REPORT: Sudan’s controversial power-sharing deal

Report: Sudan’s controversial power-sharing deal

This report will predominantly focus on the June 5th power-sharing deal agreed between the transitional military council and the Declaration of Freedom and Change, a coalition of opposition groups. The deal was a result of US pressure on Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Various analysts and activists have reacted negatively to the deal. The report concludes with suggested recommendations for Sudanese progress.

@KhalidAlBaih depicts the power-sharing deal as one signed with “the blood of the martyrs.”

Other key developments:

·       Military hires Canadian lobbying firm to polish their image (Globe and Mail, June 27): Dickens & Madson signed a $6-million deal to seek government funds and diplomatic recognition for deputy military chief Himedti. The Sudanese regime is also paying the firm to find oil investors, equipment for its security forces, a meeting with US President Trump and improved relations with Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UN, African Union. The Globe and Mail (June 28) reported that the deal possibly breaches international laws limiting arm sales to Sudan.  Himedti reportedly tried to cancel the deal after Dickens & Madson’s president Ari Ben-Menashe criticized the protests, but the deal remains in place. Ben-Menashe said his client “went crazy.” (July 9)

·       Internet returns to Sudan (multiple sources, July 9): Following this, the hashtag translating to #documentation_of_the_sit-in_massacre has been flooded with footage, images and testimonies of the June 3 massacre, capturing evidence of Himedti’s Rapid Support Forces committing abuses against peaceful protesters. The extent of the brutality committed has resulted in trigger warnings from those sharing the graphic content.

The aftermath of the June 3 massacre. This is the least graphic photo we could share. Others on the hashtag will show the rotting carcasses pulled out from the River Nile.

1.     Background to the deal:

 I.               The June 30 march:

 Multiple sources (June 29) reported that Sudan’s ruling military council warned the Declaration of Freedom and Change that they would bear responsibility for any loss of life or damage during the June 30 ‘million’ peoples march.

 As it happened, multiple sources (July 1) reported that at least 11 were killed with nearly 200 wounded by security forces.

 II.              The secret meeting:

 After multiple sources (July 3) reported that military-opposition talks resumed for the first time since the July 3 massacre, details came to light of the “tense” meeting – convened by US, UK, Saudi and UAE diplomats - which eventually led to power-sharing agreement.

 It is telling how much power Saudi Arabia and the UAE have over Sudan’s democratic dream. Fergal Keane (BBC, July 2) attributed the military’s relative restraint during the June 30 mass protests to Saudi influence on the military, with Saudi Arabia “surely [realizing] that the military cannot govern either by consent or coercion.” On June 3, Reuters’ investigation revealed the UAE’s role in the coup ousting Omar Al Bashir following his failure to match their geopolitical interests.

Declan Walsh (New York Times, July 5) reported that the Saudis and Emiratis “claimed to be aghast at suggestions that they had greenlighted [the June 3 massacre],” and thus “quietly” joined Western diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated Sudanese solution. 

 However, AP’s report on (July 8) highlighted strong US influence in pushing the power-sharing deal through, with anonymous Egyptian officials said the US ramped pressure on the Sudanese military, as well as its Saudi, Emirati and Egyptian allies. An anonymous Sudanese military official said: “[the US’] message was clear: power-sharing in return for guarantees that nobody from the council will be tried [for the June 3 massacre].”

 Multiple sources (July 5) reported that the military and opposition agreed a power-sharing deal, which was welcomed by protesters, protest leaders and the military council.

 2.     The power-sharing deal (in detail):

 According to multiple sources (July 5) the military and the opposition have agreed to:

·       Establish a sovereign council that will be Sudan’s highest authority for 3 years, until elections

·       The council be led for the first 21 months by the military, and for the final 18 months by civilians.

·       It will comprise five military members and five civilian appointees, with an additional civilian member agreed by the two sides.

·       The deal includes the formation of a technocratic government beneath the council, and an independent investigation into the June 3 massacre

·       However, the deal postpones the establishment of a legislative council - on which the DFC was due to take two-thirds of the seats.

“Nation” by @oxdamoe

3.     Reactions to the deal:

 While the deal’s signatories have praised it, Sudanese protesters and independent analysts have been quoted to criticise it.

 a)     Positive reactions:

·       Multiple sources (July 5) reported that there were street celebrations after the deal’s announcement.

·       The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), who initiated the Declaration of Freedom and Change said “today our revolution has won and our victory shines.” (AP, July 5).

·       Mohammed Naji Al-Assam, one of the SPA’s leaders, say the deal was “a first step.”

·       The deputy head of Sudan’s military council Himedti said: “this deal will be comprehensive and will not exclude anyone and will meet the ambitions of the Sudanese people and their victorious revolution.” (AP, July 5).

·       Sudanese Congress Party chief and leading political figure of the protest movement Omar Al Digair: “[the agreement] opens the way for the formation of the institutions of the transitional authority, and we hope that this is the beginning of a new era.” (Financial Times, July 5).

·       Munzir Awad, an activist from Burri: “[the deal] came to prevent the bloodshed…[it] paves the way for other initiatives.” (Reuters, July 11).

Cartoon satirising Himedti’s tendency to say that all progress in Sudan will be “by law”…

 b)     Balanced reactions:

·       Political analyst H.A Hellyer said: “the deal is not what many [protesters] will have hoped for [but some] consider it the least bad of all options.”(Independent, July 5).

·       Haafiz Mohammed, director of Justice Africa Sudan called it “ a step in the right direction, adding that “it is not what we want…but given the current situation it is reasonable. It will put the country on the right track for a transition to democracy.” (Telegraph, July 5) .

c)      Negative reactions:

Negative sentiments about the deal fall into 3 general themes: I) that the military cannot be trusted to cede power, II) that there is no justice for the massacres and, III) criticism of the protest leaders negotiating.

I.               Military can’t be trusted.

·       The Independent’s Borzou Daragahi argued that the deal gave the military junta “the upper hand,” in an article which quoted Joseph Siegle, director of research at the Washington-based Africa Center for Strategic Studies to say: “it’s very consistent with Sudanese politics to make promises and concessions and appear moderate at one point, and then as time passes, to renege on that.” (Independent, July 5).

·       Murithi Mutiga, a Sudan expert at the International Crisis Group, said “it’s important to know that the Sudan regime is a past master at extending talks indefinitely and using negotiations to buy time and stay in power,” adding that the deal ““will disappoint a lot of people on the street.” (Financial Times, July 5).

·       Khalid Mustafa Medani, an associate professor at McGill University, worries that the regime will use delay tactics or try to divide the civilian opposition. (Washington Post, July 5).

II.              No justice.

·       Influential Sudanese twitter user Dinan Alasad said: “I feel cheated…this would have been a great agreement before the [June 3] massacre. But these are the same people who did terrible things to civilians. They've lied before and they will lie again.” (Telegraph, July 5).

·       Darfuri rebel group the Sudan Liberation Movement slammed the deal as a “betrayal of the revolution.” (AP, July 6).

·       The Economist (July 8) argue that the deal is unlikely to generate justice due to Himedti’s continued power, including his attempts to prevent the promised investigation into the June 3 massacre.

·       Burri activist Mohammed Farouk: “my priorities have completely shifted… I want justice for [the June 3 massacre].” (Reuters, July 11).

 III.            Criticism of the protest leaders:

·       Dinan Alasad criticised the SPA for reneging on their promise to not negotiate with “those who killed our friends and family.” (Telegraph, July 5).

·       The Economist (July 8)  labelled the deal a “partial” victory for the protest leaders, citing concessions such as allowing the military to lead the sovereign council for the first 21 months, the postponed formation of the legislative body that would be 75% civilians and that the elections due in three years “[leave] less time for the establishment of institutions to ensure the vote is credible.”

·       Rana Othman, an engineer from Burri, called for the SPA to split from the more established political parties of the Declaration of Freedom and Change, who continue to be distrusted as protest leaders. (Reuters, July 11).

·       H.A Hellyer noted that Arab Spring democracy movements often fail to make a compelling case for why they should oversee reform. (Washington Post, July 5).

Illustration of Himedti shaking hands with Omar Al Digair, a prominent protest leader who is depicted as the loser of the deal.

 4.     Solutions and policy recommendations: for the international community.

 Murithi Mutiga, Khalid Mustafa Medani and the Economist all called for the international community to monitor the Sudanese transition to guarantee that the struggle of the protesters is not in vain. Suggested international solutions for Sudan include:

 I.               Sanctions: R Eliot L. Engel, Chairman of the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, called on the Trump administration to sanction the Rapid Support Forces under the Global Magnitsky Act, singling out Himedti for his responsibility in ordering “gross human rights abuses…against unarmed civilians.” (June 28).

 II.              Investigation: Human Rights Watch (July 9) called for Sudanese authorities to establish and cooperate with a “credible, independent” international investigation into the killings of and abuses against protesters since December 2018.

III.            UN Human Rights Office: The UK mission to the UN Human Rights Council called on the council to open an in-country Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, providing technical assistance for the development of human rights in Sudan. (July 9)

IV.            Stop tolerating Himedti: Ahmed Aboudouh (Independent, July 3) warns that continued western tolerance of Himedti’s growing power may fuel a Sudanese civil war, arguing that Saudi Arabia and UAE have misjudged Himedti’s ability to guarantee stability as Al-Sisi has in Egypt, because the latter has built “a solid, deep consensus with the generals,” whereas Himedti “is reliant on a fragile system of mutual deterrence.”

 5.     Solutions and policy recommendations: for Sudan

I.                “Persistent badgering from the streets”: to prevent the military from consolidating power (The Economist, July 8).

II.              Constitutional reform: Zaid Al-Ali (Washington Post, June 27) called for Sudanese political and civilian groups to develop a roadmap for constitutional reform that would rebuild popular legitimacy, suggesting a “complex, multi-layered process,” that brings various political and legal bodies together to find a common ground.  

III.            Enhance women’s rights: Amid the criticism of the male-dominated room in which the power-sharing announcement was made, Nada Mustafa Ali (Independent, July 8) argues that Sudan must build a strong and independent women’s movement, including participation at all levels of civilian government, with commitments to gender equality and women’s human rights entrenched in constitutional legal and policy reform.

IV.            Establishing “a truly national state”: Jerome Tubiana (Foreign Policy, July 9) argues that Himedti is poised to exploit how both Sudan’s security apparatus and protester movement are dominated by Arabs of the centre, to the annoyance of Sudan’s non-Arab periphery in the West, and Arab periphery in the East. Himedti has appeared to unite the peripheries against the centre. Thus, there is a danger of Himedti allying with Darfuri rebels, exploiting how they view the power-sharing deal “as yet another incarnation of the center’s domination on the peripheries.” To scupper such an outcome, Tubiana suggests that those who have faith in Sudanese democratic transition focus on the center’s continued dominance of the peripheries.

A gun being over-powered by a protester chanting “civilian” and “peaceful”.