths, with the militia occupying state capital Sinja and the strategic Jabal Moya area.

· 3. Al-Fashaqa: Ethiopian militias have invaded Al-Fashaqa on the Sudan-Ethiopia border region with the aim of seizing control of agricultural lands.

· 4. Libya: In an attempt to cut off critical RSF supply routes, Sudan’s war is now also being fought on Libyan soil between armed groups allied to the warring parties.

· 5. Al-Fashir: The RSF’s ongoing siege on Al-Fashir is being characterised by the systematic targeting of health care facilities and displacement camps. Analysts also identified obstacles to calls for a UN-AU civilian protection mission.

· 6. International: Sudan recalled its ambassador to Chad alleging it is facilitating the UAE’s support for the RSF; Taqadum leader and ex-prime minister Abdalla Hamdok’s defence of the UAE role fuelled allegations of Taqadum’s alliance with the RSF; and the Jeddah peace process was criticised.

1. The Battle of Khartoum

· The RSF in Khartoum are now reported to resemble “rogue gangs”.

· In Khartoum North (Bahri), the army reportedly put Al-Jaili fuel refinery out of service, thus taking all strategic fuel depots that can benefit the RSF out of service.

Khartoum City

With the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia continuing to target the Armoured Corps, a senior military source told Mada Masr (28 June) that the army aims to connect its main camps in Khartoum and secure the state, although a specific timeline for completing these stages has not been set.

The source added that the RSF in Khartoum has now turned into mere rogue gangs, no longer conducting military offensives, instead using tactics that resemble street warfare. The main formation of RSF troops has been fragmented, the source added, attributing this transformation to the impact of the battles in al-Fashir, which led to a significant withdrawal of RSF fighters from Khartoum. Those remaining in Khartoum and Al-Jazira are reportedly either forces recruited from criminals who escaped from prisons or rogue groups that previously lived off looting and banditry, or from civilian groups that have aligned with RSF leaders.

Khartoum North (Bahri)

The army’s Weapons Corps in northern Bahri continued to deploy across various front to cut off the RSF’s military supplies to the Jaili area where they are stationed (Mada Masr, 28 June) and maintained control of the Khartoum Oil Refinery, also known as Al-Jaili Refinery (Sudan Tribune, 21 June). With the Sudanese Air Force targeting remaining fuel depots used by the RSF, an engineering source at the refinery told Mada Masr (28 June) that the military has taken all the strategic fuel depots out of service. Thus, the refinery will no longer be able to process fuel, ensuring that oil coming from South Sudan will pass through without any refining, and will soon be transported to the Bashayer port for export.

2. Sennar

· The RSF’s arrival in Sennar state came with widespread looting and 20 civilians reportedly killed.

· The militia took control of the strategic Jebel Moya area with army forces promising to fight fiercely to regain it.

· Sennar state capital, Sinja, fell to the RSF militia in a major blow to the army.

RSF arrives in Sennar

Clashes erupted between the army and the RSF on the northern outskirts of Sennar over control of the Sennar Sugar Factory, surrounding villages, and the strategic Jabal Moya area, amid the militia’s southward expansion from Al-Jazirah state into Sennar (Sudan Tribune, 24 June). The RSF’s arrival triggered panic among residents, leading to a mass exodus towards Sennar city, as artillery shells rained on civilian neighbourhoods (Sudan Tribune, 25 June). The militia reportedly reportedly killed over 20 in villages around Jabal Moya during widespread looting (Mada Masr, 28 June).

RSF takes the strategic Jabal Moya

The RSF seized the strategic Jebel Moya area, with Mada Masr’s (28 June) sources saying that controlling this area directly threaten the cities of Sennar and Rabak, and the Kenana military base in the White Nile State.

A senior Sudanese military officer told Mada Masr that the military will fight fiercely to retake it. Mada Masr’s observations indicate that both sides are amassing more troops and tanks, preparing for a decisive battle before the rain season in autumn, which is expected to affect supply routes.

RSF enters in Sinjah, mass displacement

After gathering in Jabal Moya, the RSF announced that it had seized the 17th Infantry Division headquarters in Sennar state following a surprise attack on the city. The army denied reports of the RSF’s control of Sinjah, stating that its forces are actively engaged in combat against the militia (Sudan Tribune, 29 June).

Nonetheless, the RSF’s entry saw a mass exodus from the city after the militia reportedly ransacked shops, homes, and the market in Sinjah. Eyewitnesses recounted RSF fighters storming homes and demanding valuables such as cars, mobile phones, money, and jewelry. Sennar state, already home to displaced people from other conflict-stricken regions, is now grappling with a fresh wave of internally displaced people from the Jabal Moya area, which fell under RSF control (Sudan Tribune, 29 June).

3. Al-Fashaqa

The Sudanese army, which had re-taken control of approximately 90% of Al-Fashaqa border region since 2020, is now facing a resurgence of Ethiopian aggression after militias launched a renewed incursion into Sudanese territory, penetrating 15 kilometres deep into the region. Reports of escalating violence, looting, and attacks on farmers and herders in the border area have raised alarm as the militias attempt to seize control of agricultural lands. Local livestock owner Abdallah Ahmed reported being robbed of 140 sheep by the militias at gunpoint, warning of the dire consequences of unchecked violence and highlighting the militias’ attempts to prevent Sudanese farmers from cultivating their lands during the crucial rainy season (Sudan Tribune, 24 June).

4. Sudan’s war being exported to Libya

· In an attempt to cut off critical RSF supply routes which could weaken the militia across several fronts in Sudan, Sudan’s war is now also being fought on Libyan soil.

Clashes occurred in Libyan territory between the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army led by Minni Minawi (SLM/A-MM) and defectors from the Revolutionary Awakening Council (RAC) loyal to the RSF led by General Mohamed Bakhit Ajab Al-Dor (Sudan Tribune, 22 June).

A source for the Joint Forces – a coalition comprising of the army and allied armed movements including the SLM/A-MM fighting the RSF in North Darfur – told Mada Masr (28 June) that the battles aim to halt military supplies and reinforcements to the RSF, leading to battles spilling over into Libyan territory.

UN reports indicate that thousands of Sudanese fighters are present in various Libyan cities although they returned to Sudan after the war started in April last year. Al-Dor’s group began withdrawing from Libya last week, heading to Sudan to support the RSF in Al-Fashir (Sudan Tribune, 22 June).

As noted last week, the Sudan-Libyan-Chad border triangle is critical for the RSF’s operations, as it means dominance over fuel smuggling routes from Libya, making such battles crucial for the army and allies as they aim to cut off the RSF’s supplies and deplete their resources, thereby affecting their capability of multiple fronts across Sudan (Mada Masr, 21 June). Nonetheless, RSF field commander Ali Rizqallah, known as “Al-Savanna,” claimed that the militia controls the tri-border area linking Sudan, Libya, and Chad (Sudan Tribune, 22 June).

5. Al-Fashir

· Sudan Tribune (23 June) reported that the death toll in Al-Fashir rose to over 260, with more than 1,630 injured since the RSF siege began on 10 May 2024, according to Doctors Without Borders (MSF).

· Nonetheless, the death toll has continued to rise in an RSF campaign marked by the systematic targeting of hospitals, displacement camps and civilians attempting to flee the violence.

· While previous reports noted that human rights activists are calling for UN-AU civilian protection mission in Al-Fashir, analysts have identified the obstacles to prospect of one including the pre-existing lack of security in Al-Fashir and divides within the UN Security Council.

RSF systematic targeting of hospitals

As part of its ongoing siege of Al-Fashir, the state capital of North Darfur, the RSF is targeting healthcare facilities, with a medical source telling Mada Masr (28 June) that the militia’s operations are concentrated around medical areas and regions providing food and water to displaced persons within the city.

Last week saw the eighth and ninth of the militia’s campaign of attacks on Al-Fashir’s health facilities since the siege began on 10 May. Al-Fashir Southern Hospital has endured five attacks, forcing it to close. The Babiker Nahar Children’s Hospital was also closed after being bombed. Following the transfer of treatment services to the Saudi Hospital, it was bombed three times (Radio Dabanga, 25 June).

Indeed, the Saudi maternity hospital, which was the last functioning hospital in Al-Fashir capable of responding to mass casualty events, was put out of service following RSF shelling that killed a female pharmacist and destroying a pharmacy in the process (Sudan Tribune, 23 June).

Days later, the militia subsequently hit the only remaining dialysis centre in Al-Fashir, forcing to cease operations, thus depriving 94 patients from different parts of Darfur of dialysis treatment. The center had been upgraded to a regional facility to handle medical cases from other states of Darfur, after most had ceased operations as the RSF seized territory (Radio Dabanga, 25 June). The militia then targeted Iqra Hospital, further crippling Al-Fashir’s healthcare system (Sudan Tribune, 25 June), which killed at least one (Radio Dabanga, 26 June).

Targeting displacement camps

Alongside targeting hospitals, the militia is also targeting displacement camps, with at least five civilians killed in artillery shelling on the Abu Shouk camp. Adam Rijal, spokesperson for the General Coordination for Displaced People and Refugees, warned that the toll could rise due to communication blackouts in the area. While the camp, which houses nearly 400,000 displaced, was a haven for those escaping RSF brutality in other parts of Darfur, it is now witnessing an exodus of residents to seek refuge in nearby Tawila and Jebel Marra (Sudan Tribune, 25 June).

Indeed, the number of displaced has exceeded 70,000, dispersed across different localities in the state, including Kutum and Tawila, according to Mada Masr (28 June). A source from Northern State’s Dabba also said there is a significant increase in the number of displaced persons arriving to the locality. One of the displaced persons who fled Al-Fashir told Mada Masr that the journey to Dabba took four days due to the RSF’s roadblocks, setting up checkpoints, and threatening citizens on the basis of their ethnicity.

Debate on protection mission

Sudan In The News’ last three weekly reports showed how proposed solutions to avert the RSF genocide in Al-Fashir have centred around calls for a UN-AU protection mission, including from:

· Human Rights Watch (HRW, 19 June) Sudan researcher Mohamed Osman.

· HRW Deputy Africa Director Laetitia Bader (Euronews, 20 June).

· Yonah Diamond and Mutasim Ali of Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (CNN, 14 June) and (Foreign Policy, 5 June).

· David Simon, the director of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program, (Washington Post, 3 June).

However, the International Crisis Group (24 June) note that political obstacles and logistical and security risks hinder the deployment of external security forces in Al-Fashir. In addition, an article published by the Ayin Network (22 June) quoted from analysts who identified the challenges facing such a mission.

Gerrit Kurtz, a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, sees little chance of passing such a resolution – to authorise a protection mission for Al-Fashir - via the UN Security Council. Kurtz cited the bad relations between Russia on one side and the US, UK and France on the other, among the permanent members. “Therefore, only the AU Peace and Security Council or the AU Assembly could authorise an African deployment,” he said.

Canada’s first resident diplomat in Sudan, Nicholas Coghlan, believes a ceasefire agreement is necessary before any country commits to deploying troops in Sudan. “It would require at least a tentative, possibly partial, ceasefire and the acquiescence of both parties. I cannot see that any foreign country would be disposed to risk the lives of its soldiers in the current context,” he said.

Solution for Al-Fashir

Amid the aforementioned obstacles to a UN-AU protection mission in Al-Fashir, the International Crisis Group (24 June) proposed that an alternative way to protect civilians in the besieged city would be to open a safe passage into neutral areas of nearby Central Darfur controlled by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, an ethnic Fur who leads Darfur’s largest rebel group.

6. International

· Sudan recalled its ambassador from Chad amid allegations that Chad is facilitating the UAE’s support for the RSF militia.

· However, ex-prime minister and the leader of the Taqadum coalition of civilians, Abdalla Hamdok, defended the role of the UAE in Sudan.

· Allegations that Taqadum is the political wing of the RSF, and the enmity it is causing between Sudanese political forces, are argued to pose an obstacle to an Egypt-sponsored conflict mediation process.

· The US-Saudi brokered Jeddah peace process was criticised on the basis it is argued to contribute to prolonging the conflict.

Chad ambassador recalled

Sudan recalled its ambassador from Chad over escalating tensions concerning border security and Chad’s alleged support for the RSF. A government insider revealed to Sudan Tribune (28 June) that Chad is actively aiding the RSF by opening its borders for UAE supplies, facilitating the movement of RSF commanders and recruiting foreign fighters. “All Emirati aid to the militia is channeled through Chad, and Sudan has presented evidence to support this claim,” the source said.

The UAE’s role

Indeed, the UAE’s involvement in Sudan through its alleged support for the RSF continues to be a theme of articles. Arguing the UAE supports the RSF with the aim of controlling Sudan’s agricultural and economic resources, Mohamed Suliman, a senior researcher at Northeastern University, suggests the “cost of the UAE’s expansionist dreams is high,” citing the abuse of natural resources, committing of massacres, support for dictators and warlords, killing of democratic aspirations and destabilising of “too many political orders”. Suliman called for the UAE to “stop acting as a rogue state, rethink its foreign policies, and consider fairer alternatives for all concerned” (Middle East Monitor, 24 June).

Taqadum leader Hamdok defends the UAE

However, in an interview with Emirati media outlet the National (26 June), Sudan’s former prime minister and current leader of the Taqadum coalition, Abdalla Hamdok, dismissed allegations of the UAE’s support for the RSF. Hamdok, currently residing in the UAE, said: “the UAE has always been supportive of Sudan, and there is a lot of links and ties in the history”.

Taqadum, the political wing of the RSF militia

Hamdok’s comments further fuelled allegations that Taqadum is the political wing of the RSF, which is argued to an impediment to an Egypt-sponsored conflict mediation process.

As noted by Dame Rosalind Marsden, the former UK ambassador to Sudan, the accusations that Taqadum is the political wing of the RSF have gained traction among many Sudanese, who called for the coalition to maintain consistent messaging in condemning violence by both sides of Sudan’s conflict (Chatham House, 21 June).

In an analysis of Egypt’s “pragmatic” approach to mediating the conflict, Taqadum’s alleged partnership with the RSF, and the enmity it has caused between Sudan’s political forces, are argued to be a central challenge for political dialogue and consensus-building by analyst Elfadil Ibrahim. While Taqadum do not recognise the army’s legitimacy, the Sudan Charter Forces (SCF) do, notes Ibrahim. Furthermore, SCF members such as Darfur governor Minni Minnawi cite the formations of local governments led by Taqadum officials in RSF-controlled territory - as stipulated in the Taqadum-RSF Addis Ababa agreement in January 2024 - to back up allegations of Taqadum’s partnership with the militia (New Arab, 25 June).

Criticism of the Jeddah peace talks

Amid the indefinite suspension of the US-Saudi brokered Jeddah peace talks between the army and RSF, governance specialist Tahany Maalla argued that they are “out of step with the nuanced dynamics on the ground”. Maalla suggested that their design and structure contributed to prolonging the conflict in three significant ways.

· Firstly, the focus on achieving ceasefire and coordinating humanitarian efforts at the expense of hosting political discussions is argued to have pushed Darfur’s armed movements to abandon neutrality with the aim of securing a stake in any future political agreement.

· Secondly, the lack of a bridge connecting ceasefire and political negotiations is blamed for the “militarisation of civilian discourse,” which is “reinforcing militarised authority and legitimacy.

· Finally, Maalla attributes the peace talks to the conflicting parties both obstructing aid access and exploiting to enhance international legitimacy, citing the RSF redirecting their strategy to targeting aid distribution routes with intentions to assert itself as a de-facto authority by controlling aid flows.

Diplomatic solutions

The International Rescue Committee (25 June) provided diplomatic solutions for ending the conflict in Sudan including:

· Elevating engagement with the warring parties and their sponsors to the highest diplomatic level as a reflection of the severity of the crisis and a demonstration of international commitment to addressing it.

· Deploying levers of influence including encouraging the UAE and Saudi Arabia to halt the import of Sudanese gold and livestock until a ceasefire is implemented, alongside extending the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts and using their findings to increase public scrutiny of the roles of regional actors.

· Expanding investigative mechanisms, potentially including a Commission of Inquiry on Sudan, to hold those responsible for violations of international law to account.