This briefing aggregrates solutions aimed at Sudanese and international political actors in order to continue Sudan’s democratic struggle.

Summary

Solutions for the Sudanese pro-democracy movement
proposed solutions have included methods of depoliticising the military, continued peaceful protest, the unity of the pro-democracy movement and avoiding early elections.
Concessions debate
Analysts at leading global think-tanks have suggested that the pro-democracy movement must make concessions that alleviate the military’s fears of losing power, although such proposals are controversial.
Financial solutions
Amid a debate around whether sanctions would make ordinary Sudanese pay the price for the military’s sins, alternative financial solutions provided have included: using innovative technology to support Sudanese people financially while circumventing the military, supporting Sudanese civil society organisations and their democratic advocacy, alongside detailed proposals for imposing target sanctions on the coup leaders and gathering intelligence on them.
Diplomatic solutions
The western powers have been called upon to take a decisive and unified stance in favour of Sudanese democracy, including pressuring the military junta’s Arab allies. The US has been specifically called upon to utilise its financial leverage and designate the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia as a terrorist organisation.

1. Solutions for the Sudanese pro-democracy movement

A medium-to-long solution to reduce the military’s political involvement is to provide incentives for soldiers to see the benefits of civilian rule.
It was also argued that peaceful protest will make al-Burhan lose support within the army, and by extension his foreign partners.
The Sudanese protest movement was called upon to learn how to compromise, as the tendency to form factions and splinter groups prevents popular support being converted into political power.
Early elections are viewed as counter-productive to the democratic struggle.

Depoliticising the military

Yezid Sayigh, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center (3 November), outlines a Sudanese path to civilian rule by appointing a civilian defence minister and depoliticising the military.

To get the army to support the proposal, Sayigh suggests the creation of incentive structures for soldiers to see the benefits of civilian rule and have a stake in the success of democracy: increased professionalisation, modernisation and addressed capability gaps. In the interim, Sayigh suggests that the depoliticisation can be achieved by reviewing entry to officer school, thereby making the selection process more representative of Sudan’s demographics and geography. With the purpose of diluting communitarian tensions among their personnel, Sayigh also proposed a refiguring of the composition of the ground forces’ brigades and their deployment rotations.

To further get the rank-and-file soldiers to see the benefits of a civilian defence minister that can support the development of a depoliticised military, Sayegh proposes addressing equity issues and grievances, both internally and toward civilians, through improved pay and pensions alongside other conditions of service.

Peaceful protest will expose al-Burhan’s vulnerabilities

African Arguments (30 October) anonymous author suggests that peaceful protests will pave the democracy movement’s path victory because it targets coup leader Abdulfattah al-Burhan’s vulnerabilities, as his likely use of brutal repression “may prove his downfall”.

Al-Burhan’s first vulnerability is the rift between mid-level army officials and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary commander-in-chief Himedti. Should the RSF conduct most of the violence against peaceful protesters, the army may side with demonstrators.

Al-Burhan’s second vulnerability is his reliance on the “coup quartet” of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Russia – who “have abandoned partners when they appear untenable”. The coup quartet cannot replace tens-of-billions of dollars in assistance from western nations. This may lead army soldiers to support a change of military leadership due to a combination of factors: their declining purchasing power due to an economic crisis worsened by the withdrawal of financial assistance, alongside their exile from the population. In combination, ongoing public protests and al-Burhan’s declining support within the armed forces, may lead the coup quartet and al-Burhan’s foreign backers to decide that he is no longer viable.

Converting the protest movement’s popular support into political power

African Arguments’ (3 November) anonymous author argues that the setbacks facing the Sudanese democratic movement can be explained by how the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), “the leading force” of the uprising, was unable to convert its popular support into political power, and fell prey to factionalism.

While the SPA’s horizontal structure and lack of central leadership keeps the trade union coalition resilience against repression as it continues to function despite the regime’s arrest or co-optation of leaders, the horizontality also caused a leadership crisis whereby: arrested members wanted to return to occupied positions and activists returning from abroad seeking senior positions. A rift then appeared between the SPA’s moderate leadership and the rank-and-file who took a hardline position against partnership with the military. SPA elections in 2019 then saw many leaders replaced by Communist Party supporters, leaving original leaders to create a rival faction.

Thus, the author argues that successful factors in the success of the democratic movement are: managing the rift between more radical views, alongside the need to compromise as part of the political process.

Avoid early elections

Ahmed Soliman, a Research Fellow at Chatham House (11 November) warns that early elections will open the door for the old regime to return through sham elections.

2. The concessions debate

The military resists stepping down as it fears being held accountable for its crimes, and losing its economic dominance. Thus, to get the democratic transition back on track - analysts have proposed solutions that entail concessions from the pro-democracy movement.
The arguments were made by Jonas Horner, a senior Sudan analyst at the International Crisis Group (5 November), Cameron Hudson, a former US diplomat in Sudan and currently a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council (29 October), and Ahmed Soliman, a Research Fellow at Chatham House (11 November).
However, the Sentry (4 November) argue that financial and justice concessions “should be off the table”.

Horner: “civilians will have to concede ground”

Horner suggests, that “while the coup represents a perilous overreach by the generals, civilians will have to concede ground…the reality…is that [a] role for the military is inescapable”. Horner further notes that the military want to appoint a civilian government friendlier to their concerns, including: facing charges for crimes committed and losing control of the large parts of Sudan’s agricultural and industrial sectors that they have held for decades.

Thus, Horner proposes that a civilian selected government commits to “seeking consensus on contentious issues that widened the gap between the civilians and military,” with economic reform a priority issue. Horner further suggests that civilians “will also have to weigh carefully to what degree and at what pace justice should be meted out against military officers responsible for abuses”.

Hudson: “legal immunity for the crimes of military leaders”

In support of Sudanese aspirations for a civilian-led democratic government, Hudson suggests openness to the possibility of “facilitating a soft landing for military leaders – as odious as it may be - in exchange for their exit from the political and economic space they control”. Hudson specifically cites “legislation absolving military leaders of past crimes and granting them immunity” as necessities that “may be required to send the army back to the barracks”.

Soliman: “Compromise and realism”

Soliman suggests that the pro-democracy movement addresses military leaders’ fears “through an amnesty programme, in return for concessions that reinforce the transition”. Given that the military’s historic dominance of Sudan’s political scene and economy, Soliman adds that the pro-democracy forces “will have to accept a continued role for the military is unavoidable for some time yet”. Nonetheless, Soliman also proposes the creation of institutional spaces to contain civilian-military disagreement.

Soliman specifically calls for a joint civilian-military to discuss the military’s direct interests, including: unresolved issues of power-sharing, corruption, and security sector reform. Soliman also suggested that an effective parliamentary security committee will help civilians address the military’s economic role.

The Sentry: “[military economic dominance] and amnesty should be off the table”

However, the Sentry, an organisation that tracks the financial activities of African war criminals, add that while “some concessions may be inevitable…[security services’] free rein over lucrative economic sectors and amnesty…should be off the table” (Radio Dabanga, 4 November).

3. Financial solutions

Despite the suspension of financial assistance, two leading finance-focused media outlets – Bloomberg (26 October) and the Financial Times (26 October) – published sentiments that suggested that such measures harm ordinary Sudanese for the military’s “sins”.
Alternatively, the FT proposed an innovative tech-based solution for western donors to financially support Sudanese people, while circumventing the coup regime.
Hudson called for “redoubled” financial support for Sudanese civil society groups – “the last hope of the revolution”.
The Sentry, an organisation that tracks the financial activities of African war criminals, provided detailed policy proposals for imposing targeted sanctions on the Sudanese coup leaders and their networks, including ways to gather intelligence on them.

The sanctions debate

In condemnation of the coup, Sudan’s western donors are leveraging Sudan’s need for financial assistance. The US has suspended $700 million aid (Multiple sources, 26 October), the World Bank has frozen plans to give Sudan $2 billion in aid (Multiple sources, 27 October), while France is re-thinking is cancellation of $5 billion in debt owed by Sudan (Reuters, 6 November).

However, Bloomberg (26 October) columnist Bobby Ghosh suggests that economic sanctions, and the US exercising its veto on Sudanese assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may “risk penalising [Sudanese people] for al-Burhan’s coup”. In addition, the Financial Times (26 October) suggest that the US suspension of Sudanese aid “is only likely to harm ordinary Sudanese for the sins of the military”.

Nonetheless, alternative financial solutions to challenge the military coup have been proposed – the use of innovative technology to financially assist Sudanese people while circumventing the regime, supporting Sudan’s civil society organisations and targeted sanctions.

Innovative tech solution proposed by the Financial Times

An innovative solution was proposed by the Financial Times (26 October), who proposed ways that international donors can financially support Sudanese people, while circumventing the coup regime, by “funnelling small payments directly to people on their mobile phones, using the so-called M-Pesa technology pioneered in Kenya.”

Supporting Sudanese civil society organisations

Hudson calls for the redoubling of efforts to support Sudan’s “vibrant civil society groups, virtually the last hope for revolution, by funnelling money to sustain their work and skirt the military’s insidious control of the internet” (Atlantic Council, 29 October).

How to enforce targeted sanctions on the coup leaders

Hudson (Atlantic Council, 29 October) and political experts Mai Hassan and Killian Clarke (New York Times, 29 October) both proposed direct and targeted measures against military leaders and their domestic and foreign networks that undermined civilian rule.

Detailed policy proposals for targeted network sanctions came from The Sentry (Radio Dabanga, 4 November), who called for the international community to financially pressure the military by: targeting the networks of companies controlled by Sudanese military and security agencies, with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issuing an advisory on the money laundering risks associated with the Sudanese army and Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The Sentry also called for foreign companies, including banks, to assess their commercial ties to Sudan to ensure they are not inadvertently funding Sudan’s security services.

Investigate the financial networks of the coup leaders

To support the “brave campaign of civil resistance” against the military junta, Anne Bartlett of the University of New South Wales, calls for “urgent attention paid to forensic investigation of [the Sudanese security apparatus’] illegal revenue streams that bypass the government and undermine democratic change” (Conversation, 29 October).

Bartlett notes that civilian actors “could not financially outmanoeuvre the military faction or their foreign supporters,” citing the military’s numerous holding companies whereby “much of the revenue bypasses government coffers and goes into their private accounts abroad,” making the military financially unassailable and enabling them to undermine the civilian government at every turn (Conversation, 29 October).

Suliman Baldo and JR Mailey of the Sentry supplemented the calls to investigate the financial networks of the coup leaders by establishing priorities for intelligence collection on those behind the coup, thereby facilitating the imposing of targeted financial consequences on those undermining Sudan’s democratic progress.

How to gather financial intelligence

The Sentry (4 November) call for: the mapping of security service personnel involved in the coup, and collecting financial intelligence on them, thereby providing precise targets for financial pressure and accountability. The Sentry add that finding out security services’ networks of proxies for involvement in illicit commercial activities is necessary for investigators and intelligence agencies in collecting evidence about the military’s banks, service providers and suppliers.

In addition, the Sentry call for a spotlight on disinformation attempts used by Sudanese counter-revolutionary forces, with governments, technology companies and civil society needing to take steps to expose such activities, and the US government called upon to issue a data call to intelligence agencies that have information about the disinformation campaigns.

4. Diplomatic solutions

Diplomatic solutions have been directed at the African Union (AU), and the western powers: the US and the European Union (EU)
The Western powers have particularly been called upon to pressure the Sudanese military’s Arab allies: Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE – by aligning their security interests with Sudanese and western aspirations for democracy.
The US was called upon to designate the RSF as a terrorist organisation, as well as utilising its financial leverage and the Global Magnitsky Act.

African Union-led mediation

The International Crisis Group (ICG, 26 October A) call for the African Union (AU) to lead mediation to reverse the military coup, by: imposing travel bans and asset seizures on coup leaders, demanding the immediate reinstatement of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and the transitional charter, and conditioning discussions about military concessions on asset seizures and justice upon the reinstatement of civilian authorities and release of political prisoners.

“One trusted mediator”

African Arguments’ (2 November) anonymous author calls for one trusted mediator for the Sudanese political process, arguing that current mediation process is likely to disrupt rather than solve.

Firstly, the author suggests that the proliferation of “self-interested parties rushing in” to mediate a civilian-military agreement “causes confusion” for both parties, thereby wasting time and reducing the likelihood potential agreement. Secondly, the amount of rushing mediators may culminate in a “flawed agreement” that “papers over the same unresolved issues: power-sharing, justice and corruption”.

US to use financial leverage and Global Magnitsky Act

Sudan observer Alex de Waal calls for the US to counter the military coup by leveraging the rescheduling of Sudan’s $70 billion debt, which requires US cooperation given its controlling stake in the World Bank and IMF.

To prevent army chief al-Burhan sustaining his regime on gold sales, de Waal calls for the US to respond with financial sanctions, including invoking the Global Magnitsky Act which allows the US government to sanction foreign government officials implicated in human rights abuses anywhere in the world, and accelerating plans to uncover illicit flows of minerals that are ferried out of Sudan (Foreign Affairs, 11 November)

US to designate the RSF as a terrorist organisation

Cameron Hudson (Atlantic Council, 29 October) called for the US State Department to designate the Rapid Support Forces a “Foreign Terrorist Organization”.

Concrete demands, and accountability timeline tied to sanctions

Writer Abdelrahman Mansour calls for Sudan’s democratic allies to convert criticism of the military coup to concrete demands and an accountability timeline tied to sanctions, thereby forcing Sudan’s military leaders to reconsider their power grab.

In particular, Mansour suggests that the US exert pressure on the Arab governments that supported the counterrevolution in Sudan via an urgent international summit to denounce the coup, and discussing with the international community threats to prosecute military leaders Abdulfattah al-Burhan and Himedti in domestic courts (Foreign Policy, 29 October).

Western exploitation of Arab security fears in pro-democracy diplomacy

The ICG (26 October A) also call for the US and EU to use the considerable leverage they have with the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to convince them to push the Sudanese military to change course, as the Arab states “stand to gain nothing from the instability in Sudan that appears likely to follow the military takeover, particularly if the military attempts to strong-arm protesters into silence.”

Decisive and unified stance against the Arab allies of Sudan’s military

European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR, 26 October) Africa programme director Theodore Murphy calls for the European Union (EU) to support Sudan’s democratic transition by: cear signalling against the coup, as the military’s attempt to avoid the appearance of a coup indicates that the strength of international opposition will affect the military’s next steps and ultimately its preparedness to enter negotiations with the civilians, which is the only way out.

Murphy also suggests that that EU member states “need to urgently agree” to condition European support for Sudan on the military restoring civilian rule to the transition, thereby allowing the EU to make the strongest possible statement.

Finally, Murphy notes that “a decisive and unified European position will create traction with Egypt and the UAE, [who] see their interests as better served by a military-led government, [but] firm European action now can prevent history repeating itself and Europe’s investment in Sudan’s democracy going to waste.”