WEEKLY REPORT: June 18-25
Summary
Protests resume and the internet blackout continues, as the military rejects Ethiopia’s power-sharing proposal. It is disputed whether Himedti’s Rapid Support Forces - or the Sudanese army - are the most powerful forces in Khartoum, with reasons for Himedti’s popularity being identified as he tries to build his support base. The solutions suggested this week have all provided ways and reasons for the US to pressure Saudi Arabia and the UAE to stop supporting Himedti.
Cartoon depicting a wealthy Gulf man overlooking TMC leader Abdulfattah Al Burhan, and his deputy Himedti, dumping Sudan into the River Nile.
Protests resume:
“The revolution has only just begun,” writes Yousra Elbagir (25 June, Financial Times). Despite the recent atrocities in Sudan, “resistance has reignited across Sudan.”
This was reflected in the return of protests across Sudanese state capitals (20 June, Reuters). The first day-time protest in Khartoum since the June 3 massacre, held in Ribat University, was violently dispersed by security forces (24 June, Reuters).
2. Ethiopian mediation:
The transitional military council (TMC) and the Declaration of Freedom and Change (DFC) opposition alliance have still not met directly since the June 3 massacre, instead relying on Ethiopian mediators.
Multiple sources (June 23) reported that the DFC accepted the Ethiopian roadmap for civilian rule. The power-sharing proposal included a 15-member leadership council with 7 DFC and military representatives each, and a neutral civilian. The military would chair the council for the first 18 months, with the DFC leading the second half of the 3-year transition.
On June 24, AP reported that the military rejected the proposal, with TMC deputy Himedti saying that the Ethiopian proposal was supposed to pave the way for the resumption of talks, rather than offer solutions. Himedti added that civilian participation in the power-sharing council “should be formed through elections.”
Himedti’s democratic credentials remain questionable. Judd Devermont, director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies told Bloomberg (June 22) that the military council has no interest in democratic transition under Himedti’s leadership.
Mohammed Naji Al Asam of the Sudanese Professionals Association, a DFC coalition leader.
TMC pressure press conference. R-L: Spokesperson Shamseddine Kabbashi, Deputy chief and RSF commander Himedti, Air Force chief Salah Abdelkhalig.
3. Himedti’s disputed power:
While Himedti is widely referred to as the de-facto leader in Sudan, there are signs the other elements of the TMC – that is, forces affiliated to the armed forces or the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) – are “[betraying] anxiety over [Himedti’s] ambition” – namely, TMC air force chief Salah Abdelkhalig (Financial Times, June 20).
Himedti is only perceived to be in charge “because he is talking too much in the media,” and “his troops are very visible,” Abdelkhalig told the Financial Times, adding that Himedti “cannot do it” as a political commander.
Abdelkhalig further asserted that “other forces [in Khartoum are] stronger than him.” However, analyst Rashid Abdi (21 June) tweeted that Himedti “has all the cards,” after rejecting a plea from generals to step aside, with the army “fearful of a bloodbath if it moves against [Himedti’s Rapid Support Forces, which remain in control of Khartoum.”
Nonetheless, Mohanad Elbalal (June 22) noted that Sudan is a state that has diverted 70% of its income to defence, leaving NISS and the army considerably better equipped and larger in numbers.
Elbalal attributes the RSF’s dominance in Khartoum to the regime “[needing] a force willing to terrorise the population into submission,” adding that RSF troops are willing to end confrontations with protesters with murder or rape, whereas other security forces may be more willing deescalate confrontations peacefully.
As Amnesty International researcher Ahmed Elozbier told the Wall Street Journal (June 20), the “RSF is not trained to do policing activities… it’s a philosophy of shoot to kill.”
However, political analyst Daila Haj-Omar contends that the military council “has no choice but to accommodate [Himedti – the biggest power in town].” (Wall Street Journal, June 20)
Haj-Omar blames western diplomats “too fast to…shake hands with Himedti” for enabling him to enact the June 3 massacre. The WSJ also also attributes the RSF’s growing power to support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s keenness “to back dependable non-Islamist strongmen when the possibility of democratic change looms.”
TMC leader and Sudanese army chief Abdulfattah Al Burhan is depicted as a donkey, led by Salah Gosh, the former leader of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service. Himedti is riding the donkey, and struggling to read, with the cartoonist satirising Himedti’s lack of education.
4. Himedti’s supporters:
Himedti held rallies this week, in attempts to consolidate and expand his support base. CNN (June 20) report that these rallies intend to push the message that the RSF is trying to restore Sudanese security and stability, with Himedti’s supporters quoted denying allegations of RSF complicity for the June 3 massacre. Indeed, AP (June 20) reported that Himedti blamed the massacre on impostors wearing his RSF uniforms.
Tom Wilson’s Financial Times feature piece (June 20) delved deeper into Himedti’s support base. Darfuri politician Rudwan Daoud attributes Himedti’s positive image in Darfur to Saudi salaries for the RSF troops in Yemen trickling down to Darfuri households. Daoud also pointed to Himedti being a source of his inspiration for Darfuris – with his power unprecedented for a Darfuri since Sudan’s independence.
Former Sudanese foreign minister Ibrahim Ghandour told Wilson that Himedti’s “outsider status” as a Darfuri is a political advantage, enabling Himedti to exploit perceptions of the protests as a Khartoum-based elitist movement, thereby allowing Himedti to build support across Sudan.
Still, Himedti and the RSF’s legacy of mass murder and rape remain. Sulaima Sharif, who heads a trauma centre, said she is not scared to speak out against him because “[he] will kill us anyway…at least we should die with dignity.” (CNN, June 20).
Janjaweed = another name for the RSF. Himedti sitting on a bloodied throne.
5. Internet blackout
Sudanese people are still reliant on the media for their voices to be heard, amid the continuing internet blackout.
The internet was restored – albeit only for Sudanese lawyer Abdel-Ahdeem Hassan – after he won a case that he filed in a personal capacity. However, he has gone back to court with the aim of regaining internet access for “one million people.” (BBC, June 24).
The blackout may cost Sudan upward of $1 billion or nearly 1% of Sudan’s GDP, which may fuel more protests, as economic grievances sparked the uprising. (Washington Post, 21 June).
However, the blackout is “a strategically calculated risk,” according to Yousra Khalil (Washington Institute, 25 June), as only 7 percent of Sudan’s population uses social media, and its most active users significantly overlap with the demonstrators.
Khalil argues that the blackout reflects the Sudanese regime’s “continued attempts to guarantee its survival by restricting access to information,” thereby emphasising the need raise awareness and understanding about Sudan.
Khalil also noted Sudan In The News’ contribution to enhancing understanding of Sudan’s political context through independent sources, and stimulating the informed discussions among political observers that can help create practical solutions. Indeed, all solutions presented this week called for the US to pressure Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE in some form.
A bloodthirsty werewolf in RSF uniform, about to pounce on a female doctor.
Solution 1: Awareness
Yousra Khalil suggested that the Sudanese solution lies in better access to information for policymakers. Khalil noted the TMC’s internal divides and the possible consequences of international terrorist groups exploiting a potential Sudanese civil war, to highlight flaws in the TMC’s propaganda narrative of itself as a guarantor of security and stability.
Thus, Khalil calls for policymakers to not fall into the trap of TMC-controlled information, and increase its understanding of Sudan’s context, using such information to emphasise to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt that the TMC “poses the biggest obstacle to…stability.”
Solution 2: Counterweight to the Gulf
Judd Devermont (Bloomberg, June 22) argued that the US “needs to be a counterweight to Gulf influence,” citing US interests in supporting Sudanese peace and democracy such as Sudan’s geo-strategic location between Africa and the Middle-East. Devermont further called for the US to support Sudanese protesters, and champion moderates in the TMC.
Solution 3: Protect Sudan from Islamist coup
Finally, Andrew Natsios (Washington Post, June 20), ex-US envoy to Sudan, calls for the US to convince Saudi Arabia and the UAE to end their support for Himedti, citing common US-Gulf interests in a stable Sudan that does not re-align with Iran.
Natsios argues that Himedti’s continued power may provoke a domestic Sudanese backlash, resulting in a “fertile environment for an Islamist [coup].”
Natsios also offers hope for a Sudanese democratic transition, citing Sudanese political culture assets such as the maintenance of a vibrant civil society, democratic history and “highly educated and sophisticated elite,” to conclude that “Sudan is not Egypt, Libya or Syria.”