Analysis of the military coup in Sudan (part 1)

This briefing examines the causes of the military coup in Sudan (Section One) and (Section Two) whether the coup could have been avoided.

Section One covers six causes for the coup. Starting with the military’s interests and motivations, we then examine international and civilian policies that gave the military their justification for the coup. The section ends by looking at the wider historical context of why Sudan is prone to military rule.
Section Two questions whether domestic actors could have averted the coup if they gave military leaders amnesty, whether Sudan’s removal from the US terror list was premature, and whether the “suffocating” International Monetary Fund economic reforms were sensible.

SECTION ONE:

What caused the military coup in Sudan on 25 October 2021?

The military’s motivations for the coup were argued to be fears that the handover of power to civilians, as mandate by the Constitution, would have (1.1) threatened its economic dominance and (1.2) forced the military to face justice for its abuses.
Consequently, analysts have raised the (1.3) prospect of al-Burhan staging the coup due to pressure from within the armed forces.
However, the path for the coup was paved by the (1.4) IMF’s requirement for the removal of fuel and bread subsidies increasing the severity of Sudan’s economic crisis and its impact on ordinary citizens, and (1.5) civilian political mismanagement and in-fighting. These factors gave the military an excuse to stage a coup under the guise of restoring order and stability.
Colonial legacies have been blamed for the dominance of the military on Sudanese politics.

1.1 The military wants to protect its economic interests

The coup was motivated by the military’s economic interests, particularly civilian attempts to retrieve assets gained through corruption, and seeking civilian oversight over the military’s dominant and lucrative companies so that revenues can be directed towards the public good. Although the military resisted such attempts throughout the transitional period, the path to the coup was accelerated by leadership of Sudan’s highest political authority being handed over to a civilian, as mandated by the Constitution. Despite the military’s economic dominance, and the coup, exacerbating Sudan’s economic crisis, it appears that “flogging Sudan’s resources is too lucrative a business” for Sudan’s coup leaders.

The coup “epitomises” the military’s fears of civilian rule in Sudan, as it attempts to “maintain control over economic interests”, including their domination of lucrative companies, notes Jonas Horner, Sudan analyst at the International Crisis Group (AFP, 26 October). Throughout the transitional period, Sudanese security officials “consistently worked to manipulate transitional arrangements to avoid losing their privileged status…which entails lucrative economic opportunities” (Council on Foreign Relations, 25 October). The military’s numerous holding companies, whereby “much of the revenue bypasses government coffers and goes into their private accounts abroad,” made them financially unassailable and enabled them to undermine the civilian government at every turn (Conversation, 29 October).

In “preparation” for the eventual coup, Sudanese army commander-in-chief Abdulfattah al-Burhan, and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia commander Himedti, his deputy chair of the ruling Sovereign Council, were amassing greater economic power. While the RSF was expanding its business interests, the army was taking the business profits of the outlawed National Congress Party of ex-president Omar al-Bashir. Thus, Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok’s efforts to rein those financial interests “spelt trouble” (Economist, 25 October). Indeed, Al-Burhan himself is “doubling up as a corporate baron,” suggested Suliman Baldo of the Sentry, an organisation that tracks “dirty money connected to African war criminals”. Baldo cited al-Burhan’s leadership of the board of trustees for one of the military’s biggest firms (New York Times, 29 October).

Therefore, civilians tackling corruption “worried” the military, noted Alex de Waal, the author of numerous books about Sudan. De Waal highlighted the Tamkeen committee set-up to retrieve the illicitly-gained assets of the former regime, which challenged the military’s “still-increasing share of the national budget, [as] military-owned companies operate with tax exemptions and often allegedly corrupt contracting procedures” (BBC, 27 October). During the transitional period, efforts to retrieve stolen assets and unwind illicit deals were “a flashpoint for tension” between the military and civilian components of Sudan’s transitional government (CFR, 25 October). Consequently, the stage was set for “the hostile takeover,” as the military resisted reforms that included civilian oversight of its institutions and business interests, noted Chatham House’s Ahmed Soliman (AFP, 26 October).

However, “impetus behind the coup” was al-Burhan - as mandated by Sudan’s constitution - handing over leadership of the Sovereign Council (Sudan’s highest political authority) to a civilian. As noted by the Atlantic Council’s Cameron Hudson, this would have paved the way for “divesting the military of its considerable financial holdings inside the country” (Bloomberg, 29 October). Hudson further noted that economy recovery “was never going to be achieved without the military relinquishing its control over the major revenue-generating parts of the economy” from port operations to gold mining (Atlantic Council, October 25).

And despite the coup triggered triggering the suspension of debt relief that “leaves the economy on its knees,” Guardian (2 November) columnist Nesrine Mailk argues that “[this] does not concern militaries who are bent on extraction in a country that does not need to thrive for its overlords to prosper,” as “flogging Sudan’s resources and people to the highest bidder is too lucrative a business to give up for a few hundred million dollars of western aid”. Indeed, Malik wrote that Sudan’s military coup leaders – mercenaries, the army and business interests from the era of former president Omar al-Bashir - ”will sell Sudan’s resources to the highest bidder”, with “Sudan’s new ruling club” going on to “run Sudan as the host body for a partnership of parasites, divide national infrastructure, and seize and sell raw materials to regional allies”.

1.2 The military fears being held accountable for massacres

The military coup has been attributed to the military’s “forceful resistance” of revolutionary goals, including – establishing real lines of accountability and reforming the security services (CFR, 25 October). As noted by Reuters (25 October), tensions between the military and civilian component of Sudan’s transitional government were escalating as civilians sought pushed for oversight and restructuring of the military, particularly through the integration of the powerful, paramilitary RSF.

Crucially, the 21 October protests that preceded the coup, attended by millions of Sudanese, triggered military fears of being forced to face justice for past crimes, notes Theodore Murphy of the European Council on Foreign Relations (DW, 25 October) – in particular, state-sanctioned atrocities committed in Darfur and the June 3 2019 massacre in Khartoum.

Indeed, as noted by Alex de Waal, al-Burhan’s motivations for the coup was the transfer of leadership of the ruling Sovereign Council to a civilian raising the prospect of him and RSF commander-in-chief Himedti facing justice for the June 3 massacre, as well as being transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (BBC, 27 October). With the ICC seeking trials for former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir for atrocities committed in Darfur since the war began in 2003, Reuters (25 October) note that the civilian-majority cabinet has signed off on handing over al-Bashir and other suspects to the ICC, whereas the Sovereign Council, led by al-Burhan and Himedti had not.

Thus, as noted by Sudan analyst Jihad Mashamoun, al-Burhan and Himedti were reluctant to step down amid al-Bashir’s potential transfer to the ICC for atrocities in Darfur, as they fear being implicated and “would like…some immunity” (New York Times, 29 October).

1.3 The military’s internal dynamics led al-Burhan’s pre-emptive coup

In ascertaining causes behind the coup, it is important to understand the internal dynamics of Sudan’s military, particularly the factors on which al-Burhan’s continued leadership of the armed forces are contingent upon. Given that senior army officials are “most likely to dictate the fate of al-Burhan’s government,” al-Burhan had to “coup-proof” his regime by keeping the economic patronage network alive (African Arguments, 29 October). These circumstances are relevant within the context of a view that al-Burhan was pushed to stage the coup by a military seniority worried about the loss of economic privileges.

Indeed, analyst Jean-Baptiste Gallopin revealed that a former minister, close to the military, suggested that army chief Abdulfattah al-Burhan staged the coup “because his position in the military and security apparatus was under threat from hardliners who thought the time was ripe: if he held back, he would have been toppled by his fellow officers” (London Review of Books, 1 November).

Similarly, as noted by veteran journalist Osman Mirghani, “going down from the country’s leader to just a council member is traditionally not an option among the military generals in Sudan… Al-Burhan understood that such a move would have meant that military will have to remove him from political life” (Independent, 26 October).

1.4 Tough economic measures caused by IMF reforms

Economic reforms sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a condition for Sudanese debt relief have also been blamed the coup, including by

Atlantic Council (25 October) Africa Center director, Rama Yade, who wrote that the “tough austerity measures ended up plunging the population into despair and offering the military the ideal pretext they wanted to pull off this coup”, in arguments that the military “seized the moment to accuse the government of ignoring the people’s needs,” amid the spiralling Sudanese economy.

Similarly, the Financial Times (26 October) suggested the IMF’s “insistence on ending costly fuel subsidies,” led to poor families being affected by rising transport and food prices, which stoked popular discontent with the government and played into the generals’ hands.

Providing further context was Richard Walker, a former Financial Times foreign affairs correspondent. Arguing that “the price of bread always determines the fate of Sudanese leaders”, Walker suggested that the fate of Hamdok - a “politically untried UN economist [and] child of the multilateral agency mind-set” – was sealed by IMF reforms. Walker added that the IMF pre-requisite for debt relief, “the pain of immediate government cuts, including an end to subsidies on essentials,” balances budgets at the expense of unbalancing the government, with the removal of fuel subsidies “the worst of bad options” for Sudan (Spectator, 26 October).

Indeed, Hamdok’s acceptance of unpopular IMF austerity measures fits into a wider pattern of civilian political mismanagement being blamed for accelerating the path towards the coup, with writer Abdelrahman Mansour noting that the severe economic situation plummeted the popularity of civilian leaders and “made it easier for the military to snatch power under the guise of restoring stability and prosperity” (Foreign Policy, 29 October).

1.5 Civilian infighting gave the military an excuse

In analysis that has highlighted the contribution of the civilian government to the coup, factors cited include: factionalism and infighting offering the military an excuse to seize power under the pretext of restoring order, and a failure to deal with the military pragmatically.

The 2021 coup d’etat followed the same sequence of events caused the failure of 1964 and 1985 civilian uprisings, whereby unresolvable economic crisis and divisions among governing civilians paved the way for a coup (Economist, October 25). Thus, as noted by US Institute of Peace (27 October) senior Horn of Africa expert Joseph Tucker, the military may have thought the coup “would at least be tolerated” amid public frustration with political deadlock and impatience with the pace of economic recovery.

Indeed, “Sudan's political frailty has a long precedent,” note the BBC (October 25), with the “splintering of political parties and their inability to build consensus paving the way for the military to step in under the pretext of restoring order”. With at least 80 political parties in Sudan, the BBC note “this same factionalism plagued the Sovereign Council, where internal divisions among both the military and civilian camps pushed political consensus yet further out of reach.”

Nonetheless, specific civilian policies have also been blamed by pro-democracy civilians. Firstly, Osman Mirghani, the editor-in-chief of al-Tayyar newspaper, told the Independent (26 October): “it was bizarre to see politicians demanding military reform while they are disorganised and lacking legitimacy in the form of an elected parliament…their proposal would make the army effectively run by militias”.

Secondly, Nureldin Satti, the Sudanese ambassador to the US, who has been vocally critical of the coup and called upon the Sudanese public to protest it, told two US outlets that the civilians were not pragmatic enough in their dealings with the military. “Some civilians did not understand the importance of alleviating the military’s fears,” Satti told the New York Times (29 October), before arguing that Hamdok, “

a technocrat by training and temperament” lacked “the political skills to manage the tensions… he pushed too hard, too fast.” Similarly, expressing a view to Bloomberg (29 October) that civilian government leaders failed the address the military’s concerns, Satti used the following analogy: “If you have someone holding a gun, you cannot take it out of their hand unless you give him an alternative”.

1.6 Colonialism means that Sudan is vulnerable to military rule

Nonetheless, Sudan’s colonial experience “helps explain the military’s appetite for political power,” as “power came through the gun”, leaving generations of soldiers believing they are the ultimate guardians of Sudan, argues Justin Willis, a history professor at Durham University (Conversation, 28 October).

Expanding on the relationship between Sudan’s history of military coups and colonialism, Willis argued that colonial rule produced a centralised state with power focused around Khartoum, leading Sudan’s political elite to view control of the state as a route to wealth, with civilian leaders during their brief periods of rule seeking power by mobilising regional or sectarian sentiments and localising patronage politics. In tandem with Sudan’s economic dependence on cotton and wealth gap between the centre and peripheries, civilian politicians were unable to solve Sudan’s problems, giving the soldiers “a ready excuse for repeated interventions,” with the military’s prolonged leadership facilitating more state control, allowing it to expand its patronage economy and acquire its own industries and investments, in a shadow economy beyond any scrutiny (Conversation, 28 October).

Therefore, it was no surprise, as Alex de Waal notes, that rural leaders who were previously part of al-Bashir's system of "mercenary patronage" saw pro-democracy demonstrators' desire to change the system "as an assault on their constituencies” (DW, 25 October).

SECTION TWO

Could the military coup in Sudan have been avoided?

Analysis on the coup has implied that both internal and external actors could have averted the coup if some policies were, or were not, adopted. This leaves some questions which can be taken into consideration for the continuation of Sudan’s democratic struggle.

Could amnesty for military generals have avoided the coup?

Domestically, the Economist (28 October) suggested that, through the “squalid” power-sharing deal, civilian politicians could have built trust with the army by potentially “offering amnesty for all but the most serious war crimes in exchange for full disclosure about them,” with the Economist stating that this approach worked in post-Apartheid South Africa. Similarly, Sudanese ambassador to the US, Nureldin Satti, suggested that “some civilians did not understand the importance of alleviating the military’s fears,” with deposed civilian Prime Minister Hamdok accusing of pushing “too hard, too fast” (New York Times, 29 October).

Was Sudan’s removal from the US State Sponsor of Terrorism list premature?

Nonetheless, it has also been suggested that international actors could have acted differently. The Financial Times (26 October) suggested that the that US’ removal of Sudan from its state sponsors of terrorism list was premature as it left no incentive for the military to stick to the transition.

Could western donors have been quicker to mitigate the negative impact of IMF reforms?

In addition, given the “tough” and “suffocating” austerity measures that came as a condition for the IMF’s loans (Atlantic Council, 25 October), which included an “insistence on ending costly fuel subsidies, which stoked popular discontent with the government and played into the generals’ hands” (Financial Times, 26 October), it has been suggested that western donors could have smoothed Sudan’s transition with aid more quickly, but “instead the economy kept contracting, fuelling a sense of crisis that the army exploited” (Economist, 28 October).

Indeed, the Financial Times (26 October) particularly accused international donors of being “too slow” to fund an income-support programme for poor families affected by rising transport and food prices that were “partly the result of IMF” loan conditions. Similarly, the Atlantic Council’s (25 October) Africa Center director Rama Yade argued that western countries should have supported the government economically “rather than suffocating it with tough austerity measures that ended up plunging the population into despair and offering the military the ideal pretext they wanted to pull off this coup”.

Thus, as suggested by Richard Walker, a former Financial Times foreign affairs correspondent suggests that international lenders should have “taken the process of normalisation and democratic gains at face value, calculated the ghastly cost of another failed state in north east Africa, and come to the necessary conclusion: continue to feed the Hamdok government with as much cash as it needed for as long as it took” (Spectator, 26 October).