A mafia with a state: how the deep state in Sudan finances itself

Executive Summary

Stringing together information that is publicly available online, this investigation provides a glimpse into how the deep state in Sudan financed, and continues to finance itself.

Sudan’s economy is subject to a monopoly by Omar al-Bashir’s regime and its allies, as demonstrated by corrupt practices in lucrative and strategic sectors. This is reflected in:

Key positions in dominant companies being distributed on the basis of political connectivity.
Companies linked to the security apparatus or al-Bashir’s National Congress Party gaining unfair competitive advantages in their sector via tax exemptions or government tenders being granted in opaque procedures.

Our investigation into the deep state’s corruption also found that politically connected companies and businesspeople have spread their corruption globally, to states such as: China, the UAE, Kuwait, Egypt, Mauritania and Guinea.

Although progress has been made with regards to reforming government-owned companies to remove the deep state’s dominance, the transitional authorities face a tougher task in reforming private enterprises linked to the former regime and the deep state.

Introduction

Given that it represents a fifth of Sudanese tax revenue alone, we will begin by looking into the deep state’s interference in the telecommunications sector - which is the domain of Sudan’s security apparatus. After exploring the deep state’s security and economic interests into the sector, we will look into the three main companies - Zain, Sudatel and MTN-Sudan. The recent dismissal of Tarig Hamza Zain El Abdein as the CEO of Sudatel shows that Prime Minister Hamdok’s government is taking steps to mitigate this dominance. Nonetheless, the CEO of the Kuwaiti Zain is Lt. Gen Elfatih Erwa, whereas a key investor in MTN-Sudan is Zawaya Investments – which is run by Abdelbasit Hamza, the financial manager of Omar al-Bashir’s family.

In exploring the business activity of Zawaya Investment’s and its Larrycom subsidiary, we can gain a glimpse into business interests of Omar al-Bashir’s inner circle - with investments in industries ranging from telecommunications and construction, to vital natural resources such as oil, gold and gum arabic.

Following that, we will look at the Danfodio Group, which is run by the Islamist Dawaa Organisation, a group allied to Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP). Danfodio’s monopoly on Sudan’s transport and construction sectors demonstrates the financial muscle of the NCP, even if it is outlawed.

Returning to the security apparatus, we will explore their monopoly of the pharmaceutical and mining sectors. With regards to the latter, the Rapid Support Forces militia has presented itself as the dominant player.

In addition, government-owned companies such as Aryab and Giad represent a key source of deep state financing, with the latter falling under the control of the Ministry of Defence.

Finally, a measure of the deep state’s institutionalised corruption is that a civil society organisation that is working to recover the deep state’s looted funds, is allegedly led by a supporter of Omar al-Bashir.

Sudatel ‘s recently dismissed CEO Tarig Hamza Zain El Abdein and Omar al-Bashir

Telecommunications Sector

The deep state linked to Omar al-Bashir dominates Sudan’s telecommunications sector for strategic reasons. The three main telecommunications companies in Sudan are Zain, Sudatel and MTN-Sudan.

Zain is led by former Elfatih Erwa, a Leuitenant General. Sudatel’s CEO until the 25th October was Tarig Hamza Zain El Abdein - the director of the Popular Security Forces. One of MTN’s main investors is the Zawaya Group, led by Abdelbasit Hamza, the financial manager of Omar al-Bashir’s family.

It is worth noting that since Sudatel is majority government owned, the transitional civilian authorities have a scope to remove the deep-state’s influence in the company. However, it faces a formidable challenge in reforming and restructuring

Security interests

In a 2013 interview with al-Arabiya, a dissident Sudanese intelligence agent provided some insight into the security apparatus’ involvement in the telecommunications sector. Both the popular and regular security apparatus maintain a presence in the sector, with officers physically present in the telecommunications companies to eavesdrop, access subscribers’ data and carry out surveillance. Telecommunications companies can be forced to wire-tap, monitor and record phone conversations via their technical crews, facilitated by a judicial system which justifies the invasion of privacy under the guise of pursuing justice.

The securitisation of the telecommunications sector is reflected in two common practices (p.36). Firstly, that new employees are subject to security screenings. Secondly, that each company has a full team led by a security officer which enjoys privileges and exclusive powers to access information.

The telecommunications sector is also demonstrably politicised, as reflected in the strategic removal of services. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the June 3 massacre, Sudan was deprived of internet access for a month, in attempts to avoid the inevitable spread of footage on social media. In addition, it has been reported that there is a correlation between the timing of aerial raids and the loss of signal, “so that villagers cannot warn each other.”

Economic interests

Sudan’s telecommunications sector represents a crucial and highly lucrative source of income for the al-Bashir’s deep-state. In 2015, the revenue of the largest three telecom companies alone exceeded $1.8 billion (p.24). The deep-state pursues several financial strategies to finance its security apparatus.

Firstly, the tax rate on telecommunications is about 30% of the sale price, enabling the deep state to reap greater profits than the telecommunications companies themselves, as their operating costs exceed 50% of sale price. Indeed, 22% of Sudanese tax revenue comes from the telecommunications sector. (p.24-5).

The deep state also generates funding from various corrupt practices. To finance its foreign operations, the security apparatus allegedly runs a scam where it fakes numbers in order to disguise international phone calls as local phone calls. As international telecommunications companies pay for every incoming minute to Sudan in dollars, which exceeds the price paid locally in the weak Sudanese pound, the security apparatus actively defrauds telecommunications companies. (p.34).

Third, the security apparatus further eats into the telecommunications sector’s revenues via the creation of shell companies (p.31). In processes that are not competitive or transparent, these companies are then sub-contracted by telecommunications companies to provide operational support. Examples of such companies include Hawatif, Gasr El Lolo and Hadaf Company for Guards and Security. (p.31;36-37)

Finally, telecommunications companies are vital to the security apparatus due to their capacity to assist in money laundering (p.42-3). Not only do telecommunications companies provide cover to the deep states operations and sources of domestic and international financing, but they also assist in converting the deep states money into hard currency. In this scheme, telecommunication companies provide local currency liquidity to global money exchange businesses, who then accumulate and direct the security apparatus’ funds outside Sudan.

Zain Sudan

Such is the level of the deep states interference in the telecommunications sector, is that the Kuwaiti corporation Zain was forced to seek political influence in order to guarantee the success of its operations into Sudan.

Prior to 2008, Zain was embroiled in licensing dispute with the Sudan Telecommunications Company (also known as Sudatel), which was 26% government owned. Zain’s then-executive director Khalid Elmohtadi was also subjected to an arrest warrant. (p.55)

Since then, the CEO and Managing Director of Zain Sudan has remained Elfatih Erwa – the former security officer who was appointed al-Bashir’s National Security Advisor following the 1989 coup, before becoming the Defence Minister, and then Sudan’s leading diplomat to the UN.

A further demonstration of the necessity of deep state influence in the telecommunications sector are the presidential decrees that preceded Erwa’s appointment (p.41). On the same, Omar al-Bashir decreed Erwa’s return to the armed forces, having not served for almost 20 years, before being promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. Al-Bashir then issued another presidential decree on the same day retiring Erwa from the armed forces.

The impact of these decrees reflects Zain’s strategic choice in picking Erwa, given that the rank of Lieutenant General enables their Sudan CEO to access military privileges and connections for the rest of his life.

Elfatih Erwa, Zain Sudan’s CEO, stood behind Omar al-Bashir during his speech in El-Gezira in 2018.

Sudatel – Under the leadership of Tarig Hamza Zain El Abdein

Sudan Telecommunications Company, also known as Sudatel, is one of the companies that was removed from the US Treasury’s Sanctions List in 2017. Nonetheless, it has been historically connected to the security apparatus close to al-Bashir.

Until 25 October 2019, Sudatel’s CEO was Tarig Hamza Zain El Abdein.

Neither Zein El Abdein’s LinkedIn, nor his profile on Sudatel’s official website make mention of his position as the Director of Sudan’s Popular Security – a militia group allied to al-Bashir’s National Congress Party. In this video, he denies that he denies his links to the Popular Security forces, but admits that he possesses US citizenship.

The profile of Sudatel’s recently dismissed CEO makes no mention of his military experience.

In May 2019, Sudatel employees chanted for the departure of Zain El Abdein (1:10-1:30 of this video). In calls for his dismissal, it was reported that Sudatel employees cited his close relationship with Omar al-Bashir and alleged that he uses his position to spy on Sudanese people. In addition, employees protested that Zein El Abdein has transferred their salaries to Bank Al Mal (United Capital Bank), where he is the chairman. Employees also cited El Abdein’s leadership of the Popular Security militia group to say that they cannot work “under the killing of innocent people.”

Indeed, minutes were leaked of a 2018 meeting chaired by Omar al-Bashir, involving Zain El Abdein. The topic of discussion was the security apparatus’ negotiation strategy with the rebel group the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (Abdelaziz Al-Hilu faction). The meeting also involved Salah Gosh, the then-director of Sudan’s infamous National Intelligence and Security Services, among other senior members of the NCP.

The following are some excerpts from the meeting’s minutes, which highlight Zain El Abdein’s role in the deep state’s internal conflict strategy, inclination towards bribery, and Islamist leanings:

· “Concentration on money is important…we will find who can be lured by money. Our money is ready for buying…nobody can refuse money.”

· “It is easy to penetrate negotiation delegations because rebel movements chose their delegation members on tribal bases, not on qualification which means if you buy one person it means you have bought many others.”

· “If it is money we will share it with them and you can exchange gifts with the delegation… Provide them with a sense of security, we can reach our goal easily, it’s not difficult and money is at hand.”

· “There were leaders of Sudan Call [opposition movement] who were angry with the NCP and cursing, but when we filled their pockets with money they became the most loyal to the NCP.”

· “Al-Hilu and his group cannot be trusted…there are the hidden agendas of the churches, Jews and rogue organisations in the SPLM-controlled areas. They opened hospitals and university colleges in violation of our sovereignty. Basically they are outlaws; therefore, the priority is to liberate the land.”

· “We should not give Alhilu any space for political gains at the expense of the Islamic Movement…We must prepare for war if negotiations fail.”

Zein Al Abdein is not a stranger to bribery. Mauritania’s Freedom Media reported that he distributed $6 million in bribes towards to the presidential office of Guinea and to the son of the Mauritanian president. With Al Abideen said to be a US citizen, this would make him liable to prosecution under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Mauritanian writer Tarek Ould Brahim revealed the extent of Sudatel’s corruption in Mauritania, in setting up the Chinguitel telecommunications operator in Mauritania. Ould Brahim alleges that Chinguitel breaks Mauritania’s taxing laws by paying its employees in cash and refuses to reveal the extent of its profits in order to avoid paying the legal tax rate. It has also been alleged that Chinguitel is involved in terrorism financing in Mauritania.

Chinguitel’s operating license was gained via Expresso Telecom Group, the investment arm of Sudatel. Publicly registered in the UAE, Expresso’s directors are Tariq Hamza Zain El Abdein and Tariq Hamza Rahmatalla, who is Sudatel’s Vice President of International Operations. The pair, alongside the former head of Omar al-Bashir’s private office Taha Othman Al Hussein, were part of a tripartite committee who bribed an unnamed son of Mauritania’s president with $2.6 million, plus $400,000 disguised as “support to health centres.”

Expresso Telecom Group directors Tarig Hamza Zain El Abdein and Tarig Hamza Rahmatalla have allegedly bribed political figures in Mauritania and Guinea.

Omar al-Bashir’s neice Hind – Sudatel’s Chief Strategy Officer

There are also strong indications that the hiring of Sudatel’s Chief Strategy Officer was politically motivated – given her youth and family relations. On Sudatel’s 13-member executive management page, ‘Hind Mohamed Ahmed Hassan Ahmed’ is the only manager to lack a biography that provides some insight on her career background or business activities.

Hind Elbashir, Sudatel’s Chief Strategy Officer. No mention of her previous experience, and her real name is obscured.

However, a google search for “sudatel chief strategy officer hind” uncovered a November 2018 English language article in which she is named as ‘Hind Elbashir’. It is worth noting that Omar al-Bashir’s middle names are Hassan Ahmed.

In 2016, Sudanese newspaper Hurriyat revealed that Hind Elbashir was the “newly graduated head of Sudatel’s marketing department, [with] no qualifications and experience other than her closeness to the president.” Indeed, it has been previously reported that al-Bashir’s sister Zainab was appointed Sudatel’s public relations and media director.

A 2018 article reports on Sudatel Chief Strategy Officer Hind Elbashir by her real name

In a youtube video entitled “Sudanese citizen comments on Hind al-Bashir’s marriage - the president’s neice" – a woman claiming to be Hind Elbashir’s former colleague at Sudatel, claims that her job functions were given to Elbashir despite her possession of 16 years of experience. The unnamed woman further claims that Hind Elbashir was promoted to an administrative management position after only three years at Sudatel.

SUDATEL – previous ownership

In 2016, incidents at Sudatel five years previously were labelled ‘Corruption of the Century’ after it emerged that Sudatel’s shareholders expressed outrage that then-chairman Abdulaziz Othman Abdulaziz - an influential Islamist at Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party and senior security official - sold 25% of Sudatel’s shares in Expresso Telecom Group to Larrycom Investments. The sale decreased Sudatel’s assets by $119 million.

The ‘Corruption of the Century’ resulted in equity for Sudatel’s shareholders decreasing by $75 million and $89 million in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The losses were deliberately obscured in financial statements, with Sudatel’s annual reports placing the name and image of the financial director that had resigned before the report was submitted. Shareholders demanded to know who owned Larrycom.

The Dubai International Financial Centre’s public register shows that one of the directors of Expresso Telecom Group was Abdelbasit Hamza (until September 2012).

Investments made by Abdelbasit Hamza – the financial manager of Omar al-Bashir’s family

A lieutenant colonel in Sudan’s security services, Abdelbasit Hamza is Abdulaziz Othman Abdulaziz’ business partner and the financial manager of al-Bashir’s family (page 43).

US audiences were introduced to Hamza as far back as 1998, when the Wall Street Journal reported that he claimed to have overseen a road-construction project for an Osama bin Laden company during his exile in Khartoum in the 90s. Hamza – who was reported to build military factories for al-Bashir’s regime – was apparently rebuffed by Bin Laden after encouraging him to invest in an unnamed telephone company.

Hamza is also the chairman of the “suspicious” (page 22) Zawaya Investments company, which wholly owns Larrycom (written as ‘Lari Com’ in the Dubai International Financial Centre public register). Zawaya has investments in MTN, one of Sudan’s three main telecommunications providers.

A mark of Zawaya’s political connectivity is the way in which MTN-Sudan was awarded the tender of Sudan’s second mobile operator license, even though Abdulbasit Hamza’s Bashair group (P.22) was not ready to implement the project.

Zawaya’s new website, claims that the group has an “ethical philosophy.” Ironically, the way in which it obtained the MTN operating contract has been questioned.

The scope of the activities of Zawaya Investments (and its Larrycom subsidiary) highlight the strategic nature of the deep state business activity, and the financial interests of al-Bashir’s family.

Zawaya is involved in natural resources via RAM Energy, which is wholly owned by Larrycom, and was among the companies lifted from the US Treasury Department’s sanction list in 2017. Zawaya also partly owns Hammash Misr for Gold Mines – among the first in Egypt to explore gold.

In 2011, Hammash Misr was embroiled in a corruption scandal, after Egypt’s El-Shorouk Newspaper revealed that Egypt’s Attorney General was investigating he granting of Donqash gold mine to Matz Holding (partly owned by Zawaya, alongside Syrian and Israeli partners). It was alleged that the consortium attempted to bribe the Egyptian Mineral Resources Authority in order to extract and sell gold without the supervision of the Egyptian government.

In the construction industry, Zawaya owns the Nile Cement Company – also lifted from the US Treasury sanctions list in 2017 – as well as Zawaya Building Blocks. This further consolidates the deep-state’s monopoly of the construction sector, which is dominated by the Danfodio Group linked to the Islamic Dawaa Organisation and the Giad Industrial Group – which is controlled by the Sudanese Ministry of Defence.

Zawaya has also placed itself in a prime position to benefit from Khartoum’s modernisation. It owns Rotana Al Salam, Sudan’s first 5-star hotel and shopping mall, as well as Afra Mall, Sudan’s most prestigious shopping centre.

Following the Sudan Uprising, and Abdelbasit Hamza being among those of Omar al-Bashir’s inner circle to have been arrested, Zawaya’s official website is attempting to disguise its leadership. Whereas Abdelbasit Hamza is clearly list as the Zawaya Group chairman on the Zawaya Group’s 2010 website (see screenshot below)…

Zawaya’s old website - where its board of directors are clearly listed. We will look into CEO Ghada Abdelfattah Satti further on.

… Zawaya’s new website hides its owner. A reverse search of Zawaya’s apparent CEO & Founder ‘Daphnee Schohen’ is a stock photo.

A reverse image search of Zawaya’s apparent CEO & Founder Daphne Schohen turns out to be a generic stock photo.

Nonetheless, the scope of Zawaya’s Investments can be indicated by the CV (below) of its CEO - Ghada Abdelfattah Satti, also the CEO of Larrycom.

According to her CV, Ghada Abdelfattah Satti, also known as Ghada Abubakar, “established all the systems for the government relations” of MTN-Sudan, despite the political connections Abdelbaset Hamza.

Satti claims that Larrycom sold its stake in Expresso Telecoms Group back to Sudatel. Expresso is said to have operations in Senegal, Mauritania, Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria – which highlights how Omar al-Bashir’s security business network spans across Africa.

Ghada Satti - a “front” for Omar al-Bashir’s business interests

The CV of Ghada Satti, who also goes by Ghada Abubakar. Her professional experience is dominated by work for Abdelbasit Hamza.

According to Facebook group Kozat Al-Sudan – which focuses on the females linked to Omar al-Bashir’s regime - Satti is a business front for the corrupt interests of Omar al-Bashir, his brother Ali, Abbas and Abdullah, as well as the aforementioned Abdulaziz Othman, Abdulbasit Hamza, and another security official, Imadeddine Hussein – who was also a Sudatel director.

Although she generally keeps a low profile, Satti was thrust into the public spotlight as the Managing Director of Sudan’s Gulf Gum Arabic Company, after the Emirates News Agency announced that the UAE’s Hamriyah Free Zone Authority invested $15 million to establish a UAE-based plant to produce spray dried Arabic gum powder. Satti noted that Sudan is the largest producer of gum Arabic in the world.

The deal was controversial for several reasons. Firstly, gum Arabic is a unique Sudanese product. Despite no longer accounting for 80% of global gum Arabic production, Sudan remains world’s largest single producer. As a result, thousands of Sudanese are dependent on gum arabic.

Given Satti’s political connections, the deal has been marred in controversy. Firstly, Sudan is unable to maximise its profit potential from gum arabic because it is often sold raw. To refine a key natural resource abroad results in lost profits that could be spent domestically.

Secondly, the deal has been viewed as the deep state’s attempt to cover its financing by washing it as a Gulf investment. Not only would this enable the global export of Sudanese natural resources linked to al-Bashir’s family and the deep state to western markets, but by moving the factory abroad, the deep state’s business interests are insulated from the pursuit of corruption proceeds.

Ghada Abdelfattah Satti - the “front” for Omar al-Bashir’s business interests - signs a contract to produce Sudanese gum arabic powder in the UAE.

Danfodio

The Danfodio group is controlled by the Islamist Dawaa Organisation (p.18). Conservative estimates say that the company controls over 75% of Sudan’s construction and transport market through its companies, which include:

· Danfodio Contracting & Roads

· Taibah Engineering

· Danfodio Trading

· Danfodio Petrol Services

· The Center for Engineering and Technical Studies

· Jamda for Cars and Equipment

· Salka Transport

· The Industrial Gases Factor

· Al Kanar Pharmaceutical

In 2014, Danfodio was implicated in a corruption crisis involving Sudan’s then oil minister, Awad al-Jazz. The scandal reflect how private enterprises linked to Omar al-Bashir were contracted for costly, yet unnecessary, projects, from the public purse.

Now-defunct Sudanese newspaper Hurriyat – which specialised in exposing corruption cases and human rights abuses – revealed that 11 employees of the Chinese National Oil Company who were arrested by Chinese authorities over corruption charges, admitted that they bribed al-Jazz with an offer exceeding $20 million. From the proceeds, Al-Jazz allegedly contracted Danfodio’s Ibrahim Mousa to build a bridge in his hometown worth $7 million – despite the presence of a ferry service.

Indeed, there is evidence of Danfodio’s continued allegiance to the Islamist deep state. As Sudan embarked on the post-Bashir civil disobediences of May 28 and May 29, the Danfodio Group sent a letter to its employees, threatening them with being fired if they participate in the strike.

Danfodio threatens its employees with the sack if they participate in the civil disobedience of May 28-29.

The security apparatus’ monopoly in the pharmaceutical Industry

Sudan’s spy agency – the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) – has considerable investments in Sudan’s pharmaceutical industry, via the National Fund for the Development of Medical Services. A whistleblower revealed that the fund, owned by the armed forces, established “corrupt companies and factories” via money obtained from taxes.

In addition, the last Auditor General report (2015) to review the fund showed that it received 21 investments from the Industrial Development Bank, with the least amounting to over 41 billion Sudanese pounds.

The fund has played a role in creating a monopoly for ‘Alia Pharmacies’. As far back as 2011, residents of Khartoum questioned how Alia Pharmacies has 47 different stores, despite the law prohibiting the possession of more than two pharmacies. The fund is said to own the Alia group pharmacies, dispensaries and warehouses.

Pharmaceutical union leaders have complained that Alia’s political connections enable it to import medicines at cheaper prices, thereby selling at cheaper prices and driving their non-connected competition out of business. Alia’s constant access to cash also enhanced its monopoly, as other pharmacies faced liquidity issues.

Recently, former governor of Khartoum Abdulrahim Mohamed Hussein has been put under investigation for his connections to the Alia group. He was arrested alongside Omar al-Bashir, Abdelbasit Hamza and his brothers.

The National Fund for the Development of Medical Service also finances Afamed Medical Industries and the Wafrah Medicines Company. The latter was removed from the US Sanctions list in 2017.

Shortly before Omar al-Bashir’s eventual ouster, Sudanese parliamentarian Mahmoud Abdeljabbar called for an urgent investigation into the fund. Noting that the fund has not been audited since 2015, Abdeljabbar alleged that its many assets and large companies violate regulations. He asked the then-defence minister Awad Ibn Auf to clarify questions about the fund’s investment into the Al-Zahra IV drip factory. Despite its launch being personally inaugurated by al-Bashir in March 2018, by the time of the statement, it had yet to start its operations.

Mining Industries

According to the political analyst Salah Al-Doma, the “flesh and blood” of the Sudanese military still exists via the deep-state’s economic interests – such as the control of gold mines and the Giad Industrial Group.

Wajdi Saleh, a leading member of the Forces of Freedom of Change, has alleged that unnamed powerful individuals are seeking to annex companies such as the Giad Industrial Group and Aryab Mining to the Sudanese Ministry of Defence, so as to ensure that state funds do not depend on the Ministry of Finance.

The security apparatus linked to the deep-state pursues its business interest in the mining sector in various ways. According to the exploration director of the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company Naji Abdullah Mahmoud, revealed the presence of 424 mining companies owned by the deep-state security apparatus (armed forces, intelligence services, militias), as well as 76 associated “karta” companies, who own factories or labs that purchase left-over waste from initial gold excavation activities.

Naji Abdullah Mahmoud further alleged that geologists are prevented from entering mining areas unless they have a permit that is personal ratified by Himedti – the deputy chairman of Sudan’s ruling sovereign council and the commander of the Rapid Support Forces militia.

Himedti’s RSF controls the Jebel Amer mining zones, which are said to hold 17% of Sudan’s gold reserves (p.52), with his Al Juneid Company a dominant player in gold mining operations in Darfur and South Kordofan. In addition, the National Intelligence and Security Service is also present in gold mining, possessing El Sunut and El Ein El Zarga plants, among others. According to geologist Tajeldin Sayed Ahmed, further deep state financing via gold mining is reflected in National Congress Party loyalists being appointed to administrative and financial industrial functions.

GIAD and Aryab

Owned by the Sudanese government, Aryab is Sudan's largest gold producer, generating hundreds of millions of dollars a year. According to the exploration director of the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company Naji Abdullah Mahmoud, Aryab alone has the capacity solve Sudan’s economic problems.

Giad is one of the largest Sudanese manufacturing companies, with estimates that it is worth $2.2 billion. Previously governed by the National Intelligence and Security Services, as of 4 September 2019, it was reported the Giad now falls under the control of the Sudanese defence ministry. It is worth noting that under Sudan’s power-sharing agreement, the military handed over all Cabinet posts to civilians, with the exception of defence and interior ministries.

The Giad group and its subsidiaries were removed from the US Treasury sanctions list in 2017. In mining, Giad owns the Red Rock Mining Company, which Omar al-Bashir is said to have a stake in (p.61). Giad’s influence also extends to the telecoms sector, where its director general Al Amin Mohamed Ahmed is on Sudatel’s board of directors.

Giad companies removed from the US Treasury sanctions list in 2017.

Giad has a history of misusing public money. In 2011, it was revealed that the Ministry of Education had contracted Giad to provide school furniture. To benefit from the contract, Giad Motor’s then-director Mohammed Abdelaziz, alongside accomplices, set up a shell company in Dubai. After buying the furniture from a Chinese company at a price of $11 per unit, they sold the equipment to the Ministry of Education via the shell company at a price of $30 per unit.

In complaints about the slow pace of Sudan’s transitional authorities in countering the legacy of al-Bashir regime’s corruption, economic expert Ahmed Rajab pointed to Giad’s custom exemptions. In detailed Facebook post, a sub-group of the Sudanese Professionals Association highlighted how Giad is able to command a monopoly in Sudan’s transport market, and thereby finance the deep-state. In Sudan, customs duties exceed 239% of a car’s price if imported. However, Giad’s exemptions are calculated at less than 50% of the original price, a reduction of costs that enables Giad to dominate the market.

Zero Corruption?

To further complicate matters, a group that has taken the mantle in attempting to confiscate the deep state’s corruption money, has itself been linked to the deep state.

According to its founder Nader al-Obaid (also known as Nader al-Badawi), an organisation called Zero Corruption has filed 125 reports to Sudanese courts on corruption at regime-linked companies.

However, on September 22, well-known Sudanese journalist Moniem Suleiman tweeted: ”after a few days investigating Zero Corruption, I can say with confidence that Nader Al-Obeid and most of his family are [supporters of Omar al-Bashir’s regime].” Further alleging that al-Obeid falsified his doctorate, Suleiman request that al-Obaid sue him if his statement is incorrect.

Following the accusations, Sudan’s Altaghyeer newspaper reported that three co-founders of the organisation have resigned, with waves of activists turning against the group.

In response, al-Obaid has accused the former regime of fabricating these rumours in order to prevent his plan to recover their funds.