Analysis of the military coup in Sudan (part 2)

This analytical briefing on Sudan’s military coup examines the possibility of its survival (Section One), and the risks that come with the coup (Section Two).

Section One outlines the contingent factors on which the coup depends on. While the military has five weaknesses that may provide the pro-democracy movement with optimism that the coup can be reversed, its own resilience in maintaining its interests and dominance are a challenge.
Section Two looks at the four risks posed by the military coup: ineffective mediation failing to reverse it, the national, regional and global security issues it can trigger, civilians legitimising it and the international community accepting it.

Section One:

Will the military coup in Sudan survive?

This section starts by looking at five factors that can make or break the 25 October military coup in Sudan.

For those who are optimistic that the coup can be reversed, positive factors include the military’s four weaknesses: first, its lack of popular support, second, the coup appears to be poorly planned, third, the security sector is disunited, all of which may contribute to the fourth weakness, the military’s foreign partners abandoning them after deciding that the coup regime is not viable.
Another positive for the pro-democracy movement, and the fifth military weakness, is the resilience of the protesters.
However, the military is also resilient and believes that it has too much to lose by accepting a truly civilian-led government.

Five contingent factors

The success of al-Burhan’s military coup is contingent upon five crucial factors: i) the willingness of the military to brutally repress its opponents, ii) whether it can gain public support, iii) the resilience of the pro-democracy resistance, and keeping senior military officials happy by iv) maintaining economic patronage networks and gaining v) political legitimacy.

I. Repression

The military’s ability to use force will dictate their capacity to change the terms of the transition, argues David Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies at the University of Nottingham (Conversation, 26 October). In “subjugating the protest movement through brutal repression,” al-Burhan’s challenge is convincing mid-to-low level soldiers to “execute bloody orders”, and keeping RSF Himedti on his side, without alienating officers from the Sudanese Armed Forces – who, as we will learn later in this report, dislike Himedti (African Arguments, 29 October).

II. Gaining public support

A successful coup depends on whether the military can harness popular public support, which Kiwuwa writes “appears to be a tall order” (Conversation, 26 October).

III. Resilience of protesters

Kiwuwa further notes that the ability Sudanese protesters mobilising against military authorities may topple the coup regime, as it did to previous military governments in 1964, 1985 and 2019 (Conversation, 26 October).

IV. Economic patronage

However, while external factors can make or break the coup regime, for his coup to be a success, al-Burhan must also be adept at managing internal relations within the military. Given that senior army officials are “most likely to dictate the fate of al-Burhan’s government,” he must coup-proof his regime by proving to senior security officers that he can keep the patronage network alive (African Arguments, 29 October).

V. Domestic political legitimacy

Nonetheless, external factors also influence how al-Burhan is viewed within the military, and he must prove to the military seniority that his regime is viable through domestic political legitimacy. To achieve domestic political legitimacy, al-Burhan’s government must include Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) leaders, which is likely as “the self-serving nature of Khartoum’s political elite means that a combination of money and political power has a good chance of seducing [FFC] leaders” (African Arguments, 29 October).

Conversely, analyst Magdi el-Gizouli of Rift Valley Institute, argues that al-Burhan has “definitively severed” his relationship with his FFC transitional partners, although he may lean more heavily on Sudan’s rebel groups with whom he signed the Juba peace agreement, thereby convening “a viable set of alternatives to civilian leaders in the country’s peripheries where most of the resources that fuel Sudan’s economy come from” (Washington Post, 26 October).

Military weakness 1 - the military lacks popular support

Al-Burhan’s political proposal is not viable without repression, given that he lacks a political constituency or ideology, and that civilians have not sided with the military (African Arguments, 31 October).

Writer Abdelrahman Mansour notes that the Sudanese military does not enjoy the widespread popularity enjoyed by its counterpart in Egypt, which remains in power after staging a coup on the democratically elected government in 2013 (Foreign Policy, 29 October). Political experts Killian Clarke and Mai Hassan also compare Sudan and our northern neighbours Egypt to suggest that “there are reasons for hope in Sudan,” citing that the fissures in the revolutionary coalition are not as “severe as they were in Egypt,” where “many members of the secularist wing openly backed the military,” whereas in Sudan, the coup has only been supported by the breakaway National Accord faction of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC-NA) (New York Times, 29 October).

However, as we have seen in post-coup developments, al-Burhan is trying to mitigate his lack of political base by turning to the Kezan – the Islamist loyalists belonging to the ousted regime of Omar al-Bashir (Reuters, 11 November).

Military weakness 2 - The coup was poorly planned

African Arguments (31 October) argue that al-Burhan’s coup was not well-planned. In another comparison to Egyptian president Abdulfattah al-Sisi’s 2013 military coup, al-Burhan failed to: announce specific deadlines during the transition, present a transitional leader, leaving “little evidence that al-Burhan is attempting to build a coalition to govern”, all of which are “miscalculations” that suggest al-Burhan’s “days are numbered as a military leader”.

Indeed, while al-Burhan wants Hamdok to be his “technocrat prime minister,” to lead a government without the ousted FFC appointees, Hamdok’s refusal to follow al-Burhan’s orders, or endorse the coup, reflects the military’s difficulties in finding civilian representatives for the new administration (Bloomberg, 28 October). Thus, African Arguments (16 November) describes al-Burhan’s coup as a ““malfunctioning political project,” citing his inability to name government representatives, with a scholar called Hunud Abia Kadouf openly rejecting his proposition to be Prime Minister, and that the coup was initially rejected by rebel leaders, and that ones who supported it – Minni Minnawi and Jibril Ibrahim – face the risk of mutiny amid internal opposition to the coup.

Instead, the military is drawing on Kezan loyalists who served the previous regime. However, Reuters (1 November) note that there is confusion over this strategy, citing the release and immediate re-arrest of the former head of the National Congress Party, Ibrahim Ghandour. Thus, an anonymous diplomat suggests that al-Burhan “does not have a clean path to form a government in the way that he wanted”.

In combination, al-Burhan’s lack of popular support, poor planning and the resilience of the protest movement, may prove his downfall, particularly as brutal repression appears to be his strongest card – which is a risky one to play in the context of divides within Sudan’s security apparatus.

Military weakness 3 - The security sector is not united

Highlighting al-Burhan’s vulnerabilities, African Arguments (30 October) suggest that the likely use of brutality to repress the opposition brutality “may prove his downfall,” if soldiers side with demonstrators. Al-Burhan is exposed by the rift between mid-level army officials and RSF chief Himedti, potentially causing army soldiers to side with protesters if RSF troops conduct most of the violence against protestors.

Africa Report (2 November) further raised the prospect of schisms between Sudan’s coup partners – al-Burhan and Himedti, noting that the latter “relatively silent” following the coup, with rumours that Himedti stated he is against it in conversations with French diplomats. This suggests that the military is not representing a united front to support the coup, amid reports that junior leaders are unhappy with al-Burhan’s leadership, and are refusing to follow instructions and defend the coup, and tensions remaining as officers push back against the Islamist control of the military.

Furthermore, al-Burhan’s political coalition for the coup consists of Islamists and Himedti, two sides who “openly insult one another” (African Arguments, 16 November). Nonetheless, as we will explore later, this lack of unity also poses a threat to Sudan’s wider security.

Military weakness 4 - The military’s foreign partners may abandon them

One of al-Burhan’s vulnerabilities, is his reliance on Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Russia, as they “have abandoned partners when they appear untenable” (African Arguments, 30 October). But how might al-Burhan appear untenable – both externally and domestically?

Firstly, giving his lack of political constituency or ideology, and that civilians have not sided with the military, it could become clear to al-Burhan’s foreign partners that “another military leader is [preferable]” (African Arguments, 31 October). Continued marches may also convince al-Burhan’s foreign partners that he is not viable (African Arguments, 30 October).

Secondly, with the World Bank and US withholding a combined $3.7 billion in aid, and France re-thinking $5 billion in debt relief, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Russia “cannot replace tens-of-billions of dollars in assistance from western nations” (African Arguments, 30 October). De Waal notes that with the UAE and Saudi Arabia not having pockets deep enough to “bail Sudan” (Reuters, 1 November). Moreover, Camille Lons of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (16 November) challenges speculation that Sudanese military leaders received financial reassurance pre-coup, noting that Gulf states “face their own financial constraints and uncertain economic futures,” leaving them “restrained in their delivery of financial aid.”

These economic costs may prove critical for al-Burhan, they may lead soldiers to support a change in military leadership amid diminishing purchasing power and exile from the population (African Arguments, 30 October). Thus, given its lack of regional support, the coup is considered to be in a fragile state (Foreign Policy, 29 October), particularly as the UAE and Saudi joined a US and UK statement calling for the return of the civilian government in Sudan (Multiple sources, 3 November).

Moreover, it is also worth considering whether the coup is in the Saudi-Emirati interest. Lons (IISS, 16 November) suggests that it is not, for security and diplomatic reasons. Given Sudan’s divided security apparatus, Lons suggests that the Gulf states are aware that the coup opens the door to “unpredictability and instability that could precipitate a civil war,” culminating in spill-over effects including: economic repercussions, refugee flows, terrorism threats and arms smuggling. If Sudan is “absorbed by internal issues,” Egypt also loses a partner in its Ethiopian dam dispute.

Finally, the Gulf states are also “highly sensitive to the reputational risks of being associated with the coup,” as they are keen to appear as “constructive and reliable partners” US regional partners. Lons notes that after 3 June 2019 Khartoum massacre damaged their reputation, the Gulf states played a constructive role in facilitiating the power-sharing agreement with civilians (IISS, 16 November).

According to African Arguments (16 November), this partly explains why al-Burhan has not conducted massacres on protesters – he may be afraid that mass violence will lead to abandonment from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who “partially care about their image vis-à-vis Western nations”.

Military weakness 5 - Protesters are resilient

Following the coup, the authorities’ clampdown on opponents has seen at least 20 protesters killed, and at least 40 notable pro-democracy activists, politicians and journalists arrested and potentially tortured (Sudan In The News). As predicted by el-Gizouli, the military would have no option but to “brutally crush” resistance by force (AFP, 25 October).

However, this reality did not prevent civilians from participating in the 13 November Millioniyah, even if it raised the death toll again. The coup is not a “done deal,” notes de Waal, given Sudan's "tremendous capacity for civic mobilisation", even in spite of the memories of the June 3 2019 massacre of peaceful protesters (BBC, 25 October). El-Gizouli also cited the giant crowds of young people thronging Sudan’s streets on the 13 November Millioniyah as a reflection of how much Sudan’s leading generals underestimated popular resistance to the takeover (New York Times, 13 November).

The BBC’s (7 November) article covering the determination and resilience of Sudanese protesters quoted activist Suleima Elkhalifa to say: “people are more determined now. And more politically aware. After 30 years of military dictatorship, we will not submit. The youth represent more than 50% of this country and it's clear we don't want this government. They cannot kill us all. They cannot kill this dream”.

The International Crisis Group (26 October B) think-tank has also acknowledged the resilience of Sudan’s protest movement, writing that the Sudanese public will not easily accept a return to authoritarian rule, and attempts to put down protests by force are projected to culminate in a “prolonged and bitter standoff that would close the door to resolution of the crisis,” particularly as Sudan’s “sophisticated” protest movement comprising of a countrywide network of local committees able to organise effectively, even amid the internet shutdown.

In addition, Rebecca Hamilton, an associate professor at American University’s Washington College of Law, noted that Sudanese confidence towards, and organisational abilities for, toppling dictators, “have continued to grow” (Foreign Policy, 29 October). Furthermore, de Waal suggested that al-Burhan and his backers lack “the capacity or the cohesion among themselves to mount an intensive crackdown” (Reuters, 1 November).

Another factor helping the Sudanese resistance is unity. The coup reunited the civilian movement, as it has enabled Hamdok to recover popularity that was “barren” among the Sudanese Professionals Association and Resistance Committees – organisations the led the uprising on a grassroots level (African Arguments, 31 October).

However, whether the protest movement can convert its popular support into political power is questionable, if we look at the experience of the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), the trade union coalition that was the “leading force” of the uprising”. The issue is the SPA’s horizontal structure, with little protects it from the arrest or co-optation of senior members, but it also causes a leadership crisis that culminates in the splitting of the movement, factionalism and paralysis of decision-making (African Arguments, 3 November). Furthermore, as resilient as the protest movement is, so is Sudan’s military, which triggers pessimistic outlooks on the coup’s chances of survival.

The military is resilient too

Analyst Jean-Baptiste Gallopin argues that, unlike in 2019, “the army is emboldened,” noting that “security forces knock on doors at night, arresting leaders and organisers who have not already gone into hiding,” by contrast two years ago, whereby, after four months of street protests, “the generals thought better of detaining revolutionary leaders” (London Review of Books, 1 November).

In addition, Sudan analyst Magdi el-Gizouli suggests that “no amount of western pressure is likely to persuade al-Burhan” to reverse the coup, given that he appears to have seized power to prevent his own ouster by lower-ranking officers who feared they might lose the privileges that the military has amassed over its many decades in power. “Stepping back from this coup might mean a fracturing of the army,” el-Gizouli said. “It’s not going to be easy for them to reverse the steps they have taken” (New York Times, 13 November).

Nonetheless, as noted by African Arguments (16 November), al-Burhan has “suffocated” the protests with arrests rather than a massacre, which unveils two weaknesses within his regime: firstly, that mass violence may result in his abandonment by Gulf states keen to avoid reputational risks, and that, as in 2019, generals will defy orders to conduct a massacre as they did Omar al-Bashir.

Section Two:

What risks does the military coup in Sudan pose?

The first risk is the international mediation to reverse the coup may prove ineffective.
Secondly, the coup may have negative security consequences for Sudan on a national, regional and global basis. The coup may expose fractions within the security apparatus, as well as renewing conflict in the war zones in the peripheral regions. Regionally, it may exacerbate the border conflict with Ethiopia. The proliferation of competing armed groups in Sudan is a global security risk.
Thirdly, analysts raise the prospect of civilians eventually being co-opted by the coup regime and giving it political legitimacy, which would fracture the pro-democracy movement.
Finally, should the aforementioned occur, the coup may eventually gain international acceptance.

Risk 1 - Ineffective mediation

The key issues regarding attempts to mediate Sudan’s political crisis are: the reliance on Hamdok, who is not trusted by the protest movement. In addition, the amount of parties mediating the crisis may complicate the path to a resolution, and finally, the worst outcome is argued to be “most likely,” as the military may welcome endless dialogue as long as it remains in control of assets.

“Untrustworthy” Hamdok as lead negotiator

The key mediation points to resolve the political crisis are the following: the release of political detainees, the military’s fears of implication for crimes in Darfur through prosecution by the ICC, a review of the Tamkeen Committee that “strikes at the core of the military’s patronage network”, and the transfer of power to civilians as stipulated in the Constitution. However, the mediation poses its own challenges, including: protesters and most civilian parties are less likely to accept a military led-government, and trust in the FFC parties is low, making Hamdok a leading negotiator, even though he “governs by compromise, which may disappoint protestors” (African Arguments,1 November).

Indeed, protesters who seek an end to brutality, corruption and human rights violations, do not trust Hamdok - “a man of compromise who will be pressured by the military to sign a bad deal,” potentially appointing a cabinet that has no power (African Arguments,4 November).

“Disruptive” mediation process

African Arguments (1 November) further argue that the mediation process is likely to disrupt rather than solve the political crisis, citing the proliferation of “self-interested parties rushing in” to mediate a civilian-military agreement. African Arguments suggest that this “causes confusion” for both parties, thereby wasting time and reducing the likelihood potential agreement. In addition, it is argued that the amount of rushing mediators may culminate in a “flawed agreement” that “papers over the same unresolved issues: power-sharing, justice and corruption”.

Thus far, the disruptive mediation process has been reflected in the irritation of US and UN diplomats towards the mediation efforts of David Beasley, the executive director of the UN’s World Food Program (WFP), described as “diplomatic freelancing”. Not only do Beasley’s attempts to get al-Burhan and Hamdok to negotiate contradict the protest movement’s demands for civilian rule before any negotiations, but a Foreign Policy (16 November) diplomatic source said that it is “creating doubt as to what the US position is… has been net negatives for US diplomacy”.

Nonetheless, Foreign Policy note that others suggest that Beasley is “filling a diplomatic vacuum” as “the international response to Sudan’s latest political crisis was muddled and weak, diluted by multiple overlapping efforts from various parties, including the US, UN and African Union, to find a way to negotiate themselves out of the crisis”.

The military’s delaying tactics

Furthermore, Rebecca Hamilton, an associate professor at American University’s Washington College of Law, warns that the worst outcome of international mediation “is also the most likely,” raising the prospect of the UN Security Council settling on a plea for restraint and dialogue, which would be welcomed by Sudanese military leaders who risk dissenting ranks if they order mass violence against peaceful protesters, and “al-Burhan “would welcome endless dialogue—provided the military stays in control of Sudan’s assets (Foreign Policy, 29 October).

Risk 2 - Worsening the security crisis

Despite coordination on the coup, Sudanese security forces are not united, which can have negative impactions for Sudan’s i) internal security, ii) particularly the peripheral regions, alongside iii) regional and iv) global security. Thus, the democratic transition “only papered over” Sudan’s most pressing competitions for power –between the army, militias and rebel groups, and powerful Islamist entities. The competition is further complicated by how various parties use the political tensions to preserve or expand their power bases (Guardian, 25 October).

I. Internal security risks

Internally within the army, al-Burhan is reportedly facing pushback from junior officers, alongside tensions caused by Islamist control of the military (Africa Report, 2 November). There is also rift between mid-level army officials and RSF militia commander Himedti (African Arguments, 30 October), with the latter resisting attempts to integrate his force into the army (Guardian, 25 October). Despite collaborating on the coup, al-Burhan and Himedti’s mutual distrust increases the risk of Sudan’s “potpourri of militia and security forces turning their guns on each-other” (Economist, 25 October).

II. Worsening conflict in Sudan’s peripheral conflict zones

The coup may also have threatened renewed conflict in Sudan’s peripheral regions. Africa analyst Alex de Waal notes that the Sudan Liberation Movement of Abdelwahid al-Nur and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement of Abdelaziz al-Hilu, two territory-controlling rebel groups that did not sign the Juba peace deal, had confidence in deposed prime minister Hamdok in peace negotiations (BBC, 27 October).

Thus, the International Crisis Group (26 October B) also warn that the coup may “sow further instability” in the peripheries, as the rebel groups that signed the Juba peace agreement – Minni Minnawi’s Sudan Liberation Movement, Jibril Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement and Malik Agar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – may fight on the central government’s side against holdout groups.

III. The impact of the coup of regional security

The coup can also have regional and global ramifications. Bloomberg (27 October) suggest that the coup could complicate talks aimed at resolving a standoff between Egypt and Ethiopia, over Ethiopia’s attempt to build a giant dam on the River Nile which may threaten to interrupt the water supply downstream in Egypt and Sudan.

There is also potential for Sudan and Ethiopia conflict as “a military government in Sudan could also take a more proactive stance in opposing Ethiopia’s claims to land in the al-Fashqa area, which straddles a mutual border”.

IV. The impact of the coup of global security

Anne Bartlett of the University of New South Wales notes the global security risks posed by the competition over power between the military faction, hard-line Islamist elements, informal and formal armed force and a plethora of groups and armed militias (Conversation, 29 October).

Finally, the ICG (26 October B) project an economic downturn for Sudan as the US has paused economic assistance and the EU is “likely to take similar measures”, which may further destabilise the country.

Risk 3 - Civilian buy-in

As noted by the Rift Valley Institute’s Magdi el-Gizouli, coup leader al-Burhan “needs a civilian face for the government” (AFP, 26 October). Not only would this help al-Burhan gain international legitimacy (Washington Post, 26 October), but it would prove to the senior army officers that decide his fate that he can achieve domestic political legitimacy (African Arguments, 29 October).

Indeed, African Arguments (29 October) suggests that al-Burhan can achieve domestic political legitimacy by including the deposed FFC leaders in his new government, which is likely as “the self-serving nature of Khartoum’s political elite means that a combination of money and political power has a good chance of seducing [FFC] leaders.” For the time being, however, al-Burhan is insistent on a government of politically unaffiliated “technocrats” that are not part of the FFC. Nonetheless, as noted by US Institute of Peace (27 October) Sudan Programme Advisor Manal Taha, this could “widen the current divisions among civilian and political actors, pitting those who join against those deposed”.

Risk 4 - International acceptance

Another risk is that the coup regime eventually gains international acceptance, and analysts have projected how this outcome may play out.

Alberto Fernandez, the former US chief of mission in Sudan, warns that the US may face the “potential trap” of Sudan’s military leaders dangling the prospect of a “substitute civilian puppet government,” and thereby “giving the regime vital breathing space time and time again”. Identifying specific ways that the regime can gradually generate international acceptance, Fernandez suggests that it can do so by making an “outrageous decision…and the international community would engage it in an effort to make the decision less bad,” culminating in a “focus on ‘process’ over actual results.” (Washington Institute, 26 October)

In addition, Madgi el-Gizouli told the Washington Post (26 October) that: “Al-Burhan might be able to pull this off with the support of…Egypt, the Saudis and the Emiratis…He is not a pariah like [former president Omar] al-Bashir became, nor is he an Islamist. He will find a new, more pliant civilian face, he will maintain formalities, and the West will simply end up dealing with that person”.