Summary

1. What happened?

Despite US warnings to not do so, Sudan’s military staged a military coup on 25 October 2021, reportedly with Egyptian approval. Over 100 activists, journalists and government officials have been arrested in a continuing round-up. Having blamed civilian mismanagement for Sudan’s political crisis, army commander-in-chief Abdulfattah al-Burhan labelled the coup a “correction of the democratic transition”. International condemnation followed, with aid packages withheld, further adding to Sudan’s economic woes. Al-Burhan subsequently appointed a new Sovereign Council, with the ousted government officials replaced.

2. How has the street reacted?

Such is the resilience and determination of the Sudanese protest movement, they are paying the price of the sacrifices they are making to resist the coup – both physically and economically. At least 43 have been killed and hundreds injured in waves of anti-coup protests, although the internet blackout is impeding accurate estimates. Despite the cash shortages it has incurred, Sudanese civilians are also embarking on a campaign of civil disobedience.

3. How is the military trying to consolidate power?

The internet has been blacked out in Sudan since the coup, negatively impacting: gathering data on protest casualties, humanitarian work, protest organisation and Sudan’s overall economic wellbeing. In addition, in the absence of a civilian base, al-Burhan is re-integrating state institutions with Kezan – members of the Islamist regime of former president Omar al-Bashir.

4. How Hamdok legitimised the coup

Talks to resolve the political crisis were not progressing. The two key civilian entities that played a leading role in the uprising – the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC, a coalition of political parties) and Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA, a coalition of trade unions) – are refusing to negotiate. It appeared that deposed Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, who al-Burhan wants as his post-coup prime minister, was negotiating on behalf of the pro-democracy movement, who view Hamdok as a “man of compromise,” and protesters fear that he will accept a bad deal. Al-Burhan then appointed a new ruling Transitional Sovereign Council, with the same military and rebel leaders as before, but all five FFC appointees replaced. Hamdok was eventually reinstated as Prime Minister, in a move that has been viewed as legitimising the military coup.

1. What happened?

The coup was staged with Egyptian approval after a US diplomat warned Sudan’s military leaders against it.
Politicians, activists and journalists are being rounded up in a military arrest campaign. Many of their conditions and whereabouts are unknown, some are reportedly being tortured, and are likely to face criminal charges.
Army chief Abdulfattah al-Burhan justified the coup on the basis that it was necessary to avoid civil war, and it was done to correct course of transition, blaming the political mismanagement of the civilian component of the government in the process.
The coup has been internationally condemned and Sudan is already facing financial repercussions, with the US and World Bank withholding aid, and France re-thinking its debt cancellation.

1.1 The coup

According to Wall Street Journal (4 November) sources, earlier in the year, Egypt’s intelligence chief, Abbas Kamel, met army commander-in-chief Abdulfattah al-Burhan in Khartoum. With the Egyptians said to be unhappy over civilian prime minister Abdallah Hamdok’s public openness to an Ethiopian dam that al-Sisi’s government “says threatens to choke off the waters that run into the Nile”, as well as his reluctance to deepen ties with Israel, Kamel reportedly told al-Burhan: “Hamdok has to go”.

On the evening of the 24th of October, Jeffrey Feltman, the US special envoy for the Horn of Africa met with Sudan’s military leaders – al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia commander-in-chief Himedti, his deputy in the Sovereign Council, Sudan’s highest transitional political authority. Al-Burhan and Himedti told Feltman that they wanted Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to dissolve the cabinet and appoint new ministers (Foreign Policy, 26 October). Feltman warned them to not stage the coup (Reuters, 28 October).

Al-Burhan then flew to Egypt to gain support for the coup from president Abdulfattah al-Sisi (Wall Street Journal, 4 November). Hours later, on the morning of the 25th of October, reported that Sudan’s military seized power in a coup, arresting leading civilian politicians including Hamdok, and declared a state of emergency. The internet was cut off and phone lines were disrupted (Multiple sources, 25 October).

1.2 Who was arrested?

A full list of arrested civilian politicians and civil society activists can be found in our thread. They included politicians affiliated to Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) civilian coalition that played a key role in the uprising, who were increasingly vocal against the military’s threats to the democratic transition (Sudan Tribune, 25 October).

Al-Burhan said that some of the arrested civilian politicians may face criminal charges (Reuters, 29 October). The wave of arrests continued in the days that followed the coup, with over 40 activists, journalists and government officials arrested (Bloomberg, 27 October). Expressing concern about the wellbeing of the detainees, Kamal al-Gizouli, the lead defence lawyer for detained civilian leaders, said their whereabouts are unknown and that they are in a "dangerous legal situation" as nothing was known about their case nor who was heading the investigation (AFP, 1 November).

1.3 How did al-Burhan justify the coup?

Speaking at his first news conference since the coup, al-Burhan defended the military’s seizure of power by saying that he ousted the government to avoid civil war. Al-Burhan said the army had no choice but to side-line politicians who were inciting against the armed forces. “We only wanted to correct the course to a transition,” said al-Burhan (Multiple sources, 26 October).

“The whole country was deadlocked due to political rivalries. The experience during the past two years has proven that the participation of political forces in the transitional period is flawed and stirs up strife,” al-Burhan said the following day. alongside vowing to scrap emergency laws after the necessary institutions are formed, gradually restoring internet access and holding elections in July 2023 (Multiple sources, 27 October).

However, a senior aide to Hamdok told the Financial Times (26 October) that the military “are likely to press on to have a fake election and declare themselves winners and continue to rule,” with the coup “in the making for a few weeks” as

Abdulfattah al-Burhan was expected to handover chairmanship of the Sovereign Council to a civilian.

1.4 International reactions

As the coup was condemned internationally, the US and World Bank suspended aid to Sudan, with France potentially reversing its cancellation of Sudanese debts. Egypt opted out of a joint-statement involving Saudi Arabia and the UAE calling for the restoration of the civilian government.

US reaction

The US suspended $700 million in financial assistance to Sudan (Multiple sources, 26 October). In addition, US president Joe Biden’s national security adviser Jake Sullivan said that the US is contemplating a range of economic tools, potentially sanctions, to respond to the military coup (Multiple sources, 26 October).

World Bank and IMF

The World Bank, who contributed $3bn in aid to Sudan, also suspended plans to give Sudan a further $2 billion, in a move that is “likely to have dire consequences for Sudan's battered economy” (Multiple sources, 27 October). Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said it was “monitoring the developments carefully”. In June 2021, the World Bank and IMF granted Sudan debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, cutting Sudan’s debt in half to about $28 billion (Multiple sources, 27 October).

Saudi Arabia and the UAE

Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined US and UK calls for the immediate restoration of a civilian component of the government in Sudan (Multiple sources, 3 November). While it has been suggested that the aforementioned Gulf nations have been behind military power grabs in Sudan (Washington Post, 28 October), it is possible that they grew opposed to the coup given their anti-Islamist stance, amid al-Burhan’s re-integration of Islamist officials from the ousted regime of ex-president Omar al-Bashir (see section ‘Bringing back the Kezan for more detail’). Indeed, Bloomberg (29 October) reported that Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the UAE national security advisor, was negotiating Hamdok’s return with al-Burhan.

However, Reuters (11 November) note that TV channels controlled by Gulf Arab states are hosting an influx of "strategic analysts" defending the coup, some known supporters of al-Bashir's dissolved National Congress Party.

Egypt

However, US State Department spokesperson Ned Price said that Egypt declined adding itself the joint US, UK, Saudi Arabia and UAE statement calling for the restoration of the civilian government. Price said that Egypt must give its own explanation as to why that is the case (Sudan Tribune, 4 November).

France

The military coup also puts into doubt the process that would have seen France cancel $5 billion debt owed by Sudan, France's foreign ministry said.

France, Sudan's second-largest creditor, has been a main actor in backing the interim authorities after al-Bashir was ousted in 2019 (Reuters, 6 November).

2. How are the people resisting?

At least 43 have been killed, with hundreds wounded, as security forces responded to waves of anti-coup protests. Given the ongoing internet blackout, these numbers could be much higher. Despite the risks incurring through protest, citizens are adamant in resisting the coup.
Sudanese have embarked on a campaign of civil disobedience to resist the coup. The resistance has come at a great sacrifice, culminating a severe cash shortage in a country starved of ATM infrastructure.

2.1 Protests

On the day of the coup, large numbers poured on to the streets of Sudan to denounce it. Demonstrators blocked streets with burning tires and bricks, and marched waving the Sudanese flag and chanting anti-coup slogans. Seven were killed by gunfire and 140 were injured (Multiple sources, 25 October).

Even as resistance committee that organise protests saying that internet blackout has posed an obstacle to organising protests - graffiti, flyers, and neighbourhood marches are used to get the word out (Reuters, 9 November). The International Crisis Group’s Sudan analyst Jonas Horner told Reuters (26 October) that the military underestimated civilian opposition on the street. “As we saw post the revolution and post-Bashir, the streets were determined and civilians were willing to die for this" he said.

I. Day two of the protests

As large protests against the coup entered their second day, military forces once again fired bullets and teargas at demonstrators (Multiple sources, 26 October). Heavily armed Sudanese army and RSF paramilitaries continued to fire teargas at protesters. We heard 300 have been arrested... We are worried that another massacre will happen. This is happening because the military, which runs a lot of the economy, does not want to hand over the control of the country to civilians.” said Dr Samia al-Nagar, a civil society activist (The Independent, 26 October).

The Guardian’s (26 October) feature piece covering injured protesters, reported that the death toll rose to ten. Wounded protesters were shot with live ammunition, badly beaten or run over by cars driven into the protesters, as hospital staff say some may never walk again. A surgeon said that the military asked hospital staff to hand over the wounded, as soldiers from the army and Darfur’s armed movement fired around the hospital, and terrorising doctors with heavy weapons. “Patients had to hide under their beds and seats,” the surgeon said. On the 28th of October, Radio Dabanga reported that the death and injury toll rose to at least 11 and 150 respectively.

II. 30 October Millioniyah

Two days later, came the 30 October Millioniyah, the largest pro-democracy protests since al-Bashir’s regime was toppled in April 2019. Three protesters were killed and hundreds were wounded, as military forces fired at protesters across Sudan, including in: Khartoum, Omdorman, al-Gadarif in the east and Nyala in Darfur. The reported numbers of wounded were at least 278, many of whom were shot with live ammunition (Multiple sources, 30 October).

The following day, the Sudan Doctors Central Committee announced that the death toll rose to at least 12, with the ongoing internet and telecommunications blockade complicating communications between reliable sources. Other revolutionary sources estimate the actual 'body count' to be much higher, and exact numbers remain difficult to assess or confirm (Radio Dabanga, 1 November).

III. Teachers protests

A week later, at least 113 were arrested when Sudan security forces cracked down on a sit-in at the Education Ministry in Khartoum, in demonstrations against moves to appoint members of al-Bashir’s regime to educational roles (Multiple sources, 7 November).

Duriya Mohamed Babiker, a leader of the Khartoum Teachers’ Committee told Radio Dabanga (7 November) that: “the military forces stormed the ministry’s buildings by force and dealt with the protest with excessive violence and fired tear gas”. The committee posted on its Facebook page that one of the teachers suffered a miscarriage after her arrest.

IV. The resilience of the protest movement

Despite this, Sudanese protesters are not standing down. Activist Suleima Elkhalifa told the BBC (7 November): "people are more determined now. And more politically aware. After 30 years of military dictatorship, we will not submit. The youth represent more than 50% of this country and it's clear we don't want this government. They cannot kill us all. They cannot kill this dream”. Indeed, victims of the military clampdown, including an 18-year-old student shot in the leg, expressed the same determination.

V. 13 November Millioniyah

In more nationwide protests against the coup, the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors (CCSD), initially reported that five protesters were killed. Four of them were killed with live bullets, and the other suffocating due to tear gas (Multiple sources, 13 November).

The following day, the CCSD further announced that two children were killed, as the death toll from the 13 November Millioniyah rose to eight (Multiple sources, 15 November). The two children were - 15-year-old Mujahid Mohamed Farah and Remaz Hatim al-Atta, a 13-year-old girl who was standing at her house door when shot.

The CCSD said that: at least 215 people were injured during the 13th November protests in Khartoum: 112 through live ammunition, 3 from rubber bullets, 17 wounded by tear gas canisters,13 suffocated by tear gas, 8 baton injuries and 62 superficial wounds, alongside a further “11 unstable cases”.

The Socialist Doctors Association reported the names of the other five victims: Mohamed Abakar (35), Abdelhameed Abdelkareem (31), El Sheikh Khater (19), Muhammad Osman (19), and Muzamil Nour (15) (Radio Dabanga, 15 November).

Radio Dabanga’s (15 November) report on the military’s nationwide repression campaign during the November 13 protests revealed that citizens were arrested in Omdorman (103), Khartoum (52, including 10 minors), Kassala (5), al-Gadarif (12), with an unspecified amount in Sennar, alongside 71 detained in Darfur since the 25 October coup.

The crackdown on journalists has also seen the arrest of Al Jazeera network’s bureau chief in Khartoum al-Musalmi Kabbashi, and Darfur 24’s Abdelmunim Madibo. Journalists Hamad Suleiman al-Khidr and Hozeifa Adel al-Jack were hit with rubber bullets and physically assaulted for covering the protests. Summoned by security forces for covering the protests were Mohammed Omar of Al-Jazeera Live and Ahmed Younes of Al-sharq al-Awsat. Al-Jazeera’s correspondent in al-Gadarif, Osama Sayed, was physically prevented from covering the protests.

V. 17 November protests – at least 15 killed in bloodiest day post-coup

The death toll in Sudan’s anti-coup protests in Khartoum alone rose to at least 39, after security forces shot dead 10 protesters and wounded at least 70, in the bloodiest day since the 25 October military coup. Security forces fired on demonstrators with live ammunition and tear gas in marches held in Khartoum, Khartoum North (Bahri) and Omdurman (Multiple sources, 17 November).

2.1 Civil disobedience

Civil disobedience remains a key form of resistance for Sudanese revolutionaries, despite the sacrifice that it entails. Responding to the calls by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), a trade union umbrella group that played a leading role in the uprising, a large number of professional groups, unions, and associations announced strikes and other civil disobedience actions, bringing economic activities to a halt, with a “complete paralysis” in government and educational institutions in Sudan (Multiple sources, 28 October).

I. The sacrifice of resistance: cash shortages

A consequence of the civil disobedience campaign was that, prompted a nationwide strike by bankers, Sudan was hit by a severe cash shortage as most banks and cash machines remain closed. Cash still dominates the Sudanese economy due to a lack of ATM infrastructure (Guardian, 2 November). To further complicate matters, Western Union suspended its operations in Sudan following the coup, saying it will “resume operations when it is once again safe to do so” (Reuters, 28 October).

About 90% of bankers were taking part in a civil disobedience campaign, said Ibrahim Abdel-Raheem, who works at the Workers National Bank in Khartoum. “We knew that going on strike as bankers would cripple the economy…Banks are the backbone of the economy” he said. Yassir Binawai, who works in the mining industry, said “It’s been so difficult to manage with the cash shortage…but we will not give up despite all the struggles.” (Guardian, 2 November). Nonetheless, the Bankers Association of Sudan announced a temporary suspension to the strike, “to ease the burden on the Sudanese public and disburse salaries and pensions” (Radio Dabanga, 3 November).

II. The trade unions continue resisting

Even so, the Unified Doctors Office continued its withdrawal of medics from military hospitals, with the Sudanese General Employers Federation continuing its strike, and the Teachers’ Committee calling on all teachers to continue resisting after authorities dismissed the Director of the Ministry of Education of Khartoum state for his refusal to deal with coup authorities (Radio Dabanga, 3 November). Consequently, the civil disobedience campaign continued, as pro-democracy protesters took to the street in Khartoum, Madani, Atbara, Nyala and the White Nile, The SPA’s calls for a general strike were successful, despite the internet cuts (Multiple sources, 7 November).

3. How is the military trying to consolidate its power?

The military has enforced an internet blackout. Not only is this hiding evidence of abuses committed on peaceful protesters, but it is also impeding: humanitarian work, collecting accurate statistics on post-coup protest casualties, freedom of expression, the spread of information and the organisational capacity of the protest movement. The decision has also had dire economic consequences for an already struggling economy.
Lacking civilian support for his coup, al-Burhan is bringing back the Kezan – the Sudanese nickname for the regime of Omar al-Bashir.

3.1 The internet blackout and its impact

Since the coup, Sudan’s coup authorities have ordered an ongoing internet blackout. Despite a court in Khartoum North (Bahri) ordering MTN, Zain, and Sudani - Sudan’s main internet and telecoms providers - to restore internet access, the internet blackout continues (Reuters, 9 November). MTN, Zain, and Sudani claim that armed military personnel entered the control rooms and ordered the internet to be cut off (Radio Dabanga, 9 November).

Despite the order, the Telecommunications and Post Regulatory Authority stated that the internet shut-down remains in force until further notice, citing the military ordering a “temporary shutdown of the internet services in all parts of Sudan [..] to preserve the unity and security of the country against its challenges” on the day of the coup (Radio Dabanga, 12 November).

The internet blackout is exacerbating Sudan’s critical human rights situation, negatively impacting: collection of evidence of security abuses, humanitarian work and freedom of expression, as well as causing negative economic consequences.

I. Gathering data on protest casualties

Firstly, the internet and telecommunications blockade is hindering accurate estimates as to the number of victims of protest crackdowns. Although at least 43 have been reported dead, and hundreds have been wounded in the post-coup protests, the internet and telecommunications blackout is complicating communications between reliable sources, meaning that the exact numbers remain difficult to assess or confirm (Radio Dabanga, 1 November).

Indeed, the Sudanese Journalists Network said that the internet blackout “enables the militiamen behind the coup regime, its security apparatus and its shadow brigades, to commit even more crimes against the Sudanese and the revolution, and hide evidence that proves their involvement in mass attacks like the massacre of the [June 3, 2019] sit-in” (Radio Dabanga, 28 October). Thus, human rights lawyer Ali Ajab said: “if the internet service is restored, the world will witness the extent of the atrocities committed by these forces against peaceful and defenceless demonstrators” (Radio Dabanga, 2 November).

II. Obstacles to humanitarian work

Secondly, humanitarian work is being restricted, with the UN’s humanitarian agency saying that it is impeding their work (Radio Dabanga, 28 October). This has culminated in further impunity for attacks in Darfur, said Adam Rojal, spokesman for the Coordinating Committee for Refugees and Displaced People, with at least four people killed in over 10 militia attacks in Darfur, with more injured and sexually assaulted. Rojal said: “the lack of internet is allowing [militias] to commit so many violations without accountability. We used the internet to document and report”. He added that the blackout was also affecting camp residents economically by making it impossible for them to request or receive money from family abroad (Reuters, 9 November).

Furthermore, as reported in Radio Dabanga (11 November) Sudan researcher and analyst Eric Reeves said that the Arab militiamen in North Darfur “see the coup as a license to resume attacks on non-Arab farmers without fear their crimes will be communicated”. Indeed, attacks on Darfuri villagers increased following the military coup of October 25, in particular in North Darfur where more than 2,000 families reportedly fled to Zamzam camp for the displaced.

III. Freedom of expression under act / harder to organise protests

Thirdly, freedom of expression is under attack. The resistance committees that organised protests since the coup say the internet blackout has made organising difficult, even as they use graffiti, flyers, and neighbourhood marches to get the word out (Reuters, 9 November). In addition, the Sudanese Journalists Association for Human Rights (JAHR) said that: “cutting off of the Internet, among its many economic and social damages, prevented print and electronic media from being published, and from reaching the public in Sudan. [This deprives] the Sudanese public of the right to follow current events from various sources, including ‘citizen journalism’, and prevents freedom of expression through social media” (Radio Dabanga, 4 November).

IV. Economic costs

Fourthly, the internet blackout has caused losses to Sudanese companies, authorities and the government, amounting to tens of millions of dollars per day.

While some companies have been able to use “very expensive internet services”, others stopped completely. Daily losses for telecommunications companies are at least $6 million. The cessation of electronic payment services has hit customs, ports, banks, and other private sectors (Radio Dabanga, 12 November).

3.2 Bringing back the Kezan

Having failed to build civilian support for the coup, Africa Confidential (4 November) suggest that al-Burhan’s attempts is trying to build a political force by re-integrating Islamists affiliated to the ousted al-Bashir regime. Indeed, Reuters (11 November) reported that he has appointed veteran ex-officials of the previous regime, including: justice ministry undersecretary Huweda al-Kareem, foreign ministry undersecretary Ali Sadeq, and education ministry undersecretary Mahmoud al-Houri.

Al-Houri’s appointment in particularly triggered protests by teachers which led to 113 being arrested, and many wounded after tears was fired (Multiple sources, 7 November), with one woman suffering a miscarriage (Radio Dabanga, 7 November).

Furthermore, human rights lawyer Ali Ajab said he was aware of hundreds of arrests and efforts to appoint people with close links to al-Bashir’s regime in senior posts. “It’s a complete military coup,” said Amir Suliman, legal programme director of the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, citing the “dismissal of the Sovereign Council, cabinet, [and] now civil servants” (Bloomberg, 8 November).

To further tighten control of Sudanese state institutions, the Sudanese military then dissolved the boards of all state companies and national agricultural projects (Multiple sources, 5 November). Al-Burhan has also removed :the attorney general and the leaders of [the Tamkeen] committee probing illicit financial gains made during the Omar al-Bashir regime (Bloomberg, 8 November). Officials have also been replaced in senior positions in state banks, media, and regional governments (Reuters, 11 November).

Nonetheless, al-Burhan’s attempts to build a political force comprising of the Islamists that the 2019 uprising aimed to remove from power, suggests “a lack of planning even among al-Burhan’s inner circle” (Africa Confidential, 4 November).

Al-Burhan released from prison, and re-arrested within a day, the following (Sudan In The News):

Ibrahim Ghandour: The head of the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP)
Mohamed Hamid Tabidi: The former media director of Sudan’s spy agency, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)
Al-Shazly Maddeh: NISS spokesman
Mohamed al-Jizuli: ISIS supporter and Islamist party leader.

However, Africa Confidential (4 November) note a “consensus about money,” with Abdelbasit Hamza, a businessman who managed the NCP's biggest companies, released, while the central bank’s deputy governor, Farouk Kambrisi, was removed and allegedly arrested after refusing to transfer funds to a military-owned company.

4. Hamdok legitimises the coup

Issues under negotiation included the military’s immunity for the June 3 massacre and its guarantee political representation, while it appears that accountability for live ammunition on peace protests appears absent from the agenda.
Al-Burhan wants Hamdok as his prime minister, given the latter’s reputation with the international community.
Talks have reportedly hit a deadlock and the military has tightened Hamdok’s house arrest conditions.
However, with two key civilian entities that played a leading role in the uprising – the FFC and SPA – refusing to negotiate, it appears that Hamdok may be negotiating on the behalf of the protest movement.
Hamdok is viewed as a “man of compromise” and protesters fear that he will accept a bad deal. He was eventually reinstated as Prime Minister, in a move that was rejected by the pro-democracy movement and criticised by analysts.

4.1 What was being negotiated?

According to African Arguments (4 November) anonymous author, the negotiation agenda for resolving Sudan’s political crisis includes: the state of emergency, release of political detainees, Hamdok selecting government officials, military immunity for the June 3 massacre and political representation, and the dismantlement of the anti-corruption committee. The author adds that accountability for military use of live ammunition on peaceful protesters is absent from negotiations, and that “the only purpose for the military’s continued internet shutdown is punishing civilians and using web access as a bargaining chip internet shutdown,” with civilian politicians “effectively being held hostage”.

According to African Arguments (1 November), the key mediation points are: the release of political detainees, military junta fears implication for crimes in Darfur through prosecution by the International Criminal Court, review of the Tamkeen Committee that “strikes at the core of the military’s patronage network”, and the Transfer of power to civilians as stipulated in the Constitution.

However, resolving the crisis faces various challenges, namely: that most civilian parties are less likely to accept a military led-government, the tensions between senior army commanders and the growing force of RSF commander Himedti, and that with trust in FFC parties low, Hamdok is a leading negotiator, even though he “governs by compromise, which may disappoint protestors” (African Arguments, 1 November).

4.2 Al-Burhan still wanted Hamdok as his prime minister

While Hamdok was initially moved to an unknown location after refusing to issue a statement supportive of the coup (Reuters, 25 October), Al-Burhan later said that Hamdok was being kept at the general’s personal residence “for his own safety” (Multiple sources, 27 October), before being moved to house arrest (Multiple sources, 27 October).

With al-Burhan saying he wants to appoint a “technocrat prime minister” to form a new transitional government to share leadership with the military, Hamdok appears to be see his preferred choice. Al-Burhan sees Hamdok’s involvement as key to building international credibility for the new administration, with the US and World Bank freezing aid and the African Union suspending Sudan’s membership (Multiple sources, 28 October).

Al-Burhan’s overtures to Hamdok suggest the military is facing difficulties finding civilian representatives for the new administration, with most political parties rejecting the coup and no significant figure speaking favourably. Hamdok’s refusal to join a military-appointed government dashes al-Burhan’s hopes for a credible prime minister, with Jonas Horner telling Bloomberg (28 October) that al-Burhan would like a “pliant” new premier, “but such has been the military’s vast miscalculation that underpinned the coup, the position is likely to appear something of a poisoned chalice to many.” Hamdok’s reported condition for negotiations was that the military reverses its coup and releases detainees. However, the army told mediators it would only release detainees who were not facing criminal charges, sources said (Reuters, 29 October).

Indeed, CNN (31 October) sources said that Hamdok was calling for an overhaul of the political process, leading to a re-structuring of the sovereign council, for him to have full authority and independence in forming a cabinet of politically independent technocrats of his own choosing and to broaden political participation for greater representation. Nonetheless, the military’s stance was making negotiations difficult, as their leadership was “unified in their current course of action and in their belief that this is not a coup but a 'correction of the revolution'”.

The military then sought an alternative to Hamdok – scholar Hunud Abia Kudouf – although he rejected the offer, a reflection of al-Burhan’s struggle to find civilian representatives for a coup that has been described as a “malfunctioning political project” (African Arguments, 16 November).

Nonetheless, Jibril Ibrahim, the pro-military finance minister and the leader of the Darfuri Islamist armed movement, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), said that “time is running out” for Hamdok to agree to take a post in a military-led government (AP, 17 November).

4.3 The progress of the negotiations

Despite Bloomberg (2 November) reporting that a new power-sharing deal was close, it remained elusive, as negotiators were at odds over cabinet appointments.

A proposal that was reportedly under discussion was Hamdok returning as Prime Minister, with more powers, but a with a new cabinet more palatable to the army. The army would remain in charge of the government’s powerful security and defence councils under the deal.

Then, Reuters (6 November) reported that talks to resolve Sudan’s political crisis following the military coup hit “semi-deadlock” because the military has refused to return to a path of democratic transition, two sources from the ousted government said. The sources told Reuters the military tightened restrictions on ousted Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, further limiting his ability to hold meetings or make political contacts.

Nonetheless, question marks have been raised as to who is negotiating, particularly as the FFC (coalition of civilian political parties) and SPA (coalition of trade unions) – civilian entities that played a key role in the uprising, are refusing to negotiate with the military.

4.4 Negotiations: Was Hamdok negotiating alone?

With the FFC and SPA refusing to negotiate, it appears that protesters who seek an end to brutality, corruption and human rights violations, are hinging their hopes on Hamdok - “[an untrustworthy] man of compromise who [they fear] will be pressured by the military to sign a bad deal,” potentially appointing a cabinet that has no power (African Arguments, 4 November).

I. The FFC stance

The FFC coalition of parties – “the main drivers of the revolution” that overthrew the 30-year al-Bashir dictatorship in 2019 – have declared that “there will no dialogue or negotiations with the putschists” (Radio Dabanga, 2 November). The conditions that the FFC have set for re-negotiations are: restoring the full constitutional declaration, the release of all detainees including Hamdok, the reinstatement of Hamdok and his government, the handover of power to civilians, and FFC unification (Sudan Tribune, 9 November).

II. The SPA stance

The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), the trade union umbrella group that played a leading role in the uprising, has also rejected internationally-backed initiatives to return to a power-sharing arrangement with the military. Calling for the establishment of a civilian government to lead the democratic transition, the SPA said mediation initiatives which “seek a new settlement” between the military and civilian leaders would “reproduce and worsen” Sudan’s crisis. Under the slogan of: “No negotiations, no compromise, no power-sharing,” the SPA called for strikes and civil disobedience (AP, 6 November).

Instead, the SPA proposed a new political charter without a military component of government, featuring: a new technocrat prime minister, who would form a new transitional cabinet of a maximum of 20 ministers, and Sovereign Council of a maximum 5. The head of the government, the ministers, and the collegial presidency will not include political leaders but national figures supportive of the revolution and its goals, the SPA proposed (Sudan Tribune, 7 November).

4.5 Al-Burhan’s new sovereign council

However, al-Burhan would then appoint a new ruling Transitional Sovereign Council, with the same military and rebel leaders as before, but all five FFC appointees replaced (Multiple sources, 11 November). The US, UK, EU, Norway and Switzerland slammed military coup leader Abdulfattah al-Burhan’s latest move to tighten the military’s grip on power, as a decision that undermines efforts to restore the democratic transition, and criticising al-Burhan for failing to consult Sudan’s pro-democracy movement and violating the Constitutional Declaration that governed the transitional period (Multiple sources, 12 November).

In addition, people in various neighbourhoods in Khartoum took to the streets to protest against al-Burhan’s reinstated Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC). Protesters chanted: “What’s wrong with Burhan, is he sick? What are the symptoms? Exemptions and statements, And his treatment? Kober Prison”. The FFC also strongly condemned the move, saying it: “clearly confirms [the coup regime’s] indifference to the pulse of the street” (Radio Dabanga, 12 November).

4.6 Hamdok reinstated as PM, accused of legitimising the coup

Hamdok signed a deal with the army that will see him reinstated as Prime Minister after the coup, sparking fresh protests by activists demanding a complete end to military rule. Protesters labelled Hamdok a traitor and accused him of standing with the coup leaders. The Sudanese Professionals Association labelled the deal “treasonous”. The deal was also rejected by the Forces of Freedom and Change and Sudan Doctors Syndicate, and more pro-democracy groups. “The streets have already vowed to keep resisting, so it’s likely that we’ll see more, not fewer, protests,” said Kholood Khair, managing partner at Insight Strategy Partners (Multiple sources, 21 November).

Magdi el-Gizouli of the Rift Valley Institute said: “Hamdok preferred to become the secretary of a dictator over a symbol of an emancipatory movement. Whoever marketed this as realpolitik underestimated the depth of the desire for change among the new generation in Sudan. It was devastating to watch young Sudanese being shot to death by the security forces in recent weeks, and to compare that with the bankruptcy of the geriatric political class” (New York Times, 21 November).

Jonas Horner of the International Crisis Group said: “[Hamdok’s cabinet will be] entirely stocked with people who are not to be trusted”. Horner added that the felt threatened by civilians delivering tentative signs of economic recovery. He called for the US and its allies to keep the democratic transition on track but not reward a “thinly veiled military government (New York Times, 21 November).

Cameron Hudson of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, said the deal allows the generals to largely retain their control and avoid accountability for the coup and the deaths of dozens of protesters. “This is a deal among elites that largely seems to prioritise their preservation over the demands of the street,” he said (AP, 21 November).

In Sudan Tribune’s (21 November) analysis of the deal, it was reported that it amends the Constitutional Declaration to “ensure comprehensive political participation for all components of society”. This means that two Islamist parties that were allied to regime of Omar al-Bashir - the Popular Congress Party and Reform Now Party can now be represented in the transitional legislative council, having been previously forbidden from doing so. Their participation provides a political base for the military component.

The deal does not indicate who will nominate the “technocrat” civilian government. It also reforms the Tamkeen committee that aimed to retrieve the illicitly gained assets of the former regime by establishing an appeals committee to challenge its decisions.