Executive summary

On the 15th of April 2023, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia – commonly known among Sudanese as the Janjaweed – launched a rebellion that has had devastating consequences on Sudan. This report presents insights from four Sudanese analysts on the challenges facing saving Sudan from the Janjaweed rebellion, alongside their proposed policy solutions to achieve this aim.

Introduction

Section 1: Developments

The first section of the report covers the Janjaweed’s territorial gains and the humanitarian impact of the rebellion. By the end of 2023, the militia had seized most of its stronghold – the Darfur region of western Sudan, alongside Al-Jazirah state in central Sudan. The tri-city capital state of Khartoum remains contested, with the Janjaweed controlling most of it with the exception of key pockets held by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). As the militia continues to expand its territorial gains, the humanitarian consequences of the Janjaweed rebellion include Sudan facing the worst displacement crisis in the world, with projections that the country will face famine-like conditions by May 2024.

Section 2: Analysis

The second section of the report explores themes of the Janjaweed’s campaign of terror against the Sudanese people. The analysts also outlined the international danger of the Janjaweed rebellion. With the militia already known for its indiscriminate killing, occupation of homes and looting, this report scrutinises two patterns in the RSF’s violence. Firstly, the militia’s use of rape as a weapon of war. Secondly, with an ethnic base of nomadic Arab groups from Darfur, the report outlines the genocidal intent of the Janjaweed and their supporters amid the ethnic targeting of both non-Arab and Arab groups that has intensified since the rebellion began. Nonetheless, Sudanese analysts also highlighted the international danger of the RSF, given that it is an ethnic mercenary militia that does not acknowledge state borders.

Section 3: Challenges

The third section of the report examines two key challenges in saving Sudan from the Janjaweed rebellion. Firstly, analysts attribute the weakness of SAF to factors including the RSF’s stronger international ties – particularly to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Thus, amid the army’s regional isolation, the RSF has better access to resources that fuel the Janjaweed rebellion and genocidal campaign. Secondly, a peace initiative by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition is viewed sceptically by analysts, citing the coalition’s lack of trust among Sudanese people amid suspicions that it is the political wing of the militia.

Section 4: Solutions

Nonetheless, the analysts also proposed solutions to save Sudan from the Janjaweed. The international community were called upon to: pressure the UAE to comply with sanctions targeting the RSF, breaking up the RSF-FFC relationship, delegitimise the militia by designating a terrorist entity and to support the SAF in order to save Sudan from state collapse. The analysts also called upon to Sudanese civilians to continue the documentation of Janjaweed crimes and advocate for the militia to be declared terrorist entity. However, there were converging views over whether the army should be supported or whether there should be a third-way that is neither pro-RSF or pro-army.

Section 1: Developments

Section 1 covers key developments of the Janjaweed rebellion. Following a summary of the militia’s territorial gains in 2023, the humanitarian impact of the rebellion will be explored.

1.1 The Janjaweed’s territorial gains

In the final days of 2023, the RSF militia seized control of Al-Jazeera state, having already captured four of the Darfur region’s five state capitals and most of Khartoum state since the Janjaweed rebellion began on 15 April 2023. The tri-city state of Khartoum remains contested although the RSF has taken strategic locations and SAF bases.

1.1.1 Khartoum

The RSF reportedly controls most of Khartoum. The homes of citizens are being forcibly occupied, with 3.5 million Khartoum residents displaced, as the RSF seeks to add to its list of SAF bases seized.

April – present: Since the start of the war on 15 April, RSF troops have been deployed across the neighbourhoods of the cities of Khartoum state: Khartoum, Khartoum North (Bahri) and Omdorman. The RSF have evicted citizens and occupied their homes to use as operational bases, and reportedly outnumber Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) troops in Khartoum.

30 May: The RSF overtook the Strategic Corps SAF base in Khartoum.

8 June: The RSF overtook military weapons factories (al-Yarmouk Complex) in Khartoum.

July: 1.7 million Khartoum residents were displaced and remaining residents said the RSF had forced them to evacuate as the militia aims to turn the state into a fully militarised zone.

26 June: The RSF seized the Central Reserve Police HQ in Khartoum, which cut off a SAF supply line to the army corps in Al-Shajara, east Khartoum.

October: The RSF added Al-Ailafoon suburb east of Khartoum to the list of neighbourhoods under its control east of the Nile. As the militia concentrates efforts towards SAF bases in Khartoum, it now controls large swathes within the tri-city state.

20 November: RSF take control of Jabal Awliyah, south of Khartoum which gives the militia several strategic advantages including: closing off SAF reinforcements for the besieged Armored Corps in southern Khartoum, offering the RSF an alternative link between Khartoum and Omdorman, and gaining SAF’s air defence base.

December: The RSF is now reported to control most of Khartoum, where the number of displaced has rose to 3.5 million.

1.1.2 Al-Jazirah State / Wad Madani

The RSF took control of Al-Jazeera state and immediately advanced south to the White Nile state and Sennar, with rumours that the militia will go east to Al-Gadarif.

18 December: the RSF captured a SAF base in Wad Madani, the capital of Al-Jazeera State neighbouring Khartoum. 250,000-300,000 were displaced, many of whom had already been displaced from Khartoum.

1.1.3 Darfur

The RSF have captured all capitals of Darfur’s five states with the exception of Al-Fashir in North Darfur, a city of refuge for Darfur’s internally displaced since the war began, which the RSF is trying to seize.

23 April: Kabkabiya in North Darfur falls to the RSF.

4 June: RSF capture Kutum in North, Darfur.

22 June: RSF capture Al-Geneina in West Darfur, a strategic location that borders Chad and enables the recruitment of fighters from Chad, Niger and Mali. An ongoing ethnic cleansing campaign in Al-Gineina has targeted Masalit and non-Arab tribes across Darfur and has killed around 10,000 according to a Masalit tribal leader.

31 August: RSF capture Zalingei in Central Darfur after SAF flees its last held garrison.

26 October: RSF capture last SAF holdout in Nyala, South Darfur.

22 November: El-Daein, the capital of East Darfur, falls to the RSF.

1.1.4 Kordofan

The RSF has captured SAF territory in West Kordofan but North Kordofan remains contested.

September: Clashes ongoing in Umm Ruwabah and Al-Obeid in North Kordofan after the RSF temporarily control the latter.

31 October: RSF tries to seize oil-rich West Kordofan, claiming it has taken Balila airport and the main oilfield.

27 November: RSF captures SAF garrison in al-Mojlad, West Kordofan.

1.2 Impacts of the Janjaweed rebellion

Even by global standards, the Janjaweed rebellion has had a devastating impact on Sudan which faces the worst displacement crisis in the world. While the country was already grappling with an economic and food crisis before the war, the rebellion has had a comparatively worse economic impact on Sudan than other war-torn states, and the country is projected to face famine-like conditions by May 2024 amid the Janjaweed’s looting of food supplies.

1.2.1 Economic crisis

War has had a worse impact on Sudan’s economy in comparison to other war-torn states. Sudan’s economy is expected to shrink by 12% in the first year of war as state capacity is eroded, economic production halted and infrastructure is destroyed. By comparison, war shrunk Yemen and Syria’s economies on average by 5% per year (UN OCHA).

1.2.2 Health crisis

As infectious diseases such as cholera, measles, malaria and dengue spread across Sudan, over 70% of health facilities are not functional (UNICEF), with 65% of the population unable to access healthcare facilities (UN OCHA). The number of suspected cholera cases continues to increase and reached 7,725 cases as of 15 December, having increased by 136% over the past month (UN OCHA)

1.2.3 Food crisis: the prospect of famine

The RSF are reportedly looting food supplies as the UN Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) warns that famine-like conditions and death by starvation is expected by May 2024 unless Sudan’s food crisis is mitigated (Reuters). Currently, 20.3 million Sudanese are facing crisis levels of food insecurity as per the UN’s World Food Programme.

1.2.4 Casualties: Sudan’s displacement crisis

More than 10.7 million people have been displaced inside and outside Sudan, making Sudan the country with the largest number of displaced people and the largest child displacement crisis in the world (UN OCHA). An estimated 12,000 have been killed (UN) according to official figures but this likely to be higher because agencies that record deaths are unable to work due to the war and also the deaths due to lack of urgent healthcare.

Section 2: Analysis

Section 2 covers analysis of the Janjaweed’s rebellion with regards to its impact both inside and outside Sudan. Inside Sudan, the militia’s violence has consistent themes: indiscriminate killing, the occupation of citizen homes and looting. However, this report will focus on the militia’s use of rape as a weapon of war and its genocidal campaigns against Sudanese communities outside of its ethnic base. Nonetheless, it is not only Sudanese people that the militia is a danger to. Sudanese analysts also pointed out how the RSF – an ethnic mercenary militia that does not acknowledge state borders – is a regional threat, thus making it in the international interest to defeat the militia.

2.1 Themes of the Janjaweed’s rebellion

Alongside the militia’s well-documented occupation of citizen homes and looting, the Janjaweed are also known for using rape as a weapon of war, with its militants openly claiming that doing so is their “right”. In addition, the RSF is a genocidal militia that targets Sudan’s non-Arab and Arab communities alike. Whereas the militia has long been known for its ethnic cleansing campaigns against the former, the start of the rebellion has seen a rise in its targeting of northern Sudanese Arab communities, with its supporters framing calls for the extermination of such communities as an anti-colonial endeavour.

2.1.1 Rape as a weapon of war

The UN expressed alarm at the widespread use of rape by the RSF, with women and girls held in slave-like conditions in RSF-held areas (UN). In a message addressed to all Sudanese, an RSF field commander with a social media presence named Mohammed Al-Fatih openly recorded himself saying that rape is the “right” of RSF militants. Another RSF militant, Gad Elkarim, tweeted that rape is their right in areas they enter given their physical distance from their own women. Collecting accurate data for rape is difficult given poor connections, difficulties tracking survivors and fear of reprisals hindering survivors from speaking out (Radio Dabanga). However, of the recorded rape cases, 70% have been attributed to men in RSF uniforms (UN).

2.1.2 RSF’s genocidal and ethnic cleansing campaign

RSF’s core ethnic base of Darfur’s nomadic Arab tribes such as the Rizeigat and Ta’aishah (Ayin Network). RSF militants self-identify as the ‘Sons of the Desert’ and disseminate propaganda claiming their superiority over what they label as the “Zurga” and “Jallaba”.

2.1.2.1 The RSF’s targeting of non-Arab Sudanese

For the RSF, the “Zurga” (blacks) are Sudan’s non-Arab tribes, who they also call ‘slaves’ or other derogatory anti-black terms. The RSF is the formalisation of Janjaweed militias accused of mass killings, rapes and other atrocities against Darfur’s African communities (AP) who were radicalised upon the notion that the latter seek to eliminate Darfur’s Arab population (Humanity United). During the war, the RSF’s “genocidal intent [became] much more explicit” as per Confluence Advisory think-tank founding director Kholood Khair (The Economist) as they led an ethnic cleansing campaign targeting Darfur’s Masalit and other non-Arab communities which has killed around 10,000 according to a Masalit tribal leader and displaced tens of thousands.

Indeed, Reuters’ investigation of the RSF’s genocide in Al-Gineina in western Darfur – How Arab fighters carried out a rolling ethnic massacre in Sudan – reported on over seven weeks of attacks on non-Arab groups by the militia that turned the city into “swamps of blood”. Several hallmarks of genocide were reported, including:

Interrogating victims to ascertain their ethnicity before execution.
A focus on killing men and boys “seen as potential fighters”
Targeting prominent tribal figures and areas.

Furthermore, videos at the time of the massacre emerged of a Janjaweed militant explicitly stating that Al-Gineina would no longer be the land of the Masalit, but rather the lands of the Arabs. In addition, children from the RSF’s tribal base appeared taunting those who had crossed the border into Chad in order to escape the ethnic cleansing campaign.

2.1.2.2 The RSF’s targeting of northern Sudanese Arabs

The Jallaba, or the Sons of the River, are northern Sudan’s riverine tribes – which include the Ja’alin, Shawyaga, Dangala and Mahas. According to RSF supporters, the northern tribes have unjustly ruled the Sudanese state established in 1956 and are therefore worthy of collective punishment. Destroying the ’56 state’ is a central part of RSF propaganda, alongside destroying the ‘Jalaba state’. Based on the notion that the British empowered northern Sudanese, they are deemed “slaves of colonialism” according to Issa Musa Himedan, a pro-RSF influencer who rose to prominence following the 2018 revolution. As such, RSF supporters frame the militia’s aim to destroy the ’56 state’ as an anti-colonial endeavour. According to RSF propaganda, this also provides moral reasoning for the targeting and collective punishment of northern Sudanese “Jallaba”.

For example, a popular RSF mouthpiece Alrabea Abdelmoneim called for the targeting of northern Sudan’s riverine Arab tribes. Abdelmoneim holds considerable influence among RSF militants, and has been a guest on regional Arab news stations. He has interviewed the RSF’s deputy-commander Abdulrahim Dagalo and his orders to kill West Darfur governor Khamis Abakar were implemented on the same day. In addition, an RSF militant called for the outright extermination of northern Sudanese, saying the country will only be ruled by the tribes that dominate the RSF’s rank-and-file. In both aforementioned clips, there is a particular romanticising of RSF militants entering the city of Shendi in Sudan’s northern River Nile state, which is the center of the Ja’alin tribe. Such threats are ominous if taking into account Sudanese history. Towards the end of the 19th century, the army of the Mahdist state, comprised mostly of the same Darfur Arab tribes which today dominated the RSF, killed thousands of Ja’alin in an event known as the Metemmeh Massacre. During this incident, women jumped into the Nile out of fear of being raped by the Mahdists army. This draws parallels to the present day, whereby women in locations that the RSF have entered are asking for religious edicts to permit suicide due to the fear of being raped by RSF militants.

2.2 The international interest in defeating the Janjaweed rebellion

Despite the “already very high” humanitarian cost of the Janjaweed rebellion, international actors dither and prevaricate until it is too late, according to Abdelwahhab El-Effendi. Indeed, as indicated by the legitimacy given to RSF commander Himedti from his tour of six African states on an UAE royal plane, there are question marks over whether the international community even has a pre-existing interest in weakening the RSF. Nonetheless, Sudanese analysts have outlined why it is in the international interest to help defeat the Janjaweed rebellion and disband the militia, with particular emphasis on its lack of interest in governance, the regional threat that the cross-border ethnic mercenary militia poses to the Sahel and East Africa, alongside how terrorist groups in the region will be lured in by the flow of weapons.

2.2.1 Does the international community have an interest in weakening the RSF?

We have not “in practice” seen that the international community has a pre-existing interest in weakening the RSF, argues Kholood Khair, citing Himedti’s recent tour which “shows that money talks and many are willing to listen”. Thus, Khair suggests that “there is a worry that countries would learn to live with a dominant RSF in Sudan as a new normal,” with SAF’s “baggage” – such as supporting rebel groups of its neighbours and the Islamist’s disdain of the West - now possibly working against them.

2.2.2 The regional danger of the Janjaweed

Given that the Janjaweed is an ethnic mercenary militia the operates across borders, Sudanese analysts outlined how the militia is a regional threat. Kholood Khair warned that “the region may be biting off more than it can chew because the RSF have bigger ambitions than dominating only Sudan,” given that they are a transitional organisation as reflected in Himedti’s pre-war visits. “The international community must understand that the Janjaweed is not a threat to the state of Sudan only but the whole region,” argues Yasir Zaidan, noting that the RSF is an ethnic mercenary militia that is recruiting fighters from Chad, Niger, Libya and Yemen. “Such a mercenary group that doesn’t acknowledge state borders is a threat to all of Sudan’s neighboring states,” Zaidan said.

Indeed, Africa Intelligence reported that RSF were deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR) to support the Russian mercenary paramilitary Wagner Group in controlling the CAR’s northern border – a rear base for Chadian Arab rebel groups which western diplomats fear will destabilise Chad. As a result, Abbas added that “it is critical for the Janjaweed to be defeated for not only Sudan, but also for the wider Sahel region because [the Janjaweed rebellion] is a cross-border project,” adding that its failure in Sudan will make it less likely to succeed in other Sahel countries.

The RSF’s lack of trustworthiness as an ally is also a cause for concern, as indicated by the rebellion that is pushing Sudan to the verge of state collapse. “Above all,” argues Kholood Khair, “[RSF commander Himedti] has shown that he can turn on his friends and that should be the biggest lesson of all”. Moreover, the existence of the Janjaweed alone is argued to be a threat to regional peace, with Yasir Zaidan citing the militia’s ongoing committing of human atrocities and ethnic cleansing, which the “international community has a moral responsibility to address”.

2.2.3 The Janjaweed’s lack of interest in governing

Given that the Janjaweed has no interest in governing, “there is no good scenario” should it win the war argues Reem Abbas, who projects “more refugees, more need for humanitarian aid and major risk of spill-overs” in the event of a Janjaweed victory.

“The Janjaweed cannot exist in a normal state, and for them to take over completely and control parts of Sudan, they will not only massacre entire communities but they will also compromise all state institutions as well as the identity of the state,” Abbas said. She warns that a Janjaweed victory will leave Sudan a country where the militia “simply uses force on a daily basis to ensure that certain communities succumb [and] continues using communities as human shields because they have to have populations in their areas of control to further their recruitment and for other reasons.”

Thus, Abbas adds, the Janjaweed will go for a scenario similar to the Democratic Republic of Congo whereby the rebelling militia “only invests in controlling locations of wealth (gold-mines, ports etc.) and leaves the rest of the country for other militias”. Such a situation is dangerous for the International community “because it means more refugees, more need for humanitarian aid and major risk of spill-overs”, notes Abbas.

2.2.4 The Janjaweed invite terrorist actors into Sudan

Despite the RSF’s propaganda framing its war as one against Islamist terrorism, the militia’s rebellion actually heightens the risk of transnational terrorism in the Sahel and East Africa, argues Yasir Zaidan. Not only is “the UAE’s supply of arms to the Janjaweed increasing the militia’s ability to commit more genocidal campaigns against the Sudanese people,” but the flow of arms to the Janjaweed also invites terrorist actors from the Sahel and East Africa to infiltrate into Sudan’s conflict, Zaidan added.

Section 3: Challenges

Sudanese analysts also outlined ways that the international community can help to defeat the militia and end the war in section 4.1, but first we must examine the challenges facing such an objective, namely: the weakness of the army and doubts about a Sudanese civilian-led initiative to stop the war.

3.1 The weaknesses of the army

Sudanese analysts attributed the army’s failure to protect Sudan from the Janjaweed rebellion to several reasons. While the Janjaweed went from strength to strength, the army as an institution was weakened during and after the regime of former president Omar Al-Bashir. As a result, by the time the rebellion began, the army was lacking ground troops while the RSF’s steadily rose from 30,000 to 120,000. The Janjaweed had also been accumulating resources and weapons through its relationships with the UAE, while the army was unable to enhance its international ties. In addition, analysts identified tactical and strategic shortcomings on the army’s part, particularly a failure to make usage of its aerial advantage.

3.1.1 How the army was weakened during Islamist rule and the transitional period

Sudan’s military has been “severely weakened” in the latter years of Omar al-Bashir’s rule, said Dr. Abdelwahab El-Affendi. While the last years of Al-Bashir’s regime saw a deterioration in all government agencies, the army witnessed a heavier decline as the former president sought to weaken its ability to remove him from power, argues Yasir Zaidan. Indeed, Zaidan adds that the RSF / Janjaweed was created and weaponised to counter any moves by the military or Al-Bashir’s Islamist rivals to remove him.

The strengthening of the RSF at the army’s expense persisted into the transitional period following Al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019 noted both aforementioned analysts. El-Affendi said that transitional leaders mistrusted the military and thus began to rely on the RSF and increase its support. As the RSF grew stronger, noted Zaidan, “the military became more engaged in the political scene of the transition, and the army leadership failed to see the threat of such a growing paramilitary force that fostered political and economic ties with regional foreign actors independently”.

Thus, in a shell, “the army’s failure to protect the state resulted from years of deterioration that began with Bashir and continued after his removal,” adds Zaidan. This has resulted in the army’s failure to protect Sudan from the Janjaweed rebellion due to a lack of ground troops and resources.

3.1.2 The army lacks ground troops and a capable infantry

“Without an infantry it is very difficult to win a ground operation” said Kholood Khair, further noting that SAF “has never trained a fully capable infantry and has, almost from its inception, relied on outsourcing its infantry divisions to militias and paramilitary groups, including previously the RSF”. Reem Abbas also noted the army’s lack of ground troops, with their dependence on the RSF resulting in SAF not recruiting. Another obstacle for the army highlighted by El-Affendi was that hundreds of the army’s most experienced offers were retired by the time the war began.

By contrast, the RSF have been steadily recruiting ground troops. Abdelwahab El-Effendi provided some figures for context: by the time the war erupted in April 2023, the number of RSF militants rose from around 30,000 to 120,000, it controlled the presidential palace, TV and Radio building and most key establishments in the capital, alongside having a presence in every state. While the RSF’s ground troops increased at a faster rate than the army, so did its accumulation of resources and weapons. These advantages can be attributed to the RSF’s ability to foster international ties while SAF has not been able to.

3.1.3 The RSF’s ties to the UAE

The militia’s relationship with the UAE is a key factor behind its advantage of resources and diplomatic ties over the army. Al-Effendi attributes the militia’s accelerated accumulation of resources and weapons to its participation in Yemen and the Janjaweed being allowed to control of the most lucrative mines. Indeed, this fostered the Janjaweed’s relationship with the UAE, who Yasir Zaidan said are supplying arms to the Janjajweed, supporting the militia in their military offensives against the Sudanese people and increasing its ability to commit more genocidal campaigns against the Sudanese people.

Not only did the Janjaweed fight alongside the UAE in Yemen, but an indicator of the close security ties between the RSF and UAE are reports that the younger brother of RSF commander Himedti, Gony Hamdan Dagalo, oversaw the selection and training of 1000 RSF troops to work for the UAE army, mostly from the Dagalo family. In addition, the milita’s associated Al-Junaid Gold and Minerals Company, owned by its deputy commander and another one of Himedti’s brothers - Abdulrahim Hamdan Dagalo - is said to control all gold mines in Darfur including the lucrative Jabal Amer mine estimated to hold 17% of Sudan’s gold reserves. With the militia dominance of Sudan’s gold trade, it is “almost exclusively sold” to the UAE. Given that trading in gold accounts for nearly one-fifth of the UAE’s GDP, there is a relationship of mutual interest between the genocidal militia and the wealthy Gulf state.

Thus, according to a New York Times report citing a dozen current and former officials from the US, Europe and several African countries, “the UAE is running an elaborate covert operation to back [the RSF]” with powerful weapons and drones and treating injured fighters. The New York Times subsequently citied a report by UN investigators which “offers new detail about how the [UAE] has been smuggling powerful weapons to [the RSF], through Chad since last summer — armed drones, howitzers and antiaircraft missiles, sent via secretive cargo flights and desert smuggling routes,” with the supplies said to have boosted the Janjaweed to a succession of victories that altered the course of the war.

Indeed, at the end of 2023, it was on a UAE royal plane that Himedti embarked on a tour of African nations, visiting: Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, South Africa and Rwanda. As part a strategy analysts see as likely linked to the UAE, the RSF commander was legitimised after being “welcomed with the attributes of a head of state” said Clement Deshayes, a Sudan specialist at Sorbonne University in Paris.

Thus, according to Kholood Khair: “Himedti’s recent tour shows that money talks, and that many are willing to listen” culminating in “a worry that countries would learn to live with a dominant RSF in Sudan as a new normal”. However, the RSF’s international support does not make their victory a foregone conclusion, suggests Khair, who said that “even if [the RSF] take Port Sudan [where the army is now based], they will have many opponents, some armed, which would keep the war going”.

Nonetheless, the army leadership is “complicit” with both the Janjaweed and its UAE-backers, according to Reem Abbas, who noted that [SAF commander-in-chief] Abdulfattah al-Burhan, and others, “lent expertise to the Yemen war so this level of connection means that the army's leadership could be compromised”.

3.1.4 SAF’s international isolation

In stark contrast to the RSF, the army lacks resources and strong foreign alliances. El-Affendi stated that, at the start of the war, the army was “starved” of resources as it was “suspected by key neighbours and international actors, and thus was unable to receive support or even paid for supplies”. Kholood Khair attributes the hesitance of states such as Turkey, Qatar and Egypt to support the army in the same way that the UAE supports the RSF to the “reality” that the army is “too internally incoherent, fractured and not combat ready to be able to take on the RSF and its military weaponry, superior infantry and international political and financial support”. Moreover, Khair raised the prospect of the army’s “baggage” in the region – supporting rebel groups of its neighbours and the Islamists’ disdain of the West – working against them. Thus, Khair adds, “the army is too weak and lacks the international support the RSF has and so looks unlikely to be able to claim a military victory”.

3.1.5 The army’s tactics

The army’s tactics and strategy for the war also came under question. Kholood Khair said that, “for reasons unknown – [the army has] not fully utilised its aerial advantage”, adding that “one might expect SAF to bomb the Nyala airport runway to stop reported shipments of weaponry arriving [but] instead we’ve seen SAF bomb Nyala town and killing and injuring civilians.”.

In addition, Reem Abbas suggests there has been been inadequate consideration for “the very clear social dynamics that make this a rebellion supported by certain groups”. Noting that the RSF sections in eastern and central Sudan handed over sites to SAF, Abbas said: “the fact that the RSF was able to return to its organic structure meant that they were able to invest on tribal loyalties while SAF had to continue fighting with a fragmented army.”

3.2: Doubts about the FFC initiative to end the war

The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition that selected the civilian component of Sudan’s transitional government between 2019 and 2021 claim they are firmly committed to negotiating an attempt to end the war. Under their new moniker Taqadum (Progress), they recently signed an agreement in Addis Ababa with RSF commander Himedti to achieve this. However, the FFC’s initiative faces several challenges identified by analysts. Firstly, the Taqadum-RSF agreement is considered to alienate the army. Secondly, the failure of FFC leaders to condemn the RSF’s atrocities has made it lose Sudanese trust, culminating in the coalition being viewed as the “political arm of the Janjaweed”, a view that is lent further credence by statements made by Taqadum officials absolving the RSF of blame for historical crimes against the Sudanese people. In addition, the FFC are blamed for the shaping the international community’s misunderstanding of the conflict by obscuring the reality of the Janjaweed’s plot to take over Sudan.

3.2.1 Taqadum-RSF declaration likely to alienate SAF from peace talks

Kholood Khair suggests that the Taqadum-RSF Addis Ababa agreement cannot work. Firstly, Khair argues that RSF commander Himedti is not interested in ending the war, while the Taqadum / FFC coalition “went beyond its stated aims for the meeting which were to press for an end to the war and for the protection of civilians but instead went ahead with an unsanctioned declaration which has only served to further alienate [SAF commander Abdulfattah] Al-Burhan from joining the talks in Addis”. Khair adds that it is unlikely that Al-Burhan will attend a meeting with Himedti planned for the January 2024 as “his very survival as head of SAF relies on his eschewing of a direct meeting and agreement to end the war”. Further noting that Al-Burhan’s latest speech was “explicit in saying he will not be signing an agreement with the RSF,” Khair concluded that the Taqadum-RSF meeting was “a big gamble” that “seems to have backfired in terms of gaming public support but worked exactly as perhaps intended by alienating SAF from upcoming talks”.

3.2.2 The FFC’s failure to condemn the RSF

While the Janjaweed’s conduct in areas they control was “pure savagery,” Al-Effendi said that “almost all key FFC leaders have not voiced a word of criticism” against the militia despite its atrocities – including ransacking their own homes in Khartoum. Thus, in the absence of criticism of the RSF from FFC leaders despite being personally targeted, Al-Effendi questioned how FFC leaders can “tell the militia to disband and give up the power it has accumulated…if [they] cannot defend themselves against these unjust assaults while they are outside the country, how can they tell the militia to disband and give up the power it has accumulated?”.

3.2.3 The FFC lost public trust

Zaidan also noted how the FFC “lost the public’s trust” in the wake of the war as they “failed to stand with the people of Sudan, who suffered from mass murder, rape, and destruction at the hand of the RSF”. Zaidan added that the FFC’s political and media campaign shows their commitment to maintaining the RSF institution and leadership to maintain their position in Sudan’s political landscape. For Zaidan, this begs questions about the FFC’s ties with foreign actors, such as the UAE, “that are supporting the RSF in their military offensives against the Sudanese people”.

3.2.4 The FFC “the political arm of the Janjaweed”

Similarly, Abbas suggests that the “FFC is the political arm of the RSF and this partnership has been in the making since 2019”. Abbas explained how the FFC-RSF is one of mutual convenience: “Himedti wanted the FFC to do some damage control for him after the sit-in massacre and the FFC saw this as an opportunity to strengthen their position as opposed to the military institution”. Thus, Abbas adds, “the FFC does not [fully] believe in civil work, which is why they are interested in having guns to support their rule”.

3.2.5 Is Taqadum whitewashing the RSF?

The view that Taqadum is whitewashing the RSF was lent further credence in the aftermath of statements given by the Taqadum spokesperson, Rasha Awad, after the Addis Ababa agreement. Awad, the editor of “independent” Sudanese newspaper Al-Taghyeer, told Al-Sharq that the Janjaweed had not committed crimes in Khartoum despite having been in the capital for ten years. It is worth noting that, over the past ten years, Awad herself was an outspoken critic of the Janjaweed who had personally reported on their crimes across Sudan, as evidenced by screenshots from her Facebook page.

3.2.6 FFC blamed for the international community’s slow response to the war in Sudan

Yasir Zaidan attributes the international community’s “confused and discouraging” response to the war in Sudan to fundamental misunderstandings of the conflict shaped by the FFC and Volker Perthes, the former chief of the UN Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). Zaidan suggests that the Perthes and the FFC obscured the reality of the the RSF’s major plot to take over the Sudanese state by portraying the war as a conflict between two generals – SAF commander-in-chief Abdulfattah Al-Burhan and RSF commander Himedti. “In fact, it was the FFC’s strategy to use the balance of power between [SAF and the RSF] for their own political gain after they realised that they could not rule the country without breaking the military camp,” added Zaidan, before calling for the West to “rethink its apprehension of Sudan’s internal dynamics and understand the realities without using the FFC lenses”.

Section 4: Solutions

Section 4 outlines policy solutions for ending the Janjaweed rebellion and saving Sudan directed towards both the international community and Sudanese civilians.

4.1 How can the international community help defeat the Janjaweed?

Sudanese analysts propose various ways that the international community can help defeat the Janjaweed rebellion and disband the militia. Alongside calls for pressure on the militia’s international (UAE) and domestic (FFC) partners to stop dealing with the Janjaweed, Sudanese analysts also suggest the international community designates the Janjaweed a terrorist organisation, which would mean abandoning the “both sides” framing of the conflict. Finally, Sudanese analysts suggest that Sudanese state institutions should be supported, including the army, to save Sudan from state failure caused by the Janjaweed rebellion.

4.1.1 Obstacles to dissolving the Janjaweed

Before exploring policies that can be implemented by the international community to defeat the Janjaweed, obstacles to doing so were outlined by Kholood Khair. “Dissolving the RSF is difficult given how strong they are and that they also operate outside of Sudan’s borders,” notes Khair, who also highlighted the lack of a unified international community position on the RSF, meaning that “if they become the de-facto power, there are western countries, especially in the EU, that will deal with them” alongside the RSF “demonstrating that they have friends in the regions who would embrace them”.

4.1.2 Restrict financing

Nonetheless, Khair also stated that the RSF are a “threat to the political and economic interests of others in the region and the gulf [who] may support some moves to halt the RSF’s ascendancy”. Thus, “in the end, it will come down to money,” argues Khair. “If the RSF’s money supply dries up so will its arms supply. That’s what the sanctions are for,” she said. However, “without countries where RSF funds are complying with sanctions, like the UAE, sanctions will continue to have a symbolic role only,” Khair added.

4.1.3 Pressure the UAE to stop supporting the Janjaweed

Calling for western governments and the international community “to do more than just sanctioning the RSF,” Yasir Zaidan calls for them to put pressure on the UAE to stop arming the Janjaweed and providing them with financial havens. Zaidan also calls for questioning of the FFC’s ties with the UAE, adding that the FFC’s political and media campaign during the war “shows their commitment to maintaining the RSF institution and leadership to maintain their position in Sudan’s political landscape”.

4.1.4 Pressure the FFC to stop supporting the Janjaweed

If the international community wants to help dissolve the Janjaweed militia, Sudanese analysts suggest that the international community pressure the FFC to achieve this aim, alongside re-thinking its relationship with the civilian coalition now widely viewed as the Janjaweed’s civilian base.

Reem Abbas calls on the international community to push the FFC to stop dealing with the RSF, arguing that the FFC is the political arm of the Janjaweed. By breaking up the FFC-RSF partnership, Abbas suggests that it will be easier to defeat the Janjaweed on the ground given that their international and political clout would be removed.

Yasir Zaidan also suggests that the international community to avoid viewing Sudan’s internal dynamics and the reality of the war through FFC lenses. As part of the FFC’s strategy to use the balance of power between SAF and the RSF for their own political gain, Zaidan argues the coalition conveyed a narrative to the international community that the war in Sudan is one between two generals. According to Zaidan, this “obscures the reality of the RSF’s major plot to take over the Sudanese state”, thereby shaping the international community’s misunderstanding of the war and subsequent “confused and discouraging” response.

4.1.5 Delegitimising the militia: designate the Janjaweed as terrorists

Sudanese analysts called for the Janjaweed militia to be delegitimised by the international community, proposing designating the militia as a terrorist entity. Firstly, Reem Abbas called for the RSF to be declared a terrorist organisation. Similarly, Dr. Abdelwahhab El-Affendi said the RSF “should be declared a rogue actor like ISIS and other terrorist groups, and all countries must cease to deal with it or permit its leaders and adherents to enter or operate in their countries”. Furthermore, Yasir Zaidan said “the Janjaweed is the African Wagner” in calls for the West to apply tough and punitive countermeasures to the RSF similar to those applied to Wagner. El-Affendi added that the international community should delegitimise the Janjaweed militia by abandoning the common mantra of “two sides” of the conflict in Sudan, alongside discontinuing the portrayal of the militia as a key actor that should be accommodated in order to end the war.

4.1.6 International coalition to assist the Sudanese state including the military and RSF victims

Sudanese analysts proposed various ways that the international community can assist the Sudanese state on the verge of collapse from the Janjaweed militia. Yasir Zaidan called for the international community to “assist the remaining state institutions in Sudan, including the military, to prevent a new failed state scenario in a strategic region.”

Similarly, Abdelwahab El-Affendi called for the urgent establishment of an international coalition to provide full support for the Sudanese military and humanitarian aid for the victims of the RSF, after which an interim civilian government representing all political opinion in the country should organise free and fair elections within two years. El-Affendi added that, should sufficient support be given to the Sudanese military from the international community, the militia “could be weakened to such a level that it would no longer pose the danger it is now to the country and its people, and it would submit to the will of the people and the international community and demobilize.”

4.2 How can Sudanese civilians save Sudan from the Janjaweed?

Amid public distrust towards the civilian political coalition that governed during the transitional period (2019-2021), Sudanese analysts proposed ways that Sudanese civilians can help to defeat the Janjaweed rebellion and dissolve the militia. Alongside uniting in national resistance against the Janjaweed militia, Sudanese civilians are called on rally public opinion against it, as well as organising civil society initiatives and reconciliation groups.

4.2.1 United national resistance against the Janjaweed

Yasir Zaidan called upon Sudanese people to realise that the war is their war “against the enemy that is killing them, looting their houses, and destroying their institutions”. As noted by Dr. Abdelwahab El-Effendi, “the majority of Sudanese are fully supporting the military with some volunteering for military mobilisation”. Reem Abbas added that it is the “right” of Sudanese people to defend themselves against the “Janjaweed occupation” and while “it is quite unfortunate…communities have to work together to protect themselves.”

4.2.2 International advocacy

Reem Abbas suggests that Sudanese people to continue documenting Janjaweed violations and pushing for the RSF to be declared a terrorist organization. The war in Sudan is not only fought on the military front, but it also an economic war and a war of narratives in the media, notes Yasir Zaidan, who calls for Sudanese people to support their national army and rally the world against the Janjaweed and their backers.

4.2.3 Organising civil society

For Sudanese civilians to help dissolve the Janjaweed militia, Dr. Abdelwahab El-Effendi calls for the organisation of civil society initiatives and reconciliation groups all over the country, alongside preparing for the return of civilian politics and the forthcoming elections.

4.2.4 A grassroots third way that is neither pro-RSF nor pro-SAF

Noting that defeating the militia alone does not save Sudan “because then we’ll still be left with a military power,” Kholood Khair proposes – “first and foremost” - a “third way: not pro-RSF and not pro-SAF”. Amid the lack of civilian movements that are unaffiliated with the main belligerents of the war, or whose political objectives are not aligned to them, Khair recommends that Sudanese civilians start at the grassroots level rather than the elite level “which is prone to compromise with the generals”. To move the “third way” forward, Khair calls for building the networks within that grassroots level, with a focus on consensus and coalition building, alongside mechanisms to overcome disagreement. Khair concedes that this would take time, but cites Al-Burhan’s announcement that the army is not ready for an agreement to end the war, as well as his vow that it will either be the army of the RSF, to suggest that “we have a potentially long war on the cards”. Thus, Khair concludes that “our time should be spent strengthening civilian networks, not striking deals with warlords who have little intention to sue for peace”.